

THE CONCEPTION
OF
BUDDHIST NIRVĀṆA

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PREFACE.

The incentive to this work was given by Sir D. Ross, Director of the School of Oriental Studies in London, when I was asked by him to contribute for the Bulletin of the School a review of Professor L. de la Vallée Poussin's book upon Nirvāṇa. While considering some of the points there discussed I was led to reconsider the position of the Sautrāntika School and its supposed «denial» of Nirvāṇa. This school then disclosed itself as an intermediate step between Hinayāna and Mahāyāna, and its attitude could not be understood without clearly realizing the Central Conception of the latter. I have thus been further induced to elicit the Mahāyāna Conception of a Buddha and his Nirvāṇa. The contrast between Hinayāna and Mahāyāna then appeared as an occasional confirmation of the views and explanations of technical terms contained in my «Central Conception of Buddhism» (published by the Royal Asiatic Society, London 1924). The present work can be regarded as a sister volume to it and could have also borne the title of «The Central Conception of Mahāyāna».

I have appended a translation of the principal parts of those works of Nāgarjuna and Candrakīrti which are the foundation stone of Mahāyāna.

In the process of this work I derived great help from many valuable suggestions of my friend Prof. M. Tubbiansky to whom I here express my gratitude. The preparation of the Indexes of proper names and Sanscrit words is due to the selfdenying industry of Miss Alexandra Schneider to whom my deepest thanks are due.

In the reading of proofs I have been assisted by my aged mother. Since an Englishman has become a *rara avis* in this country, we both are alone responsible for all the imperfections of english style that may be found in this book.

In the transliteration of sanscrit words I have abstained from the use of diacritics for guttural *n* since its value is always clear without it.

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The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa.

I. PRELIMINARY

ALTHOUGH a hundred years have elapsed since the scientific study of Buddhism has been initiated in Europe, we are nevertheless still in the dark about the fundamental teachings of this religion and its philosophy. Certainly no other religion has proved so refractory to clear formulation. We are confronted with an intricate terminology about whose meaning a variety of interpretation is current and which is often declared to be untranslatable or incomprehensible. In despair some scholars were led to the conclusion that a religion or a philosophical system in India is not what it is in Europe, it is not a clear cut construction of consistent speculation. It is always vaguely indefinite, a display of dreamy thoughts about whose meaning their authors themselves are not quite sure.¹ In a recent work M. de la Vallée Poussin² has undertaken to reconsider the question about the meaning of the Buddhist ideal of Nirvāṇa, and he warns us from the outset that we have not to expect something very illuminating from Indian sources.³ Formerly, he confesses, the idea of Nirvāṇa seemed to him vague enough, but recently he has completely changed his opinion upon this subject, and thinks that even the hazy speculations which he was trying to disentangle are but later additions, that at the beginning Nirvāṇa

¹ The late professor G. Bühler gathered from a long intercourse with Indian pandits in their own country a quite different impression. He used to repeat to his pupils when perplexed by some difficult texts, «was ein Brahmane gemacht hat, das muss heraus!», for very often it is something simple and clear, but expressed in a technical scientific terminology.

² Etudes sur l'histoire des Religions, 5. Nirvāṇa par Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Paris, 1925.

³ Op. cit., p. XI—XII.

meant a simple faith in Soul's immortality, its blissful survival in a paradise, a faith emerging from practices of obscure magic.

In the following pages we will try to test the arguments by which this new interpretation is supported, and append some considerations about the vicissitudes of this Buddhist conception of the Absolute and the changes which, in our opinion, it underwent during the first thousand years of its history.

II. BUDDHISM AND YOGA

In the VI-V century B. C., at the time immediately preceding the rise of Buddhism, India was seething with philosophic speculation. A great variety of views and systems were springing up and actively propagated among the different classes of its population.¹ Materialistic doctrines, denying every survival of the individual after death and every retribution for his moral or immoral deeds were widely spread. The orthodox brahmanical community was also divided. A part of it stuck to the old sacrificial religion which promised to its votaries the reward of a blissful existence in a celestial paradise. Another part of it favoured, from an early date, a monistic view of the universe, and interpreted the reward of supreme bliss as the dissolution of the personality in an impersonal all-embracing Absolute. Later on some brahmanical circles developed the idea of an eternal individual Soul² which after having been bound up in many existences would return to its genuine condition of a pure spirit as a reward for accumulated merit.

Between the Materialists who denied retribution and the Eternalists who imagined a return to a pure spiritual condition, Buddha took a middle course. From the Eternalists he borrowed the doctrine of a gradual accumulation of spiritual merit through a series of progressing existences, but he was averse to their doctrine of an eternal spiritual principle.

As far as we can understand his philosophic position, it seems that he was deeply impressed by the contradiction of assuming an eternal, pure, spiritual principle which, for incomprehensible reasons, must have been polluted by all the filth of mundane existence in order, later on, to revert to

¹ This period coincides with a period of philosophic activity in China and in Greece, cf. P. Masson Oursel, *La philosophie comparée*, p. 56.

² Cp. H. Jacobi, *Die Ind. Philosophie in Das Licht des Ostens*, p. 150 f.

its original purity. He was thus led to a denial of every permanent principle. Matter and Mind appeared to him as split in an infinite process of evanescent elements (*dharmas*), the only ultimate realities, beside Space and Annihilation. The conception of an impersonal world-process was probably prepared by the idea of an impersonal unique substance of the world, as developed in the Upanishads. The analysis of the world into its elements of Matter and Mind was probably, to a certain extent, prepared by the work of the Sāṅkhya school. The originality of Buddha's position consisted in denying substantiality altogether, and converting the world-process in a concerted appearance of discrete evanescent elements. Forsaking the Monism of the Upanishads and the Dualism of the Sāṅkhyas, he established a system of the most radical Pluralism. That the essence and the starting point of Buddhism were speculative appears very clearly, if we give credit to the records about the other wandering teachers who were the contemporaries of Buddha and often engaged in controversies with him. The questions at issue between them were of a speculative nature. Ethical questions, the explanation of retribution, were predominant, but they always were narrowly linked together with some system of ontology and some doctrine of a Final Release.¹

If we make an effort wholly to realise the position of a philosopher to whom the Universe presented itself as an infinite process of separate elements of Matter and Mind, appearing and disappearing, without any real personalities, nor any permanent substances, and if we bear in mind that this philosopher was eagerly seeking for a theoretical basis on which to establish morality, we must confess that, for our habits of thought, his position was not an easy one. Striving to escape the contradictions of Eternality, of Monism and of Materialism he was landed in what, from our standpoint, was a fresh contradiction, the contradiction of a moral law without a personality on whom this law would be binding, and of a Salvation without altogether the existence of somebody entitled to reach that goal which we, more or less generally, understand under Salvation.

We will better understand the Solution at which Buddha arrived, if we take into account a specific Indian habit of mind, its idea of Quiescence as the only real bliss which life can afford. The Buddhist Saint (*ārya*) regards

¹ Cp. the information about the wandering teachers collected by B. C. Law, *Historical Gleanings*, ch. II and III (Calcutta, 1922).

the life of the worldling as an unhappy existence of constant turmoil. His aim is to escape from the movement of phenomenal life into a state of absolute Quiescence, a condition in which all emotion and all concrete thought is stopped for ever. The means of attaining this Quiescence is profound meditation (*yoga*), the technique of which was developed in India at a very early date.

The picture of the universe which suggested itself to the mental eye of the Buddha, represented thus an infinite number of separate evanescent entities in a state of beginningless commotion, but gradually steering to Quiescence and to an absolute annihilation of all life, when all its elements have been, one after another, brought to a standstill. This ideal received a multitude of designations among whom the name of Nirvāṇa was the most appropriate to express annihilation. The term was probably pre-Buddhist and was formerly applied to the brahmanical ideal of the dissolution of the individual in the universal whole (*brahma-nirvāṇa*).¹

The reward for a virtuous life and a strict observance of all religious duties consisted for the orthodox brahmin in a blissful survival in heaven. For the brahmanical Monist it consisted in being merged in the impersonal absolute. The Buddhist could promise nothing else than Quiescence of life and its Final Annihilation, a result which, taken by itself, was not very remote from what was offered by simple materialism. The latter promised annihilation after every life. Buddha promised likewise annihilation but after a long series of efforts in virtue and concentrated meditation. This result could not but strike as strange, not European scholars alone. Although the denial of a Soul as a separate substance is quite familiar to them, but they were not prepared to find it clearly stated at so early a date, in so remote a country and not in a system of skepticism, but in a religion. Numerous were also the Indian voices which protested against such radical denial of personal identity.

In the Buddhist community itself it provoked opposition which grew ever stronger and resulted, 500 years after the demise of the Master, in what may be called a quite new religion, reposing on a quite different philosophic foundation.

¹ Cp. the information collected by E. Senart in *Album Kern*, p. 104, and J. Dahlman, in *Nirvāṇa* (Berlin, 1896) and in *Die Sāṃkhya-Philosophie* (Berlin, 1902). Senart's characteristic «un simple équivalent de brahma» is right, as will be seen, in regard of the Mahāyānist Nirvāṇa only.

The apparent contradictions of Early Buddhism have been variously explained. It was assumed either that Buddha did not care for speculation or that he, like many other founders of religion, was incapable of clear logical thinking. We are now presented with an attempt to reconstruct a kind of Buddhism which had no speculative tendencies at all and to ascribe the philosophic part of it to a later date to which the final constitution of the Pali Kanon belongs.

It is thus assumed that there has been a primitive Buddhism, very much different, even, as it would seem, quite contrary, to what later on finds its expression in the Pali Kanon. Pessimism, nihilism, Soul-denial, psychology without a Soul, annihilation as ultimate end, all these features that mark out Buddhism among other religions, Indian as well as non-Indian, did not exist.¹ It was the Buddhism of Buddha himself which was so radically different from anything that appeared later, in historical times, as Buddhism. The consequence of this hypothesis of a simple creed preceding historical Buddhism, is an attempt to interpret the latter in the light of the former.

But if all, or almost all, the doctrines contained in our oldest documents are later inventions, what is it then that Buddha has taught and what in the III—II century B. C. — for this is probably the date which is assigned to the Pali Kanon in its final form — was superseded by another, invented, Buddhism? We have a definite answer. It is Yoga (p. 11). This only partly solves the difficulty, because if we are asked what Yoga is, we are told that one feels uneasy when asked such a question, «rien de plus malaisé» (ibid.). Nevertheless, on the next page, we are informed that Yoga is nothing but vulgar magic and thaumaturgy coupled with hypnotic practices. This would mean that Buddha was not a follower of some philosophic system in the *genre* of Pātañjali's where the psychology of trance plays a conspicuous part for the solution of definite problems, but that he was an ordinary magician who certainly did not think of denying the existence of a Soul, or of establishing a psychology without a Soul, or of being a pessimist. Not only is it asserted that yoga practices existed in India previously to the rise of Buddhism—this, of course, is very probable—but it looks as though the author were prepared to maintain that Buddhism itself, the genuine Buddhism of Buddha, nay that even the Pali Kanon, contains nothing but obscure

¹ Op. cit., pp. 17, 27, 32—34, 46, 52, 115—116, 125, 129, 132 etc.

thaumaturgy.¹ How else could one understand the following very explicit deliverances? «The yoga out of which Buddhism was produced had no speculative tendencies» (p. 53), i. e., it was «a technical routine in itself quite foreign to every moral, religious or philosophic view» (p. 12).² It was, in a word, magic and thaumaturgy. «In this condition», i. e., in the condition of a yoga without speculative tendencies, «has the Buddhism of the Hinayāna remained, beginning from the Mahāvagga up to Buddhaghosa, viz. it was a yoga almost without any alloy» (p. 53).³

Here we beg leave to remark that the case of Indian philosophy would really be a desperate one if a conception so familiar in it, so fundamental, so thoroughly developed in every possible detail, a conception to which a whole system is specially devoted were something vague and undefinable. Yoga is defined as concentrated thought (*samādhi*) or fixing the attention on a single point (*ekāgratā*) and doing it persistently (*punaḥ punaḥ cetasi niveśanam*). It is synonymous with *dhyaṇa* and *samāpatti* which mean the same.⁴ According to a peculiarity of the sanscrit language all these

¹ A similar tendency is displayed in another recent book, A. B. Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon* (Oxford, 1923). Buddhism is here represented as a product of a «barbarous age» (p. 26), Buddha as a «magician of a trivial and vulgar kind» (p. 29), Buddhist philosophical conceptions as lacking «both system and maturity, a fact historically reflected in the Negativism of the Mahāyāna» (p. 4).

² Similar opinions were emitted by H. Beck, «Der ganze Buddhismus ist durch und durch nichts als Yoga», (*Buddhismus* II, p. 11), Ed. Lehman (*Buddhismus*, p. 49) N. Söderblom (*La vie future*, p. 397 f.), Fr. Heiler (*Die Buddhistische Versenkung*, p. 7 et passim). They are all more or less mystics. They imagine to have found in Buddhism something congenial with their own emotions. Buddhist mysticism is for them hardly distinguishable from christian devotion, (cp. Heiler, op. cit., p. 51 f., p. 61 f., p. 66). The identification of Buddhism and Yoga by M. de la V. P. seems to be inspired by quite different feelings, he therefore converts Buddhism into magic or sorcery.

³ M. de la Vallée Poussin tries to impress on his readers that he finds himself in agreement with M. E. Senart, as far as I can see, with but little foundation. The origin of Buddhism was formerly sought in some kind of Upanishad ideology or some Sāṅkhya ideas. M. Senart has shown (R. H. R., t. 42, p. 345) that the coincidences with the yoga of Pātañjali are much more numerous and striking. Although this work is now proved (by H. Jacobi, see J. A. O. S., 31, 1 ff.) to be much later than M. Senart assumed and, in some points at least, had itself been influenced by Buddhism, nevertheless the coincidences pointed out by M. Senart are solid facts which nobody would be likely to deny. They can be now supplemented in that sense that yoga ideas have found their way into many other Indian systems as well. Senart's main result (ibid. p. 364) I understand to refer to pre-Buddhist conditions.

⁴ The subtle difference between these terms assumed in Y. S. II. 29 and III. 2-4, 11, rendered by prof. J. H. Woods as «singleness of intent, contemplation and concentration», as well as the definition of Yoga as «the restriction of the fluctuations of the mind-stuff» ibid. I. 2 are a peculiarity of that system. Prof. M. Anesaki and prof. J. Takakusu, ERE

terms can be used in an objective sense (*karma-sādhana*), in an instrumental sense (*karana-sādhana*) or in a locative sense (*adhikaraṇa-sādhana*).¹ Yoga and *samādhi* thus mean either the concentrated thought itself, as a psychical condition, or this same thought, as the method through which the condition has been created, or as the place where it has been produced. It is usual to apply in the latter sense, as a designation of the mystic worlds, where the denizens are eternally merged in trance, the term *samāpatti*. It is applicable to all the eight planes of mystic existence, of whom the denizens are, so to say, born mystics. In this sense the term is contrasted with the worlds of gross bodies and carnal desire (*kāma-dhātu*) where the denizens possess thoughts non-concentrated, disturbed. This is its more general acceptation. In a more special sense it is applicable to the four highest planes of existence alone, the immaterial worlds (*arūpa-dhātu*). It then is contrasted with the four lower mystic worlds which are specially called the four *dhyaṇas*. The word *samādhi* has also a general and a special sense. It can mean the usual faculty of concentrated attention, or it may mean cultivated, developed concentration. It then becomes a mystical power which can transfer the meditator into higher worlds and change life altogether. Yoga is usually applied in the latter kind of connotation, but it would not be inconsistent with the spirit of the sanscrit language to use it in all the three senses (*yujyate etad iti yogah, yujyate anena iti yogah, yujyate tasminn iti yogah*).¹ A complaint, if any, can be only about the detailed and subtle precision with which this notion is analysed, not about its vagueness. For supernatural power the term *ṛddhi* is used. But, of course, when concentration is supposed to produce supernatural mystic powers, then, by a metaphore, the former may be mentioned instead of the latter.

s. v. *dhyaṇa*, assume that *samādhi* is the result, arhatship, and *dhyaṇa* one of the means. But that is against Ab. Kōsabh. ad VIII. 1, where *samāpatti-dhyaṇa* «concentration» is distinguished from *upapatti-dhyaṇa* «existence in a mystic world». That *samādhi* has also a general meaning is clear from its position among the *citta-mahā-bhūmikas* where it is defined as *citta-ekāgratā*, cf. my Central Conception, p. 100. When concentrated meditation here on earth is contrasted with a birth in an imagined higher world of eternal trance the terms *samāpatti* and *upapatti* are respectively used, the first is explained as *sama-āpatti* = *sāms-par-hṛg-pa*, cf. below the opinion of *Srīlābha*, p. 14.

¹ Much of the confusion wrought by the inadequate translation of the term *samskāra* is likewise due to a failure of realising its double character, it either means a force, *samskriyate anena* = *samskāra* = *sam-bhūya-kāri*, or it means an element, *samskriyate etad* = *samskṛta-dharma*.

The context will always indicate to the advertised reader what is the meaning intended.

Very far from being vulgar magic and thaumaturgy, the Buddhist teaching about Yoga contains the following philosophic construction which, in my opinion, the historian of philosophy can neither disregard nor fail to appreciate.

Its fundamental idea consists in the fact that concentrated meditation induces a condition of Quiescence. The meditative man is the opposite of the active man. Life is then dissected in its active elements (*saṃskāras*) with a view to be one after the other reduced to final quiescence and extinction.

A personality (*pudgala*), in which other systems imagine the presence of a permanent spiritual principle, a Soul (*ātma*), is in reality a bundle of elements or forces (*saṃskāra-samūha*) and a stream of thought (*santāna*). It contains nothing permanent or substantial, it is *anātma*. This means that, according to the general idea of radical pluralism, the spiritual part of an individual consists of separate elements (*dharma*), just as its physical frame consists of atoms.¹ Although separate, these elements are linked together by causal laws (*hetu-pratyaya*). Some of them always appear simultaneously, they are satellites (*sahabhū*). Or they follow one another in consecutive moments, they are then homogeneous (*niśyanda-phala*), they constitute chains of moments (*kṣaṇa-santāna*). The law of causation is therefore called the law of dependently-together-origination (*pratitya-sam-utpāda*). The number of psychical elements (*arūpiṇo dharmāḥ*) at every given moment of an individual life is variable. It may be very considerable, because undeveloped, dormant faculties are also reckoned as actually present. This circumstance has even provoked gibes from the side of Sautrāntikas in regard to the impossibility of an actual coexistence of so huge a quantity of separate elements at a single moment.² However some of them are constant, always present at every moment, others appear only under

¹ The theory of separate elements (*dharmas*) is exposed in detail by prof. O. Rosenberg, Problems of Buddhist philosophy (now translated from the Russian into German by his widow (Heidelberg 1924), and also by myself in my Central Conception of Buddhism (London 1923, R. A. S.).

² Yaśomitra, ad Ab. Kośa II. 40, computes that, if in the first moment 27 *dharmas* are present, there will be 486 elements in the sixth one, and so on, *ity ananta-dravyā (prāṇināḥ) pratisantāna-śarīra-kṣaṇe bhavanti*. If these elements were resistant stuff, says Vasubandhu, there would be not enough room for them in the whole universe.

certain conditions. Faculties of ten different kinds¹ are supposed always to be present. They are termed the general faculties (*citta-mahā-bhūmika*). Among them we find the faculty of concentration, *saṃādhi* or *yoga*. They are morally indifferent. To them are added either a certain number of faculties morally good, or a certain number of faculties morally bad. But not only do the elements which combine in one moment vary in number, they can vary also in intensity (*utkarṣa*). In a certain individual, at a certain time, a certain element may predominate, while in another individual, or at another time in the same individual, another element may reach prominence.²

Among the constantly present elements there are two exceedingly precious ones which, when given the proper opportunity of full development, become predominant and change the character of the individual and his moral value altogether. They are the faculty of appreciative analysis (*prajñā*) and the faculty of concentrating our thoughts upon a single point to the exclusion of all other disturbing considerations and occurrences, it is just *saṃādhi* or *yoga*. These elements may be quite undeveloped and insignificant. *Prajñā* is then called *mati*, but it is the same faculty. When fully developed it becomes transcendent wisdom (*prajñā amalā*). Life in ordinary men is controlled by ignorance (*avidyā*) which is the reverse of *prajñā*, but not its mere absence. It is a separate element which can be and, in every ordinary man really is, present at the same time with his dormant faculty of wisdom. But it is not a constant faculty, it can be suppressed (*prahīna*) and thrown out of the mental stream altogether which then becomes purified or saintly (*ārya*).

Now, the moral law or moral progress or moral education of mankind is conceived as a struggle within the stream (*santāna*) between the good (*kuśala*), the noble faculties of man and his bad (*akuśala*) or defiling inclinations. Since the elements are *ex hypothesi* separate and momentary they cannot really influence one another. Nevertheless the presence of defiling ignorance and other disturbing qualities makes the whole stream impure. All the elements are then impure, even the central element, bare

¹ Cp. the tables appended to my Central conception, p. 100.

² We accordingly say «I remember», «I think», «I wish», but this does not mean that at the moment when I wish I do not think, or that in the moment when I remember I do not wish. All mind is regarded as consisting at every moment of an assemblage of mental atoms, faculties (*saṃskāra*) or elements (*dharma*).

consciousness, or pure sensation (*viññāna*), becomes affected (*kliṣṭa*, *sāsrava*). A special law of causation (*sarvatraga-hetu*) is imagined to account for the fact that the elements of the stream are either all of them pure in the Saint, or all impure (*kliṣṭa*) in the ordinary man.¹

It is part of the system, it is also a deep belief in all Buddhist countries, that the noble and sublime faculties will finally, in the long run, triumph. The defiling faculties (*kleśa*) are divided into two classes, so far as one class can be remedied by insight, so to say, by reason, and the other by concentrated attention only. The first are called *drṣṭi-heya*, the other *bhāvanā-heya*.² It is of course a natural, and even a trivial, fact that some of our shortcomings and vices can be eradicated by knowledge, and others by concentrated attention alone. But the faculty of concentration, if fully developed, has a greater force.³ It then becomes a mystic power. It can stop life altogether. In the Path of Salvation it is the last and most decisive step. It can also transfer the individual into a higher plane of existence. He is then reborn or transferred into the realm of ethereal (*accha*, *bhāsvāra*)⁴ bodies, into the sphere of purified matter (*rūpa-dhātu*), or into the still higher regions of pure spirits (*arūpa-dhātu*).

Here we forsake the ground of reality and enter into the worlds of the mystic. From this point of view existence is divided into three different spheres. The division is in reality dipartite, into the mystic worlds (*sāma-patti*) and into the non-mystic ones, i. e. our gross worlds of carnal desire, (*kāma-dhātu*). The latter include the hells, earth and the lower heavens, where the gods are living and enjoying themselves in a very human way. The position which is assigned to the gods in this sphere is very characteristic for the Buddhist, as well as for the Jaina, religions. These gods are not superior beings in a moral sense. For the sake of moral progress and salvation the condition of man is preferable. Speaking technically, the gods of the *kāma-dhātu* represent assemblages of elements of all the 18 cate-

¹ Ab. Kośa, II. 54, 57; IV. 9; V. 12.

² Ibid. I. 40.

³ When *samādhi* has reached full development it becomes the predominant element in that bundle of elements (*saṃskāra-samūha*) which make up an individual. The single term *samādhi* may then be used for this element together with its satellites, it then becomes synonymous with the individual or his 5 *skandhas*, cp. Ab. Kośabh. ad VIII. 1. The same applies to the developed *prajñā*.

⁴ Cp. Ab. Kośabh. ad II. 12.

gories (*dhātu*). Not a single of them is brought to a standstill by *yoga*. They are full of passions and are superior to man by their power, but not by their conduct.¹ The mystic worlds are further divided into two classes, those in whom the denizens possess ethereal bodies, and those in which they have no physical frame. The faculty of concentration (*samādhi*, *yoga*) has here attained predominance, it has become the central element, the others are then satellites. Imagination has built up above the heavens of the carnal gods a series of mystic worlds. They correspond exactly to the degrees of trance which are gradually reached, or supposed to be reached, by the mystic. The purely spiritual realms (*arūpa-dhātu*) are four. Their denizens are merged in contemplation (*samāpatti*) of some unique idea, either the idea of the infinity of space, or of the infinity of thought, or of the void, or in a dreamy semi-conscious state. Their condition is nearly catalepsy, a state where consciousness is quite arrested. The worlds of ethereal bodies are also four in number, exactly corresponding to the initial four degrees of trance (*dhyaṇa*), and are accordingly designated as the worlds of the first, the second, the third and the fourth *dhyaṇa*.

Whereas our material frame consists of elements of 18 kinds, four of them are in abeyance in the worlds of ethereal bodies. The sense-data of smell and taste and the corresponding two sets of sensations do not exist. It is because these beings do not want any hard food, no food which is taken piecemeal, chewed and swallowed.² Their nutrition is spiritual. Here imagination evidently is founded upon the fact that the mystic, when deeply engaged in meditation, forgets all about his meals. Therefore olfactory and gustatory sense-data lose their *raison d'être*. They are by the mystic power of *yoga* extinct altogether. But the physical organ, the nose and the tongue remain, because their absence would make the body ugly. All bodies are beautiful, none is mutilated. Their faculties of sight and audition are illimited, they possess *divya-cakṣuḥ* and *divya-śrotam*.³ Their tactile sensations are the same as the characteristic agreeable feeling of bodily ease and lightness (*prasaṃbhi*) which produces levitation in the mystic. Their movements are therefore extremely swift and dexterous. But the faculties of smelling and taste are absent altogether, because their food is immaterial. They have no need for clothes,⁴ they are born with a light ethereal covering that lasts all their very long life through. Neither do they want any dwellings. Every new born finds a house provided for him by *karma*, i. e. by nature. The phenomenon of sex is spiritualised. The bodies are without the members of physical procreation. This does not make them mutilated. Gross sexual passion does not exist at all. But total indifference does neither exist. The feelings

¹ The higher planes of these carnal gods however are morally purer than the lower ones, they gradually approach to the still higher moral standard of the worlds of trance, cp. Ab. Kośa, III. 70.

² Ab. Kośa, I. 30, III. 39.

³ They have, as a monk in Mongolia expressed himself in a conversation with me, telescopes and telephones.

⁴ Ab. Kośa, III. 70.

are delicate. The birth of a new being is quite free from all pain and filth. The new born child does not come out of the matrix of a female, it is apparitional (*upapāduka*). Those who happen to be nearest to the place of his birth are his parents.¹ No government,² of course, is needed in such a community, because there are no crimes, no gross passions. Total absence of passion would mean total absence of volitions, and this, according to the Indian conception, would stop life altogether, it would be Nirvāṇa. But all feelings have a mild form. The feeling of hatred (*pratigha*) is totally absent. Other feelings are veiled indifference (*nirvīra-avyākṛta*).³

The imagination of the man who has drawn this picture, whether it be Buddha or another, seems to have been guided by the idea that manual work is the curse of humanity. Therefore a state is imagined where there is no need for it, because food, clothes and homes are naturally provided. The other debasing feature of mankind, the gross sexuality of love, is quite absent. Thus from the three incentives of human action on earth, wealth, love and duty (*artha-kāma-dharma*) the last alone continues its unimpeded sway in the mystic's worlds. However there is no absolute equality between the denizens. There are lofty and ordinary characters. The quality of being a «worldling» (*pṛthag-jana*) can occasionally appear in these regions. At least some of the schools are quarrelling about this question.⁴ The details of this picture have given rise to a great deal of controversy, and even now we can come across Buddhist monks who will, with extraordinary vivacity, debate some of the moot points.

The Abhidharma discusses the question, whether in order to possess all the supernatural forces existing in the mystic worlds it is a necessary condition to be born in them or whether it is possible to possess them even while living here on earth, in the realm of gross bodies. We find the following answer.⁵

«There are beings living here on earth in the realm of gross bodies (*kāma-dhātu*), and there are others living in the first, second and higher worlds of ethereal bodies (*prathama-dhātūnādī*). They are all possessors of a body, of a faculty of vision and of corresponding visible

¹ Ibid. III. 71.

² Ibid. III. 98.

³ A full account of the Buddhist heavens and their denizens is given in prof. H. Kirfel, *Die Kosmographie der Inder* (Bonn, 1920), p. 190 ff. but their connection with the degrees of absorption in yoga meditation is mentioned only in regard to the 4 samāpattis on p. 198. Cp. also B. C. Law, *Heaven and Hell* (Calcutta, 1925).

⁴ The Vātsīputriyas explained the fact that a person having reached in a higher world the condition of a Saint (*ārya*) could sometimes nevertheless fall back into ordinary humanity and become again a common worldling, by the circumstance that some element of this common worldliness (*pṛthagjanatva*) was left dormant in him, it had not been quite eradicated at the time when he became a Saint, cp. Ab. Kośabh. I. 40, II. 40.

⁵ Condensed from Ab. Kośabh. pp. 88. 14—90. 7 (B. B. XX.), cp. M. de la V. P.'s transl. pp. 93. ff.

objects. Is it a necessary rule that body, sight and object should all belong to the same plane of existence or are such beings possible whose sight and objects are those of another world than their body? We answer, that different combinations of each element are possible.

If a being is born on earth and he contemplates the surrounding objects with his usual sense of vision, all the three elements will belong to the same sphere. But if this very man will acquire that mystical power of vision which is characteristic of the first world of trance, then the combination will change. The body and the surrounding objects will remain the same as before, but the faculty of vision and the corresponding sensations will be those which are characteristic of the first world of trance. If, in addition to that, he will attain a degree of mystic concentration where all objects are changed, then the body remaining on earth, his faculty of vision, his visual sensations and his external world will all be those of the mystic. . . . This being, still remaining in the plane of gross bodies, may acquire the faculty of vision characteristic of the second and higher worlds. Corresponding combinations will then arise which can easily be imagined by the analogy of what has been stated. . . . Further, if a denizen of the first mystic world contemplates the surrounding objects with his own faculty of vision, then all the elements will belong to his own plane of existence. But if he will look down upon the plane of existence below him, then his body, his sight and his sensations will remain his own, though his objects will belong to another plane. The denizen of the first mystic world may acquire the sight-power characteristic of the second mystic world, and so on. The corresponding combinations may easily be imagined.

However there is a limitation. The faculty of vision cannot be that of a lower plane than the body, (there can be no ethereal bodies with a gross faculty of vision), but there can be a gross body with a mystic power of vision. Ordinary men with an ordinary power of vision do not perceive the higher worlds, but the denizens of the higher worlds might perceive what is going on in the gross worlds, if they care to. The organ of vision, connected with a certain body, can appertain either to its own plane of existence, or to a higher one, it can never descend to a lower plane. But the visible objects and visual sensations either belong to the same plane as the body, or to a lower one, never to a higher one. The same refers to the faculty of audition. As to the faculties of touch, smell and taste, they always belong to the same plane of existence as that of their body.»

These speculations help us to understand the Buddhist denial of personal identity. The separate elements combining in a personality may even be such as normally belong to different planes of existence. Determined by actual observation these elements, by an effort of imagination, are transferred to a higher plane where they continue to combine under changed circumstances according to the same laws of evolution, élan vital or *karma*, which were settled by the analysis of actual facts. The work of philosophy here resembles a mathematical computation. Being given a certain change in the axioma of existence, e. g., the necessity of food, clothing and homes being in abeyance, what will be the consequent changes in all the formulas of personal existence? This is also clearly seen out of the following discussion in the Abhidharma.¹

¹ Condensed from Ab. Kośa. bh. pp. 52. 2 — 53. 8 (B. B. XX.), cp. M. de la V. P.'s transl. pp. 54. ff.

«It has been determined that 18 kinds (*dhātu*) of elements are cooperating in making up life in all the three spheres of existence.¹ It is then asked how many cooperate in the worlds of gross bodies, how many in the worlds of ethereal bodies, and how many in the spiritual worlds. It is answered — 18 in the first, 14 in the second and 3 in the last. All the 18 elements combine in creating life in the sphere of gross bodies. «They combine» means that they are inseparable from it, they constitute this world. In the plane of ethereal bodies, the fragrant and savoury stuff, as well as the corresponding sensations (*viñāna*) are excluded. They represent physical food (*kavali-kāra-āhāra*). But ethereal bodies belong to beings who can live without such food, they have no desire for it. The olfactory and gustatory sensations are thus absent, because their objects—that physical food which contains the fragrant and savoury stuff — do not exist.

Objection. But in this case neither the resistant stuff would exist in these worlds, since it is also (a part) of the nutriment stuff?

Answer. That part of it alone exists which is not nutriment.

Objection. The fragrant and the savoury stuffs are in the same condition, (a part of them is not nutriment)?

Answer. The resistant stuff is necessary as a support for the sense faculties, as a support for the bodies and as clothes for them. But for the fragrant and savoury stuffs there is no necessity, because there is no physical food. Therefore, since the instinct for such food is absent, neither do the corresponding stuffs exist, (i. e., they are not produced by *karma*). The case of the resistant stuff is different.

Opinion of Śrīlābha. If somebody here (on earth) by concentrated meditation reaches ecstasy, he continues to see colours, to hear sounds and his sense of touch is agreeably affected by some special tangible stuff which is produced simultaneously with the production in him of a high degree of levitation (*prasādhī*), but odours and tastes are in abeyance. For this reason, when beings are reborn in these worlds of trance, the first three sense data exist, but smells and tastes are absent.»

It is seen out of this passage that the conditions of life in the sphere of ethereal bodies are imagined by transferring personal mystic experiences into a separate plane of existence.

A very interesting discussion then follows about that driving force of nature called *karma* which, in this connection, corresponds to our conception of evolution, or élan vital.²

It produces, according to a regular plan and answering to necessities, all the varieties of life in the plane of gross bodies and *mutatis mutandis* in the imagined planes of existence constructed according to mystic experiences.

¹ Cp. the tables in Central Conception, p. 97.

² What confusion arises from a wrong translation of the term *karma* appears clearly from M. de la V. P.'s translation of this passage, Ab. Kośa II. 30, p. 56. «Quelle est la cause de la naissance d'un organe, sinon un certain acte commandé par un désir relatif à cet organe». This can only mean that there has been, once upon a time, a man who evidently did not possess this organ, or did possess no organs at all, but he manifested a desire to possess some and committed an action in consequence. After that all men, who peacefully existed without any organs at all, suddenly acquired them! No wonder that Indian philosophy, when presented in such a garb, ceases to be attractive. About Karma in Buddhism cp. O. Rosenberg, Problems, XVI.

Such is the theory of Yoga in Hinayāna. It is quite different in Mahāyāna where the philosophic foundation is different. All the devices which are employed for helping the mind to concentrate upon a single point are more or less the same in all philosophic systems. There is absolutely nothing Buddhistic in them.¹ The psychological fact of concentration which is at the bottom of them is a very simple one.² When carried on systematically they induce special mystic states of mind. Pātañjali has given their explanation according to the principles of Sāṅkhya philosophy. In Hinayāna Buddhism they are explained in a manner fitting the system of radical pluralism, i. e., that theory of separate elements (*dharmā*) which has been established with a view to their gradual extinction in Nirvāṇa. Very characteristic for Buddhism is the system of heavens or paradises in which, at their middle and highest stages, imaginary beings are lodged, who are also called gods, but are nothing but born mystics, beings in whom the condition of trance is a natural one. This distinguishes Buddhism from all other religions and philosophical systems.³ It is also inseparable from the conception of the Hinayānist Nirvāṇa, or the so called Nirvāṇa of the Śrāvakas. According to the teaching of some schools the highest cataleptic states of trance are eternal (*asaṃskṛta*), i. e., they do not differ from Nirvāṇa.⁴ But, according to the majority of schools, Nirvāṇa is beyond even that. It is the absolute limit of life, the extinction even of this kind of the thinnest vestige of consciousness which is still left in the highest of all imaginable worlds of cataleptic trance.

¹ Fr. Heiler, op. cit. p. 47, following prof. Rhys Davids, thinks that (brahmanical) Yoga is predominantly physical and hypnotic, whereas the Buddhist method of meditation is intellectual and moral. I would not venture to endorse this opinion. In this respect the difference, if any, is negligible. Heiler evidently overlooks, in his Buddhist fervour, the devotion to God (*īśvara-praṇidhāna*) of the brahmanical Yogi. The process of moral purification of the latter is very vividly described by prof. S. N. Dasgupta, The Study of Pātañjali, p. 142 ff. (Calcutt, 1920) and his other works.

² The late prof. O. Rosenberg has himself practised some yoga-meditation in a Zen Monastery in Japan. He used to compare the agreeable feeling of ease which he then experienced to the effect produced by music, especially when executed personally. Attention is then fixed and a light feeling of ecstasy makes you forget all troubles of life. The warlike Samurai before going to war used to go through a course of yoga-exercises in some Zen monastery, and this had the most beneficial influence upon their moral condition, in strengthening their courage and endurance.

³ It is interesting to note that the gods of Epicurus are also quiescent, inactive and also possess aethereal bodies of a special atomic structure.

⁴ Cp. Kathā-vatthu, VI. 4. The Yogācāras likewise reckon catalepsy among the *asaṃskṛta* elements.

III. MYSTIC INTUITION (YOGI-PRATYAKṢA)

Apart from the above described general function of Yoga, there is another special kind of it, the subjective counterpart of the first. It then appears as the mystic intuition of the true condition of the universe. The Buddhist Saint is supposed, in a moment of mystic illumination, suddenly to perceive the whole construction, with its gross and mystic worlds, as vividly as if it were a direct sense perception. As a psychological process it is equally taught in Hinayāna and in Mahāyāna, but its content, the picture which reveals itself at this moment, is quite different in both systems. It corresponds to their theoretical parts, to the system of pluralism which is taught in Hinayāna, and to the monist view which is the central conception of Mahāyāna, as will be seen later on. For, although a sudden illumination, it does not come without preparation. The future Saint has gone through a long course of moral training and he has carefully studied all the details of that philosophic construction, when in the moment of sudden illumination, what he had before tried to understand only theoretically, comes up before him with the vivacity of living reality. Beginning with this moment he is a Saint, all his habits of thought are changed. He directly views the universe as an infinite continuity of single moments in gradual evolution towards Final Extinction. In Mahāyāna the Bodhisattva sees directly, or feels inwardly, quite another picture, corresponding to the theoretical teaching of that religion. The Path towards Salvation is therefore divided in a preliminary path of accumulating merit (*sambhāra-mārga*), in a subsequent course of training (*pratyogya-mārga*) and in the path of illumination (*dṛṣṭi-mārga*).¹ The latter is momentary. It is technically called perception of the Four Truths, such perception being the exclusive property of the Saint (*ārya*). Therefore they are called the four truths of the Saint (*āryasya satyāni*). They express the general view that 1) there is a phenomenal existence (*duḥkha*), 2) its driving force (*samudaya*), 3) there will be final extinction (*nirodha*), and 4) there is a path towards it (*mārga*). In this general form the four truths are accepted

¹ Mrs. C. Rhys Davids (Dhamma-saṅgaṇi transl., p. 256, n. 2) calls it a «mental awakening», «intellectual conversion», «a certain vantage-point for mind and heart from which the Promised Land of Nirvāna was caught sight of, and the fact of impermanence first discerned». Under «the fact of impermanence» the theory of the impermanent *dharma*s must be evidently understood. A poetical description of *dṛṣṭi-mārga*, which is the same as *śrota-āpatti-phala*, is found in D. N. I. 76 ff.

by all Indian systems.¹ There is absolutely nothing Buddhistic in them. Their meaning changes according to the content which is put into them, according to what is understood under phenomenal life (*duḥkha*)² and under extinction (*nirvāna*). Within the pale of Buddhism these conceptions have, at a certain date, undergone a radical change. In early Buddhism they correspond to a pluralistic universe, in Mahāyāna to a monistic one.³

In Hinayāna the process of illumination is described as a double moment, it consists in a moment of feeling and a moment of knowledge. The feeling is satisfaction (*kṣānti*=*ruci*), after which in the next following moment comes intuition, the vision of the elements of existence (*dharma-jñāna*). The intuition refers at first to the surrounding gross world, and then, as is always the case, it is transferred to the imagined worlds of trance (*anvaya-jñāna*). Thus in sixteen consecutive moments⁴ the intuition of the future Saint has run through the whole universe, its real and imaginary worlds, and has viewed them in the light of the four stages of their evolution towards quiescence. The supreme moment of illumination is the central point of the teaching about the Path to Salvation. An enormous literature, especially in Mahāyāna, is devoted to this conception of mystic intuition.⁵

When in later times the study of Abhidharma has been superseded by the study of logic and epistemology, the mystic perception of the Saint has retained its place among the different categories of direct cognition which were then established. Direct cognition was then defined as containing no synthetic thought (*kalpanāpoḍha*). It was pure sensation which could apprehend an indefinite moment of sensation only. The four truths, i. e. ontology, were at first studied and ascertained by sound logic (*pramāṇena vinīścita*) and then suddenly perceived as vividly as a grain of corn on the

¹ About the «four truths» in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika see below p. 55.

² It is *samskāra-duḥkhatā* or *pariṇāma-duḥkhatā* the counterpart of *asaṃskṛta*=*nirodha*, cp. Ab. Kośabh. VI. 3. This kind of *duḥkha* is much nearer to our ordinary conception of joy, than of suffering.

³ In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the yogi perceives at that moment of illumination the atoms and all categories directly, cp. Praśastp., p. 187. 7.

⁴ About the 16 moments cp. Ab. Kośa, VI. 18, 25 ff. and M. de la V. P. in his edition of Madhy. vṛ, p. 479 n. 4.

⁵ The textbook for the study of this part of Mahāyāna is the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* of Maitreya-Asaṅga, of which 21 Indian commentaries alone existed besides a huge indigenous Tibetan literature. Among the sect of the «yellow caps» the chief commentary studied is the *Lam-rim-chen-po* by the great Tsoṅ-kha-pa, partly translated into Russian by G. Tsiibikoff.

palm of the hand.¹ The number of moments was then reduced to three. In the Mādhyamika system, where logic was denied altogether, the preparation consisted in a course of negative dialectic, after which the intuition of the transcendental truth springs up as an inward conviction (*pratyātma-vedya*).² In both the philosophic systems which are represented in Buddhism—the pluralism of the Hinayāna and the monism of Mahāyāna—there is a course of preparation and meditation and a moment of sudden illumination.³

If we now try to answer the question about the age and the history of this Buddhist doctrine of Yoga, we must, first of all, wholly appreciate the fact that it is an inseparable, inherent part of the pluralistic universe of separate elements (*dharma*) gradually evolving towards extinction.⁴ The possibility is not excluded, as we have stated elsewhere,⁵ that the germ of this theory is older than Buddha himself. In any case there is no historically authenticated Buddhism without this theory, without the mystic worlds and, its inherent part, the philosophic explanation of Yoga. All yoga practices which had not this philosophic and moral aim, all sorcery and thaumaturgy, the brahmanical sacrifices not excepted, were strongly condemned by the Buddha. They were considered as one of the cardinal sins.⁶ The details of the conditions in the worlds of the mystic and the degrees of mystic concentration have always given opportunities to much scholastic

¹ Cp. Nyāya-bindu and *ṭīkā*, p. 11 (B. B. VII).

² Mādhy. vṛ, p. 493. 11.

³ According to H. Bergson (De l'intuition philosophique) every great philosopher has once had a vision of the Universe to which he then remains faithful the rest of his life in a series of attempts to formulate it ever clearer and clearer. This will then be the *drṣṭi-mārga* of that philosopher. In the life of Kant it will be the time when after years of literary activity and meditation the central conception of the Critique of Pure Reason revealed itself to him and he then wrote, «das Jahr 69 gab mir grosses Licht!». The rest of his life was indeed spent in repeated attempts at a clear formulation of that vision. The preceding study and meditation were, so to say, his *sambhāra*- and *prayoga-mārga*.

⁴ It has been supposed that the four *dhyanas* are of an earlier date than the four *samāpattis*, cp. Heiler, op. cit. p. 43 f. The conception of ethereal existences in the Rūpa-dhātu as consisting of 14 *dhātus* only, because they did not want any physical food is evidently a rationalisation of the myth about the descent of man from one of the Buddhist mystic worlds where the denizens fed on *samādhi*, cp. D. N. III. 84 ff. The full theory probably existed already at the time of the formation of the Pali Canon.

⁵ Central Conception, p. 65 ff.

⁶ Cp. the article on Buddhist magic in ERE where mysticism, magic and popular superstition are not sufficiently distinguished. In the Brahmajālasutta, D. N. I. 9 ff., we have a long list of superstitions and magical practices, all strongly condemned.

controversy between the schools. We can safely assert that within the pale of Hinayāna Buddhism there is no place for trivial sorcery.¹

The psychology of trance is indeed a characteristic feature of many Indian systems, not Buddhism alone. It appears almost inevitably in that part of every Indian system which is called «the Path» (*mārga*) in which the means of a transition out of the phenomenal world into the Absolute are considered. With the exception of the orthodox Mīmāṃsakās and the materialists, every system in this part, but not in others, contains a certain amount of mysticism. The Jains had their teaching about Yoga. Even the realistic and theistic Nāyāyikas, when feeling it difficult to explain the transition into the Absolute, i. e., from saṃsāra into nirvāṇa, have recourse not to God, but to Yoga.² However, just as the European mind is not altogether and always free from mysticism, so is the Indian mind not at all necessarily subject to it. Not to speak about numerous materialistic doctrines, the orthodox Mīmāṃsakas themselves held about Yoga an opinion which probably represents just what all of us, so far we are not mystics, think about it, viz. that Yoga is sheer imagination, just as any other ordinary fantasticism.³ Considering that the Mīmāṃsakas are the oldest philosophical system in India whose roots go down into the Vedic age, we at once can measure the exact value of the «historical method» which finds it highly improbable that in India, at the time of Buddha, nothing but vulgar magic and thaumaturgy could exist.

It is the common lot of every philosophy or religion to reach a point where further explanation becomes impossible. A higher and mystical principle is then invoked, because the usual methods have failed to give satisfaction. With Descartes and Leibnitz it is God, with many Indian systems it is Yoga as a mystical power. An appeal to this power plays a considerable part in Buddhism, but not otherwise.

¹ If every supernatural world or power, imagined by the mystic is represented as magic, then of course Hinayāna will be full of magic, but Christianity, especially that which believes in miracles, will neither escape a similar reproach. The *ṛddhis* and *abhijñānas* should therefore be more properly characterised as mystical imagined powers, with the proviso that «of the reality or unreality of the mystic's world we know nothing» (B. Russel, External World, 1922, p. 20). Very interesting are the explanations, and a certain vindication, of the Buddhist supernatural cognitions and powers by Fr. Heiler, op. cit., p. 33 f.

² About the place Yoga occupies in the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika see below, p. 55 ff.

³ Cf. Ślokavārt., on *pratyakṣasūtra*, 32.

IV. BUDDHA'S BELIEF IN PERSONAL IMMORTALITY

Additional arguments in favour of an unphilosophic primitive Buddhism are derived from 1) the occurrence in the Pali Kanon of the word «immortal» among the epithets of Nirvāṇa, 2) the interpretation of two passages where Buddha is reported to have given no answer at all when questioned about Nirvāṇa, 3) the occurrence in later literature of the term reality (*vastu*) in connection with Nirvāṇa.

A short examination of the value of these additional arguments will not be out of place.

The practical, as well as the theoretical, part of Buddhism converge towards the idea of an extinction of all the active forces of life in the Absolute. This Absolute, Nirvāṇa, accordingly receives in emotional passages an overwhelming mass of *epitheta ornantia* among which the term «place of immortality» occurs several times. But what is this immortality? Is it the immortality of Vedic times? The blissful existence among the forefathers in heaven?¹ Or is this hypothetical immortality something like the paradise of Amitābha? Or something like the paradise of later Vishnuism? Not the slightest indication! Because indeed the word occurs only as an epithet of Nirvāṇa — annihilation. There is no deficiency, as we have seen, of paradises in the Buddhist outlook. But Nirvāṇa is beyond all imaginable spheres, it is the absolute limit. The words «immortal place» simply mean changeless, lifeless and deathless, condition, for it is explained as meaning a place where there is neither birth (i. e. rebirth) nor death (i. e. repeated death).² People enter paradise by being reborn in it, they disappear for ever in Nirvāṇa by being extinct.

¹ M. de la V. P. evidently thinks that all religious development starts with an idea of a surviving immortal Soul, a theory that has been exploded as far as Indian religions are concerned. Dr. Poul Tuxen in the Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, Hist.-phil. Meddelelser, II, 4, Forestillingen om Sjælen i Rigveda, has proved that such an idea is quite absent from the Rigveda. In the oldest Upanishads the surviving *homunculus* is represented as a congeries of 5 elements which dissolve at death and then a new combination of them springs into being. It is not impossible to see in them the forerunners of the Buddhist 5 skandhas. The idea of a Soul, in our acceptance of the term, appears in the metrical Upanishads and is contemporaneous with the rise of Sāṅkhya and Jainism, probably also with some kind of pre-Buddhaic Buddhism, cf. H. Jacobi, Gottesidee, p. 7 ff. and my Central Conception, p. 65 ff.

² The epithet «place of immortality» is also used in connection with Nirvāṇa in brahmanical systems which adopt a lifeless Nirvāṇa, cf. Vātsyāyana, (ed. Vizian.) p. 30. It means a place where there is no death, it does not mean a place where there is eternal life. It is like-

V. WAS BUDDHA AN AGNOSTIC?

Another additional argument is drawn out of a new interpretation of very well known passages in the Kanon where Buddha is reported to have answered a series of metaphysical questions by sheer silence. It is literally an argument *a silentio*. Considering these questions more closely, we see that they are metaphysical questions, such as: is the world beginningless or has it a beginning, is it finite or infinite, what is the condition of the Saint after death, this last question meaning, what is the nature of the Absolute. When these questions were addressed to Buddha on a certain occasion by a certain interlocutor, it has once happened that either no answer at all was forthcoming, or it was declared that the questions were futile. Scholars, Indian and European, ancient and modern, did not find much difficulty in harmonizing this occasional «agnosticism» with the main lines of the teachings of the Pali Kanon. Some scholars went all the length of comparing these reserved questions with a series of topics declared insoluble in modern critical philosophy. There is indeed some similarity.¹

However M. de la Vallée Poussin explains Buddha's silence by his incapacity in the philosophical field. He did not know what to answer!² He was prepared to answer the question of the existence of an eternal Soul in the affirmative, if his interlocutor preferred so, if not, he did not mind denying it (p. 119). This is confirmed by a reference to Kumāralābha who is quoted by Vasubandhu in the course of a very long discussion about the cardinal tenet of all Buddhists, the «personalists» (pudgalavādins) not excluded, i. e. the non-existence of a substantial Soul. This tenet is here masterly discussed with perfect clearness and every possible detail.³ Buddha denies an eternal Soul as against the Eternalists, but maintains moral responsibility as against the Materialist. Both extremes are declared to be follies against which the doctrine of Buddha is directed.

wise called a place where there is no birth, «*na jāyati, na jīyati, na māyati ti amatam ti vuccati*» (Comm. Khuddaka, p. 180). Just as birth always means rebirth, death means reiterated death, cf. Oldenberg, Buddha², p. 46.

¹ They are questions which «human reason in its natural progress must necessarily encounter», (Kant, critique of Pure Reason, transl. by Max Müller, p. 340). Cp. O. Franke, Kant u. die altindische Philosophie, in «Zur Erinnerung an Emanuel Kant» (Halle, 1904), p. 137—8.

² The same explanation is given by B. Keith, op. cit., p. 63.

³ Translated by M. de la V. P. in the last volume of his Abhidharmakośa, pp. 128 ff. and by me in the Bulletin de l'Académie des Sciences de Russie, 1919, pp. 823 ff.

He has sought and found a «middle path» which evades the dangers of both extremes. How then could such a categorical denial and emphatic protest against two extremes be turned into a connivence in them? This is as much a riddle as the conversion of the Pali Kanon into a manual of thaumaturgy. It would be interesting to know when did Buddha «teach to some persons the existence of Self» (p. 119), i. e., a full blown *ātmavāda* or *sātkāyadr̥ṣṭi*?

In many systems, ancient and modern, eastern and western, the reality in itself, the pith of reality, is declared to be something incognisable. It is therefore quite natural to find in the sūtra literature, where the style of popular discourses is adopted, the device of impressing upon the audience the mystic character of the Absolute by silence. The Mahāyāna sūtras do not tarry in characterising it as «unspeakable», «unknowable», «undefinable» etc. A long discussion about the essence of the absolute is given in the Vimalakīrti-sūtra. The question is tackled from different sides, and when Vinnalakīrti is at length asked to summarise, he remains silent. Whereupon Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī exclaims, «Well done! Well done! non-duality is truly above words!». ¹

Nor is this feature limited to Buddhist literature. The Vedāntins resorted to the same device when wishing to bring home the transcendental character of their *advaita-brahma*. Śāṅkara reports a case when the question about the essence of brahma was reiterated three times, without eliciting any answer. ² At last, when it was asked, «Why don't you answer?» the reply was, «I do answer (sc. by silence), but you do not understand me». Is it permissible to draw the conclusion that Vimalakīrti and those men to whom Śāṅkarācārya refers had themselves no reasoned opinion about the Absolute or that they were quite indifferent and prepared to answer, just as the questioner preferred, in the affirmative or in the negative? ³

¹ Cf. Suzuki, Mahāyāna, p. 106—107.

² Ad V. S., III. 2, 17.

³ Vasubandhu (Ab. Kośa, V. 22) reports that it was a rule of dialectics at the time of Buddha to answer by silence those questions which were wrongly formulated, e.g., all questions regarding the properties of a non-existing thing. Prof. H. Oldenberg rightly remarks on an other occasion, Upanishaden p. 133, «Die eigenste Sprache dieser Mystik, wie aller Mystik, ist Schweigen».

VI. THE POSITION OF THE LATER SCHOOLS OF THE HĪNAYĀNA

M. de la Vallée Poussin insists that in order to escape obscurity we must construct an outline («un schéma d'ensemble») of the history of Buddhism, that this outline must harmonize with the general conception we have about the history of ancient India, ¹ and that questions of detail become at once settled, if they find their place in this historical outline (p. XX). This schema seems to be the following one. There was in the beginning a simple faith in Soul and immortality and a primitive teaching of an indefinite character, mainly of obscure magic. After that a mixed period supervened when this simple creed was contaminated with confused ideology, and this allows us to ask the question whether Buddhism at that period was not a gnosis. At last Buddhism received a superstructure of inane scholasticism and we have a scholastic period in Buddhism, just as we had one in mediaeval Europe.

Primitive faith, a period of gnosticism and a period of scholasticism,—we at once see wherefrom the scheme is borrowed. It is an attempt to construct the history of Buddhism on parallel lines with the history of the Western Church.

What the primitive faith and the supposed agnosticism represent we have already seen.

Now what is scholasticism? It is either 1) philosophy in the service of religion or 2) excessive subtlety and artificiality in philosophical constructions. Buddhism Early or Kanonic is contrasted with Buddhism later or scholastic (p. 46). ² This leads to the supposition that the school, e. g., of the Vaibhāṣikas represented in its teaching something substantially different from the early kanonical schools. But, as a matter of fact, the Vaibhāṣikas are only the continuators of one of the oldest schools, the Sarvāstivādins. They derive their name from the title of a huge commentary upon the kanonical works of this school and follow in philosophy generally the same lines as did

¹ This general conception of the history of India is apparently mentioned as implying the opinion of the author about the social *milieu* (p. 10) in which nothing but obscure magic could possibly originate, an opinion fully shared by prof. B. Keith. It would be interesting to know the opinion of both these authors about the *milieu* in which the grammar of Pāṇini, this one of the greatest productions of the human mind, originated!

² But on p. 128 M. de la Vallée Poussin mentions the «nihilist scholasticism» as the scholasticism of the Kanon.

the original school. Quite different is the position of the second school, the Sautrāntikas. It is really a new school, a precursor or contemporary of that momentuous change which splits the history of Buddhism into two quite distinct periods. It is therefore preferable to keep to the broad lines of the old division of Buddhism into early or Hīnayāna, and later or Mahāyāna, and to admit the existence of a transitional school in the Sautrāntikas.¹

We readily admit that there was a considerable growth of scholasticism in Early Buddhism, but it is scholasticism in the second sense. Since the simple faith in immortality never existed, it is impossible to speak of its being blurred or contaminated by scholasticism. Early Buddhism started from a sound philosophical idea of a pluralistic universe, it denied substance and established lists of ultimate realities (*dharmas*). Some of these elements are highly artificial constructions. Early Buddhists and their continuators the Vaibhāṣikas have paid a heavy tribute to that innate tendency of the human mind to infer difference of things from a difference of words. The Sautrāntikas most decidedly opposed this tendency, they sharply distinguished nominal realities (*prajñaptisat*) from ultimate data. They accordingly mercilessly cut down the lists of elements adopted in the schools of Early Buddhism and by the Vaibhāṣikas. They thus reduced them exclusively to a list comprising sense-data and the primitive data of Mind. It is therefore quite wrong to throw them into the same bag with the Vaibhāṣikas. They are, if anything, antischolastic. Their rôle may be usefully compared with that of Occam's Razor in European philosophy. They even can be more properly called a critical school, a name which their continuators, the Yogācāra-Sautrāntika school fully deserves. But these already belong to the Mahāyāna. If we roughly assign the beginning of Mahāyāna to the I century A. D. and the decline of Hīnayāna in the North to the V century, we shall have about five hundred years when both these tendencies kept the field. The Sautrāntikas apparently began by taking an intermediate position² between the extreme

¹ Another transitional school between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna is the so called *satya-siddhi* school of Harivarman known only from Chinese sources, cp. Yamakami Sogen, *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, p. 172 ff. (Calcutta 1912), O. Rosenberg, *Problems* p. 274.

² This Vasubandhu himself hints, cf. my *Soul Theory*, p. 852 and M. de la Vallée Poussin's transl. IX p. 273. Vasubandhu who himself favoured this school, as well as his pupil and continuator Dignāga, are already Mahāyānists and have partly adopted Vijñānavāda views. They call themselves Vijñānavādins although in the cardinal point of absolute reality they partly adhere to the Sautrāntika view (cf. Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭṭp. ed. B. B. p. 19).

Mahāyānists and the «school men». When the battle that raged during 500 years was inclining to its end, they coalesced with the Mahāyānists who had won the battle and formed with them the hybrid school of Yogācāra-Sautrāntika. Among the ultimate realities of the earlier lists which were declared by the new movement, i. e., by both the Mahāyānists and the Sautrāntikas, to be nominal we find Nirvāṇa (*nīrodha*).

It was known long ago that the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika schools were engaged in a dispute regarding the nature of Nirvāṇa. The first maintained that it was something real (*vastu*), the second objected that it was nothing real by itself, that it was merely the cessation of all personal life. The exact meaning of this issue could, of course, be fully appreciated only if the complicated arguments of both contending schools would have been known. Our information about the Vaibhāṣikas is much more ample now, and we can represent in detail the argumentation which led to the tenet of Nirvāṇa as a reality. About the other school, the Sautrāntikas, our information is still indirect. The works of the early Sautrāntikas, Kumāralābha, Śrīlābha, Mahābhaddanta, Vasumitra and others are still inaccessible. Vasubandhu can be taken as the exponent of the latest phase of this school, when it was about to coalesce with the Mahāyānists. However enough is known to allow a definite conclusion about their supposed «denial» of Nirvāṇa and the meaning of their answer to the Vaibhāṣikas.

M. de la Vallée Poussin thinks that his hypothesis about a pre-Kānonic Buddhism, consisting of a simple faith in Immortality and Yoga practices, as well as his interpretation of the passages where Buddha is reported to have answered some metaphysical questions by silence — that both these hypotheses are fully borne out by the position which the later schools take regarding Nirvāṇa (p. 132). When it is called a «reality» (*vastu*) he declares it to be a confirmation of the existence (some 500 years ago) of that simple faith in Immortality which, by a similar method, he has discovered in Early Buddhism. We find in his book (pp. 136—148) many interesting details about the battle that raged between the two schools in the V century A. D., but unfortunately the meaning of the controversy has entirely escaped his attention, since it is *exactly the reverse* of what he assumes it to be. The Vaibhāṣikas did not maintain that Nirvāṇa was a kind of paradise, but that the annihilation of all life (*nīrodha*), the essence of Nirvāṇa, was a reality (*nīrodha-satya, vastu*), i. e., a materialistic lifeless reality. The Sautrāntikas,

on the other hand, admit the existence of Buddha's Cosmical Body (*dharma-kāya*), i. e., they adhere to the Mahāyāna conception which consists in identifying Nirvāṇa with the living world itself. Therefore, just as the Mahāyānists, they deny the reality of Nirvāṇa as a *separate element* which transcends the living world. It is a denial of the reality of that materialistic kind of annihilation which was favoured by the Vaibhāṣikas.

VII. THE DOUBLE CHARACTER OF THE ABSOLUTE

With regard to Nirvāṇa or the Absolute, Indian philosophy, just as, in a broader sense, the philosophy of all mankind, is divided between two diametrically opposed solutions. The absolute end is either eternal death, or it is eternal life.¹ The first is materialism, the second some kind of idealism. Both theories are represented in India, in Buddhism as well as in Brahmanism. The theory of eternal death is represented on the Buddhist side by Early Buddhism and the Vaibhāṣikas, on the Brahmanical side, as will be seen later on, by the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The theory of eternal life is represented on the Buddhist side by the Mahāyāna and its precursors, on the Brahmanical side by the Vedānta, Sāṅkhya, Yoga and the later Nāyāyikas. Nirvāṇa is a reality (*dharma*, *vastu*) in the sense of a materialistic, lifeless (*yasmin sati cetaso vimokṣaḥ* = *acetanali*)² reality in the majority of the schools of Early Buddhism and in the Vaibhāṣika school. They are also atheists and treat their Buddha as essentially human.³ Such reality is denied by all those schools which adhere to the conception of a divine Buddha, i. e., by the Mahāyānists and their precursors in the Hīnayāna. The conception of Buddha's Cosmical Body (*dharma-kāya*) is shared by all the schools of Mahāyāna and by the intermediate school of the Sautrāntikas. According to the modern Mongol's way of expressing it, in Hīnayāna the Supreme Buddha (*burhan-bagshi*) has no body, in the Mahāyāna and with the Sautrāntikas he has a Body, and a better one (than before becoming Buddha), a glorious, all-embracing Body.

¹ I find in modern popular works attaining to biology the conception of a lifeless Nirvāṇa and the term itself applied to describe that condition of the Universe which will obtain when all energies will be exhausted (entropy). There is assumed a biological «Lusttrieb» and a «Todestrieb», the first would correspond to *heyopādeya-hānopadāna*, the second to *sarvam heyam* or *sarvam duḥkham*, cp. Sigm. Freud, *Jenseits des Lustprinzips* (Vienna 1925), pp. 52, 80.

² Cp. Madhy. vr., p. 525. 9, cp. transl. in the Appendix.

³ This, of course, does not mean that exceptional, supernatural powers were not ascribed to him, but he belonged to the *manuṣya-loka*.

As regards the reality or ideality of Nirvāṇa the relative position of the contending schools may be roughly represented in the following schematic way.

Vaibhāṣika and early schools — both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa real.

Mādhyamika — both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa unreal (sc. separately unreal).

Sautrāntika — saṃsāra real, nirvāṇa unreal (sc. separately unreal).

Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda — saṃsāra unreal, nirvāṇa real.

The meaning of this schema will emerge from the arguments advanced by each of the schools.

VIII. THE VAIBHĀṢIKAS

As mentioned above, they are the continuators of the early school of the Sarvāstivādins and may be here treated as the representatives of Early Buddhism in general. Their tenets which concern us at this place are the following ones. Existence is of a double kind, either transient and phenomenal, or eternal and absolute. Both parts are then analyzed into their elements, classified as elements of Matter, Mind and Forces for the phenomenal part, and as Space and Nirvāṇa for the eternal one. The elements of phenomenal life are divided into past, present and future, and are all conceived as realities, the past and the future ones are as real as the present ones. This leads to the construction of two sets of elements, the one representing their everlasting nature (*dharma-svabhāva*), the other their momentary manifestation in actual life (*dharma-lakṣaṇa*).¹ It is clear that this theory brings the Sarvāstivādin very near to the Sāṅkhya system which assumes an eternal matter and its momentary manifestations. Therefore students are specially warned not to confound both doctrines, and not to overlook their difference.² When all manifestations are stopped, all forces extinct, remains the lifeless residue. It is impersonal, eternal death, and it is a separate element, a reality, the reality of the elements in their lifeless condition. This reality is very similar to the reality of the Sāṅkhya's undifferentiated

¹ This theory of the double set of elements is very clearly analysed by O. Rosenberg in his *Problems*, cf. IX and XVIII. Had M. de la V.-P. devoted to this book all the attention it deserves he never would have maintained that the Nirvāṇa of the Vaibhāṣikas is a paradise. Judging by his sweeping and unfair remark on p. XXI he has entirely misunderstood this remarkable book.

² Cf. Ab. Kośa, V. 25, and my Central Conception, p. 89.

³ When pressed to give details about this lifeless condition of *dharma-svabhāva* the Vaibhāṣikas confess their ignorance, *ibid.* p. 75 and 90.

matter (*prakṛti*), it is eternal, absolute death¹. The Sāṅkhyas were dualists, and admitted besides eternal Matter eternal Souls, but the latter, as is well known, the Buddhists very energetically denied. Candrakīrti refers to the Vaibhāṣika view in the following way. «If nirvāṇa is a reality *per se* (*bhāva*), it cannot be a simple extinction. Of course, it has been declared that consciousness is extinct (*vimokṣa*) in nirvāṇa, just as a light becomes extinct (when fuel is exhausted), but for us extinct life is not an entity (*bhāva*)!» To this (the Vaibhāṣika) answers. «You must not understand nirvāṇa to be the extinction of passion (and of life), but you must say that the entity (*dharma*) called nirvāṇa is the thing *in which* passion (and life) are extinct. The extinction of light is a mere example, and it must be interpreted as pointing to that (inanimate) thing which remains when consciousness is extinct».²

We need not insist that the school was atheistic and genuinely denied the reality of a substantial Soul, whereas the Mahāsaṃghikas, Vātsīputrīyas, Sautrāntikas and Mahāyānistis denied it one way and admitted it in another. The state of Nirvāṇa, as imagined by the Vaibhāṣikas, affords some points of similarity with that state of the Universe which modern science imagines will exist when all energies will be worked out, they will exist, since energy itself (sc. *dharma* - *svabhāva*) is eternal, but they will not work. A condition in which all energies (*samskāras*) are extinct cannot be spiritual.³ Of course simple materialism goes under the name of *uccheda-vāda*, against which Buddha is reported to have made an emphatic protest. But simple materialism in India, as elsewhere, is nirvāṇa at every death (*dehacchedo mokṣaḥ*)⁴ without retribution for one's deeds in future life. The complicated system of worlds imagined by Buddha, through which the elements composing individual existences are gradually, one after the other, reduced to a state of quiescence and extinction, until in final nirvāṇa all are extinct — is nothing but the realisation of the moral law. The worlds are «produced» by *karma*, which corresponds to a conception of evolution going on under the influence

¹ Or something quite undefinable, *nīḥsattāsattam nīḥsadasad nīrasad avyaktam alīṅgam pradhānam*, Vyāsa ad Y. S. II. 19.

² *Yasmīn sati cetaso vimokṣo (= nirodho) bhavati*, ibid. 525. 9., cp. translation in the Append.

³ European mystics, of course, put all the variety of the Indian speculations about Nirvāṇa into the same bag and declare that, although negative for our reason, it is emotionally very positive indeed, «dem Gefühl nach ein Positivum stärkster Form», cf. Heiler, op. cit. p. 41, following R. Otto, *Das Heilige*.

⁴ Sarvadarśa, p. 3 (B. Ind.).

of an accumulation of moral merit.¹ Simple materialism leaves no room for the working of this law. But neither does, according to Buddha, an eternal spiritual principle leave room for it. The moral law conduces through a very long process of evolution the living world into a state of final quiescence where there is no life, but something lifeless, inanimate.² In this sense the Vaibhāṣika outlook resembles the materialism of modern science.³

IX. THE SAUTRĀNTIKAS

This school, as mentioned above, had quite different tendencies. They denied that the past and future elements really existed in the same sense as the present ones did. They took a much more natural view. The past is what did exist, and the future is what will exist after not having existed. They consequently rejected the double set of elements, the eternal essence and the manifestations, and admitted the reality of these manifestations alone. Nirvāṇa was the absolute end of the manifestations, the end of passion and life (*kleśa-janmanor kṣayaḥ*), without any positive counterpart. It is decidedly insisted upon the fact that nirvāṇa means only the end of the process of life, without any lifeless substance (*dharma*) as the residue or the substratum *in which* life has been extinguished. Nirvāṇa thus loses its materialistic character. The denial of the Sautrāntikas is not a denial of Nirvāṇa in general, not a denial of an idealistic absolute. There is no Buddhism possible without Nirvāṇa, since without Nirvāṇa means without a Buddha. But the Sautrāntikas denied the materialistic Nirvāṇa, just as all the Mahāyānistis did.

The original works of the Sautrāntika school, as mentioned above, are not yet accessible. The school probably contained a great variety of philosophical constructions. The later Sautrāntikas coalesced with the Mahā-

¹ Cp. O. Rosenberg, *Problems*, XVI.

² All the references adduced by M. de la V. P. from Sanghabhadra and Ab. Kośa II, 55 only assert that nirvāṇa, according to the Vaibhāṣikas, was a *vastu*, but not that it was living or spiritual.

³ Prof. M. Anesaki, *Nichiren* (Cambridge, 1916), p. 137 ff. evidently alludes to the Vaibhāṣikas when asserting that Buddhism includes a materialistic school, or a school which its opponents characterized as materialistic. As a curiosity it may be added that when the educational authorities of the newly founded republic of Buriats in Transbaikalia started an antireligious propaganda, they first of all assailed the doctrine of transmigration in its popular form and insisted on the fact that modern science favours a materialistic view of the universe. The Buddhist monks, who are Mahāyānistis, retorted in a pamphlet in which they developed the view that materialism is not unknown to them, since the Vaibhāṣikas maintained that after Nirvāṇa every life ceases for ever.

yānists and formed the hybrid schools of the Sautrāntika - Yogācāras and Mādhyamika - Sautrāntikas.¹ This fact alone proves that in the vital question of Nirvāṇa and Buddha they closely adhered to later Buddhism and can be characterised as a transitional school. From Tibetan sources² we know that they admitted the doctrine of *dharmakāya*, i. e., of a divine Buddha, and this solves the question, because this dogma is the common characteristic of all the schools of the Mahāyāna. They differed from the latter in that they admitted the reality of the phenomenal world which with them included only sense data, consciousness and volition. The momentary flashes to which these entities were reduced were nevertheless conceived as real, not illusions, and their total extinction in Nirvāṇa was maintained. They neither admitted the monistic spiritual principle (*ālaya-vijñāna*) of the idealistic Mahāyānists, nor the principle of relativity (*śūnya-vāda*) of the Mādhyamikas. What their line of argument was we know from the work of Vasumitra upon the early schools.³ The author was himself a Sautrāntika and closes his work with an enumeration of their principle tenets, such tenets that were shared by all the adherents of the school. We find here (under № 3) their tenet that there are two kinds of elements (*skandha*). Besides those which are subject to total extinction at the time of Nirvāṇa, there is a subtle consciousness which survives after Nirvāṇa and of which the former are but a manifestation.⁴ We have here the germ of the *ālaya-vijñāna* of the Yogācāras. If later on the Sautrāntikas objected to this tenet, they probably did it only because, in the Yogācāra system, it involved the illusory character of the external world, whereas the Sautrāntikas stuck to its reality. Most probably they were in this point only the continuators of the Mahāsamghikas, i. e., they adhered to that tendency which at an early date manifested itself among the schools of the Hīnayāna and represented a protest against the treatment of Buddha as essentially human and against the theory of his total disappearance in a materialistic Nirvāṇa. Since every school of the Mahāyāna interpreted Dharmakāya according to their own

¹ Wassilief, Buddhism, pp. 321 ff.

² Ibid. p. 286.

³ Samaya-bheda-uparacana-cakra, trsl. for the first time by Wassilief in his Buddhism. A new english translation with copious and very instructive notes by J. Masuda appeared in Asia Major, II, 1, pp. 1—78 (Leipzig, 1925).

⁴ This is also known from tibetan sources, cf. Wassilief op. cit., p. 273.

ideas in philosophy, the Sautrāntikas likewise interpreted it as a personification of their subtle consciousness.¹

X. THE YOGĀCĀRAS

This was an idealistic school founded by Āryāśaṅga in the IV-V century B. C.

Idealistic views (*vijñāna-vāda*) have appeared in the history of Buddhist philosophy several times and at different places. We have, first of all, kanonical works like the Lankāvatāra-sūtra and others, which are written in imitation of the Upanishads, in a style intentionally averse to precision.² And then we have the three systems of Aśvaghoṣa, Āryāśaṅga and Dignāga. As Mahāyānists they are all monists and believers in the Cosmical Body of the Buddha. But in the process of realisation of this unique substance they all admit the existence of one initial or store consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*) in addition to that indefinite³ consciousness (*citta* = *manas* = *vijñāna*) which was admitted in the Hīnayāna, and they all deny

¹ It thus appears that prof. H. Kern, Manual, p. 123, was right in maintaining that «among the old sects the Mahāsamghikas entertained views agreeing with the Mahāyāna». It is also clear that the Vātsīputriyas (Vajjiputtakas) established their *puṇḍgalavāda* with no other aim than that of supporting the doctrine of a supernatural, surviving Buddha from the philosophical side. Indirectly this proves how philosophic the genuine primitive Buddhism must have been. The very character of the argument of the Vātsīputriyas in favour of the *puṇḍga* is suggestive. It was neither a *dharma* — this they could not maintain, so fresh was its categorical denial by the Master in memory — but neither was it something different from a *dharma*. It was already inexpressible at that time. Had not the denial of the *ātma* been so categorical, the Vātsīputriya would have certainly invented another, not so twisted an argument in support of their belief in a supernatural Buddha. Cf. Ab. Kośa, IX, and my Soul Theory, p. 830.

² In the Lankāvatāra, p. 182—6 (ed. Tokyo 1924) more than 20 different opinions about Nirvāṇa are mentioned. The first evidently alludes to the opinion of the Hīnayānists and the last looks like the opinion of the Yogācāras. All are rejected on the score that Nirvāṇa is undefinable. It is the Mādhyamika view. But the majority of the solutions there mentioned evidently never existed, and those that existed are so formulated that it is difficult to recognise them. It is a fanciful literary composition. Āryadeva's comment, transl. by G. Tucci, T'oung Pao XXV, p. 16 ff., looks like a forgery by some incompetent pandit. The Tibetan Bstan-hgyur, as already noticed by Wassilief, is also full of forged tracts ascribed to Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva. The last solution, p. 184, l. 15 ff., which in the sūtra is evidently mentioned *pour la bonne bouche* is not to be discovered at all in the enumeration of the comment. It has not escaped the perspicacity of E. Burnouf, Introduction² p. 462, that this last solution, although seemingly rejected, was the one favoured by the author. I find no mention of E. Burnouf's translation and comment in the article of G. Tucci.

³ That *vijñāna-skandha* is nothing else than *nirvikalpakam jñānam* and *saṃjñā-skandha* nothing else than *savikalpakam jñānam*, as stated in my Central Conception, p. 18—19, is now corroborated by Udayana, Pariśuddhi, p. 213—214 (B. I.).

the reality of the external world. They thus reduce all the elements (*dharmas*) of Hīnayāna to modes of one single conscious principle. Aśvagoṣa's system¹ is in all essential points the same as the Mādhyamika's, but it accepts the theory of an «All conserving Mind» (*ālaya-vijñāna*), as a stage in the evolution of «Suchness» (*tathatā*) in which consciousness is awakened».²

The Yogācāra school is divided into the ancient one, or the followers of Āryāsaṅga, and the new one, or the followers of Dignāga. The first³ established their idealistic views on a new interpretation of the old Abhidharma. Āryāsaṅga himself composed a Mahāyānist Abhidharma,⁴ where the number of elements (*dharma*) is increased from 75 to 100. The *ālaya-vijñāna* is here a new element, a store house, a real granary, where the seeds (*bīja*) of all future ideas and the traces of all past deeds are stored up. However it is not the Absolute. It belongs to the phenomenal part of existence because all the results (*vipāka*)⁵ of Karma are there stored up. This store-consciousness in this system occupies a position analogous to the Primitive Matter (*pradhāna*)⁶ of the Sāṅkhya school. All individual objects and ideas are regarded as its modifications (*pariṇāma*) by the Sāṅkhya. The Yogācāras likewise regard all separate ideas as modifications of their store-consciousness. This represents a disguised return from the theory of a stream of thought to the doctrine of a substantial Soul.⁷ In the stream of thought every preceding moment of consciousness is the cause of the next following one. This relation, called *samanantara-pratyaya*, is now replaced by the relation of the store consciousness (*ālaya*) to its modifications (*pariṇāma*).⁸

But in the Sāṅkhya system both the Primitive Matter and its modifications were realities. The Yogācāras regarded both as unreal. From their

¹ Whether this Aśvagoṣa, a Mahāyānist, is the same as the author of Buddhacarita has been doubted. About his system cp. Suzuki, Discourse on the awakening of the faith (Chicago, 1900), and Yamakami Sogen, Systems of Buddhist Thought, p. 252 ff. (Calcutta, 1912).

² Suzuki, Op. cit., p. 151.

³ A clear exposition of Āryāsaṅga's system is to be found in the Triṃśikā of Vasubandhu with a comment by Sthiramati, ed. by Sylvain Lévi (Paris, 1925). Cp. Yamakami Sogen op. cit. 210 ff. Cp. B. Keith, Buddhist Phil., p. 242 ff. where all the literature is indicated. A still earlier (third) idealistic school of that name is mentioned, cf. Васильев, Дараната p. 76.

⁴ Abhidharma-samuccaya, Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, vol. 32.

⁵ Cp. Triṃśikā, p. 18. 21.

⁶ Ibid. p. 36. 9.

⁷ Cp. my Central Conception, p. 35.

⁸ Triṃśikā, p. 34. 5 ff. This is Sthiramati's view about *ālaya*. Other views were entertained by Nanda, Dignāga and Dharmapāla, cp. Schiefner, Tāranātha, p. 301.

predecessors, the Mādhyamikas, they adopted the theory of the relativity and consequent unreality (*śūnyatā* = *niḥsvabhāvatā*) of all individual existence,¹ of all plurality, with that difference that they introduced different degrees of this unreality. First of all, individual ideas were unreal because they were logical constructions (*parikalpita*) without any adequate reality corresponding to them in the external world. This was called their essential unreality (*lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā*).² They were nevertheless contingently real (*paratantra*) in that sense that they obeyed to causal laws (*pratitya-samutpāda*).³ This was called their causal unreality or relativity (*utpatti-niḥsvabhāvatā*). They were, at last, unreal individually as far as they were merged in the unique reality (*pariniṣpanna*) of the Absolute (*tathatā* = *dharma-matā*). This was called their absolute unreality (*paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā*)⁴ as individual entities. It was the same as their reality in the Absolute, their reality, so to say, *sub specie aeternitatis*. The Absolute thus became immanent to the phenomenal world, it was neither different, nor undifferent (*nānya nānanya*).⁵ As an assemblage of individual ideas it was different, but viewed as an organic whole it became identical. It was a spiritual Absolute (*citta-dharmatā*),⁶ pure consciousness, undifferentiated into subject and object (*grāhya-grāhaka-rahita*).⁷ It is the essence of Reality (*dharma-dhātu*) and it is therefore identified with the Cosmical Body (*dharma-kāya*) of the Buddha.⁸ All the numerous synonyms which are used to characterise this conception in other schools can be applied to it.⁹ The yogi in his mystic intuition is supposed to possess a direct cognition of this undifferentiated pure consciousness (*advaya-lakṣaṇam vijñapti-mātram*).¹⁰

In the closing chapter of his Abhidharmakośa Vasubandhu mentions the Mahāyānist view that all separate elements, the *dharmas* of the Hīnayāna, have no ultimate reality.¹¹ At that time he rejects this view, but later

¹ Ibid. p. 41. 2.

² Ibid. p. 41. 14.

³ Ibid. p. 41. 18, cp. p. 16. 16, *vijñānam pratitya-samutpannavād dravyato'sti*.

⁴ Ibid. p. 41. 23-24.

⁵ Ibid. p. 40. 6.

⁶ Ibid. p. 42. 16.

⁷ Ibid. p. 40. 4.

⁸ Ibid. p. 43. 25.

⁹ Ibid. p. 41. 26.

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 42. 20.

¹¹ Cp. the transl. of M. de la V. P., IX, p. 273, and my Soul Theory, p. 858.

on, near to the close of his long life, he changes his stand point, and accepts the idealistic theory of his elder brother Asanga. Asanga himself seems also to have, at a certain period of his life, fluctuated between the two main lines in which Mahāyāna was split.¹ But at the end of their career both brothers definitely settled in the conviction, that the universe was a logical construction,² that all its separate elements were relative, not real in themselves, but that they possessed another reality, the *pariniṣpanna*, a reality in the Absolute, they were real when regarded *sub specie aeternitatis*. The theory of Salvation, of this transition from saṃsāra into nirvāṇa, out of the phenomenal world into the Absolute — this greatest puzzle of the Indian mind — underwent a complete change as a consequence of the change in the ontological view. In Hinayāna where, as we have seen, both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa were considered as realities, the mystic power of yoga was called upon to achieve the transition out of the one into the other. Actual experience in transic meditation suggested to the Buddhist philosophers that yoga was capable of arresting some functions of the senses and of the intellect. And since the world was analysed in bits of senses and sense data, it seemed only logical to admit that yoga could achieve the task of arresting the life of the Universe for ever.

The great change produced by the Mahāyāna consisted in the view that the Absolute was immanent to the World. There was consequently no need of converting the elements of the phenomenal world into eternal elements, the *samskṛta-dharmas* into *asamskṛta-dharmas*, the saṃsāra into nirvāṇa. The change consisted in the change of aspect. The mystic power of yoga was now invoked not in order to produce a real change in the constitution of the Universe, but in order to replace the wrong views of unsophisticated humanity by an intuition of what was the absolutely real. To the yogi the world appeared in a quite different aspect, he viewed every separate object as unreal separately, but real *sub specie aeternitatis*. For him the elements (*dharmas*) of the Universe needed no conversion into eternal ones, they were themselves eternally «quiescent».

¹ According to the Tibetans, among the 5 works of Maitreya-Asanga some are written from the Yogācāra standpoint, some from Mādhyamika-svāntarika, and one from the Mādhyamika-prāsangika view.

² *Trimśikā*, XVII, *sarvam vijñaptimātrakam*, and *Sthiramati* remarks, p. 35, that *sarvam* includes both the phenomenal world and the Absolute, *sarvam iti traidhātukam asamskṛtam ca*.

The Hīnayānist conception of separate elements (*dharma*) which were active in phenomenal life and quiescent (*śānta*) or extinct (*niruddha*) in Nirvāṇa was, according to the Yogācāras, contrary to reason. If they were real they could not disappear totally. They were, accordingly, declared to have been always quiescent, quiescent or extinct from the outset (*ādi-śānta*).¹ To regard them as active, in the transcendental sense, is an illusion. In that sense, it can be asserted, that nirvāṇa is real and saṃsāra unreal.

In the system of Dignāga the old Abhidharma is forsaken altogether and replaced by logic and epistemology. Dignāga started with the reform of the Brahmanical logic (*nyāya*) and adapted it to Buddhist ideas. His analysis of cognition resulted in the conception of an extreme concrete and individual (*svalakṣaṇa*), the root, or, so to say, the differential of cognition, a point-instant (*kṣaṇa*) in which existence and cognition, object and subject, coalesce.² The conception of this idealistic school regarding Nirvāṇa may be gathered from the closing words of Dharmakīrti in his «Examination of Solipsism».³ The question is asked how is the omniscience of Buddhas to be understood, of the Buddhas which are the personification of pure consciousness undifferentiated into subject and object, and it is answered that «the penetration of the Buddhas into every existing object is something inconceivable, it is in every respect beyond what we may express in speech or cognise in concepts».

XI. THE MĀDHYAMIKAS

This system of philosophy and dialectics is the foundation of the Mahāyāna religion. Although other systems — the realism of the Sarvāstivādins and the idealism of the Yogācāras — are also studied in the monastic schools of the countries where this religion flourishes, nevertheless the Mādhyamika system is generally regarded as the true background of the religious feelings

¹ Cf. *Mahāyāna-sūtrālamkāra*, ed. Sylvain Lévi (Paris, 1907), XI, 51, trsl. *ibid.* (Paris, 1911) — «ils (les *dharmas*) sont originellement en Paix et en état de Pari-Nirvāṇa». Cf. St. Schayer, *Die Erlösungslehren der Yogācāras nach dem Sūtrālamkāra des Asanga*, *Z. für Indologie*, II, 1, p. 99 ff. The idea that all elements are originally quiescent (*śānta=niṣṛta*) sc. eternally extinct, an idea leading to the theory of everything being real *sub specie aeternitatis* is likewise expressed by Nāgārjuna, *Madhy. ś.*, VII. 16 — *pratitya yad yad bhavati tat tac chāntam svabhāvataḥ*.

² A very interesting and rather subtle discussion between Candrakīrti and Dignāga about the point-instant in which existence and cognition are supposed to coalesce is found in *M. vr.*, p. 59 ff., transl. in the Appendix. Cp. my *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, ch. VII.

³ *Samtānāntarasiddhi*, edited by me in the B. B. and translated into Russian in the series *Памятники индийской философии*, I.

of its votaries. For it must be allowed that the Mahāyāna is a truly new religion, so radically different from Early Buddhism that it exhibits as many points of contact with later Brahmanical religions as with its own predecessor. Prof. O. Rosenberg calls it a separate «church» and compares its position with Roman Catholicism versus Protestantism.¹ The difference is even more radical, since the new religion was obliged to produce a new Kanon of Scriptures.

It never has been fully realised what a radical revolution had transformed the Buddhist church when the new spirit which however was for a long time lurking in it arrived at full eclosion in the first centuries A. D. When we see an atheistic, soul-denying philosophic teaching of a path to personal Final Deliverance, consisting in an absolute extinction of life, and a simple worship of the memory of its human founder, — when we see it superseded by a magnificent High Church with a Supreme God, surrounded by a numerous pantheon and a host of Saints, a religion highly devotional, highly ceremonious and clerical, with an ideal of Universal Salvation of all living creatures, a Salvation by the divine grace of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, a Salvation not in annihilation, but in eternal life, — we are fully justified in maintaining that the history of religions has scarcely witnessed such a break between new and old² within the pale of what nevertheless continues to claim common descent from the same religious founder.³

¹ O. Rosenberg, *Probleme der B. Philosophie*, XIX.

² Very characteristic is also the fact that Buddhist art of the ancient period represented Buddha by an empty place or a symbol which later on is replaced by a divine figure of the Apollo type. Notwithstanding prof. A. Grünwedel's contrary view (*Buddhistische Kunst*, 1st ed., p. 68) the only explanation seems to be that the total disappearance of Buddha in Nirvāṇa was thus given pictorial expression.

³ The two churches coexisted peacefully in the same monasteries, because the Buddhists very wisely always made allowance for human nature which sometimes feels inclination towards a simple rationalistic Low Church and sometimes is attracted towards a devotional and magnificent High Church. They divided humanity in families (*gotra*) of which some by nature belonged to the low-church family (*hinayāna* = *hinādhimukti*) and others to the high-church family. We must imagine the process by which some originally Hīnayānistic monasteries gradually turned Mahāyānistic as a process of aggrandisement. The educational Buddhist monasteries, which are comparable to mediaeval universities, were aggrandised by the addition of a new college which received its own temple and body of monks studying a new special literature and conducting a special worship. In present days we can witness in Transbaikalia the addition to monasteries, which can afford it, of Kālacakra-colleges with a special temple, a special body of monks, a special literature and a special worship. The different types of Buddhist monasteries are described by B. Baradīn in a very instructive work now published at Verchne-Oudinsk, «О буддийских монастырях Монголии и Тибета», (it was accessible to me in MSS. during my visit to that town in 1925).

Yet the philosophical system which is the foundation of this new religion is usually represented as the extreme expression and the logical consequence of that pessimism and skepticism by which Early Buddhism is supposed to have been inspired. It is characterised as «complete and pure nihilism», as «the legitimate logical outcome of the principles underlying ancient Buddhism».¹ It is accused of teaching that «all our ideas are based upon a non-entity or upon the void».² It is represented as a «negativism which radically empties existence up to the last consequences of negation»,³ a doctrine whose conception of reality was one of «absolute nothingness».⁴ The Mādhyamikas are called the most radical Nihilists that ever existed.⁵ When compared with Vedānta, it has been asserted that negation has a positive counterpart in that system, whereas there is none in the Mādhyamika. Negation in the latter is represented as its «exclusive ultimate end (*Selbstzweck*)».⁶

The opponents of Mahāyāna in India describe it much in the same manner. Thus Kumārila accuses the Mādhyamikas not only of denying the existence of external objects, but of denying the reality of our ideas as well.⁷

¹ H. Kern, *Manual*, p. 126; A. Barth, *Quarante ans*, I, p. 108; M. de la Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme*, p. 186.

² H. Jacobi, *A. O. J.*, XXXI, p. 1.

³ M. Walleser, *Die B. Phil.*, II, p. III; *Der ältere Vedānta*, p. 44.

⁴ B. Keith, *op. cit.*, pp. 237, 239, 247, 261 etc. Prof. B. Keith's exposition contains (p. 239) what, in my opinion, is the right view, viz. that Nāgārjuna's real object was to show that the intellect «condemns itself as inadequate just as it finds hopeless antinomies in the world of experience». As prof. B. Keith very well knows, Nāgārjuna is not the only philosopher who adhered to such a line of arguing, very celebrated men have done that. Why then should Nāgārjuna's main conception be «difficult and obscure» (*ibid.*)? He also hits the right mark when he points to a primitive, non-differentiated reality, identified with Buddha's Cosmical Body (*dharmakāya*), as the central conception of Mahāyāna. He even finds (*ibid.* p. 255) much more reality and activity in this conception than in the absolute of the Vedānta with which it is so strikingly similar. How are these views to harmonize with the conflicting opinions of the same author — e. g., p. 261 where it is asserted that for Nāgārjuna the world was «absolute nothingness», that it was «utterly unreal» — I am at a loss to explain. Or does prof. B. Keith suppose that Nāgārjuna did not admit the doctrine of Dharmakāya, or that, having admitted it, he did not fully realise its consequences, or that «the positive side of the Mahāyāna» (p. 257), is a later development out of its negative side?

⁵ I. Wach, *Mahāyāna*, p. 58.

⁶ M. Walleser, *Der ältere Vedānta*, p. 42. «Selbstzweck» is explicitly denied by Nāgārjuna, XXIV, 7 and many other places.

⁷ *Śloka-vārtika*, Nirālambanavāda, 14. In fact the Mādhyamikas denied the validity of the *pramāṇas* and maintained that external and internal were correlative terms which are meaningless beyond this correlation, see below, p. 42.

Vācaspatimiśra is full of respect towards Buddhist logicians, but for the Mādhyamikas he has only remarks of extreme contempt, he calls them fools¹ and accuses them of reducing cognition to nothing.² Śāṅkara accuses them of disregarding all logic and refuses to enter in a controversy with them. The position of Śāṅkara is interesting because, at heart, he is in full agreement with the Mādhyamikas, at least in the main lines, since both maintain the reality of the One-without-a-Second, and the mirage of the manifold. But Śāṅkara, as an ardent hater of Buddhism, would never confess that. He therefore treats the Mādhyamika with great contempt, but not on the score of a «denial of the existence of our ideas», or of maintaining «absolute nothingness», but on the charge that the Mādhyamika denies the possibility of cognising the absolute by logical methods (*pramāṇa*). Vācaspatimiśra in the Bhamatī rightly interprets this point as referring to the opinion of the Mādhyamikas that logic is incapable to solve the question about what existence or non-existence really are. This opinion Śāṅkara himself, as is well known, shares. He does not accept the authority of logic as a means of cognising the Absolute, but he deems it a privilege of the Vedāntin to fare without logic, since he has Revelation to fall back upon. From all his opponents he requires strict logical methods.³ It must be added that the Japanese

¹ *devānām-priya*, cf. Tātp.ṭīkā, p. 341.23, 469.9.

² Ibid. ad N. S., IV. 1. 18, *sarva-sūnyatve khyātur abhāvāt khyāter abhāvaḥ*. Vācaspati knows that they deny *abhāva* just as much, and in the same sense, as they deny *bhāva*, cf. Bhamatī ad V. S., II. 2. 32, *na ca nistattvataiva tattvam bhāvānām, tathā sati hi tattvābhāvaḥ syāt, so'pi ca vicāram na sahata ity uktam bhavadbhīḥ*. He also knows that to transform every thing into *abhāva* is tantamount to endow non-reality with reality, to have a *vigrahavān abhāvaḥ* ibid. 389.22. But this does not prevent him from repeating popular accusations.

³ Cf. Deussen, System des Vedānta, p. 99; Śāṅkara ad V. S., II. 2. 38. The Mādhyamika denies the validity of logic, i. e. of discursive conceptual thought, to establish ultimate truth. On the charge that in doing so he himself resorts to some logic, he replies that the logic of common life is sufficient for showing that all systems contradict one another and that our fundamental conceptions do not resist scrutiny, cf. Vācaspati, Tātparya-ṭīkā, p. 249 — *avicāritasiddhaiḥ pramāṇair itareṣām prāmāṇyam pratiśidhyate*. This is exactly the standpoint which is developed with such infinite subtlety and ingenuity by Śrīharṣa in his Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya where he openly confesses that there is but little difference between Buddhism and Vedānta, a circumstance which Śāṅkara carefully conceals. But in later works, e. g., Vedānta-paribhāṣā, or Nyāyamakaranda, different *pramāṇas* are established as proofs for the existence of *brahman*. When commenting upon V. S., II. 2. 28, Śāṅkara, in combating Buddhist idealism, resorts to arguments of which he himself does not believe a word, since they are arguments which the most genuine realist would use. He thus argues not *sva-matena*, but *paramatam āśrītya*, a method very much in vogue among Indian pandits. Deussen's interpretation of this point, op. cit. p. 260, as intended to vindicate *vyavahāra-satya* is a misunderstanding, since the Buddhists never denied

scholars, Suzuki, Anesaki, Yamakami Sogen and others who have a direct knowledge of what Mahāyāna is have never committed the mistake of regarding its philosophy as nihilism or pure negativism.

We will now shortly refer to the main lines of the philosophy of the Hīnayāna in order better to show the radical change produced by the spirit of Mahāyāna and thus to elicit the real aim of its philosophy.

XII. THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY IN THE HĪNAYĀNA

In a previous work¹ we have characterized Early Buddhism (Hīnayāna) as a system of metaphysics which contained an analysis of existence into its component elements, and established a certain number of ultimate data (*dharma*). Every combination of these data was then declared to represent a nominal, not an ultimate, reality. A substantial Soul was thus transformed into a stream of continuously flowing discreet moments of sensation or pure consciousness (*viññāna*), accompanied by moments of feeling, of ideation, volition (*vedanā-samjñā-samskāra*) etc. Matter (*rūpa*) was conceived on the same pattern, as a flow of momentary flashes without any continuant stuff, but characterised by impenetrability, and representing the senses (*āyatana* 1—5) and sense-data (*āyatana* 7—11). The world was thus transformed into a cinema. The categories of substance, quality and motion — for momentary flashes could possess no motion — were denied, but the reality of sense data and of the elements of mind, was admitted. All these elementary data were conceived as obeying causal laws. But the conception of causality was adapted to the character of these entities which could neither move nor change, but could only appear and disappear. Causation was called dependently-coordinated-origination (*pratitya-sam-utpāda*), or dependent existence. The meaning of it was that every momentary entity sprang into existence, or flashed up, in coordination with other moments. Its formula was «if there is this, there appears that».² Causality was thus assumed

the *vyavahāra* or *saṃvṛtti*. Against M. Walleser's, Der ältere Vedānta p. 43, opinion that the objectivity of our ideas themselves is meant, it must be pointed out that the Buddhists did not deny the *jñānākāra*, and Śāṅkara clearly states that external objects, not ideas, are meant — *tasmād artha-jñānāyor bhedah*.

¹ The Central Conception of Buddhism.

² The same formula in the Pali Canon (Majjh. II. 32, Saṃy. II. 28 etc.), in the Ab. Kośa, III. 18 and 28 and Madhy. vr., p. 10. In the latter instance — *asmiṃ sati idam bhavati, hrasve dāṛgham yathā sati*, the formula clearly refers to coordination, not to causation.

to exist between moments only, the appearance of every moment being coordinated with the appearance of a number of other moments. Strictly speaking it was no causality at all, no question of one thing *producing* the other. There could be neither a *causa materialis*, since there was no continuant substance, nor could there be any *causa efficiens*, since one momentary entity, disappearing as it did at once, could not influence any other entity. So the formula was supplemented by another one «not from itself (*causa materialis*), not from something foreign (*causa efficiens*), nor a combination of both does an entity spring up»,¹ «it is coordinated, it is not really produced».² Apart from these momentary entities³ the system admitted eternal unchanging elements, Space and Nirvāṇa, the latter representing some indefinite essence (*dharmā-svabhāva*), of these forces which were active in phenomenal life, but are now extinct and converted into eternal death. Thus both the phenomenal world and this kind of an absolute, both *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, were conceived as realities, somehow interconnected, linked together in a whole (*sarvam*),⁴ but in an ideal whole, having, as a combination of elements, only nominal existence.

XIII. THIS DOCTRINE MODIFIED IN MAHĀYĀNA

Now, the Mādhyamika system started with an entirely different conception of reality. Real was what possessed a reality of its own (*sva-bhāva*), what was not produced by causes (*akṛta* = *asamskṛta*), what was not dependent upon anything else (*paratra nirapekṣa*).⁵ In Hīnayāna the elements, although interdependent (*samskṛta* = *pratītyasamutpanna*), were real (*vastu*).

¹ Samy. II. 113 and Madhy. Kār. I. 1, XII. 1.

² Madhy. vr., p. 7 — *taṁ tat prāpya yad utpannam notpannam tat svabhāvatāḥ*; ibid. p. 375,6 — *paramārthato 'tyantānutpādatvāt sarvadharmānām*.

³ If I am not very much mistaken, this view of causality, viz. that there is, properly speaking, no real causality, that this notion should be cancelled altogether and replaced by a law of coordination between point-instants, is not quite a stranger to modern science and philosophy, cf. B. Russel, On the Notion of Cause, in *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 194. The Buddhist conception of causality would thus be something similar to the conception of a function in mathematics, «funktionelle Abhängigkeit», such a view of causality as was entertained in Europe by D'Alembert, Comte, Claude Bernard, Avenarius, E. Mach and others, cp. the references in Eisler, *Handwörterbuch der Philosophie*, p. 338. We hope to devote before long a special article to this question.

⁴ Cp. Central Conception, p. 6 and below p. 54, n. 5.

⁵ Madhy. Kār. XV, 2. In the sequel the references with roman figures will refer to chapter and kārikā of Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika śāstra, and the references in Arabic figures to Candrakīrti's comment, ed. B. B. IV.

In Mahāyāna all elements, *because interdependent*, were unreal (*śūnya* = *svabhāva-śūnya*).¹ In Hīnayāna every whole (*rāśi* = *avayavin*) is regarded as a nominal existence (*prajñaptisat*) and only the parts or ultimate elements (*dharmā*) are real (*vastu*). In Mahāyāna all parts or elements are unreal (*śūnya*), and only the whole, i. e., the Whole of the wholes (*dharmatā* = *dharmā-kāya*), is real. The definition of reality (*tattva*) in Mahāyāna is the following one — «uncognisable from without, quiescent, undifferentiated in words, unrealisable in concepts, non-plural — this is the essence of reality».² A dependent existence is no real existence, just as borrowed money is no real wealth.³ The theory that all real existence can last only for one moment, since two moments implied already a synthesis, was abandoned, and the conception of a momentary entity (*kṣaṇa*), so characteristic for other schools of Buddhist thought, was given up,⁴ as unwarranted (*asiddha*), not capable of resisting critique.⁵ In Hīnayāna the individual (*pudgala*), the Self (*ātma*) was resolved in its component elements (*skandha-āyatana-dhātavaḥ* = *anātma*), there were no real personalities (*pudgala-nairātmya*), but a congeries of flashing forces (*samskāra-samūha*). In Mahāyāna we have, on the contrary, a denial of real elements (*dharmā-nairātmya*), and an assertion of the whole, in the sense of the absolute Whole (*dharmā-kāya*).⁶ In Hīnayāna, in a word, we have a radical Pluralism, converted in Mahāyāna in as radical a Monism.

¹ It is clear that we have here that conception of a substance as something independently existing which is well known to the students of European philosophy, cp. Spinoza's definition of substance as «*quod in se est et per se concipitur*». This conception resulted either in establishing the theory of a *harmonia generaliter stabilita* in order to explain the interdependence of the monads, or to the view that there is only one unique substance. The latter view is taken in Mahāyāna, the former in Hīnayāna, where the harmony between the monads is established by *karma* as a special force (*samskāra*), the force *κατὰ φύσιν*, the *πρωτον κινουόν*.

² Ibid. XVIII. 9.

³ Ibid. p. 263.3 — *kālīka-āyācitakam*.

⁴ Ibid. p. 178.9, 545.18, 147.4.

⁵ Ibid. p. 547.1.

⁶ Although the Hīnayānist presses to the utmost the reality of the ultimate elements (*dharmas*) alone, nevertheless the importance of the whole is foreshadowed in the conception of *sarvam* (cp. below p. 54), as well as in the conception of a general Causality. Under the name of *kāraṇa-hetu* a kind of causality is asserted through which every moment of reality is conditioned by nothing short of the state of the whole Universe. This is expressed in the following way, (Ab. Kośa, II. 50), *svato'nye (sarve dharmāḥ) kāraṇa-hetuḥ*, i. e., an element (or a moment) cannot be its own cause, but all the other elements, i. e., the whole Universe, are in some, direct or indirect, causal relation with it. Since the three times (*adhvān*), i. e., all the future and all the

XIV. THE DOCTRINE OF RELATIVITY

In Mahāyāna we are thus faced by a new interpretation of the old Buddhist principle of the dependently-coordinated-existence of the elements (*dharmāṇām pratītya-sam-utpāda*). It is now being declared that whatsoever is dependent or relative cannot be considered as an ultimate reality, and this feature is then pressed to its last extreme. In Hīnayāna existence was bifurcated in conditioned and unconditioned (*samskrta* and *asamskrta*), both being realities. Neither of them is now considered as ultimately real, and both are brought under the higher unity of Relativity. The central conception in Early Buddhism is the idea of a plurality of ultimate elements (*dharma*s). The central conception of Mahāyāna is their relativity (*śūnyatā*). The Buddhists themselves contended that the idea of ultimate elements (*skandha-āyatana-dhātavaḥ*), of their interdependence (*pratītya-samutpāda*) and of the «Four Truths of the Saint» are admitted in both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. But in the first they are referred to the reality of separate elements, and in the second they are interpreted as meaning their relativity, or non-reality.¹ Since we use the term «relative» to describe the fact that a thing can be identified only by mentioning its relations to something else, and becomes meaningless without these relations, implying at the same time that the thing in question is unreal, we safely, for want of a better solution, can translate the word *śūnya* by relative or contingent, and the term *śūnyatā* by relativity or contingency.² This is in any case better than to translate it

past moments are included in the conception «all the elements», *sarve dharmāḥ*, it is clear that although the world appeared in Hīnayāna as validly analyzable into bits, the idea of it as a logical continuum was foreshadowed. In Mahāyāna it became definitely asserted.

¹ The germ of the idea that the elements of existence, because interdependent, are not real can be found in some passages of the Pali Kanon. This Candrakīrti himself admits (*Madhy. avat.* p. 22. 15 ff. B. B. IX). But it does not in the least interfere with the fact that Hīnayāna is a system of radical pluralism, all *dharma*s, and even Nirvāṇa, are *va-tu*, whereas Mahāyānism is a monistic system (*advaya, niṣprapañca*). It is quite impossible to maintain that Hīnayāna is an advaita-system. But if the Mādhyamika system is characterised as negativism, and everything negative is thrown into the same bag, then it is not difficult to discover in Majjh. N. I. 1 a full blown *prajñā-pāramitā*, and to maintain that «es ist ein Irrtum anzunehmen, im alten Buddhismus sei etwas anderes als Negativismus gelehrt worden», as prof. B. Otto Franke has done, cp. Ernst Kuhn Memorial Volume, p. 332 ff. (München 1916). It is also difficult to say what the contention of M. de la V. P. that «there is a great deal of Mādhyamika philosophy in the Pali Kanon» (*E R E VIII*, p. 334) exactly means.

² The notion of Relativity is thus taken in a generalised sense, just as Aristotle himself uses it in the *Metaphysica*, where he treats *Ad aliquid*, not as one among the distinct categories,

by «void» which signification the term has in common life, but not as a technical term in philosophy. That the term *śūnya* is in Mahāyāna a synonym of dependent existence (*pratītya-samutpāda*) and means not something void, but something «devoid» of independent reality (*svabhāva-śūnya*), with the implication that nothing short of the whole possesses independent reality, and with the further implication that the whole forbids every formulation by concept or speech (*niṣprapañca*), since they can only bifurcate (*vikalpa*) reality and never directly seize it—this is attested by an overwhelming mass of evidence in all the Mahāyāna literature.¹ That this term never meant a mathematical void or simple non-existence is most emphatically insisted upon. Those who suppose that *śūnya* means void are declared to have misunderstood the term, they have not understood the purpose for which the term has been introduced.² «We are Relativists, we are not Negativists!» insists Candrakīrti.³ The text book of the Mādhyamika school opens by something like a hymn in honour of Dependent Origination, or Relativity. It can be rendered thus:

The perfect Buddha, the foremost of all Teachers I salute!
He has proclaimed the principle of Relativity,
The principle that nothing (in the Universe) can disappear,
Nor can (anything new) appear,
Nothing has an end,
Nor is there anything eternal,
Nothing is identical (with itself),
Nor is there anything differentiated,
Nothing moves, neither hither, nor thither.
It is (Nirvāṇa), the blissful Quiescence
Of every (possible) Plurality.⁴

but as implicated with all the categories (cp. G. Grote, Aristotle ed. Bain², p. 88) and although he does not maintain that the relative is unreal, but he declares it to be *Ens* in the lowest degree (ibid. p. 85). The question whether *Ens* is itself relative he leaves unsolved.

¹ Ibid. 491,1 — *niravaśeṣa-prapañca-upaśamārtham śūnyatā upadiśyate*; XXIV,18 — *yaḥ pratītya-samatpādoḥ śūnyatām tāṃ pracakṣmahe*; p. 503,12 — *yo'yaṃ pratītya-samutpādo hetupratyayān apekṣya rūpa-vijñānādīnāṃ prādur-bhāvaḥ sa svabhāvena anutpādaḥ... sū śūnyatā*; p. 504,3 — *yaḥ pratītya-adhīnu sa śūnya ukto*; 403,1 — *aśūnyam... apratītya-samutpannam*; p. 591,6 — *iha sarva-bhāvānāṃ pratītya-samutpannatvāc chūnyatvam sakalena śāstreṇa pratipādītam*, etc. etc.

² Ibid. XXIV,7, p. 490,11 — *na cāpi śūnyatāyām yat prayojanam tad vijñāsi*.

³ Ibid. 368,7.

⁴ M. vr., p. 11. 13.

XV. THE REAL ETERNAL BUDDHA COGNISED IN MYSTIC INTUITION

Applying this method to the Hīnayānist conception of an extinct Buddha, representing nevertheless an eternal lifeless substance (*svabhāva* or *dharma*), Nāgārjuna flatly denies the reality of the latter, notwithstanding all the reverential feelings which the idea must have evoked. Buddha is conceived in the Hīnayāna as the ultimate goal of the world's progress, realised in a continuous stream of existences (*bhāva-saṃtati*).¹ He can really exist so far this progress really exists, but an independent existence of both is impossible, because, being interdependent, they are correlative and hence not absolutely real. Just as a man suffering from an eye-decease perceives a double moon² in the sky, just so does the inveterate ignorance of mankind dichotomise every reality. Only ignorance³ can imagine that the Hīnayānistic Buddha has any real existence of his own.⁴ Never did the Buddhas declare that either they themselves or their elements really did exist.⁵ But, of course, it is not for the unsophisticated simple man that the Hīnayānistic Buddha is devoid of any existence. Not being able to withstand the lion's roar of Relativity,⁶ the Hīnayānist, the man of a poorly religious enthusiasm,⁷ runs away, like an antelope, into the dark forest of Realism. But the Mahāyānist's denial does not mean that every hope of salvation must be given up,⁸ because that Buddha who is above every possible determination (*niṣprapañca*) is not denied.⁹ The Mahāyānist, when maintaining that the Buddha, as conceived in Hīnayāna, is not absolutely real (*niḥsvabhāva*), if he wishes to state the whole-truth (*aviparītārtha*),¹⁰ must confess that he cannot even assert so much. Strictly speaking he can assert neither that the Buddha is relational, nor non-relational, nor both at once, nor neither.¹¹ Such characteristics are also conventional (*prajñapti*). They are imputed characteristics (*āropito vyavahārah*).¹² The real Buddha must be *perceived directly by intuition*. The reserved questions, the impossibility to answer whether the world is finite

¹ Ibid. p. 432 ff.

² Ibid. p. 432.10.

³ The Hīnayānistic Buddha is not real, he has no *svabhāva*, cp. XXII. 2, 4, 16, but the Mahāyānistic one has a *svabhāva*. The synonym of *dharma-Kāya* is *svabhāva-Kāya*.

⁴ Ibid. p. 443.2, cf. XXV.34.

⁵ Ibid. 442.13.

⁶ *Svādhimukti-daridra*, ibid. p. 443.1.

⁷ Ibid. p. 442.8.

⁸ Ibid. p. 443.11.

⁹ Ibid. p. 443.13.

¹⁰ Ibid. p. XXII.11.

¹¹ Ibid. p. 444.4.

or infinite, and whether the Buddha survives after Nirvāna are referred just to this impossibility of whatsoever determination.¹ If you insist that there is a Buddha, you needs must concede that after Nirvāna there is none.² But if you realise the relativity of the conception, never will the question about his existence occur to you. Buddha is merged quiescent in nature and beyond every possible determination.³ Those who proceed to dichotomise him as eternal or non-eternal, existent or non-existent, relative or non-relative, omniscient or non-omniscient, are all misled by words.⁴ They have no direct intuition (*na paśyanti*) of the absolute Buddha.⁵ Just as a man who is blind from birth cannot see the sun,⁶ just so are men in the throes of conventional conceptions, they do not perceive the Buddha directly, but wish to detail (*prapañcayanti*) him conceptually. Only by them can He not be seen directly (*aparokṣa-vartin*).⁷ Buddha must be regarded as the cosmical order (*dharmatah*), his Body is the Cosmos (*dharmatā*). The essence of the Cosmos is incognisable, it is impossible to know what it is conceptually.⁸ The reality of Buddha is the reality of the Universe, and as far as the Buddha has no separate reality (*niḥsvabhāva*), neither the Universe has any, apart from him. All the elements of existence, when sifted through the principle of Relativity, become resplendent.⁹ All the millions of existences (*bhūtakoti*) must be regarded as the Body of the Buddha manifested in them. This is Relativity, the climax of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*).¹⁰

XVI. THE NEW CONCEPTION OF NIRVĀNA

Space and that kind of eternal death which was termed Nirvāna were entered in the list of ultimate realities by the schools of Early Buddhism and the Vaibhāṣikas, on the score that they possessed a character (*dharma*), a reality (*vastu*), an individuality (*svalakṣaṇa*), an existence (*bhāva*) of their own (*sva-bhāva*), since they fitted into the current definition of reality

¹ Ibid. p. XXII.12.

² Ibid. p. XXII.14.

³ Ibid. p. 448.1.

⁴ Ibid. p. XXII.15.

⁵ Ibid. p. 448.10.

⁶ Ibid. p. 448.10.

⁷ Ibid. p. 448.9. Such a definition of sense perception, *pratyakṣam aparokṣam* (sc. *artha* not *jñāna*) is opposed by Candrakīrti to the definition of Dignāga *pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham*, cp. M. vr. p. 71. 10. It has been later accepted by the Vedāntins (cp. Vedāntaparibhāṣā) and others; *brahma* the Absolute, is then declared to be cognised by sense-perception by *pratyakṣa*.

⁸ Ibid. p. 448.14-15.

⁹ *Prakṛti-prabhāsarūh sarvadharmāḥ prajñāpāramitā-pariśuddhyā*, ibid. 444.9.

¹⁰ *Tathāgata-kāyo bhūta-koti-prabhāvito draṣṭavyo yad uta prajñāpāramitā*, Aṣṭas., 94.14.

(*sva-bhāva-dhāraṇād dharmāḥ*). They were cancelled by the Sautrāntika on the consideration that they did not possess any such separate reality. They also were cancelled by the Mādhyamikas in consequence of the new definition of reality (*anapekṣaḥ svabhāvaḥ*). This new weapon proved much more efficacious than the Occam Razor of the Sautrāntika, especially as it was wielded by the Mādhyamika with unflinching resolve. His conception of Relativity (*śūnyatā*) covered everything, all the conditional as well as the eternal elements of the Vaibhāṣika list. Indeed the idea of an absolute becomes meaningless, if there is nothing to set against it.¹ It then loses every individuality or reality (*sva-bhāva*). And *vice versa* the phenomenal ceases to be phenomenal if there is nothing non-phenomenal with which it is contrasted. With the new interpretation of the principle of Relativity (*pratītya-samutpāda* = *śūnya*) the Hinayānic Absolute becomes just as relative as all other ultimates of this system.

Very far reaching consequences had inevitably arisen from this newly adopted principle. The whole edifice of Early Buddhism was undermined and smashed. The Nirvāṇa of the Hinayānists, their Buddha, their ontology and moral philosophy, their conceptions of reality and causation were abandoned, together with the idea of the ultimate reality of the senses and sense data (*rūpa*), of the mind (*citta-caitta*), and of all their elements of Matter, Mind and Forces. «Nowhere and never» says Candrakīrti, «have Buddhas preached the reality of the soul or of these Hinayānistic elements».² All the constructions so laboriously built up by the schools of Early Buddhism had to be relinquished with the only exception of the principle of dependently-coordinated-existence (*pratītya-sam-utpāda*) in its new interpretation as Relativity (*śūnyatā*). The textbook of the school devotes a chapter to every conspicuous item of the constructions of Early Buddhism, and destroys it by the same weapon, for whatsoever is relative is false, transient and illusory.

The fortunes of Mahāyāna were greatly assisted by the wonderful style in which Nāgārjuna couched his celebrated aphorisms. Notwithstanding the somewhat monotonous method by which he applies to all the conceptions of Hinayāna the same destructive dialectics, he never ceases to be

¹ Ibid VII. 33.

² Ibid. p. 448.2.

interesting, bold, baffling, sometimes seemingly arrogant. And this method of endless repetition of the same idea, although in different connections, impresses the student with the overwhelming, all-embracing importance of the principle of Relativity. In their Tibetan garb, owing to the monosyllabic cutting precision of this wonderful language, the aphorisms become, if possible, still more eloquent than in the original, and are, up to the present day, studied in the monastic schools, and repeated by the monks with rapturous admiration. Something like terror is inspired by this insisting and obstinate denial of all, even the most revered and cherished notions of the Hinayānist. «What are we to do», exclaims Āryadeva, the next best expounder of the doctrine, «nothing at all exists!»¹ «Even the name of the doctrine inspires terror!»²

However it is only the Hinayānist and all pluralists in general that need to be afraid of Nāgārjuna's dialectics.³ He does not assail, but extols the idea of the Cosmical Body of Buddha. He extols the principle of Relativity, and destroys through it every Plurality, only in order to clear up the ground and establish on it the unique, undefinable (*anirvacanīya*) Essence of Being, the One-without-a-Second. According to the principle of monistic philosophy, consistently applied, all other entities have only a second hand, contingent reality, they are borrowed cash.

This unique reality, although declared to be uncharacterisable (*anirvacanīya*), has been variously characterised as the «element of the elements» (*dharmāṇām dharmatā* or *dharmā-dhātu*), as their relativity (*śūnyatā*), as «thisness» (*idamitā*), as their «relation to thisness» (*idampratyaayatā*), as «suchness» (*tathatā*), as the «suchness of existence» (*bhūta-tathatā*), as the matrix of the Lord (*tathāgata-garbha*), and lastly as the «Cosmical Body of the Lord», as Buddha's Dharmakāya⁴. In this last attribution the Unique Essence of the universe becomes personified and worshiped under the names of Vairocana, Amitābha, the goddess Tārā and others, as a Supreme God. Bud-

¹ P. L. Vaidya, *Catuhṣataka* (Paris, 1923), Kār. 184.

² Ibid. Kār. 289.

³ Prof. H. Kern, *Manual* p. 127, seems also to have been terror-stricken, he exclaims with what sounds like genuine solicitude, «there is no birth, there is no Nirvāṇa! etc.» and makes responsible for this disaster «the principles underlying ancient Buddhism».

⁴ The terms *prajñā-pāramitā* and *abhisamaya*, when used in an objective sense (*karma-sādhana*), mean the same. The Yogācāras would add as synonymous *citta-dharmatā*, *vijñapti-mātratā*, *pariṇiṣpannatā*, cp. *Triṃśikā*, p. 42.

dhism becomes at once pantheistic and theistic or, as prof. M. Anesaki prefers to put it, Cosmotheistic.¹

Buddha and Nirvāṇa are different names for the same thing. But Nāgārjuna treats the same thing under four or five different headings, his object being to show that whatever be the verbal designation (*prapañca* = *vāk*),² from whatever side the problem of the absolute be tackled, the result is the same. If the phenomenal world is not real, neither can it have a real end.⁴ To suppose that the phenomenal world really existed before Nirvāṇa, in order to be changed so as not to exist after Nirvāṇa, is an illusion which must be given up the sooner the better.⁵ Whether we take the Vaibhāsika view and maintain that Nirvāṇa is something real (*dharma*) in which consciousness and life are extinct for ever,⁶ or if we, with the Sautrāntika, admit that it is the simple cessation of the world process,⁷ in both cases something real is assumed to exist before Nirvāṇa and to disappear afterwards. This makes Nirvāṇa not only relative, but a product of causes (*samskr̥ta*).⁸ In full accordance with the idea of a monistic universe it is now asserted that there is not a shade of difference between the Absolute and the Phenomenal, between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra.⁹ The universe viewed as a whole is the Absolute, viewed as a process it is the Phenomenal. Nāgārjuna declares,¹⁰

*«ya ājavamjavābhāva upādāya pratītya vā
so 'pratītyānupādāya nirvāṇam upadiśyate».*

This may be rendered thus—«having regard to causes or conditions (constituting all phenomena, we call this world) a phenomenal world. This same world, when causes and conditions are disregarded, (i. e., the world as a whole, *sub specie aeternitatis*) is called the Absolute.»

¹ In a very interesting book prof. M. Anesaki, *Buddhist Art in its relation to Buddhist Ideals*, (Boston and New York, 1915) shows how the perfection of that Japanese art which has evoked the admiration of the world is due to the influence of Mahāyāna ideals, to this genuine feeling of communion with the eternal, all-pervading principle of life, the Dharmakāya, realised by the artist in mystic intuition in every flower, every plant and every living creature he was painting. Is it not strange that the philosophy which establishes these ideals has been so utterly misunderstood by European scholarship?

² M. vr. 373. 9.

⁴ Ibid. XXV. 1.

⁶ Ibid. p. 225. 10.

⁸ Ibid. XXV. 5, 13.

¹⁰ Ibid. XXV. 9.

³ Ibid. p. 175.

⁵ Ibid. p. 522. 6.

⁷ *Kleśa-janmanor abhāva*, ibid. p. 527. 7.

⁹ Ibid. XXV. 20.

XVII. IS RELATIVITY ITSELF RELATIVE? CONDEMNATION OF ALL LOGIC FOR THE COGNITION OF THE ABSOLUTE

But the principle of Relativity (*sūnyatā*) did not prove an entirely safe foundation for the New Buddhism. A danger lurked in it which was likely to bring the whole construction in jeopardy. Just as the Absolute of Early Buddhism could not escape from the fate of being declared relative, just so was Relativity itself relative,¹ it clearly depended upon its opposite, the non-relative, and without this contrast it was likely to lose every meaning. Nāgārjuna did not shrink before this danger and faced it with the same audacious spirit as he was wont to do. This principle, the pivot of the system, is called upon in order to destroy all theories and to replace them, as we have seen above, by direct mystic intuition, not in order to replace it by a new theory. As a theory it is just as bad as the old ones, it is even much worse. «If something non-relative», says Nāgārjuna,² «did really exist, we would then likewise admit the existence of the relative, but there is absolutely nothing non-relative, how then can we admit the existence of the relative (or the truth of Relativity).» «Relativity», explains Candrakīrti, «is here the common characteristic of all the elements (*dharma*) of existence. That is our view. But since there is no element which would be non-relative, Relativity itself, for want of those objects with which it could be contrasted, (becomes as inane as a mirage), as a garland of flowers in the sky». Does this mean that Relativity should be rejected? No, «because the Buddhas have taught that to realise the relativity of all artificial conceptions is the only way to get rid of them. But if people then begin to cling to this very concept of Relativity, they must be called irreclaimable». ³ «It is», explains Candrakīrti, ⁴ «as if somebody said, „I have nothing to sell you,“ and would receive the answer, „All right, just sell me this your absence of goods for sale!“» We

¹ I find the question whether Relativity is itself relative mentioned by B. Russell (A B C of Relativity, p. 14) and declined with the remark that it is absurd. Nevertheless the question exists and cannot be dismissed on such grounds, the more so by an author from whom we learn that «whosoever wishes to become a philosopher must learn not to be frightened by absurdities». (The Problems of Philosophy, London 1921, p. 31).

² Ibid. XIII. 7.

³ Ibid. XIII. 8.

⁴ Ibid. p. 247. 6.

read in the Ratnakūṭa,¹ «I declare that those are rotten, and many times rotten who, having conceived relativity, cling to it (as a new theory). It is much better to cling to the false idea of a really existing personality (*pudgala*), notwithstanding it is a blunder of Himalayan dimensions, than to cling to this doctrine of relativity which (in this case would be) a doctrine of the void (*abhāva*). . . It is as if a doctor² administered a powerful remedy which would remove all the ailments of the patient, but could not afterwards be expelled from the abdomen. Do you think that the patient would be really cured? No, he would suffer even much more than he did suffer before!»

The characterisation of reality as Relativity is resorted to in extremis for want of any other expedient. It is a verbal characterisation, it takes into account the necessities of speech (*śabdān upādāya prajñaptih*).³ The Sautrāntika made use of the conception of a nominal entity (*prajñaptisat*), as has been mentioned above, when combating the artificial constructions of Early Buddhism. This conception was extended by the Mahāyānists so as to cover all the elements without exception. Sense data, consciousness, feeling, volition were declared by the Sautrāntikas ultimate realities. But Nāgārjuna did not spare them. They became all relative and nominal, and relativity itself was but a nominal «middle path» of approaching reality. Middle path meant in Early Buddhism steering between materialism (*ucchedavāda*) and the doctrine of an eternal Soul (*śāsvatavāda*). Its positive content was the doctrine of separate elements (*dharma*). In Mahāyāna this term changes its meaning and becomes synonymous with Relativity (*śūnyatā*). Relativity is the Middle Path.⁴

XIX. PARALLEL DEVELOPMENTS IN BUDDHISM AND BRAHMANISM

That the evolution from Hīnayāna to Mahāyāna ran parallel with the movement which in other Indian religions at the same epoch led to the establishing of their pantheons and their supreme deities of Śiva and Vishnu, is quite obvious. The brahmanical religions were likewise founded on a background of pantheism, on radical monism with the Śaivists, and a somewhat mitigated

¹ Ibid. p. 248.7

² Ibid. p. 248.11.

³ Ibid. XXIV. 18, XXII.11, p. 215.1, 286.1.

⁴ Ibid. XXIV. 18. Therefore. Mādhyamika-śāstra must be translated «A Treatise on Relativity.»

one with the Vishnuites. Both tendencies represented old traditions, based on explicit, though contradictory, utterances of the Upanishads. That the Mahāyāna is indebted to some Aupaniṣada influence is most probable. That Gaudapāda and Śāṅkara have been, in their turn, influenced by the dialectic of Nāgārjuna can hardly be denied. But it is at present impossible to elicit something definite about the strength of these influences, their time and their place. A Mahāyānist tendency seems to have manifested itself very early in the Buddhist schools. Part of the community was not satisfied to see in Buddha an essentially human nature, and felt restive before the idea of his total disparition in Nirvāṇa. Some centuries later this tendency reaches full eclosion and a great man, Nāgārjuna, gives lustre and popularity to a new Church. Its philosophy made volte-face from Pluralism to Monism.

XIX. EUROPEAN PARALLELS

To assign to Nāgārjuna his place among the great philosophers of humanity is not so much the task of the Indianist, as of the general historian of philosophy. But until the texts are made accessible in translations intelligible to him we cannot expect him to guide us.¹ The Indianist finds himself obliged tentatively to do it himself in comparing the ideas he comes across in India with what may be found similar in the vast field of European philosophy. In characterizing an Indian philosopher as «nihilist», rationalist, pantheist or realist some comparison is already involved. If A. Barth, E. Senart and others have protested against premature and misleading comparisons it is only because they were inclined to find between the Indian philosopher and his European associate more points of divergence than of similarity, but to find divergence means already to compare. To characterise Nāgārjuna as a «nihilist» means to make a misleading comparison, since his condemnation of logic is only one part, and not the principal one, of his philosophy. In order to understand a philosopher there is no better method than the one proposed and so brilliantly applied by H. Bergson, i.e., to dissect him in different parts which by themselves will not be the philo-

¹ The two translations by prof. M. Walleser, *Die Mittlere Lehre*, (Heidelberg 1911 and 1912) are extremely useful for the study of the texts, they would have been still more useful if comparative indices were added to them. But being literal we doubt whether they could convey any definite impression in the mind of a philosopher.

sopher in question, but which summarized will help us to understand him.¹

Upon the Indian side we must first of all point to the almost absolute identity with Vedānta, as a probable consequence of his indebtedness to Aupanishada tradition. If prof. B. Keith and prof. M. Walleiser suppose that Nāgārjuna stops at negation, or denies even the empirical reality of this world, it is only because his real aim, the positive counterpart of his negativism, the identity of *dharmakāya* and *brahma*, has escaped their attention. It follows from this identity that all the points of contact which prof. Deussen has really found, or imagined to have found, between Schopenhauer and Vedānta, will equally apply to Nāgārjuna. This philosophy was most decidedly opposed to rationalism, to those systems, modern or ancient, Indian or European, which asserted the capacity of human reason to cognise things as they really are. He even presses this incapacity to the utmost and challenges the claims of logic with greater emphasis than any philosopher ever has done. Other remarkable parallelisms may be pointed out which refer to the step taken by Nāgārjuna from Pluralism to Monism. Whether the systems operated with the conception of an independent substance and assumed the existence of separate, though harmonising, monads, or assumed a perpetual stream of passing events, the next step is to imagine one all-embracing indivisible substance. This, as we have seen, is the position of Mahāyāna versus Hīnayāna. It has been paralleled in Greece by the position of Parmenides versus Heraclitus. The step was repeated in modern German philosophy. Prof. H. Jacobi has already suggested² a comparison between Zeno of Eleia and Nāgārjuna. We may add that the similarity was not limited to their dialectics. Zeno, as is now known, devised the celebrated «sophisms» in order to prove the impossibility of motion, and in support of Parmenides's conception of the world as one motionless whole.³

Very remarkable are then the coincidences between Nāgārjuna's negativism and the condemnation by Mr. Bradley of almost every conception of the every day world: things and qualities, relations, space and time, change, causation, motion, the Self. From the Indian standpoint Bradley can be characterised as a genuine Mādhyamika. But above all these

¹ De l'intuition philosophique, Revue de Metaph., 1911.

² A. O. J. XXXI. 1, p. 1.

³ Cp. Bertrand Russel, External World, p. 167 ff.

parallelisms we may perhaps find a still greater family likeness between the dialectical method of Hegel and Nāgārjuna's dialectics. Hegel in his *Phänomenologie des Geistes*¹ challenges common sense to point out some object which is certainly known for what, in our experience, it is, and solves the question by stating that all we really know of the object is its «thisness», all its remaining content is relation. This is the exact meaning of the *tathatā*, or of «suchness», of the Mahāyānist, and Relativity, as we have seen, is the exact meaning of the term *śūnyatā*. We further see the full application of the method which maintains that we can truly define an object only by taking explicit account of other objects, with whom it is contrasted, that debarring this contrast the object becomes «devoid» of any content, and that both the opposites coalesce in some higher unity which embraces them both. The facts are knowable only as interrelated, and the universal law of Relativity is all that is properly meant by reality. Both philosophers assure us that Negativity (*śūnyatā*) is the Soul of the Universe, «Negativität ist die Seele der Welt». Reducing the world of fact to a realm of universal relativity this implies that every thing cognisable is false, transient and illusory, but that the constitution of the real world depends upon this very fact. Even sensations and sense data (*vijñāna*)² which first appeared as ultimate realities, we then gradually discover to stand in relations without which they prove to be meaningless. Relativity, or negativity, is really the Soul of the Universe.

Some more points of similarity will be easily detected between Nāgārjuna and every monistic philosophy, the more so between him and those philosophers who, like Nicolaus Cusanus, G. Bruno and others, insist upon the negative method of cognising the Absolute. It will hardly be denied that the Mahāyānist conception of Buddha's Cosmical Body as the unique substance is very similar to Spinoza's conception of God as the only substance, *Deus sive substantia*, *Deus sive natura*. Although Spinoza's *intuitus* of everything particular *sub specie aeternitatis* is supposed to be a rational capacity of the intellect and Nāgārjuna's intuition is mystic, nevertheless both lead to the same result.

These several points of similarity should, as a matter of course, be taken for what they are worth. For one thing, they might preclude the character-

¹ For the English phrasing of Hegel's principles I am indebted to Baldwin's dictionary.

² Ibid. IV. 1.

ristic of a «nihilist» to be applied to Nāgārjuna. The chief divergence between him and his European colleagues in Monism is that he did not believe in logic, at least for the ultimate aim of cognising what reality in itself is. Hegel and Bradley seem to believe in the efficiency of their logic. It did not occur to them that if applied to their own results their logic would sublate itself. Nāgārjuna was fully aware of this fact. Therefore abandoning logic altogether he betook himself to direct mystic intuition of the Absolute, the One-without-a-Second. This step, or jump, from a condemned logic to direct intuition, has been made by many philosophers and in our days it has a very eloquent exponent in the person of M. H. Bergson.

XX. THE POSITION OF NYĀYA-VAIŚEŚIKA

The estrangement which befell many scholars at the idea of annihilation as the ultimate goal of a religion would perhaps never have been so strong if it had been known that Buddhism was by no means the only Indian system which had arrived at such conclusions. Besides a series of systems of a decidedly materialistic tinge, the orthodox Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system adhered to the conception of an absolutely lifeless Nirvāṇa.¹ This annihilation of all life is here called Final Deliverance (*mokṣa*) or Absolute End (*apavarga*) and is characterized as a kind of «superbliss» (*nirhreyasa*).² «Is it possible», asks Vātsyāyana, «that an enlightened man should favour a Final Release in which there is neither bliss nor consciousness? And he answers by another question — «Is it possible that an enlightened man should not favour the idea of a Final Release where all turmoil of life is stopped for ever and where there is no consciousness about it!». «This Release», he says, «is tranquility where everything is given up, everything has ceased to exist, and therefore a great deal of depression, horrors and sin are extinct».³ Jayanta exclaims likewise, «is it possible that reasonable men should make efforts in order to reduce themselves to a stone-like (inanimate) condition?» and gives the same reply.⁴

All Indian philosophical systems professed to be doctrines of Salvation. They therefore start from the conception of a whole (*sarvam*)⁵ which is then

¹ Cf. S. N. Dasgupta's History of Indian Philosophy, p. 362 ff.

² Nyāyasūtra, I, 1, 2 and 22.

³ Nyāyabhāṣya, p. 9 (Vizian.).

⁴ Nyāyamañjarī, p. 509 (Vizian.).

⁵ That *sarvam*, in its technical sense, does not include *nirvāṇa*, as M. de la Vallée Poussin asserts, op. cit. p. 139, is quite wrong. *Sarvam* means *sarvam jñeyam* which is but an

split in two halves, Phenomenal life and the Absolute (*saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*). The phenomenal part is further divided into an analysis of its actual condition (*duḥkha*), its driving forces (*duḥkha-samudaya*) and their gradual extinction (*mārga*). When this extinction (*nirodha*) is reached, life merges into the Absolute about whose essence a variety of constructions exist. These four topics, — the four «noble truths», as the term has been very inadequately translated and represented as a fundamental principle of Buddhism, — contain, in reality, no doctrine at all.¹ It is only a scheme for philosophical constructions and is accepted as such by all Indian systems without exception. They cover, indeed, the Indian conception of philosophy. Uddyotakara says, «these are the four topics which are investigated by every philosopher in every system of metaphysics».² Accordingly every philosophical system must contain an analysis of the elements of life, a doctrine about its driving forces, a doctrine of the Absolute and a doctrine about the method to be followed in order to escape out of phenomenal life and become merged in the Absolute. Phenomenal life receives in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system the designation of *duḥkha*, just as in Buddhism. It is very inadequate to translate this term by suffering, misery, pain etc., since it covers such items as inanimate matter, the five objects of sense, colours, sounds, tastes and tactile phenomena.³ These are not the objects to which the term suffering can be

other name for the 12 āyatana (corresponding to the 12 prameyas of Nyāyasūtra I, 1, 9), *nirvāṇa* is included in āyatana № 12 (*dharmā*), cf. my Central Conception, appendix II, p. 106, the elements E. 2—3. This is also clear from Saṃyutta IV, 15 where *sabba* is used in its technical sense, *sabba-vaggo, sabbam vo bhikkhave desissāmi*. The passage in Majjhima I, 3 contains no statement about this topic at all. The classification of the elements into 12 āyatanas and into 16 dhātus includes *nirvāṇa*, the one into *skandhas* (VIth classification) does not. Cf. also Tripiṭkā, p. 36, *sarvam iti traidhātukam asaṃskṛtam ca*.

¹ This clearly appears from the fact that the «truths» are explicitly admitted in the Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems and implicitly in all the others. Within the pale of Buddhism they cover two opposite theories, the *dharmā = pudgala-nairātmya* theory of the Hinayāna and the *śūnyatā = dharma-nairātmya* theory of Mahāyāna, cf. above p. 41. They are a classification of the elements in four stages as viewed by the saint, the *ārya*, cf. Madh. vṛtti, p. 127, *āryāṇām eva tat satyam*, and Ab. Kośa, VI, 2, and the tables appended to my Central Conception. The editors of the P. T. S. Pali Dict. think that *ārya* has a «racial» meaning, *ārya-pudgala* would then mean, not the same as *anāsrava-dharmā* or *mārga-satya*, but something like «a noble gentleman»; but T. W. Rhys Davids rightly translates it «Arhat» in D. N., I, 37, cf. Dialogues, I, 51.

² Nyāyavārt, ed. B. I., p. 13, *etāni catvāry arthapādāni sarvāṃ adhyātmaśāstrīṇa sarvācāryair varṇyanta iti*.

³ Vātsyāyana says that *duḥkha* means *janma* (ad N. S., I, 1, 22) and Vācaspati explains, *duḥkhaśabdena sarve śarīrādāya ucyante*, and warns against confounding it with suffering, *mukhyam eva duḥkham iti dharmo mā bhūt*; the same is pressed by Jayanta, *na ca mukhyam*

safely applied in our language, if we are to escape confusion. Bliss itself is entered into the classification of existence (*duḥkha*), as one of its 21 items. And this is quite natural because there is no eternal bliss neither in early Buddhism nor in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, if the «super-bliss» of disappearing into an eternal senseless condition be excepted. The classification into 21 items is but a slight modification of the Buddhist classification into 16 component parts of existence (*dhātu*).¹ The reason why this term has been chosen as a designation of phenomenal life is that philosophy seeks a way out of it. Philosophy is the science of the Absolute, of Nirvāṇa. For every philosopher all phenomenal life is something that must be shunned, it is *heya*. The analysis of existence into its elements, as has been stated above, is undertaken in order to determine the means by which all the forces of life must gradually, one after the other, be brought to a standstill.

It is likewise a general feature of all Indian systems that they assume the existence of a central force which keeps life going in this world, nay in all the imaginable worlds. This general force (*karma*) is resolved into the special ones, termed illusion, desire and aversion. They produce germs of future actions and until they are neutralized by corresponding methods, they will always produce a continuation of life. Illusion is neutralized by philosophic insight, but the decisive and final step which stops empirical life for ever and transfers the individual into the Absolute is achieved by Yoga, i. e., by that mystical power which is produced by absorption in intense concentrated meditation. These conceptions represent a characteristic Indian habit of thought. We meet them everywhere. Their origin is certainly not to be sought for in the Yoga system of Pātañjali which has been proved to be a very late production, about 800 years later than the origin of Buddhism. Their most primitive and crude form appears in the Jaina system. The defi-

eva duḥkham bāḍhanāsvabhāvam avamṛśyate, kim tu tatsādhanam todanūṣaktam ca sarvam eva. (Nyāyamañjarī, Vizian., p. 507). Cf. Ab. Koṣa, VI, 3, and Madhy. vṛtti, p. 127, *iha hi pañcōpādāna-skandhā duḥkham ity ucyate*. Exactly the same definition in Saṃyutta N., III, 47. It is a technical term, the equivalent of the first *ārya-satya* and of the *sāsrava-dharmāḥ*; «suffering» is *duḥkha-vedanā*, a quite different thing, it has an other place in the system under *vedanā-skandha*. To confound them is a mistake, just as to confound *rūpa-āyatana* with *rūpa-skandha* (the latter includes 10 *āyatanas*), or the 3 *dhātus* with the 18 *dhātus*, or the 6 *indriyas* with the 22 *indriyas*, or the 75 *dharmas* with the 64 *dharmāḥ*, etc. Cf. M. C. Rhys Davids, B. Psych., p. 83.

¹ Another classification of every thing cognizable into 12 *prameyas*, cf. Nyāyasūtra, I. 1. 9, corresponds, to a certain extent, to the Buddhist classification into 12 *āyatanas*.

ling elements of illusion, desire, aversion etc. are here represented as a kind of subtle matter which through the pores of the skin flows into the body and fills it up like absorbed medicine or like a bag is filled with sand.¹ By taking vows, by ascetic and meditative practices the entrance into the body is shut up, the inflow ceases, and the individual becomes purified. In all other systems this process is spiritualized, and instead of an «inflow» of defiling matter we have an «influence» (*āsrava*) of defiling psychical elements which is being stopped by insight and meditation. All elements of existence are in the Buddhist system, as mentioned above, divided in such that can be extinguished by philosophic knowledge, and such that can be extinguished by mystical absorption only. The first class includes wrong views, under which item the naïve realism of ordinary men is understood. Desire, passion and even the physical elements of matter can be extinguished for ever only by the force of absorption.² Although the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system favours a naïvely realistic view of the universe, it has no other means of reaching Nirvāṇa than the mystical power of Yoga. «The details about this matter», says Vātsyāyana, «will be found in special yoga manuals». Any question about the efficiency of this method is answered by stating that the power of yoga is illimited. The Nyāya sūtras mention a characteristic objection from some skeptic mind.³ A man, says he, may be intensely absorbed in meditation, so as to forget everything which exists about him. He may retire into a lonely place, a forest, a cave, a sandy beach, and there practice meditation until every perception of the external

¹ Cf. Tattvārthadharmasūtra, VI. 2 ff., VIII. 2 (transl. by H. Jacobi, Z. D. M. G., LX). Cf. also the detailed and very clear exposition of the complicated Jaina theory in H. v. Glase-napp, Der Jainismus (Berlin, 1925), p. 158 f. The passions are imagined as a kind of tar by which the influent matter is glued with the Soul, *ibid.* VI. 5.

² *Samudaya-satya* (= *heya-hetuh*) consists in Nyāya just as in Buddhism of *avidyā-tṣṛṇe*. cf. Nyāyavārt, p. 4, l. 13. It is specified that these elements are also included in *duḥkha* (i. e. in the *upādānaskandhas*) — *tad dhetuḥ ca duḥkham uktam*, *ibid.* Their respective antidotes (i. e. *mārga*) consist on both sides of *prajñā* and *samādhi*, cf. Vaiś. sūtra, V. 17—18. *Prajñā* is characterised as *dharma-praviveka* (cf. Vātsyāyana ad IV. 2, 41) which corresponds to the Buddhist *dharma-pravicaya* (Abh. Koṣa, I, 2).

³ Nyāyabhāṣya ad IV, 2, 46. Although the *prasankhyāna* is analogous to *prati-sankhyā-nirodha* of the Buddhists, its procedure is different. By the illimited mystic power of Yoga innumerable «magic bodies», *nirmāṇa-kāya*, must be created at once, to atone in them for endless former deeds and thus to reach Final Extinction. Cf. Tātparyatikā, p. 6. This prof. B. Keith, Indian Logic and Atomism, p. 260, calls «vulgar thaumaturgy». According to such phrasing Dr. H. Beck, who interprets even the knowledge of *duḥkha-satya* as a vision of ethereal bodies (Buddhismus², II, p. 89 f.), would be called a magician. Usually these men are called mystics.

⁴ IV, 2, 39—44.

world has ceased. Nevertheless when external phenomena of exceptional force, as e.g., a thunderstorm, overcome him, he will awake out of the most intense meditation. Why could not the same happen to him in the moment he is about to attain Final Release, if this is to be attained by such meditation? The objection is answered by pointing to the mystical power of trance which stops all energies of life for ever. After that no living bodies, no feelings and no cognitions can exist.

We thus see that an appeal to the mystical power of yoga is a common feature of many Indian philosophical systems. It is needed to fill up the place of the four main subjects which are another general feature of the Indian systems. The originality of each system lies in its ontology, its theory of cognition, its conception of the Absolute, and the details of its construction of a path leading to Final Release. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system assumes a limited number of substances with their changing qualities. The Soul of the individual is here represented as an eternal substance, it is ubiquitous and conterminous with space. Knowledge is produced in it by a special contact with an internal organ of a physical nature. When the body is removed from one place to another, feelings and ideas are produced in a new part of this same motionless¹ substance by its occasional contact with the internal organ which follows the movement of the body. Soul is thus a semi-material ubiquitous substance similar to space and time which in this system are equally conceived as separate ubiquitous substances. This construction facilitates the transition out of phenomenal life with its feelings and cognitions into the Absolute, which is the absolutely senseless and lifeless state of this very substance. By the power of absorption the internal organ is kept back from all contact with the Soul and the senses. No consciousness is then produced, all life is annihilated, but the substance of the Soul reverts in Nirvāṇa to its original and natural condition (*svarūpāvasthā*).

The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika were at an early date engaged in a controversy with the Vedāntins about the condition of the liberated Soul. The Vaiśeṣikas maintained that it was simply a cessation of all life, just as a cessation of fire when all fuel is exhausted.² What is this eternal bliss

¹ Faddegon, *Vaiśeṣika System*, p. 272—3, thinks that this Soul was imagined «as really moving». This is quite impossible since it represents a unity (Vaiś. S. III, 2, 19) and is omnipresent (*vibhu*, *parama-mahat*, ibid. VII. 1, 22). Cf. also Nyāyabinduṭīkā ed. B. B., p. 65, *niskriyāś cātmā... sarvagataḥ*.

² In his vindication of a substantial Soul Faddegon, op. cit., p. 276 ff., apparently

and what is this eternal consciousness, they ask, which constitutes the essence of the eternal spiritual principle according to the Vedāntins? Since all objects of knowledge have entirely disappeared for ever in Nirvāṇa, it is a joy without something to be enjoyed, and it is knowledge without knowing anything. Such feeling and such knowledge, even if they existed, would be as good as if they never existed at all (*sthitopy asthītān na viśiṣyate*).¹ «But then», asks an objector, «your Soul would be as lifeless as a stone?»² The Vaiśeṣika concedes the argument, although he seems to prefer, as a sort of *image médiatrice*, the comparison with space.³ A question is next asked which gives expression to that feeling of estrangement which is so strong when we think of annihilation as an ultimate goal. «No wise men will ever strive to attain Final Deliverance (*mokṣa-nirvāṇa*) if, after all consciousness and life have been annihilated, it becomes similar to a piece of rock (*śilā-sakala-kalpa*),⁴ if it is undistinguishable from a stone (*pāṣāṇa-nirviśeṣaḥ*), if it is inanimate (*jaḍa*).» «But, says the author, wise men do not exert themselves for bliss alone. Experience shows that they also exert themselves to escape pain, like when they, e.g., «avoid being stung by thorns».⁵ Phenomenal life being here comparable to pain, the result is that the annihilation of it alone is the ultimate aim of man on earth. This ultimate annihilation and this lifeless substance receive the epithet of the place of Immortality (*amṛtyu-padam*),⁶ the same epithet which final annihilation receives in Early Buddhism. Its eternal unchanging character is thereby emphasized.

Nor was this analogy between the theories of the Buddhists and the Nāyāyikas ignored by the latter. We find in the Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta (p. 512) the following very characteristic deliverance: «By nirvāṇa and

assumes that the Vaiśeṣikas imagined the Soul as a conscious substance, just as the Sāṅkhyas and the Vedāntins did. But consciousness (*buddhi*) is in that system only a *guṇa* of the *ātman*, it appears occasionally through a special contact. The Soul in itself (*svarūpāvasthāyām*) has neither consciousness, nor feeling.

¹ Nyāyakandali, p. 286 (Vizian.), cf. Nyāyamañjarī, p. 510, l. 12—13.

² Ibid. That the pure essence of a Soul, or of the substance that produces consciousness is itself as lifeless (*jaḍa*) as a stone seems to be here an extreme consequence drawn by the objector, the comparison with space, as an ubiquitous substance, is more adequate.

³ Cf. Vaiś. sūtra, VII. 1. 22; Bhāsarvajña's Nyāyasāra, p. 39 (B. Ind. 1910)

⁴ Cf. Nyāyamañjarī, p. 508 f. and Nyāyatātparyadīpikā, p. 282 (Ibid). Cp. Naiṣadhiya, XVII. 75, *muktaye yāḥ śilātāvāya sāstram ūce... Gotaman*.

⁵ Nyāyasāra, p. 40.

⁶ Nyāyabhāṣya, p. 30, cf. likewise p. p. 31-34 where the controversy with Vedānta is already in full swing.

similar expressions the Buddhists mean an absolute end (*apavarga*) which is either (in *Hīnayāna*) the annihilation of the flow of consciousness, or (in *Mahāyāna*) a flow of pure (objectless) consciousness. (The first) solution — annihilation — is even more pitiful than (the condition to which Soul is reduced in *nirvāṇa*) according to the *Nāyāyikas*, since it does not leave to the Soul even a stonelike condition. But in one point we agree with the Buddhists, viz. that there is a difference between the essence of the Soul by itself and the form in which it appears in its reciprocal action with other objects. A constant change of (this substantial) Soul (as maintained by the Buddhists) is absolutely inconceivable, it must be rejected as impossible, just as (the converse theory of the Buddhist about the sound, viz. that) sound is a substance (sc. atomic).»

The *Nirvāṇa* of the old ¹ *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school is thus lifeless and similar to the *Nirvāṇa* of the *Vaiśeṣika-Buddhists*. On the other hand the *Nirvāṇa* of the *Mahāyānists*, to which the *Sautrāntikas* adhered, has the same pantheistic character as the *Nirvāṇa* of the *Vedāntists*.

XXI. CONCLUSION

The probable history of the Buddhist conception of the Absolute is, therefore, the following one.

1. In the VI century B. C. there was a great effervescence of philosophical thought among the non-brahmanical classes of India, and a way out of phenomenal life was ardently sought for, the majority of the solutions having a materialistic tinge. Buddha at that time proposed, or accepted, a system denying the existence of an eternal Soul, and reducing phenomenal existence to a congeries of separate elements evolving gradually towards final extinction.

2. To this ideal of a lifeless *Nirvāṇa* and an extinct Buddha some

¹ In later theistic *Nyāya* Final Deliverance is reached by the direct contemplation of God, and the condition of the liberated Soul is defined as blissful, cf. *Nyāya-sūtra*, p. 40, and *Nyāyatāt-paryadīpikā*, p. 293. Both the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nāyāyika* systems were originally atheistic, cf. H. Jacobi, *Die Gottesidee bei den Indern*, (Bonn 1923) p. 47 ff. and Faddegon, op. cit. p. 165 and 354. That the idea of an eternal God could not easily tally with the system is seen from the embarrassment to decide whether it should be classed as a *muktātman* or not. The question is solved, in agreement with *Yogasūtra* I.24, by admitting that the quality of consciousness, which is only accidental in Souls, becomes eternal in God, cf. *Nyāyakandali*, p. 58 (Vizian) and *Nyāyavārtika* p. 469. Both theistic and atheistic *Nāyāyikas* existed at Śrīharṣa's time, cp. *Naiṣadhiya* XVII, 75 and 77.

schools alone remained faithful. A tendency to convert Buddha into a superhuman, eternally living, principle manifested itself early among his followers and led to a schism.

3. This tendency gradually developed until in the I century A. D. it ended in the production of a luxuriant growth of a new kanonical literature. It then adopted, probably borrowing from some *Aupaniṣada* school, the brahmanical idea of a pantheistic Absolute, of a spiritual and monistic character. After this Buddhist adaptation of the *Vedānta* the Buddha was converted into a full blown *brahman* and its personification worshipped under the names of a Cosmical Body (*dharmakāya*), *Samantabhadra*, *Vairocana* and others.

4. The philosophical doctrine of the old church stuck to the central conception of separate elements of Matter, Mind and Forces, composed lists of them with a view to investigate the method of their gradual extinction in the Absolute.

5. Among the early schools the *Mahāsaṃghikas*, *Vātsīputrīyas* and others already assumed a kind of consciousness surviving in *Nirvāṇa*.

6. They were followed by a school with critical tendencies, the *Sautrāntikas*, which cut down the list of artificially constructed elements, cut down *Nirvāṇa* itself as a separate entity and transferred the Absolute into the living world, thus constituting a transition to *Mahāyāna*.

7. The philosophy of the new religion is an adaptation of the *Vedānta* system. It forsook the pluralistic principle altogether and became emphatically monistic.

8. It then took a double course. It either assumed the existence of a store-consciousness of which all phenomenal life was but a manifestation. This school in the sequel cultivated logic. The other school denied the possibility of cognising the Absolute by logical methods, it declared all plurality to be an illusion, and nothing short of the whole to be the Reality directly cognised in mystic intuition.

9. The transitional school of the *Sautrāntikas* coalesced in the V century A. D. with the idealistic school of the *Mahāyāna* and produced India's greatest philosophers *Dignāga* and *Dharmakīrti*. With regard to *Nirvāṇa* it assumed the existence of a pure spiritual principle, in which object and subject coalesced, and, along with it, a force of transcendental illusion (*vāsanā*) producing the phenomenal world.

10. Contemporaneously with this highest development of Buddhist philosophy, in the VII century A. D., the relativist school of early Mahāyāna received a fresh impulse and a revival of popularity. This led to the formation of new hybrid schools.

11. The very high perfection to which philosophy was brought by both the idealistic and relativistic schools of Buddhism could not but influence all philosophical circles of India, and we see in the next period the old Vedānta remodelled and equipped with fresh arguments by an adaptation to it of the methods elaborated in the Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda schools of Buddhism.

APPENDIX

A TREATISE ON RELATIVITY

BY NĀGĀRJUNA

CHAPTERS I AND XXV

TRANSLATED

A TREATISE ON RELATIVITY

by

NĀGĀRJUNA

PREFATORY

Nāgārjuna is the author of three different works upon the Buddhist Theory of Relativity (*śūnyatā*), a fundamental (*mūla*), complete work, Mādhyamika-Śāstra, and two short summaries — Yukti-śaṣṭikā and Śūnyatā-saptati.

The complete work contains about 400 aphorisms divided into 27 chapters. The first chapter is devoted to a critique of the conception of Causality. It reduces our every-day conception of it and all realistic theories ad absurdum and thus indirectly establishes Monism (*advaita*). The rest of the work is filled with the application of this result to every separate item of the Hinayanist philosophical system.¹ Nāgārjuna is also the author of two short tracts dealing with the method of negative dialectics adopted by him. One of them «The Refutation of Contests» (*viraha-vyāvartanī*) is very often quoted.

Whether he is the author of numerous other works which go under his name, and whether he is the same personality as the celebrated metallurgist,

¹ The following is the list of subjects treated, ch. I On Causality, II On Motion, III on the sense-faculties (*indriya*), IV On the elements of existence (*skandha*), V On the component elements (*dhātu*) of an individual, VI On passions (*rāga*), VII On momentariness (*samskṛta=trīlak-ṣaṇī*), VIII On Agent and Action (*karma-kāra*), IX On the unreality of the preceding moment (*pūva*), X On the relation of fire and fuel, XI On the Infinite (*pūrvāparakoṭi*), XII On the unreality of the phenomenal world (*duḥkha = pañcopādānaskandha*), XIII On the unreality of all the forces (*samskāra*) of life, XIV On the unreality of relations (*samsarga*), XV On the notion of Essentia (*svabhāva*), XVI On Bondage and Deliverance, XVII On Karma and its result, XVIII On the doctrine of a Soul (*ātman*), XIX On Time, XX On the notion of a Totality of causes (*sāmagrī*), XXI On the notions of origin and end (*sambhava-vibhava*), XXII On the reality of Buddha, XXIII On logical incongruity (*viparayāsa*), XXIV On the «Four Truths», XXV On Nirvāṇa, XXVI On the Twelve Stages (*nidāna*) in the development of an individual life, XXVII On false dogma (*dṛṣṭi*).

chemist and alchemist Nāgārjuna is very doubtful.¹ His pupil and successor Āryadeva, a Ceylonese by birth, has composed an independent treatise about the same subject, also in 400 aphorisms, but following another, more systematic, arrangement.

About the date of both these authors there is till now no absolute certainty, but the II century A. D. is generally accepted as most probable. Although both were born in the South, the scene of their activity is Northern India, during the best time of the Kushan empire.

After that there was a break in the development of the Mādhyamika philosophy. During two centuries we hear of no prominent personalities and no works dealing with it. It seems as though it were partly fallen into oblivion. It is impossible otherwise to explain the total silence of Buddhaghōṣa about it.

During the next period, the golden age of Indian civilisation, the age of the Gupta empire in Northern India, the brothers Asanga and Vasubandhu appear in the Vth century as the champions of a somewhat modified Monism which receives in their hands an idealistic interpretation.

The scene of the development of the Mādhyamika philosophy after that shifts to the South. We witness there, in the VIth century A. D., a powerful revival of the genuine, uncompromising Relativism of Nāgārjuna. Contemporaneously with the pupils of Vasubandhu, Sthiramati and Dignāga, two very celebrated men, who were working, the one in Valabhi in Surat, the other mainly in Orrissa, two equally celebrated champions of the Mādhyamika system, the Masters (ācārya) Buddhapālita and Bhavya or Bhāvaviveka,² appear in the South. The Mahāyāna Monism becomes now definitely split into the idealistic school in

¹ There is an old tradition according to which the authentic works of Nāgārjuna are six, but there is no agreement about how this number is composed. Generally admitted are 1) Mūla-mādhyamika-śāstra, also called Prajñā-mūla, 8 celebrated men have commented upon it, Nāgārjuna himself, Buddhapālita, Bhavya, Candrakīrti, Devaśarma, Guṇaśrī, Guṇamati and Sthiramati, 2) Yukti-śaṣṭikā, a very condensed statement of the theory; its composition, Wassilieff thinks, possibly preceded the composition of the main work, 3) Śūnyatā-saptati, a short poem on Relativity with the author's own comment, 4) Vighraha-vyāvartanī, also with comment, a work on logic already mentioning the four pramāṇas of the Naiyāyiks, 5) Vaidalya-sūtra and prakaraṇa, self defence of Nāgārjuna against the charge of perverting logic. The sixth is according to Bu-ston a work which is not translated, Tha-sñad-grub-pa, «A vindication of empirical Reality». However, others reckon, instead of it, Akutobhaya, a comment upon the mūla-kārikās. But Wassilieff remarks (in his «Review of the Mādhyamika literature», Mss musei As. Petrop.) that «the authenticity of this work was doubted even by the credulous Tibetans». Candrakīrti evidently held that Nāgārjuna did not write any comment upon the mūla-kārikās, cf. text, p. 25. 6, but Avalokitavrata, commenting upon Prajñā-pradīpa calls it rañ-hgrel. Besides these works the Betan-hgyur contains 1) Mahāyāna-viṃśikā, in 20 verses, 2) Aksara-śataka, in 3 lines, and 3) Pratītya-samutpāda-hṛdaya, in 5 lines, renewed attempts to express with utmost shortness the main conception of a monistic (aiḱyam) motionless Universe. They probably are spurious.

² Perhaps Bhāvaviveka = legs-ldan-hbyed.

the North, the Yogācāras, and the relativistic one in the South. The latter is again divided between the followers of Buddhapālita and the followers of Bhavya.

The condemnation of all logic for the cognition of the Absolute was final in the first of these schools, it admitted no bona fide argument at all, but undertook it only to show hopeless inconsistency in whatever logical argument would be produced by its opponents. This school received the name of Mādhyamika-Prāsangika. The other school, the followers of Bhavya thought it necessary to supplement the short rules of Nāgārjuna by independent (svatantra) arguments constructed in accordance with the rules of logic. This school received the name of Mādhyamika-Svāntarika. Bhavya is a very subtle logician. He perhaps, more than any other one, deserves to be compared with Zeno of Eleia. Some of his baffling «sophisms» made his name celebrated in the Buddhist world. His school had success and was more numerous than the school of Buddhapālita in the beginning. But in the next VIIth century A. D. the Master Candrakīrti appears as a mighty champion of the purely negative method of establishing Monism. He succeeds in driving Bhāvaviveka's school into the shadow and finally settles that form of the Mādhyamika System which is now studied in all monastic schools of Tibet and Mongolia where it is considered to represent the true philosophical basis of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

We can thus establish the following periods in the development of the philosophy of the Mahāyāna,

1) I century A. D., the rise of Mahāyāna, ālaya-vijñāna and tathātā both admitted by Aśvaghoṣa.

2) II century, the theory of Universal Relativity (śūnyatā) formulated by Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva

3) III and VI centuries, a gap.

4) V century, the idealistic interpretation of Asanga and Vasubandhu.

5) VI century, a split between the idealistic and relativistic schools, Sthiramati and Dignāga representing the first, Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka the second.

6) VII century, final establishment of the Mādhyamika System in its extreme form by Candrakīrti.

We now give the translation of the first chapter of the treatise of Nāgārjuna with Candrakīrti's comment.¹ All the protagonists of the development just sketched together with some representatives of the brahmanical systems will be here seen at work. From the rest of the work the chapter about Nirvāna

¹ Candrakīrti has given to his comment the title of «The Clear-worded» (prasanna-padā) probably not without some dose of irony, since, as prof. Wassilieff attests, its extreme dialectical subtlety, especially in the first chapter, is equalled by no other work in the whole domain of northern Buddhist literature.

has been chosen as an illustration of the method which is in turn applied to every philosophic conception.

In our translation we have endeavoured to avoid, as far as possible, literal renderings when they convey no clear meaning, in order to escape what M. A. Barth has called «traductions infidèles à force d'être littérales». Sanscrit scientific works are not supposed to be read, but to be studied, their style is laconic and their technical terms suggestive of a wide connotation. Their translation, in order to be comprehensible, should be, to a certain extent, an explanation. The literal rendering, when needed, is given in a foot-note. The sanscrit text has been edited by M. de la Vallée Poussin in the Bibliotheca Buddhica. The division into small sections has been introduced by the translator in order to facilitate a vue d'ensemble.

A TREATISE ON RELATIVITY

DEDICATION

The Perfect Buddha,
The foremost of all Teachers I salute.
He has proclaimed
The Principle of (Universal) Relativity,
'Tis like blissful (Nirvāna),
Quiescence of Plurality.
There nothing disappears,
Nor anything appears,
Nothing has an end,
Nor is there anything eternal,
Nothing is identical (with itself),
Nor is there anything differentiated,
Nothing moves,
Neither hither nor thither.

CHAPTER FIRST

EXAMINATION OF CAUSALITY

I.

There absolutely are no things,
Nowhere and none, that arise (anew),
Neither out of themselves, nor out of non-self,
Nor out of both, nor at random.

II.

Four can be the conditions
(Of every thing produced),
Its cause, its object, its foregoing moment,
Its most decisive factor.

III.

In these conditions we can find
No self-existence of the entities.
Where self-existence is deficient,
Relational existence also lacks.

IV.

No energies in causes,
Nor energies outside them.
No causes without energies,
Nor causes that possess them.

V.

Let those facts be causes
 With whom coordinated other facts arise.
 Non-causes will they be,
 So far the other facts have not arisen.

VI.

Neither non-Ens nor Ens
 Can have a cause.
 If non-Ens, whose the cause?
 If Ens, whatfore the cause?

VII.

Neither an Ens nor a non-Ens,
 Nor any Ens-non-Ens,
 No element is really turned out.
 How can we then assume
 The possibility of a producing cause?

VIII.

A mental Ens is reckoned as an element,
 Separately from its objective (counterpart).
 Now, if it (begins) by having no objective counterpart,
 How can it get one afterwards?

IX.

If (separate) elements do not exist,
 Nor is it possible for them to disappear.
 The moment which immediately precedes
 Is thus impossible. And if 't is gone,
 How can it be a cause?

X.

If entities are relative,
 They have no real existence.

The (formula) «this being, that appears»
 Then loses every meaning.

XI.

Neither in any of the single causes
 Nor in all of them together
 Does the (supposed) result reside.
 How can you out of them extract
 What in them never did exist?

XII.

Supposing from these causes does appear
 What never did exist in them,
 Out of non-causes then
 Why does it not appear?

XIII.

The result is cause-possessor,
 But causes are not even self-possessors.
 How can result be cause-possessor,
 If of non-self-possessors it be a result?

XIV.

There is, therefore, no cause-possessor,
 Nor is there an effect without a cause.
 If altogether no effect arises,
 (How can we then distinguish)
 Between the causes and non-causes?

Finished the Examination of Causality, the first chapter of the
 Treatise on Relativity.

CHAPTER XXV

EXAMINATION OF NIRVĀṆA

I.

If every thing is relative,
 No (real) origination, no (real) annihilation,
 How is Nirvāṇa then conceived?
 Through what deliverance, through what annihilation?

II.

Should every thing be real in substance,
 No (new) creation, no (new) destruction,
 How would Nirvāṇa then be reached?
 Through what deliverance, through what annihilation?

III.

What neither is released, nor is it ever reached,
 What neither is annihilation, nor is it eternality,
 What never disappears, nor has it been created,
 This is Nirvāṇa. It escapes precision.

IV.

Nirvāṇa, first of all, is not a kind of Ens,
 It would then have decay and death.
 There altogether is no Ens
 Which is not subject to decay and death.

V.

If Nirvāṇa is Ens,
 It is produced by causes,
 Nowhere and none the entity exists
 Which would not be produced by causes.

VI.

If Nirvāṇa is Ens,
 How can it lack substratum,
 There whatsoever is no Ens
 Without any substratum.

VII.

If Nirvāṇa is not an Ens,
 Will it be then a non-Ens?
 Wherever there is found no Ens,
 There neither is a (corresponding) non-Ens.

VIII.

Now, if Nirvāṇa is a non-Ens,
 How can it then be independent?
 For sure, an independent non-Ens
 Is nowhere to be found.

IX.

Coordinated here or caused are (separate things),
 We call this world Phenomenal;
 But just the same is called Nirvāṇa,
 When from Causality abstracted.

X.

The Buddha has declared
 That Ens and non-Ens should be both rejected.
 Neither as Ens nor as a non-Ens
 Nirvāṇa therefore is conceived.

XI.

If Nirvāṇa were both Ens and non-Ens,
Final Deliverance would be also both,
Reality and unreality together.
This never could be possible!

XII.

If Nirvāṇa were both Ens and non-Ens,
Nirvāṇa could not be uncaused.
Indeed the Ens and the non-Ens
Are both dependent on causation.

XIII.

How can Nirvāṇa represent
An Ens and a non-Ens together?
Nirvāṇa is indeed uncaused,
Both Ens and non-Ens are productions.

XIV.

How can Nirvāṇa represent
(The place) of Ens and of non-Ens together,
As light and darkness (in one spot)
They cannot simultaneously be present.

XV.

If it were clear, indeed,
What an Ens means, and what a non-Ens,
We could then understand the doctrine
About Nirvāṇa being neither Ens nor non-Ens.

XVI.

If Nirvāṇa is neither Ens nor non-Ens,
No one can really understand
This doctrine which proclaims at once
Negation of them both together.

XVII.

What is the Buddha after his Nirvāṇa?
Does he exist or does he not exist,
Or both, or neither?
We never will conceive it!

XVIII.

What is the Buddha then at lifetime?
Does he exist, or does he not exist,
Or both, or neither?
We never will conceive it!

XIX.

There is no difference at all
Between Nirvāṇa and Saṃsāra.
There is no difference at all
Between Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa.

XX.

What makes the limit of Nirvāṇa
Is also then the limit of Saṃsāra.
Between the two we cannot find
The slightest shade of difference.

XXI.

(Insoluble are antinomic) views
Regarding what exists beyond Nirvāṇa,
Regarding what the end of this world is,
Regarding its beginning.

XXII.

Since everything is relative (we do not know),
What is finite and what is infinite,
What means finite and infinite at once,
What means negation of both issues?

XXIII.

What is identity, and what is difference?
 What is eternity, what non-eternity,
 What means eternity and non-eternity together,
 What means negation of both issues?

XXIV.

The bliss consists in the cessation of all thought,
 In the quiescence of Plurality.
 No (separate) Reality was preached at all,
 Nowhere and none by Buddha!

Finished Examination of Nirvāṇa, the twenty fifth chapter of the
 Treatise on Relativity.

THE CLEARWORDED

A COMMENT

UPON

NĀGĀRJUNA'S TREATISE ON RELATIVITY

BY

CANDRAKĪRTI

THE CLEARWORDED

DEDICATION

To that Nāgārjuna I bow who has done away all recourse to the abode 2. 3.
of Duality,¹

Who has emerged out of the ocean-like (all-embracing) Spirit of the 1. 3.
Supreme Buddha,²

Who mercifully has explained the deeper meaning of the treasury³ of 1. 4.
religion, according to his own conception of it,

Whose philosophic fire consumes even now the fuel of opposed systems 1. 5.
and burns down the darkness in the hearts of simple mankind,

Whose words, containing incomparable knowledge, (like) a host of ar- 2. 1.
rows, completely destroy the army of our foes (and deliver us from the bonds
of phenomenal) existence,

Whose words assume the majesty of rule over (the denizens) of all the 2. 2.
three spheres of existence,⁴ the Buddhist converts and the gods.

¹ The method of adopting a middle course (*madhyamā pratipad*) between two opposite extremes from which the Mādhyamika school has received its name is differently applied in Hinayāna, e.g., S.N.III.135. It is there a term designating the central conception of Hinayāna, a middle course between «everything exists and nothing exists», meaning that a limited catalogue of ultimate elements (*dharma*) exist in interdependence (*pratitya-samutpāda*). In Mahāyāna it is synonymous with the central conception of the Mādhyamikas and means their idea of Relativity or Negativity (*madhyamā pratipad*=*śūnyatā*=*pratitya-samutpāda*), cp. XXIV. 18. The ff. terms are declared by Candrakīrti, p. 504.13, to be *viśeṣa-saṃjñā*'s, i.e., different manners of expressing the same idea, *anta-dvaya-rahitatva*=*sarvastabhāvānupatti*=*pratitya-samutpāda*=*śūnyatā*=*upādāya-prajñapti*=*madhyamā pratipad*. As usual the first word of the work is significant, it refers to its main idea. The translation of *mādhyamika-śāstra* as The Doctrine of the Middle Path (Die Mittlere Lehre) is ambiguous since there are different middle paths.

² *sambuddha-āhi-sāgara* refers evidently to the doctrine of *dharma-kāya*.

³ Read *kośasya* with the Tib.

⁴ i. e., the worlds of carnal desire (*kāma-dhātu*), the heavens of ethereal beings (*rūpa-dhātu*) and the heavens of pure spirits (*arūpa-dhātu*).

2. 3. Having made my salutation to that Nāgārjuna, I am proposing to write an explanation of his aphorisms in clear sentences containing the right explanation unobscured by the fires of dialectics.¹

¹ This is a jeer at Bhāvaviveka who below, p. 31.1., is called a (champion of) logic (*tār-kika*). It does not mean that dialectical subtleties will be avoided, but that all arguments will be indirect. The word *tarkānīla*, p. 2.4, evidently alludes to *Tarkajvāla* the title of Bhāvaviveka's work.

CHAPTER FIRST

EXAMINATION OF CAUSALITY

I. PRELIMINARY

The treatise which will be here expounded, is that which begins with 2. 5. the statement «there is neither a *causa materialis*, nor a *causa efficiens*, nor are (the things of the Universe a product of the combination) of both (these causes)».¹ The question now arises how does this doctrine affect (us), what is its subject matter and what its aim. The connection of the treatise (with us)² is the following one. (In a previous work), «Introduction into the Mādhyamika System»,³ we have elicited that in order to attain the (supreme) knowledge of a Buddha the first step to be taken is an initial vow (of devoting oneself to the Final Deliverance of all living creatures, this vow) harmonising with a monistic view (of the Universe), and inspired by a feeling of Great Commiseration.⁴ Our revered Master Nāgārjuna was himself wholly equipped with the (true) unflinching method of (our monistic system revealed in the predication about) the «Climax of Wisdom»,⁵ and he graciously has condescended to lay it down in a treatise for the enlightenment of others.

¹ Lit., p. 2.5, «not from self, not from other, not from both», cp. infra, p. 93.

² *Sambandha* discussed at the beginning of every scientific work means usually its relation to the subject matter, Nyāya-bindu, p. 2.15 (B. B.). Here it refers to the importance of the work for the Salvation of mankind.

³ *Mādhyamika-avatāra*. The Tib. transl. ed. by de la Vallée Poussin in B. B. IX and partly translated in the Musée 1907, 1910 and 1911.

⁴ The Mahāyānist Great Commiseration (*mahākāruṇā*) differs from the Hinayānist one, it agrees with Monism. This means that the Mahāyānist strives for the weal of all living beings, cp. Suzuki, *Mahāyāna*, p. 292 ff., *Madhy. av.* p. 6.9 ff. The Tibetans make a distinction between the Mahāyānist conception, *thugs-rje-chen-po* and the Hinayānist one, *sñin-rje-chen-po*. In Sanscrit the same word is used.

⁵ *prajñā-pāramitā*, one of its synonyms is *sūnyatā*.

3. 3. (Indeed a philosophic treatise should contain a doctrine of Salvation, it then «rules and it saves»). «It rules over all our enemies, our passions. It saves us from the misery and from phenomenal existence (altogether). Those two advantages are not to be found in other philosophic doctrines».

(Therefore the teaching of Nāgārjuna should appeal to every one.)

(What is its subject matter?)

3. 5. The Master himself (discloses it in his initial prayer). He hints at the idea which will be developed during the whole treatise and at its aim. He tries to impress upon us that it will be a grand and fundamental treatise,¹ because it will present (this idea) in a thorough² and unflinching manner. Since this central idea of the (whole treatise) cannot be separated from (the Mahāyānist's conception of a Buddha,³ Nāgārjuna) in making his initial salutation to Him, the Supreme Teacher, alludes to the cause that induced him to compose this treatise and says —

(Buddha has proclaimed) the monistic Principle of Relativity,⁴ the principle that nothing (in the Universe) can disappear, nor can (anything new) arise, nothing has an end, nor is there anything eternal, nothing is identical with itself, nor is there anything differentiated (in itself), there is no motion, neither towards us, nor from us, etc. etc. (everything is relative).

3. 11. The subject matter (the central idea) of the treatise is the monistic principle of Relativity characterised by these eight (negative) characteristics, nothing disappears, etc.

4. 1. The aim of the treatise is indicated (in the same salutation). It is Final Deliverance, Nirvāṇa, which is characterised as the bliss of the Quiescence of every Plurality.⁵

The salutation itself is expressed by the words «I praise this highest of all Teachers.»

¹ *mahātmyam* sc. *sāstrasya*. The ideal scientific work for India is the Grammar of Pāṇini with the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali. A *mahāśāstra* is a *sāstra* possessing *mahātmya*, i. e., treating the subject with the thoroughness exhibited by both these authors in their great work.

² *saṃ-prakāśana* = *samyak prakāśana*.

³ Buddha's Cosmical Body (*dharma-kāya*) is the unique transcendental essence of the Universe and it is synonymous with *śūnyatā*, cp. de la Vallée Poussin, *The three Bodhis*, J. R. A. S. 1906, p. 952.

⁴ *pratitya-samutpāda* = *śūnyatā* = *antadvaya-rahitatva*.

⁵ On Mahāyānistic Nirvāṇa see above and Suzuki, op. cit., p. 339 ff., S. Schayer, *Die Mahāyānistischen Erlösungslehren* (München, 1921).

This is, first of all, the general meaning of the first two stanzas. We are now going on to detail the meaning of every word.

«To disappear» means to be evanescent. The split (of all existence into discrete) point-instants is here meant.

(Nothing new can arise), to «arise» means to emerge as an individual existence.

(Nothing has an end), an «end» means cutting off the stream of (consecutive point-instants).¹

«Eternal» means perpetual, existing through all times.

(Non-identical). Being identical means not being separate, not being discrete.

(Non-differentiated). Differentiated means being different, i. e., discrete.

«Motion hither», means the motion of distant objects into a near place.

The «motion thither», means the motion of objects from a near into a remote place.

II. THE MEANING OF PRATĪTYA-SAMUTPĀDA ACCORDING TO THE AUTHOR

(The first part of the term consists of the gerund of the root *i* and the preposition *prati*). The root *i* means motion, the preposition *prati* means «reaching». But the preposition (when added to a verbal root) modifies its meaning. It has been said that «the meaning of a verbal root (is changed by the preposition as if it were) violently dragged into another place, just as the sweet waters of the Ganges (change their savour when reaching) the waters of the ocean.» Therefore the word *pratitya*, being a gerund, means «reaching» in the sense of being dependent (or relative). The word *samutpāda* means appearance, manifestation. It comes from the verbal root *pad* which with the preposition *saṃut* has this meaning. Thus the term *pratitya-samutpāda* (in our system) conveys the idea of a manifestation of (separate) entities as relative to their causes and conditions.²

¹ *prabandha* = *kṣaṇa-santāna*.

² *hetu-pratyaya-apēkṣa*.

III. THE MEANING OF THIS TERM IN HINAYĀNA

5. 7. Others, (Śrīlābha and other Hinayānists),¹ maintain that *pratitya-samutpāda* means (appearance and immediate) disappearance of everything. The verb *i* means to go, to disappear; *itya* is the participle, meaning «fit to disappear». The preposition *prati* generalises. *Pratitya* is thus (not a gerund), but a derivative noun (meaning that everything is momentary). The evanescent momentary things appear—that is their explanation.

IV. THE HINAYĀNIST INTERPRETATION REJECTED.

6. 1. This interpretation fits very well such passages of the Scripture as the following one, «O Brethren! I will teach you the Dependent Origination (of everything). Those who will get an insight into it, will have grasped the teaching (of the Buddha), etc.» The sense of generalisation and the suggested grammatical composition of the term can be accounted for.
6. 3. But (in other passages) there is altogether no generalisation,² because a single particular case is directly referred to. E.g., in the following words, «visual consciousness appears when coordinated with the faculty of vision and (a patch) of colour.» In this expression «in coordination with the faculty of vision», the word «in coordination» takes into account one single flash³ of consciousness, produced also from one single (moment) of the faculty of vision. There is no generalisation.
6. 5. But (the interpretation which we propose applies in both cases). The meaning of relativity applies when the word *pratitya* does not refer to a single case. It then means relative existence (in general), origination relatively

¹ In the sūtras of the Hinayāna the term is mainly applied to the doctrine about the twelve consecutive degrees in the development of an individual life (sc. of the *skandhas*), from prenatal forces *saṃskāra* up to the continuation of life after death (*jāti*). But this, according to the abhidharma, is only a special case of the general law of interdependence between the separate elements of life; *pratitya-samutpāda* or *panna* is here interpreted as a synonym of all *saṃskṛta-dharmas*, cp. my Central Conception p. 28. The formula of this interdependence «this being, that becomes, from this that arises» has then been criticised, because the generalised formula, since it refers to all elements, to those also that exist simultaneously, the meaning of a consecution will not be quite correct. Therefore Śrīlābha proposed his interpretation, according to which the first part of the term is a participle, not a gerund, and does not imply consecution, but simultaneity and evanescence. Cp. Ab. Kośa-bhāṣya ad III. 28. In this treatise *pratitya-samutpāda* is treated in the first chapter, the 12 *nidānas* quite separately in the 26th.

² This is the same criticism which is already mentioned by Vasubandhu, op. cit. ad III. 28.

³ *eka-vijñānotpatti*.

(to something else). It also can be applied when a particular single occasion is referred to, for in that case we interpret it as meaning «with reference to the faculty of vision, in coordination with this faculty, having regard for this faculty, — visual consciousness appears».

If we take the word *itya* as a derivative adjective, then the above 7. 2. sentence «visual consciousness arises in coordination with the faculty of vision and some colours» (will altogether change its meaning). This word, if not a gerund and when not the first part of a compound, must appear in its inflected form (*pratityam*).¹ The meaning of the sentence would then be the following one, «all visual consciousness is evanescent (*pratityam*) in regard of the faculty of vision and the colours».² This is impossible! Therefore it must be taken as a gerund and indeclinable. (We will then get for the whole term the meaning of dependent origination, or relative, unreal existence).

V. THE OPINION OF BHĀVAVIVEKA

Now, (another author, Bhāvaviveka, dealing with this topic) begins by 7. 6. quoting opposed opinions and then goes on to refute them. He quotes in the following way. «One party (the Mahāyānist Buddhapālita) explains the term *pratitya-samutpāda* as meaning «manifestation, dependent on every cause» or «relative existence». They assume that the preposition *prati* has a generalising sense, the verbal root *i* the sense of relativity, the word *samutpāda* the sense of existence or origination. Another party (the Hinayānist Śrīlābha) maintains that *pratitya-samutpāda* means the apparition of all immediately disappearing things».³

First of all, we notice here a remarkable incapacity of quoting foreign 8. 1. opinions (with anything like precision). How is that? Because that party which interprets the word *pratitya* as indicating relativity, does not also give to the preposition *prati* a generalising sense, nor does it give to the verb *i* (by itself) the meaning of being relative. It (on the contrary) explains the preposition *prati* as meaning relativity, and then takes the whole composite word *pratitya* as meaning likewise relativity.⁴

¹ *pratitya-samutpādaḥ* = *pratityasya* (*kṣaṇikasya*) *samutpādaḥ*.

² Lit. «eye-evanescent sensation and colours».

³ Lit., p. 7.6-8.1 «But one who quoting the explanation of others thus, since the preposition means generalisation, *iti* means reaching and the word *samutpāda* means becoming, with reference to such and such cause reaching-becoming, thus one (party); in every, every case origination of evanescent (things) is *pratitya-samutpāda*, thus the other (party) . . . »

⁴ But they never have given to the root *i* the meaning of *prāpti* as imputed p. 7.6.

8. 5. Now, if we take *pratitya-samutpāda* as meaning «relative existence» (then it will cover both cases, where the generalised meaning is wanted and where a single case is meant). When it takes into account all possible things then the generalised meaning is applied in the following way, «in every case, dependent upon a corresponding complex of causes and conditions, something exists, i.e., it arises, in coordination with them».¹ But when a single thing is referred to, then there is no need for applying the generalising meaning, (we then understand it to mean that, e.g., some visual consciousness has arisen) in coordination with (some momentary flash) of the faculty of vision and some colour. But the Master (Bhāvaviveka in maintaining that we assume generalisation in all cases) has betrayed his incompetence to quote the opinions (which he combats).

VI. BHĀVAVIVEKA'S CRITICISM OF BUDHAPĀLITA'S COMMENT

8. 10. The following (criticism of our definition by Bhāvaviveka) is likewise unfounded. (He thinks that our interpretation of the sentence) «visual consciousness arises when coordinated with the sense of vision and some colour» is wrong, (because we have expressed this interdependence by the word «reaching», *pratitya*=*prāpya*, one thing springs up when «reaching» the other). «There are here (says he) no two things («reaching» one another)!» We cannot understand this criticism! What is the reason adduced? He says that if one thing is not attained, not «reached», how is (the other) to originate? There is no argument. It is mere begging the question.²
9. 1. But perhaps his real argument is the following one. Consciousness being mental (and the sense of vision physical), the first cannot be reached by the second. Experience teaches that only material things can be reached by the sense of vision. But this is a trivial (objection). The term «reaching» is used (in Scripture when the attaining of spiritual aims is in question), e.g., «this recluse has reached the goal». Others reject the criticism upon the score that «reaching» is synonymous with «being dependent». Our

¹ This is also mentioned by Vasubandhu loco. cit. and Yaśomitra, as the interpretation of Śrīlābha. The interpretation *pratitya*=*prāpya* is also criticised in the Ab. Kōśabh. ad III. 28, but on different grounds. It is supposed to suggest a consecution of elements, and to leave out of account the interdependence of simultaneously existing elements.

² Lit., p. 8.10-9.1. «And this is wrong (on the part of Bhāvaviveka. He says,) „and moreover it is not right to maintain that in relation to (=in reaching) the eye and the colours, visual sensation arises, because two things (reaching one another are here) impossible“. Just the incriminated fault is nonsense. Why? Because «how is it that (one thing) will arise when (the other)

(common) Master Nāgārjuna has himself used it in this sense (in his *Yukti-śaṣṭikā*), «if something springs up after having reached this or that, (i.e., if something is dependent upon this and that), it is not really produced (by these conditions).»

VII. THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM BY BHĀVAVIVEKA

As to the opinion pleaded by (Bhāvaviveka) himself it is also not (quite) 9. 7. correct. Indeed he gives the term *pratitya-samutpāda* the meaning «of being relative to something else» in the sense of (a disjunctive judgment), «if this is, that appears», «because this has appeared, that will appear».¹ Although the word «dependent origination» consists of two words, it is not right to suppose that each part refers to a different object.² The (parts) are only mentioned with a view to etymological explanation.

(Bhāvaviveka) further says, «*pratitya-samutpāda* is thus named (wit- 10. 3. hout any regard to its being composed of two words), we can take it as a conventional expression (for Relativity) just as the expression «the forest ornament» (is used to designate something utterly useless, without any connection either with forest nor with ornament)».

This also misses the mark, since our Master admits the term to have a meaning which harmonises with the meaning of its parts. (Indeed he says), «whatsoever appears as relative to this and that is not really existent».

At last (Bhāvaviveka) explains the term to mean (mere Relativity), 10. 6. «this being, that becomes, e.g., as far as there is something short, there is also something long». Does he not admit exactly the same meaning as we do, i.e., (the meaning of Relativity)? The long exists (not independently, but) as far as it is coordinated to the short, as relative to the short, as dependent upon the short. Thus Bhāvaviveka rejects (with one hand) what he accepts with the other. This is not right, but we will not insist upon this point.

is not attained, not reached»? — (these words of Bh.) are a bare postulate without any argument». On p. 9.1 read with the Mss. *katham anava(ga)te 'prāpte sambhavaḥ*, and on p. 8.10 preferably *etaccūyuktam*.

¹ Bhāvaviveka here partly returns to the interpretation already contained in the Hīnayāna sūtras (e.g., M. N. III. 63), but of course its meaning is quite changed. Formerly it referred to real elements (*dharma*s), now it means *sūnyatā*, or unreal *dharma*s.

² The difficulty arising from the interpretation of the term as involving a disjunctive sentence is also mentioned by Vasubandhu, op. cit. ad. III. 28.

VIII. THE PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY THE LAW OF ALL PLURALISTIC
EXISTENCE

10. 11. Thus it is that Buddha wished to put in a strong light¹ (the principle of Relativity, i.e.), the fact that entities are produced only in the sense of being coordinated.² He therefore maintains that they neither are produced at random, nor from a unique cause, nor from a variety of causes; he denies that they are identical (with their causes), that they are different from them, 10. 12. or that they are both (partly identical and partly non-identical). By this negative method he discloses the true relative character of all the relative entities (of every day life). This is the relative existence or dependent origination,³ because nothing really new is produced. From the transcendentalist's⁴ point of view it is a condition where nothing disappears, (nor something new appears) etc., and in which there is no motion. It is a condition characterised by the eight above mentioned characteristics, «nothing disappears» etc.⁵ The whole of this treatise is intended by its author to prove

¹ *paridīpayatū=parito dīpayatū.*

² *hetu-pratyaya-apekṣa.*

³ *pratitya-samutpāda* is here synonymous with *sūnyatva=anta-dvaya-rahitatva=advaita*, and although it is the contrary of *saṃvṛtti*, it is here called *saṃvṛttāḥ pratitya-samutpādaḥ* meaning, that *pratitya-samutpannatva* or *advaita* or *sūnyatā* is the real condition which is «covered» or hidden behind the phenomenal world, the *saṃvṛtti*. (It is a *karma-sādhana*, i. e., *saṃvṛtiyate etad iti saṃvṛta*, not a *karana-sādhana*, i. e., not *saṃvṛtiyate anena*).

⁴ The *ārya* or *ārya-puṇḍala* is the Buddhist Saint who has entered the path of Salvation, has become *śrota-āpanna*, has reached insight (*dṛṣṭi-mārga*) of reality as it reveals itself to the philosopher. In Hinayāna it is the man who has acquired the intellectual habit of seeing everywhere only separate, discrete, evanescent elements (*dharmatā=anātma*). He has got rid of the impression of stability which the world produces upon the ordinary man. In Mahāyāna, as is seen from this passage, it is the man who has acquired a monistic view of the Universe, he has cognised the *pratitya-samutpāda* as *sūnyatā=dharma-nairātmya*. From the phrasing of this and many other passages it clearly appears that the Mahāyānist Saint, the *ārya* and the Bodhisattva, possesses, in addition to his moral achievements, his Mahāyānist *bodhi-citta-utpāda*, the practise of the *pāramitās*, the attainment of *bhūmis* and the Mahāyānist Great Commiseration, as a foundation of all this, a monistic view of the Universe, acquired by *yogi-pratyakṣa*. It constitutes the Omniscience, *sarvajñatā*, of the Bodhisattva which together with the *sarva-ākāra-jñatā* of the Buddha is the main idea of the *abhisamaya* or *prajñā-pāramitā* in Āryasāṅga's interpretation. This *sarvajñatā* is accordingly very different from our conception of Omniscience. We find a very interesting exposition of these topics in *Vācaspati-miśra's Nyāyakaṇika*, the *sarvajña-vāda* begins p. 110.16 (Reprint from the Pandit), the Buddhist *yogi-pratyakṣa* p. 147.4 ff., the brahmanical *yogi-abhimata-sarvajña* p. 205.16 ff., its refutation (*sva-matena*) p. 181.25 ff., *Naiyāyika-abhimata-yogi-pratyakṣa* p. 168.12 ff.

⁵ Lit., p. 10.12-11.2. «By this negation the concealed essence of the covered entities is disclosed as it exists. And now just this concealed *pratitya-samutpāda* is characterised by eight

that the condition of interdependence (or the principle of Relativity) does not allow (for something in the Universe) to disappear, nor (for something new to appear).

The principle of Relativity (being the central law of all existence) can 11. 4. be characterised by an infinite number (of finite characteristics),¹ but only eight have been selected, because they are predominant in the sense of having given opportunity for discussion.

It is also called (Nirvāṇa) the Quiescence (or equalisation) of all plurality, because when it is critically realised² there is for the philosopher³ absolutely no differentiation of existence to which our words⁴ and (concepts) could be applied. That very (essence) of Relativity is called (Nirvāṇa) the Quiescence of Plurality, for which there are no words.

Thoughts and feelings⁵ do not arise in this (undifferentiated whole), 11. 9. there is no subject and no object of knowledge, there is (consequently) no turmoil like birth, old age and death, there is (eternal) bliss.⁶

Since the principle of Dependent Origination, as it is here defined (as meaning the Relativity of existence), represents the direct object of the process of instruction, it is (in the dedicatory verses) alluded to as the object of Buddha's teaching —

The perfect Buddha,
The foremost of all Teachers I salute,
He has proclaimed
The Principle of (Universal) Relativity.

characteristics, non disappearance etc., since, as it has not been produced in its own essence, there is in it, with reference to the *ārya*, no disappearance, up to «there is no motion out.»

¹ Cp. Spinoza's idea that the *essentia Dei* is equal to an infinite number of finite attributes or modes. Here we have exactly the same thought expressed by the Indian Monist, viz. (*Buddhasya=dharma-kāyasya=sūnyatāyāḥ*) *ananta-viśeṣaṇa-sambhava*...

² *yathāvasthita... darsane.*

³ *āryānām*, cp. above p. 90. n. 4.

⁴ *prapañco vāk*, cp. M. v. 373. 9; the reality is *niṣprapañca=anirvacanīya*; but, of course, not only words, concepts are also meant.

⁵ *citta-caittāḥ.*

⁶ This idea of bliss as equivalent to absence of suffering is the same as in the Nyāya system, cp. above p. 54 ff. It coincides with the Vedānta idea by the conception of all plurality being merged in an unique allembracing substance. It is also a spiritual substance because *dharma-kāya* is spiritual (*jñāna*). According to Deussen, *System des Vedānta*, p. 228-9, *ānanda* with Śaṅkara also means Freiheit von Leiden, cp. ibid, p. 150. Nevertheless the Buddhists would probably not characterise their *sūnyatā* as *ānanda* which carries a flavour of worldliness.

'Tis (like) blissful (Nirvāṇa),
Quiescence of Plurality.

There nothing disappears,
Nor anything appears,
Nothing has an end,
Nor is there anything eternal,
Nothing is identical (with itself)
Nor is there anything differentiated,
Nothing moves,
Neither hither, nor thither.

12. 1. Buddha alone has rightly taught the doctrine of Relativity, because he has conceived it in the manner here described. Our Master Nāgārjuna having realised that all divergent doctrines are nothing but foolish talk (as compared with this doctrine of Buddha) gives expression to his deep feeling of devotion and praises the Buddha by inserting the characteristic «He is the foremost of all Teachers».

IX. CAUSALITY DENIED

12. 4. In such a (Universe nothing can disappear). The denial of extinction comes first. This is to illustrate the fact that it is not (in every respect) established that every thing must first appear and then disappear. Indeed it will be stated below—

If birth comes first,
Decay and death comes later,
We will then have a birth
Without decay and death,
And what is born will be immortal.

12. 8. Therefore there is no hard and fast rule that everything must first appear and then disappear. The author now intends to explain the principle of that Relativity which implies the denial of extinction and other characteristics. But he thinks it more convenient to begin with the denial of origination, (i. e., of causality), because the denial of extinction etc. will become after that an easy task.

Causation which is imagined in other systems (as a real production) 12. 11. appears either as a (new manifestation) of the same (continuant stuff), or as (an influence) of separate (factors), or as the result of both (a continuant stuff and separate factors), or as proceeding at random (without any regularity). The author decides that none of these theories is in the right.

Never at all, nowhere and none
Are the things that arise
Out of self, of non-self, or both,
Or at random. (I)

(The meaning of the words) is here the following one. «At all» means 13. 1 at any time. «Somewhere» means the place, it is equivalent to «in whatever place». «Something» means the objects situated on the place, it is equivalent to «some things». (All this is denied — never, nowhere and none). The meaning is the following one. Never, nowhere and nothing is found which is produced out of its own self. And in the same way the three (next) predicates, (out of non-self, out of both, without a cause) must be interpreted.

It can be objected that an undesirable consequence¹ will follow, if we 13. 4. lay stress (upon the negation and maintain that entities do) not at all arise out of themselves. It will follow that they arise out of some non-self, (i. e., out of factors separate from them). No, this will not follow, since only a simple negation² is expressed, (without any implied affirmation of the contrary). Production out of something separate will likewise be denied.

X. IDENTITY OF CAUSE AND EFFECT DENIED

The argument against self-origination, (i. e., against the preexistence 13. 6. of the effect in its material cause) must be constructed upon the same lines (which we have sketched) in our «Introduction into the Mādhyamika System». We find there the following statement.³

Thus,

No real advantage (will accrue)
If something will be born (that already exists).
If (something really) does exist,
Its own repeated birth is quite a nonsense.

¹ *prasanga*.

² *prasajya-pratiṣedha*.

³ M. av. (B. B. IX), VI. 8.

14. 1. The Master Buddhapālita makes the following comment. «Entities do not arise out of their own self, since such origination would serve no purpose, and because the quite absurd consequence¹ would follow (that everything is eternally arising). Indeed if things exist, there is no need to produce them once more, and supposing an existing thing could be (once more) produced, never would it be non-nascent.»

XI. BHĀVAVIVEKA ASSAILS THE COMMENT OF BUDDHAPĀLITA

14. 4. Some philosophers (viz. Bhāvaviveka) have raised objections against this (interpretation of Buddhapālita). His comment, (they maintain), misses the mark, because
- 1) neither a reason nor an example are given,
 - 2) objections are left unanswered,
 - 3) it is a mere deduction ad absurdum,² (consequently) in contrast (with the denial) expressed, a contra-thesis and a contra-reason will emerge (by implication). (It will then follow) that entities are produced out of something (essentially) separate from them, since this will serve a purpose, and since this will prevent (eternal new) production (of the same already existing thing).³

XII. THE FIRST OBJECTION OF BHĀVAVIVEKA ANSWERED

15. 3. We consider all this attack to be ill founded. For what reason? Regarding the first (objection), viz. that no (independent) reason and no example are given, we answer that this is not to the point. Why? Because (the position is the following one). An opposing party (the Sāṅkhya System) advocates the identity of cause and effect,⁴ and is invited to explain, what may be the use of causation in regard of something already existent. In

¹ *atiprasaṅga*.

² *prasāṅga-vākya*.

³ Lit., p. 15. 1-2. «Through an obversion of the subject stated, when the contrary subject, as a predicate and its appurtenance, will emerge, it will be a contradiction with the adopted principle, viz. „entities have arisen from something extraneous, since their birth is useful and since (their birth) shall have an end“.» *sādhya*=*pakṣa*, *taddharma*=*pakṣa-dharma*, *vyakti*=*arthāpatti*, *kṛtānta*=*siddhānta*.

⁴ *svata utpattih*=*satkāryam*.

saying that the cause is the self, you (seemingly) maintain that one's own self is once more produced. Now, we do not understand the meaning of a new production of what already exists. Moreover, we see (the danger of) an infinite regress. (The newly produced thing will be as long as it exists again and again produced and so on ad infinitum).¹

But you (the Sāṅkhya) do not really mean to maintain that an exist- 15. 6.
ing thing is once more produced, neither do you admit an infinite series² (of self-productions). It follows that your theory (of a substantial identity between cause and effect) is absurd³ and, (expressed as it is), it runs against your own intentions.

Now, (you think) that if (the Sāṅkhya), our opponent, is assailed 15. 8.
merely in this way, he will not yield (to our onslaught), and an (other) reason with example is needed in order to make it (more) efficacious. But if you have detected a self-contradiction (in the argument of your) opponent⁴ and he nevertheless persists (in his errors), neither will he be reduced to silence by (new) arguments and examples, for (his obstinacy is due) to his impudence and it is not worth our while to carry on a disputation with a fool.

The Master (Bhāvaviveka) betrays indeed a certain bias for syllo- 16. 1.
gistic reasoning. He would like a syllogism to be introduced at the wrong place. But according to the Mādhyamika (method of dialectics) an independent argument is never needed. (This method consists in producing a contra-thesis and then balancing two conflicting views) without admitting either of them. It has been said by Āryadeva,

If I neither admit a thing's reality,
Nor unreality, nor both (at once),
Then, to confute me
A long time will be needed.⁵

¹ It would be similar to the Hinayānist and Yogācāra view, *sarvam kṣaṇikam*.

² *anavasthā*.

³ *nirupapattika*.

⁴ The Sāṅkhya admits both *utpāda* and *svataḥ*, i.e., he admits that *tad eva utpadyate*, but he does not wish it to be an absolute identity, thus he is in conflict with himself, there is *sva-upa-gama-virodha*.

⁵ Lit., p. 16. 4-5, «who has no thesis „is, is not, is-is-not“, his confutation even long it is impossible to tell». Cp. *Catuhśataka*, XVI, 25.

In the «Repudiation of Conflicts», (the manual of Nāgārjuna), it is likewise stated,

When I have theses (of my own to prove),
I can commit mistakes just for the sake (of proving)
But I have none. I cannot be accused
(Of being inconsistent).

If I did (really) cognise some (separate) things,
I could then make an affirmation or a denial
Upon the basis of these things perceived or (inferred).¹
But these (separate) things do not exist for me.²
Therefore I cannot be assailed on such a basis.

XIII. THE SECOND POINT OF BHĀVAVIVEKA, VIZ. THAT THE ANSWER OF THE SĀṆKHYA IS LEFT UNNOTICED BY BUDDHAPĀLITA, REJECTED

16. 11. Thus it is that since the Mādhyamika is not obliged to have an argument of his own (in which he believes, why do you require Buddhapālita) to confute the Sāṅkhya by an independent argument, like the one (produced by yourself, viz. that) «the mind and the sense faculties³ are not necessarily⁴ identical to their cause»? (The Sāṅkhya, indeed, has responded to this argument in the following way). «What is the meaning of your argument? Do you deny an identity between cause and effect because an effect is really a new manifestation of the same matter, or because you deny the identity of matter itself?⁵ If it is the first, then you bring against us a

¹ *ādi* in 16. 10 refers probably to *anumāna*.

² i. e., for the Monist.

³ *adhyātma-āyatana* are the six subjective bases of our cognitions, i. e., five sense faculties and pure, undifferentiated consciousness (*viñāṇa*), cp. my Central Conception, p. 7. All mental phenomena are, according to the Sāṅkhya System, essentially physical, products of the evolution of Matter and, in this sense, they are identical with their cause or, as this is here expressed, produced out of their own self, out of the same substance. Bhāvaviveka sets forth against this theory a regular syllogism, which will be analysed by Candrakīrti in the sequel, p. 25. 9 ff.

⁴ From the Tib. *nes-te*, cp. M. vr, p. 17. 4.

⁵ Lit., p. 17. 1-18. 1. «What is here the meaning of the thesis? Is it „from self“ as containing the result or „from self“ as being the cause. If from (the self) as containing the result, it is establishing the established. If from the self as being the cause it is contradiction, since every thing having origination originates as being necessarily existent as a cause.»

point which we never doubted, (we agree that the effect is a new manifestation of a continuant stuff). If it is the second, then (it is you, Buddhapālita), who are contradicting yourself,¹ (not I, because even you, the Monist, must agree) that every product necessarily preexists in its cause.²

(To this retort of the Sāṅkhya Bhāvaviveka requires that Buddhapālita should give a reply). But how can we (Mādhyamikas who do not 18. 1. believe in logic altogether) produce an argument³ (like the one produced by Bhāvaviveka) about the (transcendental) reality (of all mental phenomena)? (This argument the Sāṅkhya could indeed declare) either trivial, because he never doubted it, or self-contradicting (because it really implies the identity of cause and effect). Why should we bother ourselves with a reply to this (imputed) irrelevance or this (imputed) self-contradiction? Therefore, since these accusations of the opponent are absolutely out of place, it was not incumbent upon our revered Buddhapālita to refute them.⁴

¹ Buddhapālita first accuses the Sāṅkhya of self-contradiction by imputing to him the idea that an already existing thing is once more produced, although it already exists. The Sāṅkhya answers by accusing Buddhapālita of self-contradiction on the score that a Monist must admit the identity of cause and effect. The Vedāntin, indeed, admits *satkārya-vāda*.

² The Sāṅkhya maintains that, since Matter is eternal, every thing is identical with it as far as it is an impermanent manifestation of this permanent Matter. He does not deny the evolution of this Matter into different forms. The objection of Buddhapālita is unfair, because the Sāṅkhya never denied the variety of the manifestations. If, therefore, *na svataḥ=na kāraṇāt-makam*, this will contradict the principle of *satkāryavāda*, but if *na svataḥ=na kāryātmakam*, the Sāṅkhya will agree, he will say *sarvam kāraṇāt-makam vidyate, kāryātmakam (vāryam=āvir-bhāvah) na vidyate, kārye nāsti vivādaḥ, kāraṇam sat, kārye tu mahān vivādaḥ*. The Vai-ṣeṣika maintains that in the effect even the stuff is different, although related by *samavāyi-kāraṇa*. The Hinayāna Buddhist denies the existence of a continuant stuff altogether. The Mādhyamika's intention is to show the hopeless mutual contradictions of all these views and thus indirectly to establish Monism. By leaving the main issue, the difference between origination and manifestation, intentionally in the dark, by taking the expressions *svata utpādaḥ* «origination out of one's own self», *satkārya* «preexistence of the result» literally, Buddhapālita secures a dialectical triumph. Bhāvaviveka wishes to improve the position of the Mādhyamika by producing a sound argument.

³ This argument of Bhāvaviveka is given below, text p. 26. 1. For the Sāṅkhya all mental phenomena and the intellect are of a physical nature, but an eternal, unchanging, motionless Spiritual Principle is reflected in them. Bhāvaviveka, as a Monist, assimilates all mental phenomena, from the transcendental point of view, to this eternal unique principle. The Sāṅkhya replies that this is not a refutation, but a corroboration of an identity between cause and effect, and that it is a self-contradiction, since it at the same time denies and accepts this identity. For Buddhapālita it is enough to point to the contradiction between *utpāda* and *vidyamānatva*, he, from his transcendental point of view, neither believes in the one, nor in the other. Cp. p. 105, § XVIII.

⁴ Lit., 18. 1-3. «How can we have a reason „because they exist“, a reason that would either be a proof of the proved or a contradiction, for the refutation of whose proving the proved or its contradictory (character) we should take pains? Therefore, since he is quite unaffected by

XIV. THE MĀDHYAMIKA METHOD EXPLAINED.

18. 5. But perhaps (we must understand Bhāvaviveka to mean the following thing). Since the Mādhyamika does not admit any valid reason, thesis or example, and cannot produce any independent argument, let us concede that he is incapable himself of proving what he would like to prove, viz. that there is no real causation out of the same (stuff). We also (admit that it is impossible for him) to combat the tenet of the opponent by an argument (based upon facts the reality of which) both parties admit.
18. 7. However in accusing your opponent of contradiction you must yourself take your stand upon an argument which, in your own opinion,¹ would be free of those logical errors to which a thesis, a reason or an example are liable. But (Buddhapālita) has given no (reason and no examples), neither has he shown (his capacity) of avoiding the logical errors (pointed out by the Sāṅkhya). Therefore the accusation (that he has proved nothing by his deduction *ad absurdum*) stands.
19. 1. To this we answer: this is not right! Why? Because (of the following considerations). Certainly, when someone is vindicating an assertion, he is desirous to convince other people, just as he is convinced himself. He must prove to his opponent the validity of that very argument by which he himself has arrived at the right conclusion.
19. 3. It is indeed a general rule that the opponent should be (at length) induced to agree with that very line of argument which the respondent himself has set forth in order to prove his own thesis. But (the case of the Mādhyamika is quite different). He does not vindicate any assertion in order to convince his opponent. He has no (*bona fide*) reasons and examples (of which he himself is convinced). He sets forth a thesis of his own (and) undertakes to prove it only so far it runs parallel (and destroys) the argument (of his opponent).
19. 5. He thus brings assertions which cannot be proved.² He is in conflict even with himself. He (certainly) cannot convince his opponent (of this imagined thesis).

The accusations pronounced by the opponent, revered Buddhapālita is not obliged to expatiate upon their refutation. If we accept the sanscrit, not the Tibetan, text of the last sentence (sc. omitting *na* and the *a* of *prasanga*), it will mean, «therefore revered Buddhapālita is obliged to expatiate upon a refutation of them (only) when he is himself affected by the accusations of the opponent».

¹ *svata eva*.

² *nirupapattika-pakṣa*.

But can there be a more eloquent refutation of an opponent than (the 19. 6. proof) that he is not capable to establish his own thesis? Is there really any necessity to produce (new) counter arguments?¹

XV. BUDDHAPĀLITA'S COMMENT VINDICATED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF FORMAL LOGIC.

However (if you insist that this must be necessarily done) and require 19. 8. that the contradiction (in the tenet of the opponent) should be disclosed by an independent argument, we maintain that Buddhapālita has done it. If you ask, how is that? We answer: he has said,

Entities do not arise out of themselves,

Because such origination would serve no purpose.

Here the word «such» refers (to a new origination) of something by itself (already) existing.

The following words contain a comment upon this short statement.² 20. 3. «If something already exists in its own real individuality, it does not need to be produced once more». This sentence points to the example,³ i. e., an analogous case admitted by the opponent where both the reason and the predicate coexist, (e. g., an existing jar). The reason is indicated by the words «existing in its own individuality», and the predicate is indicated by the words «because such origination would serve no purpose». (We thus shall have the following regular syllogism —)

(Thesis. An entity does not require a second production).

(Reason. Because it exists).

(Example. Just as a jar).

(Major premise. Whatsoever exists does not require to be produced once more).

(We can indeed express a syllogism in two different ways, e. g., we can express it thus —)

¹ *anumāna-bādha*.

² read p. 20. 3—*tasya grahaṇaka-vākyasya*. What a *grahaṇaka-vākyam* is appears clearly from *Tātparyatīkā*, p. 145.16 and an overwhelming multitude of similar phrasing in all Nyāya literature. The argument is first stated laconically (*grahaṇaka*) and then developed (*vivaraṇa*).

³ The example is always a very important part of the Indian syllogism, *parārthanumāna*. It points to the particular facts on which the general rule or the major premise is established. Apart from such formal syllogism, Indian logic knows a simple inference from one particular to another one, *svārthanumāna*, it is a simple inference by analogy which is considered as representing the essence of thought or of synthesis in general.

20. 7. (Thesis) The word is not an eternal substance.¹
 (Reason). Because it is produced.
 (Major premise. Whatsoever is produced is not eternal).
 (But we can put it also in another way, e. g.,) —
 (Major premise). Whatsoever is produced is known to be non-eternal.
 (Example). As e. g., a jar.
 (Minor premise). The word is produced.
 (Conclusion). Therefore, being produced, it is not eternal.
 In this instance the reason (middle term) reveals itself in the minor premise, («the word is produced», where the application of the middle term to the minor is indicated).
21. 1. This is (just what Buddhapālita has done) in the present case. (He has said),
- Entities do not arise out of their own self,
 Since the production of what already exists is not needed.
- (He might have put the same argument in another form, viz.) —
 (Major premise). Whatsoever already exists does not want to be produced.
 (Example). As e. g., this jar standing before us.
 (Minor premise. It already exists).
 (Conclusion. It needs no second production).
21. 3. The jar in its (potential) condition in a clump of clay is an example (by contrast),² (since it needs to be really produced). But if you mean the jar which (already) exists by itself, such a jar is not produced (once more).
21. 4. Thus it is that the reason (i. e. the middle term in Buddhapālita's syllogism) is the fact of direct (individual) existence, a fact which precludes a second origination (of the existent); it is expressed (in the minor premise, the so

¹ The school of the Mīmāṃsakas imagined that the word was an eternal transcendental substance, somewhat similar to the Platonic idea. The uttered word was then only its particular manifestation. The logicians and all other schools of philosophy denied the existence of the eternal word on the score that the word which we know from experience is an impermanent production. To illustrate the rules of logic this example is as popular in the whole East, as the deduction of Socrates's mortality is the current example of the first form of the syllogism in the West.

² Instead of reading, p. 21. 3, *tathā ca* it would be preferable to read *na tu*, but *tathā ca* is also possible, since a *vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta* is also sometimes introduced in this way. After *avasthāyām* a *cheda* must be inserted.

³ *upanayana*.

called) application (of the middle term to the minor), and thus it is that 21. 5.
 (Buddhapālita) has really elicited in the argument of the Sāṅkhya a contradiction, (he has done it) just by an independent argument of his own.
 How is it then that you accuse him of giving neither a reason, nor an example? 21. 7.

XVI. THE ANSWER OF THE SĀṆKHYA VIRTUALLY REPUDIATED BY BUDDHAPĀLITA

(We have thus shown that the accusation of Buddhapālita) for not 21. 8.
 having produced (a regular syllogism) with a reason and example is not founded. But not only this. Equally unfounded is the accusation of not having repudiated the (double) stricture of the opponent, (sc. the Sāṅkhya, who accuses him either of telling nothing new or of contradicting himself).¹ (Virtually he has repudiated the Sāṅkhya also). How is that? (The Sāṅkhya maintains that if our denial of identity between cause and effect only means that the effect is a new manifestation of the same stuff, this he has himself always admitted). Yes, but the Sāṅkhya has never admitted that causation consists in a manifested jar, a jar standing before us, being once more manifested, and it is just this manifested jar, in its ready form,² that we take as an example (when we prove the absurdity of the idea of an identity between cause and effect).

Regarding the non-manifested jar, the jar in its potential condition³ 21. 10.
 (as a clump of clay), it is clear *à fortiori*⁴ that (from our point of view) it cannot be produced. How is it then possible to accuse our thesis of falling in (with the Sāṅkhya view)⁵ and how is it possible to accuse our argument of being selfcontradictory?⁶

(To summarize) our opinion. (Buddhapālita) has pointed out the 21. 13.
 contradictions (in the Sāṅkhya theory of causality not only by a deduction *ad absurdum*, but) also by an independent argument. Nevertheless the faults imputed to him do not exist. It is therefore impossible to maintain that he

¹ Cp. above p. 97.

² Lit., p. 21. 10, «because its form (or essence, *rūpa* = *svārūpa*) is established (as an example)», cp. the Tib. transl.

³ *śakti-rūpāpanna*.

⁴ *viśiṣṭa-sādhya*, a qualified predicate, a predicate *à fortiori*; *anabhivṛtya-rūpa-anutpatti* = *kāraṇa-rūpa-kāryasya anutpatti* = *parata anutpatti*.

⁵ Lit., p. 21. 11, «the objection of a faulty thesis of proving the proved».

⁶ Cp. above, p. 97.

has not answered the accusations of the Sāṅkhya. The whole onslaught (of Bhāvaviveka) is therefore absolute nonsense.¹

XVII. SOME MINOR POINTS EXPLAINED.

22. 1. (It might be objected that the example of a jar is not convincing enough. The rule may apply for the production of a jar out of clay, and not apply to the production of a piece of cloth out of threads? No, because) we say a jar *etc.* By the *etc.* the inclusion of every possible object which can originate is indicated. There is not the slightest possibility to doubt (that the rule might not apply) to a cloth *etc.*

22. 3. The argument (against the Sāṅkhya) may have also been formulated (by Buddhapālita) in another way, viz.,

(Thesis). All physical entities do not arise out of themselves.

(Reason). Because they always exist in their own essence (i. e., because Matter is eternal).

(Example). Just as the (eternal) Spirit does.

The (Sāṅkhya who advocates the identity of cause and effect (must accept this argument) for that very reason (that he advocates this identity which is here exemplified by his changeless Spirit). This example (of the Spirit whose eternal identity the Sāṅkhya admits) may have also been quoted (by Buddhapālita in order to combat the Sāṅkhya view).²

22. 6. It might be maintained that (the Sāṅkhya) is not affected by this denial of origination. He vindicates the theory (that causality consists in a new) manifestation (of an existing stuff). However the term «origination» may also have the meaning of «manifestation».

Indeed (both origination and manifestation) have the common feature of representing something that was formerly unperceived and became perceived after. Therefore a new manifestation can also be called a new origination.

¹ Lit., p. 21. 13 — 14. «Therefore if there is also an objection (*codanā*) of contradiction by a self-argument (= *svānumānena*, i. e., even admitting that Buddhapālita has produced a real argument), since the faults as they have been depicted do not exist, the non-refutation of the faults mentioned by the opponent is quite impossible. Thus this critique is quite incongruous. This should be known».

² Lit., p. 22.3 — 5. «Or else the following other way of formulation. Entities which are not Spirit, (i. e. are physical), for the advocate of self-origination, for that very reason, do not originate out of themselves, because they exist in their own self, just as the (individual) Soul. Thus this example can be quoted».

It then becomes impossible for the Sāṅkhya to maintain that he is not affected by the denial (of an identity between a cause and its effect).¹

It may be asked, how is it possible to deduce all these considerations 22. 9. of detail (out of the short statement of Buddhapālita), since he does not mention them? We answer. His words are full of (profound) meaning. In a concise manner they include the above mentioned details. When analysed they reveal their own self in these details. We do not invent something that is not included in them.²

XVIII. THE THIRD STRICTURE OF BHĀVAVIVEKA ANSWERED. THE DENIAL OF ONE VIEW DOES NOT IMPLY THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONTRARY.

(Bhāvaviveka maintains that the repudiation of the Sāṅkhya theory 23. 3. of causation by a mere deduction *ad absurdum* involves acceptance of the opposite theory, viz. that cause and effect represent two different substances. This is wrong), because the converse theory will be again charged to the account of the same opponent, not to our account,³ since (we have declared that) we have no theory of our own. We therefore (cannot be accused) of contradicting our own principles. But if the many objections that have been already raised against the opponent are accrued by charging to his account the counterpart of our deduction, we really will only welcome it.⁴

The Master Buddhapālita is a faithful adherent of the method of 24. 1. Nāgārjuna. How can he possibly pronounce something inadvertently⁵ that would give an opportunity (to his opponent)? When a philosopher who

¹ Lit., p. 22. 6—8. «Although the denial of origination does not repudiate the maintainer of manifestation, nevertheless by using the word origination in the sense of manifestation, since by the similarity of non-perception before and perception after just a manifestation is expressed by the word origination, the denial is not non-repudiatory».

² Lit., p. 22.9 — 23.2. «How is again this detailed analysis (*vyasta-vicāra*) attained without an expression of the meaning as it is here told? If this is asked, then this is answered. These sentences, (full) of meaning, are very much meaning, they are turned out (*pravṛttānti*) in summarizing the meaning as it has been told and, being commented upon, they give birth to their own self, the meaning as is (here) told, thus nothing is imagined which is not (really) assumed».

³ Both *prasanga* and *tad-viparyaya* are used together to prove the same thesis in, e. g., *Sasvadarś.*, p. 21 (Poona, 1924).

⁴ Lit., p. 23. 4-5. «And the more faults of the opponent are deduced through a deduction of the contrary of (his, sc. Buddhapālita's) deduction, the more desirable will it indeed be for us.»

⁵ *sāvakāśam*.

denies the reality (of single objects) deduces *ad absurdum* the conception of their reality,¹ how can he be charged with the counterpart of this deduction? Our words are not policemen! They cannot deprive us of our liberty! (Words) possess a power (to express something), but they are controlled by the intention² of the speaker. Therefore the only result of our deduction is to repudiate the theory of our opponent. Our acceptance of the converse theory is not at all therewith implied.³

24. 7. Our (common) Master Nāgārjuna, when combating opposed opinions, has very often had recourse just to a deduction *ad absurdum*, (without ever admitting its positive counterpart).

E.g.,

24. 8. We find nothing (called empty) Space,
Before its essence has (here) been determined.
If it would previously to this determination preexist,
It would be Space without an essence.⁴
24. 10. Supposing all the causes of some matter taken off,
And we would call it matter none the less,
It would be matter without causes.
But nowhere without causes any matter does exist.⁵

(This does not at all imply that Nāgārjuna admitted the existence of caused matter).

24. 12. Another example,
25. 1. Nirvāṇa is no (separate) entity,
Or else it would be subject to decay and death.
There is no (separate) entity
That never would decay and never die.⁶

¹ Lit., deduces *ad absurdum* «the maintainer of reality», the Realist (*sa-svabhāva-vādin*).

² We would expect either *vivakṣayā* or *vivakṣām anu vidhiyante*.

³ Lit., p. 24. 5-6. «There is no accepted deduction (*arthāpatti*) being the contrary of the unacceptable deduction (*prasanga*).»

⁴ M. ś., V. 1. It does not follow that Nāgārjuna admits the existence of a real space.

⁵ M. ś., IV. 2.

⁶ M. ś., XXV. 4. If the converse conception be that of a Nirvāṇa immanent in the world and eternal, Nāgārjuna admits it, cp. ibid. XXV. 9.

(Bhāvaviveka). But these are aphorisms.¹ The sentences of our Master contain profound intentions. They can be variously tackled² and give rise to a variety of syllogistic formulation.

(Answer). Why, to be sure, should not the comment of Buddha-³ *nāḥita* (which does not contain any syllogistic formulation) be accepted just in this sense, (as the only faithful rendering of Nāgārjuna's intention).

(Bhāvaviveka). It is the business⁴ of the writers of detailed commentaries to make detailed statements about the syllogistic formulations (implied in the aphorisms).

(Answer). This is not (always) the case. Our Master has written a commentary upon his own manual of dialectics, «The Repudiation of Con- tests», but he did not indulge in it in syllogistic formulations.⁵ You are, indeed, merely parading with your cleverness in the science of dialectics. Although you pretend to be an adherent of the Mādhyamika system, you nevertheless compose independent syllogistic arguments. But for such a logician, as you would like to appear, (the Mādhyamika method) is only a very great encumbrance. It makes him pile up mistake upon mistake.⁶

How is that?

XIX. EXAMINATION OF BHĀVIVEKA'S FORMAL ARGUMENT AGAINST THE SĀṆKHYA.

(To combat the Sāṅkhya theory of Causality you have composed the following syllogism).

(Thesis). Mental phenomena,⁶ if considered from the transcendental standpoint (of the Monist), are no new productions out of the same (substance).

¹ *artha-vākya*

² *parikalpyante*.

³ or method, *nyāya*,

⁴ This statement can be interpreted as an indirect indication that Candrakīrti knew nothing about a commentary written upon the *mūla-kārikās* by Nāgārjuna himself. It would follow that the work called *Akutoḥbhaya* is a forgery as suggested by Wassilieff.

⁵ Lit., p. 25. 7-9. «Merely through the desire of displaying the own proficiency in the science of dialectics, the use of independent syllogisms (*prayoga-vākya*), although having accepted the Mādhyamika system, is an indirect indication (*upalakṣyate*) of such a logician who is in a very high degree the receptacle of an assemblage of many logical mistakes!»

⁶ *ādhyātmikāny āyatanāni*, cp. above, p. 96 n. 3.

(Reason). Because they exist.

(Example). Just as the Conscious Principle (of the Sāṅkhya which is an eternal unchanging entity).

(Major premise. Whatsoever already exists is not a new self-production).

Now, in this syllogism, by you so formulated, what is the use of the qualification «from the transcendental standpoint (of the Monist)»?¹

26. 3. (Bhāvaviveka). If we take our stand on phenomenal reality we cannot deny origination (of mental phenomena). If this were denied, it would follow that the contrast which we assume (between the absolute thing in itself and phenomenal reality) does not exist.²

26. 4. (Answer). This is not right, because we deny the identity of cause and effect³ from the phenomenal point of view also. It is corroborated by the following words of the Scripture.⁴ «This sprout which springs up from a seed is not produced out of itself, neither is it produced out of non-self, nor out of both, nor without a cause. It is neither created by God,⁵ nor by Time, nor from the Atoms, nor from Primitive Matter,⁶ nor by Nature».⁷

26. 7. Here is another text. «The sprout does not belong to the seed, neither is the seed identical with the sprout, nor is it non-identical. It is (a manifestation of that unique) Reality⁸ which neither (can be determined as) annihilation,⁹ nor as (one of the Eternal Principles)».¹⁰

26. 10. And in this treatise the author will make the following statement,

Whatever relatively does exist
Is really not what (it appears to be).
But neither is it something else.

¹ Lit., p. 25.9—26.2. «Here the syllogism which has been stated thus, as absolute reality the internal bases do not arise out of self, since they exist, just as consciousness, what for again in it the qualification «as absolute reality» has been assumed?»

² Lit., p. 26. 3-4. «And if denied, the admitted repudiation (*bādha*) (of the phenomenal by the absolute) would not be entailed (read *prasangāt*)».

³ *svata utpatti*.

⁴ From Śālistamba-sūtra, cf. Śikṣāsāmuc, p. 219. 10 ff.

⁵ *īśvara*.

⁶ *prakṛti*.

⁷ *svabhāva*.

⁸ *dharma*.

⁹ *uccheda*.

¹⁰ Such as God, Time, Atom, Matter, Nature etc.

Therefore it neither has an end,
Nor has it a beginning.¹

(Bhāvaviveka). The qualification («from the standpoint of transcendental reality») has been introduced (into the above syllogism) in consideration of the opinion held by the opponent.

(Answer). This is a wrong method, because we do not admit his construction,² even from the point of view of phenomenal reality.³ Non-Buddhists are absolutely lacking the right understanding of (the division between) both realities, (the transcendental and phenomenal one). (It is therefore much better) to repudiate them from both these standpoints. I would think it a great advantage. The above qualification is thus out of place, even if it is introduced in order (to distinguish the view taken by the author from) the views of the opponent (or from the ideas of simple people).

As to simple people they do not understand what self-origination means. For them also the qualification is useless. Unsophisticated people simply admit that an effect is produced by a cause. They do not enter into such considerations as to whether (the effect) is identical (to the cause), or not.

Our Master (Nāgārjuna) has (really) established the same thing, (viz. that we must avail ourselves of the every day idea of causality without any hope to explain it metaphysically). It is therefore clear that the qualification is absolutely senseless.

XX. BHĀVAVIVEKA'S ARGUMENT ASSAILED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF FORMAL LOGIC.

However (let us agree and admit that) the qualification might have been introduced in order to intimate that phenomenal causality is not denied. (The syllogism of Bhāvaviveka will then nevertheless be formally deficient, since its example, the Spirit, and its reason, the fact of «the existence» of mental phenomena, will both be ultimately unreal). We will then have either the logical error of a faulty thesis, since it will refer to

¹ M. ś., XVIII. 10, *prāṇītya* = *śūnya*; *śāsvata* «beginningless», cp. XXV. 21. Cp. Kant's solution of the first antinomy, viz. that the world is neither finite, nor infinite because «a phenomenon does not exist by itself», op. cit. p. 410 ff.

² *vyavasthā*.

³ It is not right to maintain that the Sāṅkhya's view of phenomenal reality is admissible with the qualification that from the transcendental point of view it will be an illusion.

something (sc. the mental phenomena) which (the author of the syllogism) himself, (from his own monistic point of view), does not accept as real;¹ or we shall have the logical error of a faulty reason,² (viz. the fact of the existence or reality of mental phenomena) which will then refer to something (equally) unreal.

Indeed (Bhāvaviveka) himself (being a Mādhyamika) does not admit the transcendental reality of (separate) mental phenomena³ (and at the same time he composes a syllogism about this very non-existing thing).

27. 9. (Bhāvaviveka). This does not matter, since we admit the phenomenal reality of the sense of vision etc.!

(Answer). But then, who is qualified by the words «from the transcendental standpoint»?

27. 10. (Bhāvaviveka). If considered from the transcendental point of view the existence⁴ of the phenomenal sense faculties⁵ (and of empirical consciousness)⁶ is not real. The qualification is introduced in order to specify the kind of causality which is denied.

27. 11. (Answer). Then you ought to have expressed yourself (otherwise. You ought to have spoken) exactly thus: «the supposed phenomenal reality of the sense-faculties etc. is no reality in the transcendental sense». But your expression is different.⁷ However, even supposing you would have expressed yourself (properly), nevertheless (you would not have escaped) the logical error of a faulty thesis since it would then have referred to (empirical sensations, i. e., something quite) unknown to your opponent.⁸ (For the

¹ This *pakṣa-doṣa* would be probably classified by Dignāga as *anumāna-nirākṛta*, cp. Nyāyabindu, p. 59.1. (B. B. VII).

² About the *āśraya-asiddha hetu-doṣa* cf. Nyāyabindu, p. 64.16. The logic of Dignāga forbids deductions from facts which the author of the syllogism, from his own point of view, does not admit as real, cp. ibid. p. 63.13 ff.

³ Lit., «of the basis of the sense of vision (*caṅsur-āyatana*) and other (subjective bases of cognition, i. e. *ādhyātmika-āyatana*)».

⁴ *utpatti*.

⁵ *caṅsurādi*.

⁶ *citta* (= *manas* = *vijñāna*) is included among *caṅsurādi* as *āyatana* № 6, cf. my Central Conception, p. 96.

⁷ The expression that «from the transcendental standpoint the sensations do not arise out of themselves» can be understood as meaning that the transcendental sensations are not identical to their causes. But transcendental sensations do not exist from the Monist's point of view. Hence for him it will be a syllogism composed about a non-existing thing.

⁸ Lit., p. 28. 1-3. «And even if told, since the opponents admit exclusively a really existing faculty of vision etc., and do not admit nominal realities, it will be a faulty thesis whose substratum will be unreal for the opponent. Thus it is not right».

Sāṅkhya) indeed all sensations are absolutely real. He has altogether no nominal (or empirical) realities.

Thus it is that the argument is wrong (either from the standpoint of 28. 3. its author, for whom the separate mental phenomena are not real, or from the standpoint of those to whom it is addressed, because they do not admit any difference between phenomenal and absolute reality).¹

XXI. ANOTHER ATTEMPT OF BHĀVAVIVEKA TO VINDICATE HIS ARGUMENT.

But be that as the case may be, we may envisage (the syllogism in 28. 4. question) as referring in general terms just to the relation between a fact, (the mental phenomena), and one of its characteristics, (viz. existence), without enlarging upon the special (theories which might be entertained by both parties about the nature of mental phenomena or the essence of existence). E. g., when it is inferred that words are non-eternal (the general relation of this characteristic to the characterized fact is alone referred to). Indeed the work of inference would become quite impossible, if the special 29. 1. views entertained in different systems) were to be taken into account. (There are no two systems which agree in the question about the nature of the sound). If we admit (with the Hinayāna Buddhist) that the sound is a secondary element of matter, dependent upon the four universal elements,² this will not be admitted by his opponent (the Vaiśeṣika), (because he, on the contrary, maintains) that the sound is a quality of the ether, (it is not a substance). This again the Buddhist does not admit on his own behalf. Similarly when the Vaiśeṣika undertakes it to prove that the word is 29. 3. non-eternal, (he can be asked) whether he means the word as a physical product, or the word as a manifestation (of an eternally existing substance). The first is not admitted by his opponent (the Mīmāṃsaka who postulates the existence of a special eternal substance of whom the spoken words are nothing but separate manifestations). The second is not accepted by (the Vaiśeṣika) himself.

¹ According to the logic of Dignāga a discussion must start from facts admitted by both parties, cp. Nyāyabindu, p. 62. 3. Sensations real in the absolute sense do not exist for the Monist. The difference of sensations empirically real is unknown to the Sāṅkhya, for him all sensations are real. Hence, accordingly as we take it, the syllogism of Bhāvaviveka will refer either to something non-admitted by the respondent himself, or to something not admitted by his opponent.

² Cp. my Central Conception, p. 14.

29. 4. The same (applies) *mutatis mutandis*¹ (to every philosophic issue). (If you admit) that the destruction (of an object) must have a cause, this will not be accepted by the Buddhist on his own behalf, (since he maintains that every existence consists of discrete moments which are evanescent by themselves, without a cause).² But if he alludes to uncaused (invisible) destruction (going on at every moment) this will not be admitted by his opponent, (the Vaiśeṣika).
29. 5. Therefore, just as in the case (of the evanescent character of the sound), only the relation of this characteristic to the characterized substratum, in general terms, is taken into account, just so in the present instance, the mere fact that there is some substratum (called sensations), should be taken (in general), without entering into details, (whether it be a phenomenal or an absolute existence).
29. 7. (Answer). This is not so, (since in the present case it is just the existence of such a general substratum that is denied). It is denied by no one else than (Bhāvaviveka) himself. His avowed aim is here to deny Causality. However, just in denying every causality, he at the same time (*eo ipso*) denies its substratum, (the caused thing), the substance (of the thing produced), (converting it in a thing which) owes its existence to a mere illusion. Illusion and reality are indeed opposites. (The pluriverse as it appears before the unsophisticated eyes of mankind is either logically inconsistent or it is a reality).³
30. 2. If it is logically inconsistent,⁴ and if (this plurality) which is not the real (condition of the universe) is wrongly apprehended by us as real, if it is a false impression in the mind of the perceiver,⁵ then

¹ *yathā-sambhavam*.

² Cp. Nyāyabindu, p. 33.6 ff.

³ We find here an eloquent expression of that genuine conviction very much spread, even in our days, among the pandits of India who have studied the various systems of their country that Monism is superior to all other systems by the fact of reaching the limit of all philosophic construction. The realism of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā, the dualism of the Sāṃkhya, the radical pluralism of Hinayāna Buddhism — all were engaged in constructing a skeleton of the Universe out of a limited number of ultimate data and have then stopped before them, refusing to go deeper into them and to reduce them to their still deeper root. Should they have embarked on a further analysis of those ultimate principles at which they had arrived they would have been inevitably landed in Monism. Only in Monism does philosophic analysis reach its real limit — *yathā yathā vicāryate tathā tathā brahmany eva ekasmin sarvam paryavasyati*. In modern philosophy, as far as I am aware, a similar view has been taken by Ladd, *Introd. to philos.* p. 403.

⁴ *viparyāsa*.

⁵ Lit. «like (non-existing) hair etc. by the ophthalmic».

there is (in this plurality) not the slightest bit of what is (absolutely) real.¹ But if there is no (transcendental) illusion, if it is not a mirage,² if (we perceive) a real³ (pluriverse), not the one constructed (by our imagination), then there is not the slightest vestige of something unreal (in pluralism), (nothing at all to justify the claim) that a *phenomenal* reality has been established (by us).⁴

Our venerable Master (Nāgārjuna) has therefore said,

30. 6.

If I did really cognize some (separate) things,

30. 7.

I could then make an affirmation or denial

Upon the basis of these things perceived or (inferred).

But these (separate) things do not exist for me!

Therefore I cannot be assailed on such a basis.⁵

Since it is so since (transcendental) illusion is one thing and (transcendental) reality another, since for the transcendentalist,⁶ in what (he considers to be) absolutely real, there is no room for non-reality, (what is then the meaning of Bhāvaviveka's syllogism? He takes) the phenomenal visual sensations and other (mental phenomena) as a minor term, (the subject of his deduction). He thus cannot escape from the criticism that his thesis is logically impossible, since it refers to a non-entity, or that his middle term is contradictory, because it appertains to an unreal substratum. (The syllogism would be equivalent to the assertion that *non-existing* things do not arise out of themselves, «because they exist»).

As to the analogy (with the discussions about the nature of the word), it does not exist. In those (discussions there always) is an agreement between (every) pair of contending views about what sound, in general, and what evanescence, in general, are, without entering into details (about the

¹ *sad-bhūta-padārtha-leśa*, a hint at Dignaga's *ksaṇa* = *svalakṣaṇa* = *paramārtha-sa* and at his claim to have vindicated phenomenal reality, cp. below, text page 66 ff.

² Lit., «like (real) hair etc. by the non-ophthalmic».

³ Read *bhūtam* in stead of *abhūtam*.

⁴ Lit., p. 30. 1-5. «Because just when the denial of origination is here intended to be a characteristic to be established, just then the negation of the characterized, of its substratum, which has reached its own existence only through an illusion, is admitted just by himself Different are indeed illusion and non-illusion. Therefore if, owing to illusion, non-Ens is taken as Ens, just as by the ophthalmic (non-existing) hair etc., then wherefrom would even a bit of a really existing thing be apprehended? But if through non-confusion, the real, non-imagined (is perceived), like by the non-ophthalmic (real) hair etc., then wherefrom the perception of even a bit of a non-really-existing thing, so as then there would be phenomenalism (*saṃvṛtīh*)?».

⁵ This stanza from the *Vigraha-vyāvartanī* has been quoted above, text p. 16.9.

⁶ *viduṣām*, they are identified with the *āryas*, cf. above p. 90 n. 4.

nature of the sound). There is no such agreement between the radical Relativist¹ and the non-Relativist (or Realist),² in regard of what visual sensations in general are, either from the phenomenal or the transcendental point of view. For this reason the (two) cases are not comparable.

30. 15. All that has been said about the logical impossibility of a thesis which refers to a non-entity is applicable (*mutatis mutandis*) as the proof of the futility of (the conception of) «existence» as a logical reason.

XXII. BHĀVAVIVEKA ALSO AVAILS HIMSELF OF THE ARGUMENT THAT FOR THE MONIST ALL INDIVIDUAL EXISTENCE IS UNREAL.

31. 1. Such is (the force) of this (argument)³ that even (Bhāvaviveka) himself, this champion of logic,⁴ is (obliged) to admit (the condemnation of logic) which we have exposed.
31. 1. (He examines the following syllogism).
(Thesis.) The causes and (conditions) which produce mental phenomena⁵ really exist.
(Reason.) Because this has been declared by Buddha.
(Major premise.) Whatsoever has been declared by the Buddha is true.⁶
(Example.) As e. g., (his statement) that Nirvāna is (Final) Quiescence.
31. 3. This syllogism has been advanced by a (Hīnayānist) opponent of (Bhāvaviveka). He replies by the following criticism. «In what sense, do you think, the word «cause» is here used? Has Buddha spoken from the phenomenal point of view or from the transcendental⁷ one? If it is taken in the phenomenal sense, the reason has (*eo ipso*) no (ultimate) reality for (Buddha) himself. But supposing it is taken in the sense of something transcendently real, (then we must remember the following words of Nāgārjuna),

¹ *śūnyatā-vādin*.

² *aśūnyatā-vādin*.

³ The argument, namely, that for a consistent Monist every separate thing and every separate reason is ultimately unreal.

⁴ *tārikā*.

⁵ *ādhyātmika-āyatana*.

⁶ Lit., «Indeed what (and) how is taught by the Buddha (to exist), is so».

⁷ *paramārthataḥ*.

Neither an Ens, nor a non-Ens,
Nor any Ens-non-Ens,
No element¹ is really «turned out».²
How can we then assume
The possibility of a producing³ cause?

«Since causation⁴ of things, whether real or unreal or (partly) real 31. 7. and (partly) unreal, is excluded, there is no such thing as a (really) efficient 31. 9. cause». This is the meaning of the words (of Nāgārjuna).

«Therefore from the transcendental point of view⁵ there is altogether 31. 9. no efficient causality.⁶ Every reason (you may adduce) will be either (ultimately) unreal or contradictory».

By adopting this line of argument (against the Hīnayānist, Bhāvavi- 31. 11. veka) has himself admitted the unreality of every reason (from the transcendental standpoint of the Relativist). Thus all logical demonstrations are smashed, since in all such syllogisms reasons are adduced which (in the opinion of the opponent) are founded on real fact, but in the opinion of (the Relativist) himself they are all (ultimately) unreal.⁷

In the following (two syllogisms of Bhāvaviveka the middle term 31. 13. must likewise be declared faulty, on the score that it is meaningless from the Monist's transcendental point of view). E. g.,

(Thesis). Mental phenomena⁸ do not really⁹ arise from corresponding causes, separate from them.

(Reason). Because these are separate (entities).

(Major premise. Whatsoever is a separate substance cannot really be a cause).

¹ *dharma*.

² *nirvartate*.

³ *nirvartaka*.

⁴ *sad-asat-karya-pratyayatva*, i. e., neither *satkārya*- nor *asatkārya-vāda* is admitted.

⁵ *paramārthataḥ*.

⁶ *nirvartya-nirvartakatva*.

⁷ Lit., p. 31. 11-13. «Since thus he even himself by this method has admitted the unreality of the reason, therefore in all syllogisms which have middle terms suggested by attributes of real entities, since just by themselves reasons etc. are unreal, just all demonstrations are killed».

⁸ *ādhyātmika-āyatana*, lit. «the (six) subjective bases (of cognition)».

⁹ *paramārthataḥ*.

(Example). As the causes of a jar¹ (which are not real in the absolute sense).

31. 14. Or (another example),

(Thesis). The causes which, in the opinion of our opponents,² produce mental phenomena³ are not understood to be causes in the absolute sense.

(Reason). Because they are separate (entities).

(Major premise. Whatsoever is a separate entity is not a cause in the absolute sense).

(Example). As e. g., the threads, (the loom, the weaver etc. are not the causes of cloth from the transcendental point of view).

32. 1. The reason «because they are separate (entities)» is not a valid middle term, since (for the author of these syllogisms) himself it has no (ultimate) reality.

32. 3. Another example where (Bhāvaviveka implicitly admits that the transcendentalist has to forego usual logical methods, is the following one). He is desirous to elicit that the reason given by his opponent (the Sautrāntika) is wrong, because it represents a fact whose (ultimate) reality he, (as a consequent Relativist), does not accept. (The argument of the Sautrāntika runs thus).

(Thesis). Internal facts⁴ (i. e., mental phenomena) really arise (i. e., they have a real existence).

(Reason). Because they produce purposive actions directed towards the same objects as (our thoughts have been directed to).

(Major premise. Whatsoever is efficient is real).

32. 4. (Bhāvaviveka repudiates this conclusion by quoting the following parallel argument),

(Thesis). The Yogi, when merged in transic meditation, perceives by his supernatural faculty of vision the ultimate reality, he then apprehends causation, motion etc. as they really are.⁶

¹ Read *ghatasya*.

² Read *paraiḥ* instead of *pare*.

³ Lit., «The (six) subjective bases (of cognition), the faculty of sight (*cakṣuḥ*) etc.».

⁴ *ādhyātmikā bhāvāḥ*.

⁵ The definition of reality (*paramārtha-sat*) as efficiency (*artha-kriyā-kāritva*) is accepted by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, cp. Nyāyabindu. p. 13. 15. It is also shared by the Sautrāntikas, cp. N. b. Tīpp., p. 19.

⁶ In the *Santānāntara-siddhi*, § 90 (B. B. XI), Russian transl. p. 47, Dharmakīrti denies the capacity of the yogi to perceive the ultimately real.

(The reason adduced is the same as in the foregoing syllogism, viz.) 32. 5.
«because they produce purposive actions directed to the same objects (as his thoughts have been directed to)». In this argument, (says Bhāvaviveka), the reason does not represent a real fact (from the transcendental point of view).

It is moreover (unreal, says he), because motion does not exist.¹ Since 32. 6.
there is no (real) causation, (motion cannot exist)».²

Now this method (by which Bhāvaviveka here combats the argu- 32. 7.
ment of his opponent can be *mutatis mutandis*) applied to his own deductions (which he produces *bona fide*, viz.),

(Thesis). The future does not exist in an absolute sense.³

(Reason). Because it represents time.⁴

(Example). Just as the past time (does not exist).

(Major premise. Whatsoever is «time» does not represent an ultimate reality).

(To this syllogism we may likewise) apply (the stricture) that the 32. 8.
reason «time» represents nothing real (to the author of the syllogism) himself.

(The student will be now able) himself to extend (the critique here ex- 33. 2-3.
pounded) upon the unreality of the reasons (adduced by Bhāvaviveka in the following three syllogisms).

1. (Thesis). The operating⁵ sense of vision does not perceive colour. 32. 9.

(Reason). Because it is a sense of vision (in general).

(Example). Just as a non-operating⁶ (sense of vision always is).

(Major premise. Whatsoever is a sense of vision does not necessarily perceive colour).⁷

¹ In Hinayāna motion is denied (*na gatir nāsāt*, Ab. Kośa, IV. 1) since it represents in reality a series of separate momentary productions (*nirantara-utpāda*), as in a cinema. In Mahāyāna motion is denied because all these moments are relative (*svabhāva-sūnya*).

² Lit., p. 32. 3-7. «Just as he has said when eliciting the unreality (*asiddhārthatā*) of this reason given by an opponent, viz. «internal facts (*bhāvāḥ*) are necessarily (*eva*) produced, since they produce actions characterized as possessing their objects»; now it is being proved that «for the meditating Yogi who by his eye of wisdom sees the real pith of existence (*bhāvayāthātmya*), origination, motion etc. exist in the absolute sense (*paramārthataḥ*), then there is unreality of the reason, because they produce actions characterized as possessing their objects, and motion is denied just because origination is denied. Just so...»

³ Lit., «The not-run is not at all being run in the absolute sense».

⁴ *adhvan*.

⁵ Read *sabhāgam* instead of *sāśrayam*. *Sabhāga* = *sva-karma-kṛt*, cp. A. Kośa, I. 39.

⁶ *tatsabhāga* = *a-sva-karma-kṛt*, cp. Ab. Kośa, I. 39.

⁷ For the Monist, according to Candrakīrti, it would have been sufficient to deny a real perception of colour on the score that all separate facts have no ultimate reality for a con-

33. 1. 2. (Thesis). The organ of vision does not apprehend colours.
(Reason). Because it is physical.¹
(Example). Just as any physical object,² (e. g., a jar etc.).
(Major premise. Whatsoever is physical does not apprehend colours).³
33. 2. 3. (Thesis). The solid bodies⁴ do not really possess solidity.
(Reason). Because they represent Matter.⁵
(Example). Just as the gaseous bodies.
(Major premise. Whatsoever is Matter is not always a solid body).⁶

XXIII. ANOTHER FORMAL ERROR IN THE SYLLOGISM OF BHĀVAVIVEKA.

33. 4. Moreover the reason «because they (sc. mental phenomena) exist»⁷ is «uncertain» from the standpoint of the opponent. (The syllogism of Bhāvaviveka is directed against the Sāṅkhya who admits a double kind of existence, the eternal, changeless existence of the Spirit and the changing existence of Matter. It is therefore uncertain) whether the words «mental phenomena do not arise out of themselves because they already exist» mean

sequent Monist, or only a second hand reality (*paratantra*) for a Yogācāra, cp. above p. 33. But Bhāvaviveka apparently tries to corroborate this view by something like a formally correct syllogism. He seemingly has detected in the judgment «the eye is a colour-perceiving organ» the same contradiction as really appears if the copula be taken in the sense of an equation. The eye thus does not perceive colour because it does not *always* perceive it, perception is not its essence (*svabhāva*) as, e. g., the quality of being resistant is the essence of the hard stuff.

¹ *bhautika*.

² *rūpa*, the first *rūpa* = *rūpa-āyatana*, the second probably = *rūpa-skandha*.

³ Here Bhāvaviveka has recourse to an idea of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school (*bhautikāni indriyāṇi*) in order to undermine the fact that colours are perceived through the eye. According to Candrakīrti this is quite superfluous for a believer in Universal Relativity (*sūnyatā* = *niḥsvabhāvatā*), and moreover constitutes a fault in formal logic, since the reason, the physical character (*bhautika*) of the organ, has no real force from the point of view of the author of the syllogism, it is *asiddha svataḥ*.

⁴ *maḥi* = *prthivī*, cp. my Central Conc., p. 13.

⁵ *bhūta* = *mahā-bhūta*, cp. ibid. 99.

⁶ Solidity (*kharatva*) is the essence (*lakṣaṇa*) of the solid bodies. All the work of predication being relative, it can, from this point of view, be maintained that the solid body is not solid, sc. is not solid by itself, but only in relation to others. This is a case of the *lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā* or *sūnyatā*, cp. Tripiṣikā, p. 32. For Candrakīrti it is enough to point out this general conception in order to establish the relativity and consequent unreality of the idea of a solid stuff. But Bhāvaviveka wishes apparently to construct a formal syllogism on the same basis as the first one, i. e., he finds a contradiction in the sentence «a solid stuff is a stuff» on the score that there are stuffs that are liquid and gaseous. These three syllogisms are celebrated among Tibetan schoolmen as baffling arguments establishing Relativity (*sūnyatā*) according to the system of the Svātantrikas founded by Bhāvaviveka.

⁷ Cp. above, p. 26.1, *sattvāt* = *vidyamānatvāt*.

that they exist eternally¹ like the Spirit² exists, or whether the words «because they already exist» refer to that kind of origination which is exemplified by the origination of jars and other (physical existence in general, an origination which represents a change in a permanent stuff, since according to this system mental changes are in themselves physical).³

It may be objected (that the adduced example, the identity of matter in physical objects) like jars etc., is a *petitio principii*⁴ and therefore the argument is not uncertain, (but wrong).⁵ However this is not so, because the argument is stated not in conformity (with our view, but from the standpoint of the Sāṅkhya, where mental phenomena indeed have a double nature, they are physical in themselves and at the same time they are the reflection of the eternal changeless Spirit).

XXIV. THE MĀDHYAMIKA REPUDIATES HIS OPPONENT ON PRINCIPLES ADMITTED AS VALID BY THE SAME OPPONENT.

But it may be objected that our own argument will then be liable to just the same criticism which we apply to the arguments of our opponents. (All our arguments will be also wrong, because) the reasons (which will be adduced) will either be non-entities (themselves), or they will represent something appertaining to a non-entity. When both parties are guilty of the same fault, it cannot be charged to the account of one of them alone. All this our attack (on logic) will thus become unfounded.

To this we reply. This objection affects only those who (being Mādhyamikas, nevertheless, like Bhāvaviveka), have recourse to *bona fide* arguments.⁶ But we do not resort to direct proof by syllogism. Our arguments can have only the result of repudiating the tenets of our opponents, (for us they are not valid by themselves).

¹ Lit., «should not arise», i. e. not change. The spirit of the Sāṅkhya is changeless.

² *caitanya*.

³ Lit., p. 33. 4-5. «Because they exist, this reason is uncertain, what? should the (six) internal bases (of cognition), because they exist like the Spirit, not arise out of self, or like jars etc., they should arise out of self?»

⁴ *sādhyā-sama*.

⁵ not *anaikāntika*, but *asiddha*, cp. Nyāyabindu, p. 62.

⁶ *svatantra-anumāna*.

34. 6. Supposing someone maintains that «the eye perceives external objects». He will then be repudiated on principles which he himself admits. You maintain, (he will be told), that the eye lacks the capacity of introspection¹ which, in your opinion, is invariably concomitant with the capacity of apprehending external objects.

Now, (we will assail it by a counter-argument).

(Major premise). Wheresoever introspection is absent, cognition of external objects is also absent.

(Example). E. g., (in physical objects) like jars etc.

(Minor premise). The eye lacks the capacity of introspection, (it is physical).

(Conclusion). Therefore it cannot cognize external objects.

34. 9. Thus it is that the perception of an external object like (a patch of blue colour is in conflict with the fact that the eye itself is deficient in self-perception. This contradiction (in the argument of our opponent) has been disclosed by another argument which is valid from (the standpoint of the opponent) himself.

34. 11. This alone is elicited by our syllogism. How is then the above mentioned accusation possible? How can it be maintained (that our deduction contains) the same flaw (which we have found in the argument of our opponent)?

XXV. LOGICAL REFUTATION ON THE BASIS OF FACTS ADMITTED BY ONLY ONE PARTY.

34. 13. (Bhāvaviveka). (It is true that for us Monists all individual facts possess no reality). However (a discussion is possible) even then when an argument is combated on the basis of principles admitted by one of the parties.

(Answer). Yes, but it must be done on the basis of principles admitted by yourself, not on the basis of principles admitted by your opponent.

¹ *svātma-adarśana-dharma*.

² Dignāga has established the rule that a discussion must start from facts the reality of which is admitted by both parties. For the Mādhyamika as a Monist all individual facts have no reality. Transcendental logic is thus doomed. But Bhāvaviveka deems it possible to establish a kind of logic on the basis of facts the reality of which is admitted by one party alone, viz. by the opponent. Candrakīrti, on the contrary, requires that the facts should be recognized by the disputant. He thus cannot produce any direct proof.

This¹ is what happens in everyday life. Indeed, sometimes in common life two contending parties appoint somebody to judge them, and according to his verdict the gain or the loss are settled. Sometimes the disputant himself declares (that he has won or lost). But never is this question of gain and loss to be settled by the enemy. What is good in common life is equally right in logic, because scientific logic is exclusively concerned (with an examination of the principles which underly purposive action in common life).²

For this very reason some (logicians) have maintained that an argument cannot be exploded on the basis of the principles admitted by the opponent, because it is just these principles, by him admitted, that it is intended to reject.

Of course (Dignāga) thinks that a demonstration or a refutation (can be valid, if it is carried on principles) admitted by both parties, not by one of them only.³ If admitted (by one of them only), it will be inconclusive. But even he must make allowance for the just mentioned method prevailing in common life (and admit the validity of arguments which start from principles admitted only by one party).

Indeed (he admits that when discussions are going on about religious matters), you cannot repudiate the Scriptures (adopted by your opponent on the basis of some other Scriptures which would be adopted by both parties. As to individual judgments⁴ (which are going on in every man's consciousness) they are guided exclusively by what people themselves think right, not by what both parties, (a respondent and his possible opponent), may agree upon.

Therefore the standpoint of (strict) logic is to no purpose. The Buddhas have favoured their converts, who were not versed in the (science of logic), with arguments which suited the occasion. Enough about this subject! Let us continue our comment.

¹ Read *evam* instead of *eva*, p. 35. 1.

² Cp. below, text p. 58.14 and *Nyāyabindu*, p. 3. 5.

³ *Ibid.* III. 58 (p. 62).

⁴ *svārthānumāna* corresponds to our judgement, it includes every our cognition which is not a direct passive sense perception.

XXVI. DENIAL OF CAUSALITY THROUGH A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE.

36. 3. Neither do entities arise out of something different from them, just because (from the monistic point of view) the different does not exist.¹ This point will be elicited later on,² where it will be expressed that «(what belongs to the things themselves), their own essence, does not belong to their causes and (conditions)».³
36. 5. Therefore, just because they do not preexist *in* something else, they cannot be produced *out* of it. Moreover the impossibility of a substantial break⁴ between cause and effect can also be established on the lines which we have laid down in our «Introduction into the Mādhyamika System» where it is said,⁵
36. 6. If, to be sure, a thing were «other» in regard to causes,
Deep darkness would then be produced from light.⁶
36. 8. Then surely everything could be produced out of anything,
Since «otherness» is just the same (in causes and) non-causes.⁷
36. 11. The Master Buddhapālita comments, «entities cannot arise out of something (essentially) different from them, since it would follow that everything could then arise out of anything».
36. 13. The Master Bhāvaviveka assails this comment. «It is nonsense! he says, because the argument contains its own destruction,⁸ since 1) it is mere *deductio ad absurdum*, 2) it conflicts with the point previously established. Indeed in taking the counterpart of the reason and of the predicate

¹ or «just because entities do not exist *in* something else (= *parasminn abhāvād eva*)» as e. g., the cloth in the threads, the jar in the clay, etc.

² Cp. aphorism I. 3.

³ Lit., 36. 4. «The own existence (*svabhāva*) of entities (*bhāvānām*) is not found in their condition, etc.» Cp. infra I. 3. This is the Vaiśeṣika view, the cloth is something different from the sum total of the threads, the jar something over and above the sum total of the atoms of clay, etc.

⁴ *parata utpattiḥ*, 36. 10,

⁵ *Madhy. av.*, VI. 14.

⁶ When causality is understood as a regularity of consecution the day will be the cause of the following night and night would produce the following day, a question that has been often discussed in European philosophy.

⁷ Among all considerations which tend to undermine our usual conceptions of causation this one is considered by the Tibetans to be the strongest, they say it is as solid as diamond.

⁸ p. 37. 2 read *sādhana-dūṣaṇāntaḥ*. . . i. e. *ity asya sādhanasya dūṣaṇa*. . .

(we will have the following argument), «since everything must arise out of something (and the origination out of non-self is rejected), entities must then arise either out of themselves or out of self and non-self combined, or without a cause, otherwise (really) everything would arise out of anything».

It is not nonsense!¹ We have shown above (that a *deductio ad absurdum* is a valid proof). As to the accusation that (Buddhapālita) in confuting the tenet of his opponent,² has (indirectly) invalidated (his own)³ previously established point, it is trivial.⁴ We will not again take pains to refute this!

XXVII. COMBINED CAUSALITY DENIED.

Neither do the entities arise out of both (a continuant stuff and separate factors), since all the incongruity attaching to each of these hypotheses separately, will then attach (to their combination).

(But then both causes may perhaps work alternately, not simultaneously? No,) since if they are not fit to produce something separately, (they neither will be fit to produce something alternately). Indeed it will be stated later on that—

The world⁵ could be a product
From a double (set of causes),
If separately they were efficient.⁶

38. 3.

XXVIII. NO PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE WITHOUT CAUSATION.

But neither can (the separate entities of this world) arise without a cause. The incongruities which would follow on such an assumption will be pointed out later on, where it will be said,

¹ p. 37.4 read with the Tibetan *asamgatārtham nāsti*.

² The Vaiśeṣika who maintains *parata utpatti*.

³ sc. *paradūṣaṇena svadūṣaṇāntahpātitaṃ*.

⁴ Lit., p. 37.4-7. «And that he has fallen into a refutation by refuting the thesis of the opponent, this is anything (but truth)», i. e., by denying causation between independent substances Buddhapālita has indirectly admitted causation out of the same substance — this argument is worth nothing.

⁵ *duḥkha*, cp. above p. 55 n. 3

⁶ M. ś., XII. 9.

38. 5. If there be no causation,
(All difference) will vanish
Between a cause and its effect.¹

(In our «Introduction to the Mādhyamika System») we have also indicated the following incongruity,

38. 7. Nothing at all could we perceive
In a universe devoid of causes,
It would be like the colour and the scent
Of a lotus growing in the sky.²

38. 10. The Master Buddhapālita comments. Entities, (says he,) neither can arise without a cause, since everything would then be possible at any time, and in any place».

38. 12. This also has been assailed by Bhāvaviveka. (He says), «this is again a mere *deductio ad absurdum* and it can be turned into the contrary, if the meaning of the argument be disclosed by taking the counterpart of the reason and of the predicate. (You say «entities are not without a cause, since otherwise everything could appear at any time and at any place». I say) «entities must have a cause, since everything springs up at a definite time and in a definite place, and because (as experience proves) efficient causes produce (new) results». Therefore the comment (of Buddhapālita on this point) is wrong, because it contains the same misconception (as his comment on the foregoing points).

(As) opponents³ (we will repeat) that this criticism misses the mark. Its refutation has been made above.

XXIX. CAUSALITY THROUGH THE WILL OF GOD.

39. 5. (It may be supposed that this critique of the usual notion of causality is intended) in order to introduce God or similar (transcendental supreme causes). But this is also impossible, because God must be included in one of the alternatives discussed, according to the idea we entertain (about his essence). He is either immanent in the world, or transcends it, or he is both (simultaneously immanent and transcendent).

¹ VIII. 4.

² M. av., VI. 100.

³ The same use of the term *opara* as above, text p. 9.6.

Thus (it is established that) there is no causality (in the ultimate sense). The Dependent Origination (or Relativity) with its (eight) characteristics of no real origination etc. is thus established.

XXX. MAHĀYĀNA AND HĪNAYĀNA CONTRASTED.

An objection is here raised (by the Hinayanist). If it is so, (he says), 39. 8. if your interpretation of the principle of Dependent Origination (as a principle of Relativity) involving that there is no (real) Causality (is correct), how are the deliverances of the Buddha (to be explained which run against such a theory? Indeed it has been declared),

1. «The forces¹ of life are influenced (in this world) by illusion (and 39. 9. desire). When illusion (and all desires) have been suppressed (in Nirvāṇa), these forces are extinct».² (This suggests the reality of the force of illusion and of Nirvāṇa).

2. All elements³ of life,
They (all) appear and disappear;
As soon as they appear they vanish.
Their (final) stoppage is the (only) bliss.

39. 11.

And further,

3. «Whether (some) elements of existence have appeared or whether 40. 1. they have not appeared, there is, according to the teaching of the Buddhas (no controlling conscious Agent who makes them either appear or not appear), remains (unchallenged) just this (eternal) essence of what the elements (really) are, (their causal interconnection)».⁴

¹ *samskāra*.

² This is the abridged formula of *pratītya-samutpāda* as applied to the development of an individual life in 12 consecutive stages, the so called *prākaraṣika* or *āvasthika* *pratītya-samutpāda*. Its first part corresponds to the direct order (*anuloma*) of the members, its second part to their reversed (*pratiloma*) order. This abridgment clearly reveals the simple meaning of the formula as it is understood in all Buddhist countries. Cp. O. Rosenberg, *Probleme*, ch. XVI, and my *Central Conception*, p. 28 n. 3.

³ *samskāra* for *samskṛta-dharma*.

⁴ This is the celebrated formula of *pratītya-samutpāda* in its generalized sense, as given in the *Śālistamba-sūtra*, it is very often quoted, cp. references in M. de la V. P.'s text edition, p. 40 n. 1. The second *tathāgatānām* must be dropped and the first understood with *Mādhavācārya*, *Sarvadarś.*, p. 21.8, in the sense of *tathāgatānām* *mate*. Lit., «whether according to the Buddhas the *dharma*s originate or if they do not originate, this their essence

40. 2. 4. «There is one fundamental law¹ for the subsistence of living beings, that is their fourfold nutrition».
5. «There are two mental elements² which protect the world, humility and the sense of justice».
40. 4. 6. «There is a descent from another world into this one, and a departure from this one into another one».³
40. 5. Thus (it is clear) that Buddha has taught a principle of Dependent Origination which is not incompatible with the disappearing (of some things and the appearing of others). How can you (assert) that it does not interfere with (your principle of Relativity)?⁴
40. 7. It is just for this reason, because (Scripture) mentions a principle of Dependent Origination meaning that some elements disappear (when others appear), it is for this very reason that our Master (Nāgārjuna) has composed this Treatise on Relativity, in order to show the difference between

necessarily stands». The notion of causality, as well as the idea of a gradual evolution (by *karma*) of the world towards Nirvāṇa, the absence in this process of any Controlling Conscious Will, all this is included in the connotation of the term *dharma* itself. Therefore *dharma* as an element of existence and *dharma* as the doctrine about these elements are expressed by the same word. The formula is found in Hinayānistic, as well as in Mahāyānistic literature. Mādhyamācārya, borrowing from some Buddhist source, gives it a Hinayānist interpretation (*dharmāṇām kārya-kāraṇa-rūpāṇām*). Candrakīrti takes it as a comprehensive formula admitting both doctrines, it very well suits his aim in this place, since he wishes to establish that the Hinayānist view is the simpler one and the Mahāyānist the deeper one. In Aṣṭas. Prajñāp., p. 573. 21 ff. and in Bodhicaryāv. t. ad IX. 150 it is given a Mahāyānist interpretation as a denial of Causation and of Plurality. The meaning of the formula may then be freely rendered thus. «Whether we, with the Hinayānists, decide that according to the teaching of the Buddhas there is a causality between the separate elements of existence, or whether we, with the Mahāyānists, decide that there is none, the (eternal) essence of elements stands (as a Unity)». At the time when the theory of a *kāraṇa-hetu* was established in the Abhidharma, this theory which implies a universal link of a special causality between all the elements of the Universe, past, present and future, at that time the Mahāyānist Monism was already foreshadowed.

¹ Here *dharma* is not used in the Buddhist technical sense of an element. It is not one of the 75 dharmas. The conception of food as an abstract principle keeping life going is inherited from the Upanishads (cp. Jacob, Concordance, s. v. *anna*). The food is physical in the realms of gross bodies. It is spiritual, consisting of sensations (*sparsā*), volitions (*cetanā*) and consciousness (*vijñāna*), in the mystical worlds of ethereal bodies and pure spirits.

² Here *dharma* is used in the technical sense, since *hrī* and *apatrapā* are included in the 75 dharmas. The prominence given to these moral forces (*saṃskāras*) is natural, since the reverse of them, irreverence and indifference for injustice, are supposed to be the deepest root of every immoral deed, cp. my Central Conception p. 101, 102. Their definition is a shade different in the Triṃśikā, p. 27.

³ i. e., first of all, out of this world into one of the mystic ones. For the identification of all these quotations cp. the notes of M. de la V. P. to his edition.

⁴ Read *virudhyate* instead of *nirudhyate*.

the real and the conventional meaning of the Scriptures. All the above utterances which mention a principle of Dependent Origination along with (real) causation do not refer to the pure essence of the objects (which reveals itself) when the darkness of our ignorance (in philosophy) is dispelled.¹ On the contrary it refers to that condition of the world which reveals itself to the mental eye² whose vision is vitiated by the darkness of illusion.

There are other utterances of Buddha which, on the contrary, hit the absolute reality,—

1. «The paramount Reality, Brethren, is Nirvāṇa, it is not a clandestine Reality.³ All the combined forces (of phenomenal life) are illusion».

2. «There is here (in this world) neither Reality, nor absence of illusion. It is surreptitious Reality, it is cancelled Reality, it is a lie, a childish babble an illusion»!

Further,—

3. (All) matter is a piece of foam, (all) feeling is a bubble. A mirage all ideas are, a (hollow) plantain trunk the forces, The sunlike (Buddha) has declared (All) consciousness is but illusion.⁴

4. Attentive, mindful day and night, The recluse full of courage, By contemplating (separate) elements,⁵ Should penetrate into Quiescence, The bliss where all the energies⁶ repose.

5. «Because all elements (that are active in the process of life) contain nothing real, (Plurality is an illusion)».⁶

¹ Read *āsrava* (sc. *vigata* . . . *āsrava*) instead of *anāsrava*.

² *mati-nayana* = *prajñā-cakṣuḥ*.

³ «The element having the characteristic of not being some stolen good», i. e., the non-relative.

⁴ This stanza is found in Samyutta N., III. 142 where the illusion regarding the 5 *skandhas* must be understood as referring to the theory of *pudgala-nairātmya*. Here evidently Candrakīrti takes it as referring to the theory of *dharma-nairātmya*.

⁵ *dharma* = *saṃskṛta-dharma* = *saṃskāra*.

⁶ A very frequent proposition referring to the theory of *dharma-nairātmya*.

XXXI. THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT MEANING OF BUDDHA'S WORDS.

42. 5. For the sake of those who, having no thorough knowledge of the intention contained in the (different) utterances of Buddha, fall into doubt whether (a particular expression) refers to the (absolute) truth or whether it does (depart from it) with a special intention; and for the sake of those who, owing to their slow wits, mistake a metaphorical expression for the real intention; for the sake of both these (classes of men) needing instruction, is this treatise composed, in order to dispel doubt and misconception by the way of argument and references to Scripture.
42. 9. The arguments have been exposed above (in commenting upon the aphorism «entities do) not arise out of themselves etc.».
43. 3. The scriptural references are given (by Nāgārjuna in the following chapters, e. g.),
42. 10. The stolen goods are of no use,
This has been said by Buddha.
And all the forces (in this world)
Are stolen goods. They are illusion!¹
- (And further),
42. 12. This world has neither a beginning nor an end,
We do not see its first extremity.
The Great Ascetic has declared,
It has no first, it has no last.²
- (And further),
43. 1. When speaking to Kātyāyana the Buddha did elicit,
What is existence, non-existence what?
He then denied both issues,
The possibility of affirmation and negation.³
43. 3. In these and similar (aphorisms of Nāgārjuna) Scripture is quoted.
43. 4. Some supplementary (scriptural evidence is here appended). In the discourse with Akṣayamatī (we find the following statement). «What are

¹ M. ś., XIII.1.² M. ś., XI.1.³ M. ś. XV.7.

the scriptural texts which have a conventional meaning, and what are those which have a direct meaning? Those discourses which have been delivered in order to teach the Path of Salvation are metaphorically expressed. Those discourses which are delivered in order to teach the Final Result are expressed with precision. Wheresoever you find a text specifying the entrance 43. 6. into that kind of Final Deliverance which is Relativity, where there is no separate object, no profound meditation, no volition, no birth, no causation, no existence, no Ego, no living creature, no individual Soul, no personality and no Lord — they are all called texts having direct meaning. This, o Reverend Śāriputra, is called keeping to the precise meaning of the Scriptures and not to their metaphorical expressions. 43. 8.

Further it is stated in the Samādhirājasūtra,

44. 1.

A man who knows the difference
Of the precise meaning of Scripture,
Knows in what sense the Relativity¹
Has been conceived by Buddha.
When, on the contrary, the Personality,
The Being, the Spiritual Self are spoken of,
He knows that all the elements are then
Conventionally taken.

Therefore, in order to show that the doctrine which admits causality 44. 6. etc. is a wrong doctrine, our Master (Nāgārjuna) has undertaken to reconsider the doctrine of Dependent Origination.

XXXII. HOW IS THE MORAL LAW BE TO VINDICATED IN AN UNREAL WORLD?

Now, the following objection (will eventually be made). If the Master 44. 8. has composed this treatise in order to prove that there is no real causation and that the plurality of the elements of life is a mere illusion, then, considering that what is an illusion does not really exist, it will follow that wicked actions do not exist, and if they do not exist, neither do miserable lives exist, nor are virtuous actions possible, and without them no happy life. Without the happy and unhappy lives there will be no phenomenal world,² and thus all endeavours (towards a better life) will be absolutely fruitless.

¹ śūnyatā.² saṃsāra.

44. 12. We answer. We teach the illusion of existence as an antidote against the obstinate belief of common mankind in the reality of this world, (we teach its relative truth). But for the Saints¹ (there is no need for that). They have reached the goal. They apprehend (no plurality), nothing that (could be) illusion or non-illusion. And when a man has thoroughly realized the (pluralistic) illusion of all (separate) entities, (there is for him no Moral Law). How can there be any virtuous actions for him, or any phenomenal life? The question whether an entity exists or does not exist will never occur to him.
45. 1. Accordingly Buddha has declared in the «Ratnakūṭa Discourse». «O Kāśyapa! if we search for consciousness we do not find it. What is not to be found, is not to be perceived. What is not to be perceived is neither past, nor future, nor present. What is neither past, nor future, nor present has no separate² reality. What has no reality has no causation. What is uncaused cannot disappear. But (an ordinary man) follows wrong views. He does not realize the illusive character of separate elements. He obstinately thinks that the contingent entities have a reality of their own. Swayed by this inveterate belief in the reality of separate things,³ he takes action,⁴ and as a consequence of this he migrates through this phenomenal world. As long as he takes his stand on such confusion, he is not fit to attain Nirvāṇa».
45. 8. But although the reality of (these separate) entities is an illusion, they nevertheless can produce either moral defilement or purification, just as the magical apparition of a beauty (inspires passion to those) who have not realized her nature, and just as a vision evoked by the Buddha (is a cause of moral purification for those) who have practised the roots of virtue
46. 1. This is stated in the «Discourse with the Dṛdhāśaya». «It is similar, o noble son, to somebody watching a magical show. He contemplates the vision of a (pretty) woman and his heart fills with passion. Feeling shy before the assistance, he gets up from his seat and disappears. After having left, he tries to persuade himself that the woman was ugly, that it is (even) no real personality, but (an assemblage) of elements impermanent, disquieting and illusive etc».
46. 5. The following is stated in the Vinaya. «An engineer⁵ might construct
- ¹ ārya.
² svabhāvataḥ.
³ idamsatya-abhiniveśa, i. e. regards the dharmas as real.
⁴ karma, technically it means that blind biotic forces (karma) operate, seemingly through him.
⁵ yantra-kāra.

a mechanical doll (with the form of) a beautiful young woman. It was not a real woman, (but the workmanship was so perfect) that it appeared as a real beauty, and an artist painter (really) fell in love with it. Just so is it that phenomena, although having no separate reality of their own, are nevertheless efficient producers either of moral pollution or moral purification for simple people».

We find in the Ratnakūṭasūtra¹ the following (story). «At that time 47. 1. there were five hundred monks who did not understand the preaching of the Buddha. They did not go deep into it. They had no fervour for it. They then stood up from their seats and went away. The Buddha on this occasion produced a magical vision of two recluses on the path by which the monks were receding. The five hundred monks then reached the place where 47. 5. the two apparitional recluses were standing. Having met them they spoke unto them. «Where are both the Reverend Fathers going»? The magical monks answered. «We are retiring to the woods. There we will live enjoying the delightful feeling of trance. We cannot penetrate the doctrine taught by the Buddha, we cannot go deep into it. We feel no devotion, we fear it, we are trembling before it». Then the five hundred monks spoke. «Neither we can 47. 9. penetrate into the doctrine taught by the Buddha, nor can we go deep into it, nor are we devoted to it. We fear, we tremble, we have got quite in a tremble. Therefore we too will go to the woods and live there enjoying the delightful feeling of trance». The magical monks spoke. «Therefore, o Reve- 47. 11. rends, we shall be united, we shall not quarrel. Above all duties for the monk, not to quarrel is the paramount!» «Whom do the Reverendus think to get rid of»? They answered. «We think to get rid of covetousness, of hatred and of infatuation». The two magical monks spoke. «But are the Reverendus (really) possessed of those covetousness, hatred and infatuation which they want to forsake»? They answered. «They are not to be perceived, neither in us internally, nor in the things externally, nor in the space between both. Nor can they indeed arise without having been imagined». The magical 48. 3. monks spoke. «Therefore, o Reverendus, do not imagine them, do not fancy them. And if the Reverendus will not imagine, will not fancy them, they will neither love nor dislove. The man who neither loves nor disloves, is called dispassionate. 48. 5. Merit, o Reverendus, neither migrates, nor finally disappears. Trance, Wisdom, Deliverance, the intellectual awakening (of the first glimpse) of Nirvāṇa² — they do not migrate, nor do they disappear, they are the ele-

¹ Cp. Wassiliew, p. 157.

² vimukti-jñāna-darśana.

48. 7. ments, o Reverends, through which Nirvāṇa is suggested. But (in themselves), o Reverends, these elements are also relative,¹ they have no essence. You must forget, o Reverends, even the idea of a (separate) Final Nirvāṇa! Do not produce conceptions about what is only a conception, do not conceive an idea about what is only an idea! For him who very much thinks about an idea as an idea, this idea becomes a prison. O Reverends, you must enter that mystic condition where all concepts and all feelings are extinct! We tell you that a recluse who is merged in such a trance (has reached the
43. 12. climax) after which no further progress is possible». After that these five hundred recluses have got their minds delivered (from all bonds, even from) dispassionate bonds. Having got their minds thus enlightened, they approached the place where the Buddha was dwelling. After having approached they saluted the feet of the Lord in touching the ground with their heads and sat aside.
49. 1. «The Reverend Subhūti then spoke to the recluses thus. «O Brethren, where did you go, wherefrom are you coming?» They answered. «O Reverend Subhūti, the system taught by the Lord does not allow for moving to some place nor for coming from some place». Subhūti spoke. «Who is your teacher?» They answered. «That one who never was born and never will disappear».² He asked. «In what (spirit) has philosophy been taught to you?» They answered. «The goal was neither Bondage nor was it Deliverance». He asked. «Who has drilled you?» They answered. «That one who neither has a body nor a mind». He asked. «What was the method of your preparation?» They answered. «Neither that of foregoing ignorance nor that of acquiring knowledge». He asked. «Whose disciples are you?» They answered. «Of that one who has not reached (Nirvāṇa), who has not attained at the Supreme Enlightenment». He asked. «Who are your fellow disciples?» They answered. «Those who never appear in one of the three planes of existence». He asked. «O Brethren, how long will it take you to reach Supreme Nirvāṇa?» They answered. «We will have reached it when (all) the magical bodies created by the Buddhas will vanish». He asked. «(How) have you reached the goal?» They answered. «By analysing the idea of Self and the idea of Mine».
49. 9. He asked. «How have you got rid of passions?» They answered. «By the utter annihilation of all the elements of life». He asked. «How have you challenged the Temptator?» They answered. «By disregarding the Temptator who

¹ *śūnya*.

² *parinirvāsyati*. These denials evidently refer to the Hinayānist conceptions of Nirvāṇa.

is inherent in the elements of our individuality». He asked. «How have you been communicating with your Teacher?» They answered. «Neither bodily, nor vocally, nor mentally». He asked. «How have you discharged your charity obligations?» They answered. «By taking nothing, by receiving nothing». He asked. «How have you escaped rebirth?» They answered. «By (evading) both annihilation and eternity». He asked. «How have you reached the goal of charity?» They answered. «By being absolutely averse to every property». He asked. «What are you going in for?» They answered. «We are going in for the same aims as (all) apparitional existences created by Buddha».

«During this meeting when Subhūti was starting questions and the 49. 15. recluses giving answers, 800 monks got rid even of their dispassionate bonds¹ and 32,000 men had their spiritual eyes cleared of all dust and filth, with regard to the (reality of all) elements of life».

Thus it is that the two magical apparitions which had no real existence, which were magically created by the Buddha have laid down the foundation for the purification of five hundred recluses. 50. 4.

It is also declared in the Vajramādhārāṇī.² «Thus it is, o 50. 6. Mañjuśrī, that conditioned by a piece of wood, and conditioned by attrition, and conditioned by an effort of a man's hand smoke appears, and fire appears. But this conflagration is neither in the piece of wood, nor in the attrition, nor is it included in the effort of the hands. Even so it is, o Mañjuśrī, that in the individuality (called) man one feels bewildered by an illusive unreality. The conflagration of lust, the conflagration of hatred and the conflagration of infatuation are produced. But this conflagration is not inside him, neither is it in the objects outside him, nor in the intermediate space between both. Again, o Mañjuśrī, what we call illusion, why is it so called? Illusion, o Mañjuśrī, is (a condition) 50. 11. of complete error in regard of all elements of existence. The axiom of this Dhāraṇī is that all elements are like the hells». When asked, «How is it, o Buddha, that this is the axiom?» He answered. «The hells, o Mañjuśrī, are produced by imagination. Fools and simple people are cheated by error and illusion». He asks. «Wherefrom, o Blessed One, do the hells descend?» Buddha answers. «From the Space do the hells descend.» «Do you think, o Mañjuśrī, that the hells are produced by our imagination or do they exist as a separate reality?» He answers. «The (transmigration of our Soul into) the hells, in-

¹ I. e. they became *āryas*.

² Cp. Burnouf, Introduction, p. 454 ff.

to animals and into ghosts is fancied exclusively by the imagination of fools and simple people. By error and imputation they imagine that they suffer, that they live a life of misery in these three inferior planes of existence».

51. 6. «These tortures of the hell exist, o Blessed One, only as far as I imagine them. Let us, e. g., suppose, o Blessed One, that somebody in a dream imagines himself gone down to the hell. He will then imagine that he is cast in an iron vessel, boiling (amidst) blazing fires, quite filled with many human beings.¹ There he will be tormented by a strong, acute, intense pain. This awful suffering he will imagine in his mind. He (nevertheless) will be frightened, will be terror stricken. Having then awakened,² he will cry out
51. 11. «Oh, how awful! how awful!» He will be distressed and lament. His friends, acquaintances and relatives will ask, «who has made you suffer so much»? He will reply to these friends, acquaintances and relatives. «I have suffered the tortures of the hell». He will then revile and repeat, «I am suffering the tortures of the hell, and you ask me to tell you who has made me so suffer!» Then these friends, acquaintances and relatives will address the man in the following way. «Be not afraid, o man, you were asleep, you have not left this house». He will then regain memory (and think), «yes, I have been asleep, this is all wrong, it is my imagination»! And he will again recover his good spirits».
52. 4. «Thus it is, o Blessed One, that this man dreaming in sleep has imagined, through a wrong imputation, that he has been in the hell. It is in the same manner, o Blessed One, that all simple and foolish people are saturated with an imagined sexual appetite. They construct (for themselves the idea of) a woman as the target (of their desires). Having constructed it, they imagine that they are enjoying themselves in her company. To such a foolish and simple man it occurs, «I am a man, she is a woman, she is my wife!» His mind is overcome by lust and delight, he allows his mind to indulge in pleasure. Moved by such (feelings) he (might) produce a row, a dispute, an altercation. His senses become obscured, he breathes hate. With these illusions he then imagines himself passing away and suffering in the hells during
52. 11. many thousands of eons. The friends, acquaintances and relatives of this man, o Blessed One, will speak to him in the following way. «Don't fear, don't be frightened, o man! You were asleep, you did not leave this house!»

¹ *eka-pauruṣa*, cp. Tib.

² *saṃāna*!, «with self assurance», accord. to Tib.

«O Blessed One! it is just according to this (relativity of the phenomenal world) that the divine Buddhas have preached their doctrine to the living creatures who are imbued with the fourfold¹ illusion (of the world's reality). «There is here (in this world, they teach,) neither man nor woman; no living creature, no Soul, no Spirit, no Personality! All this plurality of the ultimate elements² of existence is an illusion. They do not exist. They are misleading, they are like a trick, they are like a dream, they are like magic, they are like the reflection of the moon in water etc.». Having received this instruction of the Buddha the (living creatures) perceive the plurality of elements without their enticement, without their illusive character, without considering them as separate existences, without this covering (of plurality). They pass away with their mind merged in Space. After having passed away they will be completely merged in the Final Reality of Nirvāṇa.³ Thus, o Blessed One, do I regard the hells!»

It is also said in the «Questions of the Venerable Upāli»,⁴ «I have seen the many terrors of the hell, by which thousands of creatures are tormented. But there are no creatures in this world who after death go to the tortures of the hell. There are there no swords, no arrows and no spears, by which torture is inflicted. In imagination they fancy them falling upon their bodies. There are no (real) weapons. (And in the heavens) delightful golden palaces decorated with beautiful variegated flowers appear before us, but nobody has constructed them. They are also constructed by imagination. The simple man constructs them in imagination. The foolish sticks to these constructed conceptions. Whether we stick to them or do not stick to them, they are not real. These our conceptions are like *fata morgana*».

Thus it is proved that these (separate) entities (of the phenomenal world) have no real (independent) existence of their own. To simple people who are misled by their own subjective illusions they become a source of moral defilement in this life. In our «Introduction into the Mādhyamika System»⁵ we have explained at length how it is that objects which have no reality of their own can nevertheless produce either moral defilement or moral purification. There it can be learnt.

¹ i. e. the illusions of a real Self, its bliss, its purity and its permanence. cp. Yogas., II. 5.

² *sarve dharmāḥ*.

³ *nirupādhi-seṣe nirvāṇa-dhātav*.

⁴ This work is quoted in Śikṣāsamuccaya as an authority on confession, p. 164, 168, 173, 290.

⁵ The tenor of this work in general is probably meant.

XXXIII. THE TWELVE MEMBERED CAUSAL SERIES REFERS TO THE
PHENOMENAL WORLD.

54. 9. To this (the Hinayānist) objects. If there is (altogether no causation), if things arise neither out of themselves, nor out of something extraneous, nor out of both these sources, nor at random, (how is the causal series preached by the Buddha to be understood), how is it that he has declared that as long as illusion (has not been extinct by knowledge and meditation) prenatal forces (will always produce new lives)?¹
54. 10. We answer. This is the phenomenal (point of view),² it is not (absolute) reality.³
54. 11. The Realist. Please tell, how is phenomenalism proved?

Mādhymika. Phenomenalism is nothing but (the expression) of the fact of (Universal) Relativity.⁴ It cannot be established otherwise than by denying the four theories (of causation just examined), since they necessarily imply the realistic view⁵ (of a plurality of substances having their own reality). But if we take our stand upon Universal Relativity,⁴ the cause and effect, being correlative, have neither of them any absolute existence. Realism⁵ is thus repudiated.

¹ The last but one chapter of the Mādhy. śāstra is devoted to an examination of the formula of the twelve membered Causal Series. It is there given the following interpretation. There is in the world craving for life (*punar-bhavārtham*) produced by an illusion (*avidyā*) which can be stopped by the *tattvadarśin*. In Mahāyāna it is the Saint who intuits the world *sub specie aeternitatis*. (In Hinayāna it is the Yogin who really stops all the functions of life and converts it into an eternal death). Under the influence of such illusion prenatal forces (*saṃskāra* = *karma*) produce a new life (*viñāna*), an embryo (*nāma-rūpa* = *pañca-skandha*) is formed (*kuṣṭha nāmarūpam niṣeyate*), which gradually develops the senses (*saṃvīyatana*), sensation (*sparsa*), feeling (*vedanā*), sexual appetite (*trṣṇā*), the habits underlying (*upādāna*) life, life itself (*bhava* = *new karma*), and, after death, a new birth, old age and death again. The formula represents the rotation of phenomenal life (*duḥkha*) in which there is no eternal principle, which is *kevala* = *anātma* = 12 *āyatana*, with the implication that it can be completely stopped, without any residue of life, in Nirvāṇa. If its connection with the theory of the separate elements (*dharma*s) and their total extinction in Nirvāṇa, ultimately through yoga, is overlooked, the formula simply states that living beings come and go, are born and die. Cp. O. Rosenberg, Problems, ch. XVI. The interpretation of Nāgārjuna is virtually the same as is current in all Buddhist countries, cp. Aung, Compendium, p. 259 ff. In prof. B. Keith's interpretation, op. cit. p. 99 ff, the simple formula is converted into a heap of absurdities.

² *saṃvṛti*, or this is «the covering», «the face of it».

³ *tattvam*.

⁴ *idampratyayaṭī-mātram* = *pratitya-samutpāda-mātram*, cp. tex. 67. 12, transl. p. 152.

⁵ *su-svabhāva-vādaḥ*.

Accordingly it has been said,¹

Philosophers assume phenomenal world²

Either as self-produced or as non-self produced,
Or causeless or both (self and non-self made).

But You have proved, it is contingent.³

And it will be stated (in this treatise) later on,⁴

So far there are effects, there is a cause,

So far there is a cause, there are effects.

We cannot realize

For their reality another reason.

Just the same has been declared by Buddha himself in the following words, 55. 2.

«The theory of separate elements⁵ (implying the denial of personal identity)⁶ means that «this exists so far as that exists», «if this has appeared that will appear»,⁷ e.g., prenatal forces exist so far illusion (and desire have not been stopped), a new life⁸ is produced so far there are prenatal forces which produce it, etc. etc.».

XXXIV. CONTROVERSY ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF LOGIC.

A vehement protest⁹ is raised by some (philosophers against this condemnation of logic).¹⁰ «You maintain» (they say) «that (separate) entities 55. 11.

¹ Lokatīta-stava, 19, Bstan-lgyur. Bstod, I (M. de la V. P.).

² *duḥkha*.

³ *pratitya-ja*.

⁴ VIII. 12.

⁵ *dharma-saṃketa* = *anātma* = *pudgala-nairātmya* = 12 *āyatana*, cp. Central Conc., p. 28.

⁶ *pudgala-nairātmya* = *anātma*.

⁷ This very ancient formulation, cp. Majjh. N., III. 63, is given a realistic interpretation in Hinayāna and a transcendental one in Mahāyāna, cp. above p. 40.

⁸ *viñāna*. In the first period of the development of the embryo it is dormant (*sammūreccita*), until sensation (*sparsa*) appears. In a bird's egg, as long as it has not lost vitality, there is *viñāna* according to the principles of *pratitya-samutpāda*. When the term is mistranslated as «thought», «pensée» etc. confusion inevitably arises. Prof. B. Keith, op. cit., p. 101, has imagined that it is «visible»?! Visible is termed in the Pali Canon «*sanidassana*». Among the 75 ultimates there is only one, the *rūpa-āyatana*, i.e., colour, which is visible, cp. Digha N. III, 217, Ab. Kośabh. I, 28.

⁹ *pari-codanā*.

¹⁰ This and the following discussion refers to the *pramāṇa-viniścaya-vāda* of Dignāga and others. The first step in the vindication of logic has been made by Bhāvaviveka. But he remained a Mādhymika. The *pramāṇa-viniścaya-vāda* is exposed by Vācaspatimiśra in Tātparyat. p. 7 l. 28 and p. 248.25 ff., cp. Garbe, Die Sāṃkhya Phil., p. 203. *viniścaya* is another name for Dignāga's conception of *kalpanā*, it represents the fundamental act of thinking appearing in such judgments as «this is Devadatta», «this is dark complexion», «this is moving» etc. where the element «this» refers to the *sva-lakṣaṇa*, cp. n. on p. 137, cp. Tātparyat. p. 101. 1 ff.

are not caused (in the absolute sense). Now, is this assertion founded on argument, or is it not founded on argument? If you admit that it is founded on argument, you are obliged to answer the following (questions). How many are the sources of our knowledge? What is their essence? what their scope? (What is their origin?) Have they arisen out of themselves, out of something extraneous, out of both, or out of nothing? But (if your denial of causation) is not founded on argument, it must be rejected, because our cognition of an object depends upon the method by which it is cognized. If something is not known, it cannot become known otherwise than by (appropriate) methods. If these methods do not exist, neither will cognition ever be arrived at. How is then your explicit assertion possible? You cannot (assert) that the (separate) entities are not caused. Or else just the same reason which allows you to maintain that nothing is caused will also allow (me to maintain the contrary, viz.) that every single thing exists. And just as you assert that all (our) elements of existence are uncaused,¹ I will maintain that whatsoever exists has a cause».²

56. 1. «Or perhaps you do not really believe that nothing is being produced, (you tell it just for the sake of cavilling)? But then you will never persuade your opponent to believe (a theory) you do not yourself believe. The composition of this treatise will then serve no purpose, and the denial of Pluralism³ will not have been really made».

56. 4. Mādhyamika. We answer. If our system did allow assertive judgments (implying the transcendental reality of a substratum), the question would then arise whether these judgments are founded on sound method or not. However there is no (place for them in a system of Universal Relativity). The reason for that is just the following one. If problematic judgments regarding reality were admitted as possible, we would then be obliged to admit the counterpart, the possibility of corresponding assertions. But we also absolutely deny the possibility of problematic judgments (regarding the transcendental reality of a substratum), how could we then make the correlative⁴ assertions, since they would not be correlative with the other (unexisting) member of the relation. It would be like the length and the short-

¹ *anutpannāḥ sarva-dharmāḥ*, (dharma = bhāva).

² *sarva-bhāvotpattih*.

³ *sarva-bhāvā apratiṣṭhāḥ*.

⁴ Read *tadviruddho*.

ness (of an unexisting thing, e.g.), the horn of a donkey. Therefore, since we do not make any such assertion, (where are the things) for the sake of whose reality we should so much imagine the existence of the sources of right knowledge?¹ And how could we (establish) their number, their essence and their (respective) objects? How could we (decide) whether they originate out of themselves, out of non-self, out of both, or without a cause? It is not our business to answer all these questions!

The Logician. You thus (insist that you) make no assertion whatsoever. 57. 4. But we hear from you a proposition which looks like a definite assertion,² viz. that entities arise neither out of themselves, nor out of something different, nor out of both, nor at random. How is that (to be explained)?

The Mādhyamika. We answer. This our statement appears decisive 57. 5. to simple people who (try) to understand it according to arguments familiar to them, but not to the Saints³ (who can intuit absolute reality).

The Logician. Do you really mean to say that these Saints (believe 57. 7. in) no argument?

The Mādhyamika. Who (can) say whether they have or not (any

¹ Lit., p. 56. 4 — 57. 1. «We answer. If we would have (what you) call assertion, it would be produced either by right cognition or not by right cognition. But we have none. Why? Here, when non-assertion is possible, its counterpart, an assertion relative to it, might exist. But when we, first of all, don't have any non-assertion, then wherefrom the counterpart, the assertion? since (it would be) disregarding the other part of the relation, just as the length and the shortness of the donkey's horn. And when there thus is no assertion, then for the sake of whose reality (siddhi) we would very much imagine (pari-kalp) sources of right knowledge?» *niścaya* = *adhyavasāya* = *vikalpa*, cp. Tātparyat., p. 88. 22. *vikalpa* is an assertion of the form «this is that» *sa evāyam*, cp. N. b. t. üpp., p. 23. 4, where the element «this» refers to the «Hoc Aliquid» interpreted by Dignāga as the «thing in itself» (*svalakṣaṇa*). The judgment is regarded as synthetic (*kalpanā* = *nāma-jñāti-yojanā*) and as dialectical (*vikalpa*-dilemma). *anīścaya* evidently means a problematic judgment. *iha* means either = *asman mate*, or = *satyām śūnyatāyām*. Cp. N. b. t. 69. 22 ff., where it is stated that when something is cognized (*paricchidyate*) it means that it is contrasted (*vyavacchidyate*) with its counterpart. For both parties every assertion (*niścaya* = *kalpanā*) has a counterpart (*pratipakṣa*), it is a dichotomy (*dvaidhī-karana*), it is relational (*apekṣā*), dialectical (*vikalpa*). If the counterpart (*sambandhy-antara* = *pratipakṣa*) is missing, an assertion is impossible, since it would be without a counterpart, non-relative (*nirapekṣa*). But for the Logician every relation, as e.g., short and long, has an indirect (*paratantra*) reality in the underlying «thing in itself» (*svalakṣaṇa*). This for the Mādhyamika is like the horn of a donkey. His point seems here to be that Relativity is itself relative.

² *niścita-rūpam vākyaṃ* = *upapattiḥ* = *pramāṇam*.

³ The Buddhist Saint (*ārya*) is here the equivalent of the Monist who by mystic intuition (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) has reached a direct vision of the world *sub specie aeternitatis*, he has entered the *drṣṭi-mārga*, cp. above p. 90. He has absolutely no judgments (*niścaya*), strictly speaking, not even the assertion of Relativity (*śūnyatā*), cp. above, p. 49.

arguments)? (About) the Absolute¹ the Saints remain silent! How is then a conversation² (with them on this subject) possible? (How can we then decide) whether there are arguments or not?

The Logician. If the Saints do not enlarge upon arguments, how do they (manage) to bring home to simple folk the idea of an Absolute?

57. 10. The Mādhyamika. When the Saints are engaged in a conversation with simple folk, they do not really exhibit their own arguments. They take the arguments which are just the arguments that appeal to simple men, they (provisionally) admit them as a (convenient method) for the instruction of others, and thus give instruction to common people by just those (methods which simple men can understand).

57. 11. Just so it is that men influenced by sensuality invert (the real condition of things). The real impurity in the body (of a female) they overlook. They imagine a non-existing beauty of its forms and are tormented by it. In order to liberate them from their passion, a person magically created by Buddha or a god may depict to them the impurities of the body which theretofore were concealed from them under the idea of its beauty. This body, (they will say), is covered by hair and contains other (impurities in the intestines).³ These men will then get rid of their conviction that it was a beauty and attain impassibility.

58. 1. Just the same happens here. Common mankind whose power of vision is obstructed by the darkness of ignorance imputes to (separate) entities a reality which they do not possess, a reality which for the Saint does not exist at all. (It then happens that these ordinary men) are tormented by some particular thing which they somehow imagine to exist.⁴ The Saints then try to rouse (their skepticism) by some argument which would appeal to them. E. g., (supposing the Sāṅkhya proves his tenet of identity between an effect and its material cause, the Monist then says), «if the jar did really exist in the clump of

¹ *paramārthah*.

² *prapañca* = *vāk*, M. vr., p. 373. 9. Lit. «Therefore wherefrom the possibility there of speech, so that there would be either argument or no argument».

³ The *asubha-bhāvanā* is here alluded to, the practice of the *yogins* to concentrate upon the repulsive, loathsome particulars of every animal life.

⁴ Lit., p. 58.1-3. «Just so here likewise, the worldlings are very much tormented (subject to *kleśas*) having imputed to something some inverted essence of entities, because their mental eyes are obstructed by the darkness (or ophthalmia) of ignorance, (an essence) whose substance is in every respect unperceived by the Saints».

clay, it would never have needed to be produced out of it once more». This will be acquiesced in. He then concludes, «if something exists before its production, it needs not to be produced once more, because it exists». (Thus the Sāṅkhya will be confuted in a way intelligible to everybody).

Similarly (will it be said against the converse theory of the Vaiśe- 58. 5. śikas who admit a break between the effect and its material cause), «you agree that a sprout cannot be produced out of blazing coal because the latter is different, we then must conclude that it neither can originate out of seeds etc., which are usually represented¹ (as their cause), (since they also are different).²

The Logician may at last (maintain that causality exists because) 58. 7. such is our direct experience.³

Mādhyamika. This also is wrong because of (the following argument).

(Thesis). This direct experience is misleading.

(Reason). Because it is experience.

(Example). Just as the direct experience of a double moon by a man suffering from ophthalmia.

Consequently it is wrong to oppose our argument on the basis of direct 58. 8. experience, since (the reliability) of the latter remains to be proved.⁴

We have thus established in the first chapter of our work that the (sepa- 58. 10. rate) entities (of the phenomenal world) have never originated (and do not exist). And we have proved this (by our negative method). We first assume the reality of something impossible and then condemn it.⁵

The remaining parts of the treatise are now (concerned with details). 58. 11. They are devoted to the repudiation of all (possible) characteristics (of reality), wheresoever (they have been assumed to exist). It will be shown that (in the light) of Relativity all these particular characteristics are not

¹ *vivakṣita*.

² In order to save the reality and substantiality of separate objects the Vaiśeṣikas maintain that the effect is absolutely different (*atyanta-bhinna*) from its material cause, and that the whole contains something in addition, over and above its parts. But this does not prevent them from maintaining that the parts are inherent (*samāveśa*) in the whole. The Mādhyamika here resorts to his «diamond like» argument against Causality, «if the effect is different, there is no causation, if it is partly different and partly non-different the difficulty will be double». This of course should not prevent him to make use of the every-day conception of Causality when needed.

³ *anubhava*.

⁴ *sādhya-sama*.

⁵ Lit., p. 58. 10, «Therefore unproduced are the entities, thus, first of all, by counter-argument, by imputation of a contrary essence, the first chapter is composed».

(ultimately) real, e. g., neither a moving object, nor the point to be reached,¹ nor motion² itself (do really exist).³

XXXV. CONTROVERSY WITH THE BUDDHIST LOGICIAN CONTINUED.

53. 14. However (there is still a question to be considered, viz. the theory of our Buddhist epistemologists). «We are only giving, (they maintain), a scientific description of what just happens in common life, in regard to the sources of knowledge and their (respective) objects. (We do not consider their transcendental reality).⁴

53. 15. The Mādhyamika (asks). But what is the upshot of such a description, (does it lead to the cognition of the Absolute)?

The Logician. (No, but) bunglers in logic, (the Naiyāyikas) have given wrong definitions (of logical processes) and we have then given the right ones.

53. 1. The Mādhyamika. This also is beyond the mark, (we will reply, because if the realistic logicians, the Naiyāyikas, are) bad logicians, and have given wrong definitions (of logical processes), then there must be a gap between what humanity (at large imagines about) the essence of cognition (and what the realists are teaching). Then alone will your (emendatory) work prove promising. But this is not the case. Your work therefore is a quite useless occupation.⁵

¹ *gatarya*, cp. II. 25.

² Ch. II is devoted to the denial of motion. It is noteworthy that a splendid opportunity offered itself here to Nāgārjuna to repeat, in some form or other, some of Zeno's of Elea deductions of our usual conception of motion *ad absurdum*. The Greek philosopher was also a monist, he was anxious to prove that motion is really impossible, because he followed Parmenides in denying plurality. There is no trace of Nāgārjuna having known them.

³ Lit., p. 58.12-13. «... in order to teach that without exception every characteristic of *pratītya-samutpāda* does not exist». In this phrasing *pratītya-samutpāda* becomes a synonym of reality (*sāmrtaḥ pratītya-samutpādaḥ*). Since it is also synonymous with *śūnyatā*, cp. p. 431, it is quite clear that this latter term means reality, and not voidness, the voidness refers to all its determinations which have only empirical reality.

⁴ It seems that the first chapter originally ended with the words *pratipādanārtham*, p. 58.12-13. The following discussion with a follower of Dignāga looks like a later addition.

⁵ Lit., p. 59. 1-3. «This also is wrong. If indeed bad logicians have produced inverted definitions, common mankind would have the reverse of what is being defined, for the sake of it there could be (some) fruitfulness of the endeavour. But it is not so. Therefore the endeavour is quite useless». The Naiyāyikas, in their conceptions about the categories of existence and the ways of cognizing them, follow the every-day conceptions of common humanity. Now, if the Buddhist Logician, who is here represented as likewise adhering to the every-day logic, has really no other aim than to correct the logic of the Naiyāyikas, there must be a divergence between the latter and the common life views, otherwise the Buddhist would have nothing to correct in these theories of the Naiyāyikas. But «it is not so», i. e., the Naiyāyika views are much nearer to the conceptions of simple humanity than what the Buddhists are teaching about logical questions.

Moreover the criticism (directed against epistemology by Nāgārjuna in 59. 4. his) «Repudiation of Contests» (must not be forgotten). (He there asks), «If every cognition of an object depends upon (reliable) sources of knowledge, these sources (being in their turn objects cognized by us), on whom do they depend? (If they are also cognized through other sources of knowledge, we shall be landed into a *regressus ad infinitum*)». As long as this (fundamental criticism) has not been cleared away, (all your talk about) having given the right definition (of logical processes) is nothing.

But never mind, (let us consider your views more closely). You maintain that there are two sources of knowledge (sensation and intellection, two only), and that this corresponds to the double *essentia* of (every thing existing), the particular (or the unique) and the universal.¹ We will then

Therefore if the Buddhist really intends to remain on empirical ground, his «endeavour is quite useless», he has nothing better to do than to accept the logic of the Realists. This the Mādhyamika has done. He accepts the categories of existence and the modes of cognizing them (the 4 *pramāṇas*) of the Naiyāyikas, as well as the theory that our sense faculties (*sannikarṣa*) can apprehend the universals as well as the particular things. He accepts all this with the proviso that it is empirical cognition which has nothing to do with the cognition of the Absolute, and which, from the transcendental stand-point, is an illusion (*samvrti*), since it is relative (*śūnya*), not absolute (not *paramārtha-satya*). As to Dignāga's school, it is true that it investigates that kind of cognition which is not contradicted by experience, which is *samvāda*, and defines reality, i. e., ultimate reality, as efficiency. They have the right to maintain that in their logic they partly remain on empirical ground. But they establish a sharp distinction between the «pure» object (*śuddha-artha*), «pure synthesis, or reason» (*śuddhā kalpanā*), pure sensation (*śuddham pratyakṣam* = *nirvikalpakam*) and empirical definite cognition (*niscaya* = *adhyavasāya*). With regard to the latter there is no divergence, hardly any, between the logic of the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists, *prāpya-viśaye* (= *adhyavasāya*) *nāsti vivādaḥ*. But with regard to the former, the divergence is decisive, *grāhya-viśaye* (= *paramārthasati*) *tu mahān vivādaḥ*. In pure sensation we cognize the pure object, the «thing in itself» (*svakṣaṇa*), the point-instant (*kṣaṇa*), the focus of efficiency. Here we part with the empirical ground, the «thing in itself» cannot be cognized empirically (*jñānena na prāpyate*), but it is reached in pure sensation (*api tu vijñānena* = *pratyakṣeṇa* = *nirvikalpakena*). It is a kind of limit, a kind of «Grenzbegriff» (*loka-maryāda*), and the logicians who have established it are transcendentalists (*atipatita-loka-maryādāḥ*). It is as much the central conception in Dignāga's system as Relativity (*śūnyatā*) is the central conception of the Mādhyamikas and Pluralism (*dharmāḥ*) the central conception in Hīnayāna. All these points will be put in a clearer light in the notes to my translation of the Nyāyabinduṭīkā shortly to appear in the B. B. translation series. But it is necessary to keep them in mind in order to understand the next following discussion between Dignāga and Candrakīrti about the essence of this «thing in itself». The attitude of the Mādhyamikas towards realism corresponds to the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church towards the plain empiricism of Aristotle. Both the Mādhyamikas and the Roman Catholic Church were hostile to critical systems, they preferred realism, with the proviso that it had nothing to do with the cognition of the Absolute which is cognized by revelation or by intuition.

¹ The originality of Dignāga's system of logic consists in the doctrine which admits two distinct sources of knowledge, two only. He calls them perception and inference, but they differ

ask, the thing possessing this double *essentia* does it also exist or does it not?

59. 8. If it does, we must then have a supplementary object of cognition, (a third kind of it). What happens then to your two sources (established in exact correspondence to the double character of existence)? And if the thing possessing this (double) essence does not exist, the (double) essence (itself will remain in the air), unsupported by something (possessing it). What will then the double knowledge mean? (Nāgārjuna) will state in the sequel.¹

Without at all any characteristic
The thing itself becomes impossible.
And if impossible the thing will be,
Characteristics likewise are impossible.

XXXVI. CRITIQUE OF THE NOTION OF AN ABSOLUTE PARTICULAR POINT-INSTANT.

60. 1. But (says the Logician), we should not interpret the notion of a particular essence as an essence *possessed by* something, but we should avail ourselves of the grammatical rule allowing us to interpret this term as meaning the thing itself *which possesses* that essence?²
60. 2. (The Mādhyamika answers). Even so, (even supposing that you are

very widely from what is usually understood by these terms in logic and psychology. They exactly correspond to the double character of everything existing, the particular and the universal. The particular again is not the concrete object usually so designated, but the absolutely particular, the unique, the thing which neither has extension (*deśānanugata*), nor has it duration (*kālānugata*), it is the thing in itself (*svalakṣaṇa*), apart from anything else (*sarvato vyāvṛtta*, *tvailokya-vyāvṛtta*), the point-instant (*kṣaṇa*). By sense-perception (*pratyakṣa*) the knowledge corresponding to this point-instant is understood. It is a moment of pure sensation in which no synthesis, no integration at all has been produced (*kalpanāpoḍha*). Every synthetic process of thought is contrasted with the direct cognition by the senses, as an indirect cognition or inference. Dignāga's inference thus embraces, besides our inference, all that we would call judgment, intellection, ideation, thought, reason etc., every cognitive process, except pure passive sensation. The point-instant corresponding to pure sensation is the central conception in Dignāga's system, it represents a differential from which, by a process of integration, all our knowledge is built up. The principle of the Differential Calculus of a planet's motion (*tātkālikī gatih*) was known to Indian astronomers. We still do not know exactly when it was first discovered. Bhāskara in the XII-th century knows it, but Vācaspati Miśra, in the IX-th century A.D., avers that the point-instant of the Buddhists is the mathematical point known to the astronomers (*jyotiṣ-vidyā-siddhā*), cp. Tātparyatīkā, p. 386. 1. On the Differential Calculus of Hindu astronomers cp. W. Spottiswoode, J. R. A. S. 1860, p. 221.

¹ V. 4.

² Lit., p. 60. 1—2. «Further let it be that a characteristic (or essence) is not that by what it is characterized, but, according to Pāṇini, III. 3.13, by making the *lynf* to stand for the object, a characteristic is the characterized».

right, if it really means the thing possessing that essence), nevertheless a thing cannot be characterized by its own self. That by which it is characterized must be instrumentally related to it, it must be different (from the thing itself which is) the object (of this instrumental relation). Our criticism (of the notion of an absolute particular) stands.¹

(The criticism is wrong, the Logician will then answer. We assume) that sensation (*through which* the particular essence reveals itself) is instrumentally related to it, but nevertheless it is immanent in it. We thus escape our criticism.²

(Mādhyamika). Our criticism stands, we will answer. Indeed, we are here (adhering to the usual conception of what a particular essence is). 60. 4—5.

The particular 'essence of something' in our opinion, is that essence which is the exclusive characteristic of the thing, a characteristic which it does not share with anything else. Take, e. g., the following definitions,

1. resistance is the exclusive characteristic of solid bodies,
2. feeling is the reaction (pleasant or unpleasant) produced by an object,
3. consciousness is awareness in every single case (of some object present to our mind or senses).³

This means that by such (exclusive characteristics) something is characterized. But you brush aside this generally known and far spread interpretation, and admit another one, according to which essence means (not the characteristic), but the object characterized.⁴

However if you imagine that (the absolutely particular, the point-instant) is characterized by our awareness of it, this can only have the following meaning. (The single point-instant contains a double aspect, the thing characterized and its characteristic. This, strictly speaking, will be a double particular essence), one of them will be the thing characterized, and the other 60. 7.

¹ Lit., p. 60. 2—3. «Thus also, since it is not possible that this should be characterized by that, and since by what this is characterized, its instrument, is a different thing from the object, just the same fault».

² Lit., p. 60. 4—5. «Further it may be that this is not a fault, since cognition is instrumental, and this (instrumentality) is included in the absolute particular». *Jñāna* is here used in its widest comprehension, it then includes not only pure sensation (*viññāna*) but, according to Buddhists and Vedāntins, *vedanā*, *sukhādi* as well.

³ For these definitions of *pythivī*, *vedanā* and *viññāna* cp. my Central Conception, p. 18-19.

⁴ Lit., p. 60. 7. «Having waived off the well known and followed etymology, you assume an object-production». Before the word *prasiddha*, p. 60. 7, a *cheda* must be inserted.

91. 1. will be the characteristic. If our awareness of the point-instant represents its characteristic, the thing characterized, (i. e., the objective side of the relation), will nevertheless represent something different from its characteristic. Our criticism stands.¹

61. 3. Moreover (the Logician may point to the general Buddhist denial of all substance behind the changing sense-data). The quality of resistance in solid bodies etc. is but a sense datum, revealed in our sensation, it is just the subjective part of that relation, and it does not differ from its particular essence, (it is not something revealed by the sensation, but it is the sensation itself).²

61. 4. The Mādhyamika. But then this moment of sensation³ itself will never be objective, and then it never will be cognized, because a particular (point-instant) can be cognized only under the condition of its being objective (in regard to our consciousness). In that case the following qualification must be added to your statement about the double essence of everything cognizable, the particular one and the universal one. «One particular essence (of the point-instant) will be cognizable, that one which we (here) have called the characterized (aspect of it). Its other particular essence will not be cognizable, that one which we here have called the characterizing aspect of it».

61. 7. But if you (go on to) maintain that this (second aspect is in its turn also) a thing characterized, it will then likewise require some other thing as a characteristic. And if you in this case imagine a further step in awareness, (an awareness of awareness) as its characteristic, you will incur the danger of an infinite regress in addition (to the fault of disregarding the relation of substance and quality).⁴

¹ Lit., p. 60.7—61.2 «By conceiving an instrumental essence in sensation the following is expressed, just the particular essence has objectivity, the character of being an instrument belongs to another particular essence, therefore if the particular essence in sensation is an instrument there should be an object different from it, thus the same fault».

² Lit., p. 61.3—4. «Further it might be that the hardness etc. which is contained in earth etc., being apprehended by sensation, it (sc. hardness) is just the object of that (sc. sensation), and it is not different from the particular essence».

³ *vijñāna-svalakṣaṇa*.

⁴ Lit., p. 66.6—9. «Some particular essence which is designated «what is characterized» is object of cognition, some is not object of cognition which is designated «what is characterized through it». Further it also is object-production. Then its different instrument must exist. If the instrumentality of another knowledge is with an effort imagined (*pari-kalpānā*), the fault of an infinite regress is incurred».

XXXVII. INTROSPECTION.

The Mādhyamika. But then you have (your theory) about Introspec- 61. 10.
tion. According to this theory, (that consciousness which represents our awareness of a point-instant of reality) is apprehended by introspection. It thus contains (inherent) objectivity (and immanent cognizability).¹

The Mādhyamika. We answer. In our «Introduction to the Mādhy- 61. 11.
mika System» we have already refuted at length this theory of Introspection.² That one particular essence (the point-instant) is characterized by another one, (i. e., by our awareness of it), and the latter by introspection — this is impossible!

Moreover (the criticism of Nāgārjuna which we have mentioned above³ 62. 1.
remains). That very (moment of) consciousness cannot be real without having an essence of its own, it cannot exist (without it). And if (on the other hand) there is nothing of which it is the essence, the latter (i. e., the essence), having no support, will have no opportunity to realize itself. What becomes then of introspection (which is supposed to apprehend such consciousness which is itself impossible)?⁴

Accordingly it is said in the «Questions of Ratnacūḍa»,⁵ —

«Considering consciousness he (the Bodhisattva) investigates⁶ the stream of 62. 4.
thought,⁷ and asks wherefrom does it come. The following occurs to him. Consciousness arises, if there is an (immanent) object. Does that mean that consciousness is one thing and the object another, or that they are identical? In the first case we shall have a double consciousness. But if they are identical, how is then consciousness to be cognized through consciousness? Consciousness cannot apprehend its own self. The trenchant of a sword cannot cut its own

¹ Lit., p. 61.10—11. «Then you suppose that there is self-consciousness, therefore, objectivity existing because of apprehension through self-consciousness, there necessarily (*eva*) is inclusion in cognizability».

² VI. 73 (p. 167. ff.).

³ Text, p. 59.10; transl. p. 142.

⁴ Lit., p. 62.1—3. «Moreover, this very knowledge, for sure, not being real separately from the particular essence (and therefore) being impossible, (and) in the absence of the thing characterized, not being able to operate as a characteristic without any substratum, altogether does not exist, thus wherefrom self-consciousness?»

⁵ Translated partly by Burnouf, Introduction², p. 500.

⁶ Notwithstanding the Tibetan, we prefer here to read with Burnouf *cittam samanupaśyan*, just as in the sequel, p. 62.7 and 63.6. *asamanupaśyan* could only mean «not having yet fully realized what consciousness is (i. e. not having yet attained *vipaśyana*), he investigates...».

⁷ *citta-dhārā*, Burnouf — «le tranchant (de la pensée)».

trenchant. The tip of a finger cannot touch that very tip. Similarly this, consciousness cannot be conscious of its own self».

63. 2. «Thus it is that when (a Saint) is thoroughly attentive,¹ (when he is engaged in the spiritual exercise of the Mahāyānist application of mindfulness² towards his own consciousness), then it appears to him as undefinable, It neither has an end nor a beginning.³ It is not changeless, it is not causeless, it does not conflict with the interdependence (of the elements), but it is neither identical, nor non-identical, neither with itself, nor with others. He then cognizes this stream of thought, of thought (as thin as) a creeper, the thought-element, indefinite thought, non-manifested thought, imperceptible thought, thought as a thing in itself.⁴ He intuitively this (unspeakable thought) as «Thisness», (the unique Reality of the Universe), he does not suppress it».⁵

«Such is the analysis of thought which he realizes and intuitively. This, o noble son, is the Bodhisattva's exercise of application of mindfulness consisting in the consideration of what in our consciousness represents its (essence)».

XXXVIII. THE DISCUSSION ABOUT THE POINT-INSTANT RESUMED.

63. 8. We thus reject Introspection. (We now return to the single moment of sensation which was supposed to be characterized by self-awareness). Since there is no such (self-awareness, when we say that it is a «thing in itself», a thing characterized «exclusively by itself», what do we mean?) who is characterized by whom?⁶

63. 9. And then (we ask), is there here (in this thing which is its own essence) any difference between the essence and the thing possessing that essence, or is there none? In the first case, the essence will be different from the thing, and it will cease to be its essence. It will be in the same condition as any other thing which is not supposed to be its essence. Similarly the thing

¹ *yonisāḥ prayukta*.

² This is the third *smṛty-upasthāna* exercise. That the Mahāyānist exercise is meant is clear, because it results in identifying one's own consciousness with *tathātā* = *śūnyatā*.

³ Cp. M. vr., p. 536. 14, *pūrāntam samāśritya drṣṭūḥ*.

⁴ *citta-svalakṣaṇa*, Burnouf — la pensée «contenue en elle-même».

⁵ Lit., 63.5. «He does not produce Annihilation», sc. as the Yogin in Hīnayāna is supposed to do.

⁶ The Logician, i. e. Dignāga, posits as absolutely real (*paramārtha sat*), unimagined (*anāropita*) existence, the single moment (*kṣaṇa*) of existence which is then supposed to coalesce with the single moment of sensation characterized by self-awareness. This moment cannot be characterized by something else, since this would convert it in a relational existence. It is characterized by itself (*sva-lakṣaṇa*), it is the «thing in itself». But for the Mādhyamika it is relational nevertheless.

being different from its essence, it will not be the thing possessing that essence, just as any other thing which also does not possess it. And then, if the essence be different from the thing, the thing will be severed 64. 2. from its essence, and (the result will be that) being detached from its own essence it will be nothing, (a non-entity) like a flower in the sky. Now, supposing the thing and its essence are identical. In that case the thing characterized ceases to be characterized, since it has coalesced with its own characteristic, (it loses its separate existence), just as the characteristic also loses its own separate existence. Neither does the essence retain its separate existence, because it has coalesced with the thing characterized. Just as the latter (which has then lost) its own Self (it becomes also lost).

Accordingly it has been said¹ —

64. 4.

Characteristic from the thing is different?

The thing is then without characteristic.

And if both are identical,

T'is clear, You have declared

That neither really does exist.

And there is no middle course to be taken between identity and 64. 7. otherness, if you (wish) to establish the reality of the thing characterized and its characteristic. The author will state this in the following verse.²

(Supposing thus we have two things)

64. 8.

They are not really one, nor are they two,

(What are they then indeed)?

How can we their reality assume?

The Logician further (makes the following suggestion). (Just as the 64. 10. Mādhyamika asserts that ultimate reality is something unspeakable, we shall also say that the relation between the thing characterized and its characteristic is something) unspeakable and thus establish their reality.³

Mādhyamika. This is impossible. Unspeakable reality is assumed by 64. 10.

¹ *Lokāṭīta-stava*, 11 (M. de la V. P.).

² II. 21.

³ Lit., p. 64.10—11. «Otherwise, (*ucyate* to be omitted, cp. Tib.) (their) reality (*siddhi*) could (be established) as unspeakable? It is not so. Indeed unspeakableness, for sure, appears when a mutual split cannot be thoroughly realized». *paraspara-vibhāga* is here the same as *dvaiddhi-karṇa* or *vikalpa*, a division of something into A and non — A, involving the so called infinite judgment. Such dichotomy is then called also *vikalpa* and identified with *kalpanā* «arrangement» (= *yojanā*), it then covers, directly or indirectly, the whole range of thought, the active element of cognition. Cf. M. vr., p. 350. 12 ff.

us (when we have proved) that a dichotomy does not resist scrutiny. Indeed, a dichotomy is untenable when it is proved that we cannot independently cognize «this is the characteristic, this is the thing characterized», we then conclude that both are unreal.

But to establish (the reality of both the members of a dichotomy, as unspeakables), is impossible.

XXXIX. IS THERE A COGNIZER?

(Further, after having discussed the question whether our knowledge can be regarded as playing the part of) an instrument through the medium of which an object becomes cognized, (it is natural to ask the question whether there is something playing the part of a cognizing) agent (in this process of cognition), because neither an instrument, (nor an action, nor its object) are possible without an agent, just as the action of cutting (wood is impossible without an agent).

65. 1. Logician. (We do not admit the reality of a cognizing Soul, but the element) of pure, (indefinite) sensation¹ may be imagined (as playing the part corresponding to some sort of) agent.

65. 1-2. Mādhyamika. Even (that sort of agent) cannot be acquiesced in, because (according to your theory), the function of pure sensation (in the process of cognition) is to indicate the mere presence of something. The object is, after that, qualified by (other) mental processes.² It is indeed a tenet accepted (by you) that «pure sensation³ apprehends the (pure) object, its qualities⁴ are apprehended by (other) mental processes».

65. 4. Indeed an instrument, (an object and an agent) are assumed to be a real instrument, (a real object and a real agent), when there is one single action (accomplished by a variety of factors). We may then admit that every one of these factors performs some special function of its own, and thus becomes a component part (of the principal action by the production of some change or of new) qualities (in its object).⁵ But here, between definite

¹ *citta* = *viññāna*, cp. Central Conception, p. 16.

² *caitasa* = *caitta* = *citta-samprayukta-saṃskāra*, cp. *ibid.* p. 18.

³ *viññāna* = *citta*, cp. *ibid.* p. 36.

⁴ Tib. read *dei khyad-par*...

⁵ Lit., p. 65.4-5. «When one principal action is performed, instrument etc. possess instrumentality etc., because we admit their membership through the medium of producing qualities and actions for themselves respectively». The action of cooking rice, e. g., consists in fetching fuel, pouring water into the kettle, putting on fire, throwing rice into the vessel, etc. All these factors (*kāraṇa*) concur in producing the central result, they are either instruments or object or

cognition¹ and pure sensation,² there is no such central action. On the contrary (every part has its own separate function). There is an independent action of indicating the mere presence of something, it is performed by pure sensation, and (there is another separate action) of cognizing the qualities of the object. This is performed by (constructive) thought. It thus becomes impossible (to impute the part of) an instrument to qualifying thought,³ and the part of an agent to pure sensation. Therefore (your theory that in the absolutely particular essence of existence there is an immanent objectivity and an immanent instrumentality, cannot be saved). Our criticism stands.

But perhaps (the Hīnayānist will, to a certain extent, concede this point 65. 9. about the agent, because he also maintains) that there is altogether⁴ no real agent, since, according to Scripture, all elements⁵ (into which existence is analysed represent separate momentary flashes, there is between them) no Soul⁶ (or agent, or continuant stuff). Indeed (impersonal) motions and (processes) are clearly going on (in nature) without any conscious agent.

Mādhyamika. You have quite misunderstood the Scriptural teaching 65. 10. about the (separate momentary elements of existence). Neither do (these separate elements really) exist. We have made this clear in our «Introduction into the Mādhyamika System».⁷

XL. VINDICATION OF PHENOMENAL REALITY.

Logician. Further, it is also possible (to explain the fact that the expression 66. 1. *svakakṣaṇa* «the thing in itself», «the thing characterized only by its own self» does not involve any possessive relation by assuming that the relation is merely verbal). A relation (or characterization)⁸ is possible even when there is no real characteristic beyond the characterized, e. g., when we speak about the body of a statue and the head of Rāhu, although there is nothing in the statue besides its body, and nothing in Rāhu beyond just a head. Is agent etc. But between two independent activities, as e. g., cooking rice and weaving cloth there can be no single agent in common.

¹ *jñāna* = *svikalpaka-jñāna* = *artha-viśeṣa-paricchitti*.

² *viññāna* = *citta* = *manas* = *artha-mātra-paricchitti* = *nirvikalpaka-jñāna* = *sattā-mātra-pradarśana*.

³ *jñānasya*.

⁴ *sarvathā-abhārāt*.

⁵ *sarva-dharmāḥ*.

⁶ *anātmānaḥ*, the *ātman* in this context covers our notions of Soul and of substance, cp. M. vi., p. 437. 4.

⁷ e. g., Mādhy. avat., VI. 68 ff.

⁸ *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*.

it not just the same as when we use the expression «solidity is the exclusive essence of solid bodies»? (We use the possessive expression) although there is nothing which could be called a solid body over and above this exclusive essence, (sc. the sense-datum of resistance).¹

66. 3. Mādhyamika. It is not so! Both cases are not comparable. Indeed the words «body» and «head» are used in connection with other features (usually coexisting with them, e. g., brains etc.² (in the head), hands etc. (with the body). Therefore if a representation arises³ whose object is suggested by these words taken by themselves, we naturally expect to find the usually coexisting parts also. The questions, «whose is the body?», «whose is the head?», (naturally suggest themselves). And if someone is desirous to indicate that (in the present case) the usual appurtenances are absent,⁴ he repudiates the expectations (of his interlocutor) by using words according to their conventional meaning in life, where they suggest such (really existing) appurtenances.⁵ But in the (other) case no relation (or characterization) at all is possible, because there altogether are no solid bodies⁶ over and above (the sense-datum) of resistance.⁷

66. 9. Logician. Non-Buddhists⁸ assume a separate reality of substance⁹ (and

¹ Lit., p. 66.1—3. «Further also, it may be that in «the body of a statue», «the head of Rāhu», even if there is no characteristic beyond a body and a head, there is a relation of characteristic and characterized; just so in «the proper characteristic (essence) of earth», although there is no earth beyond the proper characteristic, there will be (this relation)».

² *buddhyādi*.

³ *buddhy-upojananaḥ* for *upojāta-buddhiḥ*, or *ālambana-buddhy-upojananaḥ* (sc. *puruṣaḥ*).

⁴ Read p. 66.6, *viśeṣaṇāntara-sambandha*, and in the Tib. *khyad-par-gzhan*.

⁵ Lit., p. 66. 3—7. «Indeed, since the words «body» and «head» are used in association (*sāpekṣatā-pravṛttau*) with other coexisting things, thoughts etc., hands etc., (a man) who produces a thought intent upon only the words body and head is always (*eva*) in expectation of the coexisting other things, «whose the body», «whose the head»? And another (man), wishing to discard the connection with other appurtenances, cuts off the expectation of his interlocutor (*prativaktuḥ*) by (availing himself of expressions) suggestive (*dḥvaninā*) of the (non existing) appurtenances of the statue and of Rāhu, (expressions) which agree with their import in everyday life. This is natural. But here...». *Prati-kartuḥ* = *na vastutaḥ kartuḥ*, the «supposed agent» of the possessive relation, or the counterpart of such relation, *pratikartuḥ* = *pratiyogināḥ*, (the expectation) «of the counterpart».

⁶ *prthivyaḍi*.

⁷ *kāthinyādi*.

⁸ *tīrthika*.

⁹ *lakṣya*. C. assails the doctrine of the absolute *sva-lakṣaṇa* on the ground that there must be a *lakṣya* behind the *lakṣaṇa* and this remembers the realistic doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas about a relation of inherence (*samarūya*) between substance and quality, a relation which no Buddhist has ever admitted to be real. The suggestion of the Logician is evidently ironical, it is a

quality). (Are you not inclined), in order to do them pleasure,¹ to assert that the use of adjectives in speech² is quite all right, (that it corresponds to a real relation)?

Mādhyamika. No, indeed, (for *you*) it is not admissible to intro- 67. 1. duce into your system such categories as have been imagined by non-Buddhists on very poor grounds, or else you will be obliged equally to admit (their number) of additional sources of cognition³ and other things also!

The Logician. But (is not our example of a merely verbal relation 67. 3. just the same as the generally admitted among Buddhists fact of) the nominal⁴ personal identity⁵ (in every individual's life)?

Mādhyamika. (No, it is not the same!) Your example refers to an 67. 2. (expression, not to a theory). The (possessive) relation as a mode of expressing one self in every-day conversation, without enquiring into its reality, exists. (In speaking) there is a possessor of a body. The statue (we say), possesses its own body. And there is a Rāhu, the possessor of a head which is his possession, (but in speech only). This your example proves nothing!⁶

Logician. However there is here nothing else than a mere body and 67. 6. a mere head, (no possessors of them), they are the only objects apprehended. The example is quite all right!

jeer at the fact that the Mādhyamika prefers the realistic logic of the Naiyāyiks and rejects the reforms of the Buddhist logicians.

¹ *tad-anurodhena*.

² *viśeṣaṇa-abhidhāna*.

³ C. admits the four *pramāṇas* of the Naiyāyikas, cp. below, text p. 75, with the proviso that they will not help in the cognition of the Absolute. He here answers the gibe of the Logician with a counter gibe. He apparently wishes to say, «I can admit the realistic logic without forsaking my transcendental doctrine, but you cannot. For you the acceptance of the Naiyāyika doctrine about the sources of our knowledge (*pramāṇa*) would mean that you would be obliged to give up your doctrine about the double aspect of existence, your two sources of knowledge, your «thing in itself», in fact all your epistemology».

⁴ *prajñapti*, a *cheda* is needed after *prajñaptivat*.

⁵ *pudgala*, the personality is different at every moment, its identity is a mental construction, it is an entity purely nominal (*prajñapti-sat* = *śabda-mātram*).

⁶ Lit., p. 67.3—5. «Moreover like the nominal entity (*prajñapti*) of a person etc.? Because there exists the characteristic, being a part of usual conversation, well known without pondering, (the characteristic) of the statue, the possessor (*upādātṛ*) of the possession of its own body (*sva-śarīra*), and because Rāhu, the possessor of the possession of a head, exists, this example is not suitable». Although it incidentally happens that there is no real possessive relation, nevertheless the expression is not wrong, since in other cases the relation exists. The relation of substance and quality can be condemned on other, philosophical, grounds, not on the ground of an inadequate expression.

67. 7. Mādhyamika. It is not at all so! Your example is taken from common conversation, (it refers only to what holds good in a conversation) in which there is no philosophic investigation of reality and the usual categories are accepted as real without scrutiny.¹ (Quite different is the case when the relation of substance and its appurtenance is philosophically considered).
67. 8. The notion of a substance,² indeed, when critically examined, contains nothing real over and above the corresponding sense-data. Nevertheless the conventional thinking of common life (assumes) it to exist. It imputes it to the (underlying reality) of the groups³ (of sense-data and mental phenomena). But your example does not mean that the same applies to the statue and to Rāhu.⁴
67. 10. That there is thus no substance⁵ in solid bodies⁶ over and above the quality (orsense-datum) of resistance⁷ is proved by philosophical criticism.⁸ (It is true) that a quality⁹ (cannot be imagined) without the support of some substance, but this is just (what we call) «the surface»¹⁰ (or phenomenal reality). (Substance and quality are correlative terms), our Master (Nāgārjuna) has established their reality¹¹ (in that sense), i. e., as a reality of mutual correlation,¹² (none of them is real separately).
67. 12. The Mādhyamika (continues). This point is of capital importance, it must necessarily be conceded.¹³ If it is not conceded, (viz. if it is not admitted that phenomenal means relative), it will prove impossible to separate the pheno-

¹ Lit., p. 67.7—8. «It is not so, since in common-life-conversation there is no investigation of reality (*itthamvicāra*) going on and the categories of common life exist without scrutiny».

² *ātman*, cp. *anātman* = 12 *āyatana* = sense data and the mind, but no substance, *ātma-śabdo'yam svabhāva-śabda-paryāyah*, M. vr., p. 437. 4.

³ *skandha*.

⁴ Lit. p. 67.9. «There is no such establishing of the example (on the score) that the same applies to the torso and to Rāhu».

⁵ *lakṣya*.

⁶ *prthivyādi*.

⁷ *kāthinyādi*.

⁸ *vicāryamānam nāsti*

⁹ *lakṣaṇa*.

¹⁰ *saṃvṛti eva iti*.

¹¹ *siddhi*.

¹² Lit., p. 67.11—12. «Nevertheless the Master has established the reality (*siddhim*) (sc. of the phenomenal world, of the *saṃvṛti*) by the reality (*siddhyā*) of them both in as much as they are mutually dependent upon one another». The idea of C. is that the «thing in itself» (*svalakṣaṇa*) is no exception to the law of Universal Relativity. The phenomenal is here an equivalent of the relative. In the example of the body and the statue or Rāhu and his head there is no mutual interdependence of two phenomenal realities, but simply a wrong verbal expression.

¹³ Lit., p. 67.12. «Of all necessity (*ca avadhāraṇe*) this must be admitted so! It is a point of capital importance that the world as it is conceived phenomenally and Relativity are equivalents.

menal from what is logically consistent¹ (and therefore real); and then every thing will be absolute reality,² (since there will be no difference); there will be no phenomenal reality at all. You must not indeed think that the «body of a statue» and similar (relations) are the only case where a thing, upon investigation, reveals itself as (merely verbal and) non existing. We will prove (in our fourth chapter)³ that colour, feeling and other (fundamental sense-data) are likewise (relational constructions and) are impossible (by themselves). Does it mean that we must deny their phenomenal reality, just as we deny even the phenomenal reality of, e. g., a (separate) body in the statue?

This is impossible. Therefore (your vindication of the absolute, relationless «thing in itself» and the example adduced to illustrate it) is wrong.⁴

¹ From these words we must conclude that whatsoever is for C. logically consistent (*yad yad upapannam*) represents not phenomenal, but absolute reality (*na tat saṃvṛti*). But since nothing short of the whole is logically consistent and real (cp. the definition of reality, above p. 41), all particular objects are relative and logic dealing with them condemned.

² *tattvam eva*.

³ *skandha-parīkṣā*.

⁴ This is a brilliant piece of very subtle dialectics about the conception of a «thing in itself». C.'s aim is to prove that it is also relational, since it is «a thing» characterized by «itself» and contrasted with a thing characterized not by itself, but by «non-self». Dignāga tries to prove by an example that the supposed relation is merely an inadequate expression. C. begins by criticising the example. The relation, says he (*gūḍhābhisandhī*), between, e. g., the elements of a personality (*puṅḡala*) and the personality itself is not the same as the relation between the body of a statue and its possessor. In the first case we have a possessive relation, the identity reveals itself on philosophic examination, in the second there is no relation at all, but only a wrong expression. C. now discloses his aim (*svābhīprāyam udghāṭayati*) and vindicates the phenomenal reality of the relation of substance and quality, and in the same time he vindicates, upon Kantian lines, the necessity of assuming a transcendental reality which however he imagines on monistic lines. The body, or bodily frame of a statue, is but an irregular and perverse manner of speaking, (it means as much as «the statue of a statue» would mean). There is no real possessive relation. But in such expressions as the «resistance of solid bodies» or «the elements of a personality» there is a real possessive relation as far as phenomenal reality goes and its categories of substance and quality are regarded. It is not until philosophical analysis (*vicāra*) has condemned this relation as involved in contradictions and logically untenable (*anupapanna*) that we are obliged to reject it as ultimately unreal, whether reality be defined as efficiency (*arthakriyā-kāra*), or as independent (*anapekṣa*) existence in itself (*sva-bhāva*, *sva-lakṣaṇa*). But empirically there is absolutely nothing cognizable which would not involve this relation. The «thing in itself» (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) which by Dignāga is supposed to represent the absolute reality, outside every kind of relation, C. holds equally to involve a double relation, first of all, a moment of objective reality corresponding to the moment of pure sensation, and then the relation of «the thing» to its characteristic «in itself», since this characteristic has a meaning only if contrasted with, or relative to, the thing «not in itself», i. e., the general, the universal. The general and the extreme particular are thus correlative terms, the one is no more absolute than the other. This non-absolute, this being relative (*paraṃpara-ākṣa*), means the same as being phenomenal (*saṃvṛti*). If we do not accept that, there will be no line of demarcation between the phenomenal

68. 5. The Logician. Now, what is the use of such cavilling? (There is a general agreement between us). Indeed I do not in the least maintain that all our familiar conceptions of cognition and cognizable represent (absolute) truth. (I also deny the ultimate reality of the categories of substance and quality), but by this my epistemology¹ (I claim to have) established (upon a logical foundation) that condition (of the external world) which humanity at large believes to be real.²

68. 7. Mādhyamika. It is for me to ask you, what is the use of (your) sophistry? You only explain (the origin) of some (perverse) expressions current in common life! As to phenomenal reality, leave it alone, albeit its existence and shape is founded on mere confusion! It nevertheless is useful for accumulating those fundamental virtues which bring Final Deliverance to those who strive after it.³ (It has some value only) as long as the philosophic comprehension of the absolute reality is not attained. But you, by your wrong logic, destroy (the foundation) of this phenomenal reality. The refinement of your intellect is led the wrong way, so far as the difference between what is absolutely real and what is only conventionally real is concerned. You are (apparently) establishing phenomenalism upon a logical basis in one point (by assuming the underlying «thing in itself»), but in the same time you are undermining it by your wrong logic (in all other points).⁴

69. 1. Now I come with a theory which really explains the importance of

and the absolutely real. C. thus maintains that he has both a phenomenal reality (*saṃvṛti*) and a transcendental one (*sāṃvṛta*); whereas Dignāga, in admitting the absolute reality of the «thing in itself», undermines this line of demarcation and has, as a matter of fact, no phenomenal reality at all.—It would be of some interest to compare this doctrine of a «thing in itself» (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) with the doctrine of Kant. The argument that if we do not admit any absolute reality, then the phenomenal will cease to be phenomenal and will itself become absolute (*tattvam eva syāt, na saṃvṛtiḥ*) is quite the same as with Kant, as well as the conception that the thing in itself is a «non-representable *x*». Kant is fully aware that his conception of a «thing in itself» is relative, it is, in his words, «a correlatum to the unity of the manifold in sensuous intuition» (Critique of Pure Reason, transl. by Max Müller, p. 204). For Candrakīrti «being correlative» means «having no reality in itself (*svabhāvena*)», he thus charges the thing in itself with being also phenomenal, and he maintains that there is no other phenomenality than relativity.

¹ *amunā nyāyena*.

² *lokāprasiddhīḥ*.

³ This is the Mādhyamika method of saving the moral law under phenomenalism. The phenomenal world is not real, but useful, since by accumulating merit and knowledge (both are inseparable) in it, we cognize its unreality. As far as I can see, this means that the phenomenal world, although unreal, is nevertheless partly real. Whether this method is a better one than the construction of a «categorical imperative» in a phenomenal surrounding, must be left for the specialists to decide.

⁴ Perhaps to read *anyāyato nyato nāśayati*.

empirical reality. I take my stand on our usual (unsophisticated conceptions), and then I set forth a series of arguments of which every one is intended to destroy some particular usual conception of mankind. By this method, I thoroughly undermine the usual views. It is only you that I, like a venerable authority, am keeping back from neglecting the rules of usual decent behaviour, (i. e., of logic), but I do not (undermine these rules, i. e. I do not deny) their empirical reality.¹

Therefore, if (it is true that you are also taking your stand upon) empirical reality² (in assuming your two essences, the strictly particular and the universal), you are obliged to admit the existence of a stuff which is characterized by these essences themselves. Our criticism thus stands, (i. e., the criticism of the conception of an ultimate particular is not refuted). However, if we take our stand on transcendental (absolute) reality, then indeed we will deny the (separate) existence of a characterized substance. But then we will also deny both your essences, and both your sources of knowledge.

And moreover (you maintain that speech is not a source of knowledge and that the meaning of our words is purely negative),³ you do not admit

¹ Lit., p. 68.7—69.2 «We will also say the same! Whatfor is this subtlety, which introduces us into an expression of common life? Let stand, first of all, yonder «surface» (*saṃvṛti*) which has reached an-existence of its individuality (*ātma-bhāva*) through logical inconsistency (*viparyāsa*), it is a cause of accumulating the fundamental virtues which bring salvation to those who are desirous of Deliverance, (let it stand), until the knowledge of the Absolute (*tattva-adhigama*) is reached. But you, by your perversely sharp understanding of the division between phenomenal and absolute realities, after having introduced consistency (*upapatti*) into some points (*kvacit*), you destroy (this division) by wrong logic (*anyāyatoḥ*). But here I (come), because I know how to establish phenomenalism (*saṃvṛti-satya*), taking my stand just on the philosophy (*pakṣa*) of common sense (*laukika*), I (take) one argument (*upapattī-antaram*) which is adduced for the critique (*nirākaraṇa*) of phenomenal reality and refute it by another (parallel) argument; like a mentor (*loka-vyādha*) I call to order (*nivartayāmi*) just yourself, (whenever) you set aside the rules of decency (*ācāra*) (accepted) in the world, [second sense, «like an ancient authority (on logic, known throughout) the world, I am only refuting you whenever you depart from the ground of common sense (*lokācāra*)], but I do not deny phenomenal reality)]. Thus Candrakīrti maintains 1) that the phenomenal world and the world of Relativity are equivalents and 2) since logic is in any case doomed as a means of cognizing the Absolute, he prefers simple realistic logic to a transcendental logical doctrine.

² Cp. above, text p. 58. 14, transl. p. 140.

³ According to the Indian grammarians and realistic logicians, a sentence contains an expression of an action associated with an agent and factors (*kāraṇa*), or circumstances. This theory of speech the Mādhyamika accepts with the aforesaid proviso. But the school of Dignāga have a special theory of their own about the meaning of words according to which words express only relations, or mutual negation (*apoha* = *paraspara-parihāra* = *anya-vyāvṛtti* = *vyavaccheda* = *paricheḍa*) between point-instants. Reality is even characterized as that what can never be

that analysis of our speech which implies (the reality) of actions, factors and their connection. This indeed is a very great disaster! (When you speak) you make use of these very words which express actions, factors and their connection, but you yourself do not admit the reality of their meaning, of these actions, these agents etc. Alas! your attitude¹ is influenced by mere desires.

69. 11. And if, as we have shown, the duality of every thing cognizable is a moot point, then we must agree with those who admit other sources of knowledge (besides sensation and thought), as e. g., Revelation etc., (since these sources of knowledge are not devised with a view strictly to agree with the duality of everything cognizable), the particular and the universal.

XII. THE DEFINITION OF SENSE PERCEPTION.

69. 12. Mādhyamika. Further (your theory of an extreme particular as the «thing in itself») is wrong, because your definition² (of sense-perception, through which it is supposed to be apprehended is deficient). It is too narrow, it does not cover such every-day expressions as «the jar is a perception», (i. e., the physical object before us is perceived) and these (usual) expressions of the ordinary man³ should likewise be taken into account. Therefore (your definition) is wrong.

expressed in speech (*paramārtha-sat = svalakṣaṇa = pratyakṣa = nirvikalpaka = anabhilāpya*) The Mādhyamika here hints at this theory and sets forth the argument that if speech could express nothing real, nothing positive, no actions, agents etc., then it would be impossible for people to enter into conversation. This remark is of course more of a glib gibe and unfair, since the Mādhyamika's own ultimate reality is also inexpressible in speech (*nīṣprapañca = anabhilāpya = anupākhya, prapañca = vāk*). But Candrakīrti thinks that no improvement in the logic of the Realists is needed, no critical theory of cognition, no «thing in itself» and no negative theory of speech (*apoha*). The logic of the Naiyāyikas can be accepted wholesale for the phenomenal aspect of the world, and for the Absolute logic at all is needed. The school of Dignāga, as well as the Hinayānists, can maintain that they also admit a double aspect of life, one on the surface (*samvṛti*) and one ultimate (*paramārtha*) or concealed (*sāmṛta*), cp. A. B. kośa, V. 12, but C. is persuaded that his vindication of an empirical reality has a greater force. The Mādhyamikas are the inventors of the doctrine of a double «truth» which they probably contrasted with the «four truths» of the Hinayāna, cp. Mādhy. s., XXIV. 8. This is also partly the reason why the Mādhyamikas, and their followers the Vedāntins, deem it permissible freely to use the arguments of the Naiyāyikas when combating Buddhist Idealism, cp. above p. 38n. 3. At Śrīharṣa's time, when the enemy is no more the Buddhist, but the Naiyāyik, this attitude changes.

¹ Read *pravṛttiā*. C. is here playing with the double meaning of *icchā*, «desire» and «tenet». «Your behaviour is bound (by such theories as are) merely (fantastical) desires», i. e. you are not acting in accordance with your tenets, if speech is only *apoha* you ought not to speak at all.

² The definition here alluded to is Dignāga's definition, «sense-perception is quite free from all synthetic operation of thought (*kalpanāyudha*)», cp. Nyāyabindu, p. 6. 15.

³ *an-ārya*, the non-Saint. The Buddhist Saint, being a philosopher who has changed all usual habits of thought, directly realizes that what he perceives are only momentary sense-data,

The Logician. It might have been (wrong, but for the following considerations). Perceived are directly the sense data, e. g., a patch of dark colour etc. They make up the physical object, the jar. Sense perception, as a source of knowledge, distinguishes (only that). (But the cognition of the physical object which is a mental construction *resulting* from sense-perception) is likewise called sense-perception by a metaphor. Such metaphors we find in Scripture, e. g., when it is stated that «the advent of Buddhas is a weal», (instead of stating that it *produces* weal). We impute to the cause what really belongs to the effect. Just so, by a (converse) metaphor, from the cause to the effect, we say that (the physical object), the jar, is perceived, while only its causes, the sense data, are really perceived.¹

Mādhyamika. To assume a (natural) metaphor in such cases (as the perception of a jar) is impossible. (Quite different is the case of the advent of a Buddha). Indeed a birth, (i. e. the process of a birth), is held in ordinary life as the reverse of pleasure. (It is not the blissful Quiescence of the Forces of life). It is essentially produced through the cooperation of a plurality of biotic forces.² It is a cause of very much pain. (By itself) it is anything but a weal. Nevertheless it is (here) called a weal. There is a contradiction.³ In such cases we assume a metaphor. (The advent of a Buddha, although also painful by itself, is nevertheless a weal, because it produces the weal of Quiescence in Nirvāna). The case is different with a perceived jar. We have no such separate thing as an invisible jar which could be called perceived metaphorically.

The Logician. (On the contrary!) Just because there is no jar over and above the corresponding sense-data, it is convenient to maintain that its perceptibility is a metaphor.

Mādhyamika. If you take it so, the metaphor is still less possible, because the object which you metaphorically endow (with perceptibility) does

the remainder is construction. Dignāga's definition may be a right description of his perception, but will not cover the usual view.

¹ Lit., p. 70.1-3. «But let it be! The blue etc., the substratum of the jar, are evident, since they are being determined by perceptive cognition. Hence just as by imputing the effect to the cause it is said that the birth of Buddha is agreeable, thus the jar, although its causes are the evident blue etc., by imputing the cause to the effect, is called a perception».

² *samskṛta-lakṣaṇa-svabhāva*, «it has the essence of the forces of life», about the four forces (*samskāra*) which are called *samskṛta-lakṣaṇa* cp. my Central Conception, p. 39. There is no other weal for the Buddhist as the Quiescence i. e. extinction of all life in an Absolute.

³ *asambaddha eva*.

not exist at all. You cannot speak about the sharpness of the horns on the head of the donkey even metaphorically.¹ Moreover if you assume that the jar which is a part of our every-day experience is perceived by us in a metaphorical sense, because there is no such jar over and above the sense-datum of a dark patch of colour etc., then (you are bound to take the next step and condemn this patch of dark colour as well), since it also does not exist over and above the sense-datum of something resistant.² Then, please, assume that the patch of dark colour is also perceived in a metaphorical sense! This has been expressed in the following verse,³ —

71. 1. Just as there is no jar
Beyond its colour,
Just so there is no colour
Beyond resistance.⁴

71. 3. Therefore this and similar usual expressions are not covered by your definition of perception. It is quite deficient, (since it does not cover the whole of its subject matter). Now, from the transcendental point of view,⁵ we equally condemn the perception of (the physical object), the jar, as well as the perception of (the sense data), blue etc. On the contrary, from the empirical view of every-day life, we must admit that the jar is perceived. This has been expressed in one of the four hundred verses (of Āryadeva) in the following manner.

71. 6. A transcendentalist⁶ will never say —
«We see (a patch) of colour, not a jar»,
Or «a jar is present (before us)».
In following just this line of argument

¹ Lit., p. 70.9. «Because there is no substratum for what is being metaphored». In the first case the really existing sense-data were the substratum, and the physical object jar superimposed upon them. It was answered that you cannot superimpose a thing you nowhere have perceived. In the second the relation has been reversed and it is supposed that the non-existing jar is the substratum upon which the sense-data are superimposed. This is still less possible.

² Lit., 70.11 «there is no blue etc. beyond earth etc.».

³ Catuḥśataka, XIV.14.

⁴ Lit., p. 71.2. «Just so there is no colour beyond wind etc.». Earth, wind etc. are the 4 fundamental elements of Matter (*mahā-bhūta*) which are cognized exclusively by touch, (*spṛṣṭavya-āyatana*), thus colour (*rūpa-āyatana*) is here reduced to a tactile phenomenon. Cp. the contention of modern empiricism which reduces our notion of Matter to sense-data and the sense-data to the one fundamental sensation of resistance. About Matter offering resistance (*sapratighatva*) to sight, cp. Ab. Kośabh. ad I. 29.

⁵ *tattva-vid-apekṣayā*.

⁶ *tattva-vid*.

His sovereign mind will equally deny
The soft, the fragrant and the sweet.¹

There is however (another explanation of what perception really means). 71. 10. The word perception simply means a thing which is not beyond the range of our senses, (it does not mean its cognition through our senses). An object which is present and faces us is thus called a perception.² Jars, patches of blue colour and similar physical objects are called perceptions when they are not beyond the range of sight. A perception thus means an object which has been approached³ by our senses. The corresponding definite cognition is (also) called perception (by a metaphor), because it is the cause which makes the object evident, just as we speak of a «straw fire» or «husk fire» (metaphorically, instead of saying fire *producing* burning straw or burning husk).

There is a philosopher⁴ who has given the following interpretation of 72. 1. the term perception. (Perception is that kind of knowledge which) exists in close connexion with each sense faculty. (This could also mean that sense knowledge is a knowledge about the senses, a knowledge whose objects are the senses). This interpretation is wrong, because sense-perception is not a knowledge about the senses, it is a knowledge about the object⁵ of (the senses). (If his interpretation were correct, we would speak not of sense perception), but of «object-perception» or of «thing-perception».

Be it as the case may be, we find in (the Abhidharmakośa) the 72. 4. following explanation. Sensation⁶ is produced by a double cause, (the sense faculty and its object). Nevertheless it receives its name only through (one of its causes, the organ) in which the corresponding sense faculty is lodged, because sensation changes in degree, according to the changes by

¹ Catuḥśataka, XIII. 1—2.

² The origin of this definition — *pratyakṣam aparokṣam* «perception is the object not beyond our ken», can be traced in the Brh. ār. Upaniṣad, III. 4. 1 and III. 5. 1. It is adopted in the later scholastic Vedānta, cp. Vedānta-paribhāṣā, p. 12 (Bombay 1900, Venkateśvar). It is also mentioned by Udayana, Pārisuddhi, p. 647 (B. I.). It seems probable that the Mādhyamikas have borrowed it from the Vedāntins. To the Mādhyamikas it suggested the omnipresence of Buddha's *dharma-kāya*, just as to the Vedāntins it suggested the omnipresence of *aparokṣam brahma* cognized by mystic intuition. Cp. above, p. 45.

³ Lit., p. 71.10-11. «By meaning «in it the sense is approached», the perceptibility of jars, blue etc., not being beyond the ken, is established».

⁴ The definition of Praśastapāda is here alluded to, cp. Praśastp., p. 186.12. The etymological explanation of the Naiyāyikas does not differ materially, cp. Nyāyavārt., p. 30.4. Nyāyabinduṭ, p. 6. 4, makes a difference between the etymology and the real meaning.

⁵ *viśaya-viśaya*.

⁶ *viññāna*.

which the faculty may be affected.¹ To sharp or feeble faculties correspond (sharp or feeble) sensations. We then have visual and other sensations. Thus, although a perception changes with every object,² nevertheless it receives its name according to the place where it is lodged. It exists as lodged in different sense organs, it is thus sense-perception, (not object-perception). It is customary to name a thing by its specific cause, e. g., the sound «of a drum» (although it is also the sound of the sticks), the sprout «of barley» (although it is also the sprout of the soil etc.).

72. 8. Mādhyamika. There is no analogy between (the example of the sound of a drum) and the above mentioned (designation of sense-perception instead of object-perception). If sensation be specified according to its object, (one could specify) our sensations as colour-sensations etc. (But we could not specify in this way) all the six kinds of sensations, since mental (or intellectual) sensation (is a sixth kind of sensation) which is apprehending the same object simultaneously (with the external sense). Indeed, if we include in the term sensation all its six varieties, beginning with the visual ones (and including the intellectual ones), we might be quite uncertain what to think when someone would mention the term (visual) sensation. (We will not know) whether it means only the sensation produced by the external sense, or it is meant to include the corresponding internal sensation, (the mental reaction)⁴
73. 1. also. But if we specify sensations according to (the organ) in which they are lodged, although mental sensation can refer to (the same) object to which visual and other sensations (likewise refer), nevertheless their mutual distinction will, in that case, be clearly established. (If they were called according to their object, since the object can be the same when different sensations are meant, confusion would arise).
73. 2. However, in this case you are merely concerned with giving a definition of what the sources of our knowledge are. You accordingly assume that sense-knowledge is simply that kind of knowledge where all constructive thought is brushed aside, (it is pure passive sensation).⁵ Just the contrast with thought

¹ Ab. Kośa, I. 45.

² Lit., p. 72.5—7. «Thus although it exists with reference to every object, nevertheless it will be (sense) perception, because, existing as lodged in every sense-organ, sensation is designated by its residence».

³ *nīlādi-vijñāna*.

⁴ *mānaśa*.

⁵ *kalpanāpodha* is the celebrated definition of Dignāga discussed almost in every Indian philosophical work. It makes a difference between the first moment in every perception

is in your opinion its characteristic. No purpose is served by naming (its varieties) according to their specific causes.¹ Now, the number of the sources of our knowledge (exactly) corresponds to the number of the cognized (categories of existence). You have established the character of both your sources of knowledge in strict correspondence with the double character of the cognizable. (To this strict correspondence) they owe their existence and their shape. You should, therefore, remain always faithful to your principle of designating cognition only according to its object. To name it according to the organ of sense would serve no purpose (from your standpoint).²

However (the Logician may vindicate his interpretation by the following consideration). The word sense-perception is generally known to everyone. The word object-perception is not used as a designation of what we here have in our mind. For this reason we adhere to the interpretation that the term sense-perception means perception (through the sense-organs), through the place where the sensations are lodged, (it does not mean the perceived object).

The Mādhyamika answers. (This is true), the word perception is very well known in common life, and we, (not you), are using it just in what sense it is used in common life.³ (Your) interpretation is made with utter disregard of what is established as real in common life. Generally known (in your interpretation) is only the utter disregard of what is (really) generally known,

it is then pure sensation, it is passive, involving absolutely no thought-construction. But the next step, which is also perception, represents the construction of an image by synthetic thought (*vikalpena anugamyate*). The distinction has a great importance for Dignāga, because he thinks that in this pure sensation, this, so to say, «reine Sinnlichkeit», the «pure object» (*śuddha-artha*), the «thing in itself» (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) reveals itself to our consciousness. It is interesting to compare the controversy between Eberhard and Kant on a similar question. Eberhard assumed that he was opposing Kant when he maintained that the «thing in itself» reveals itself in our sensations (*Empfindungen*), but Kant conceded the point, «nun ist das eben (viz. dass die Dinge an sich der Sinnlichkeit ihren Stoff geben) die beständige Behauptung der Kritik», cp. Ueber eine Entdeckung, nach der etc., p. 35 (Kirchmann).

¹ Lit., 73.4—6. «But here, with a view to express the essence of the sources of cognition (*pramāṇa*), the absence of synthesis (*kalpanā*) alone is admitted as perception, because the peculiarity of this (mode of cognition) is found (in its difference) from constructive (dichotomizing, *vikalpaka*) cognition; by naming it according to its special (cause) no usefulness is indicated».

² Lit., p. 73.6—8. «And since the existence of the number of the sources of cognition is dependent upon the objects of cognition, and because the essence of (such) two sources of cognition has been established which have attained their shape (*ātmabhāva*) and existence (*sattā*) exclusively by conforming to the (double) form of the cognizable, the designation through the sense-organ helps nothing; thus in every respect the designation just by the object is the right one».

³ *pratyakṣa* means also an object «evident», «present».

because (in your interpretation, as pure sensation), it would not even mean perception.¹

74. 3. And moreover, since you give to the term a generalizing sense (of what is present in all sensations), the case (of a single moment) of visual sensation, which is produced by a single moment of the faculty of vision, will not be covered (by your definition). And then, if a single moment of perception will thus (according to this definition) not be perception, neither will a number of them be perception.²

74. 6. Now, you maintain that sense-perception is only that kind of cognition which is quite free from any participation in it of constructive thought. However with such (pure sensation alone) you will not be able to converse with your fellow beings. Nevertheless you pretend to analyse the course which cognition and its object take in common life. It follows that that sort of sense-knowledge which you assume (sc. pure sensation) is quite useless.

74. 8. Mādhyaṃika. (You are also vindicating your theory of perception by referring to Scripture where it is stated that) «a man, having a visual sensation (of a patch of blue colour) apprehends blue, but does not know that it is blue», (the definite knowledge is produced by a subsequent operation of contrasting blue with not blue).³ (But in our opinion this scriptural delive-

¹ Lit., p. 74.3. «...well known could be (your) distortion (*tiraskāra*) of the term «well known» and therefore it would not be thus sense-perception». The *pratyakṣa* in Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's interpretation, meaning as it does a moment of pure, undifferentiated sensation, represents, indeed, something quite unknown in common life. The divergence between the common idea of perception and Dignāga's conception of pure sensation is much more considerable than the divergence between it and the Mādhyaṃika-Vedānta definition of perception as the thing perceived, since the Sanskrit term for perception *pratyakṣa* is a word very commonly used in the sense of a thing present, evident, perceived. Dharmottara himself calls that kind of pure perception which is imagined by Buddhists something «hardly existing» *asat-kalpa*, cp. Nyāya-binduḥ, p. 16. 6. This retort of the Mādhyaṃika is, nevertheless, not quite fair, because the follower of Dignāga, when maintaining that perception is not the object, but its cognition, does not refer to pure sensation, but to perceptive cognition which includes a moment of sensation.

² Lit., p. 74.3-4. «And there will be no perception-character (*pratyakṣatva*) of one visual sensation (*caḥṣur-vijñānasya*) possessing an underlying (*āśrayasya*) single moment of the sense-faculty (*indriya-kṣaṇa*), because of the absence of the meaning of generalization (*vīpśā*)».

³ This very important text from an unknown *āgama* is mentioned already by Dignāga in his *Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti*, I. 4, as a quotation from the abhidharma (*chos-mñon-pa-las*) in support of his theory. This could prove that Dignāga's theory of pure sensation was foreshadowed in previous Sautrāntika works. Kamalaśīla examines it at length in his *Nyāya-bindu-pūrva-pakṣa-saṃkṣipti* (Bstan-hgyur, Mdo CXI, f. 112 ff). Vasubandhu's definition of *pratyakṣa* is quite different, cp. *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* I, 15, and *Nyāyavārt*, p. 42.

rance is not meant to give any definition of sense-perception. It only is meant to notify that the sensations of the five external sense-organs (alone, without the participation of a conscious element), remain unconscious. Sensation which is absolutely bare of every element of (synthetic) thought cannot be maintained to represent perception, even on the basis of Scripture. This would be wrong.

Therefore from the empirical,¹ (not from the transcendental), point of view, everything without exception is called present,² (i. e., a perception), when it is directly perceived (by the senses), whether it be (your strictly) particular essence or the general essence or the thing³ (possessing these both essences). A perception is thus determined (as meaning) the object of perception together with its cognition.⁴ The double moon and similar illusions will not be sense-perceptions, if compared with the cognitions of a man with a normal capacity of vision, but for the man suffering from ophtalmia it will be just *his* sense-perception.

As regards cognition of objects lying beyond the range of our senses, it is produced by a (perceived) mark which is invariably concomitant with them. It is called inference.

The words of specially qualified persons who directly perceive transcendental things⁵ are called Scripture.

If something that has never been experienced is cognized (through a description), so far as it has been declared to be similar (to another thing which has been experienced by us) — this is called analogy, e. g., when we are told that a gayal whom we have never seen is (some animal) similar to a bull.

By these four methods of cognition is our knowledge of objects determined (and our actions guided) in common life.⁶

(But if we are then asked on what transcendental basis these four methods of usual cognition repose, we will be obliged to confess) that their reality is relative.⁷ The cognizable things exist so far as cognitions exist and (*vice versa*), cognitions exist so far as the cognizable objects exist.

¹ *loke*.

² *aparokṣa*.

³ *lakṣya*.

⁴ *jñānena saha*, according to Dignāga *pratyakṣa*, when pure (*śuddha*) is not *jñāna*, but Dharmakīrti brings it under the head of *samyag-jñāna*, cp. *Tātparyat*, p. 102. 17.

⁵ *atīndriyārtha*.

⁶ These are exactly the four sources of knowledge admitted by the Realists, the Naiyāyikas.

⁷ *parasparāpekṣayā siddha* = *sūnya*.

But¹ in no case is there any independent (absolute) reality² either of our cognitions, nor of the objects cognized. Therefore let us be satisfied with the usual (view of the phenomenal world), just as it is cognized by us from experience.³

Enough of this discussion!

Let us revert to our subject matter.

The Sublime Buddhas have also preached their doctrine in adapting it just to the habits of thought of common humanity.⁴

XLII. THE HĪNAYĀNA THEORY OF CAUSATION EXAMINED.

76. 1. From our correlative religionists⁵ (the Hīnayānists) we receive regarding this (our denial of causation) the following reply.⁶ We agree with you, (they say),

¹ Here Candrakīrti winds up this remarkable controversy with Dignāga by admitting realistic logic in the empirical field, but not in the transcendental, and by rejecting Dignāga's reform which, although professing to be a logic of common sense (*laukika*), aimed at establishing a transcendental reality of a «thing in itself». For describing the fact that phenomenal reality is established in his system on a firm basis, he uses two words, it is *satya* «a truth», and it is *siddha*, «established as a reality». However it is a «surface truth» (*saṃvṛti-satya*) and it is «established as a relative reality» (*parasparāpekṣayā siddha*), not absolutely (*na tu svabhāvena*). Dignāga retorts that he has also two realities, the relative reality of all our conceptions and the absolute reality of the «thing in itself». Indeed the followers of Āryāśāṅga and Dignāga are frequently characterized as being also Mādhyamikas (i. e., relativists) because they adhere to the doctrine that all our conceptions have merely a relative value (*paratantra*). But Candrakīrti insists that Dignāga's «thing in itself» is also relative, that he has thus failed to grasp the real profound meaning of the doctrine of the two realities, the Relativity is the «surface» of the Absolute, it has its real stand as such a surface. Therefore in chap. XXV. 9 and XXV.20 Nāgārjuna will emphatically assert the essential identity of the Absolute and the Phenomenal, of Nirvāṇa and Saṃsāra, cp. translation below p. 200. The Absolute of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti has thus a certain similarity with the *ἐν αὐτῷ πᾶσι* of Parmenides, whereas the «thing in itself» of Dignāga has some points of similarity with the *Hoc Aliquid* (= *kimcid idam*) of Aristotle. The Mādhyamika view can be clearly realized out of the following equations,

1) *saṃvṛti* (surface) = *parasparāpekṣā* (relativity) = *loka* = *laukika-vyavasthā* = *prapañca* (pluralism) = *pratītya-samutpāda* (dependently-together-origination) = *sūnyatā* = *nir-svabhāvatā* = *saṃsāra* = *Dharma-kāya* = the manifested world = omnipraesentia Dei phac-nomenon,

2) *sāmṛta* («under the surface») = *anapekṣa* (non-relative) = *paramārtha* (absolute) = *nir-prapañca* (non-plural) = *anirvacanīya* = *advaita* (monistic) = *pratītya-samutpāda* (i. e., *sāmṛtaḥ pratītya-samutpādaḥ*) = *sūnyatā* (i. e. *sāmṛtā sūnyatā*) = *sasvabhāvatā* = *tattva* = *tathātā* = *dharma* = *nirvāṇa* = *Dharma-kāya* = the world sub specie aeternitatis.

² *svābhāvīkī siddhiḥ*.

³ *yathādr̥ṣṭam* = *dr̥ṣṭam anatikramya*.

⁴ *laukikam darśanam*, «philosophy of common sense» as opposed to *darśana* «real philosophy».

⁵ *svayūthyā*.

⁶ About the general idea of Causality (*pratītya-samutpāda*) in Hīnayāna cp. above p. 39. About its special application to the evolution of life in 12 consecutive stages, cp. O. Rosenberg,

that entities cannot arise out of themselves, so far the production of a thing (already existing) out of its own self is useless. That entities cannot arise out of both sources (i. e., out of a preexisting stuff and separate agents) is also true, since one half (of this solution) is invalidated (by our denial of a pre-existing substance).

The (last) eventuality, (viz. that every thing exists at random), without any causal link at all, is absolutely poor. It is quite right to dismiss it (without much consideration). But if you also maintain that neither are existent things caused by something separate from them, this we do not admit. The Buddha has specified that existing things have causes producing them, (and that these causes are substantially) different (from the thing produced).

(The Hīnayānists maintain),

II. Four (can be) the conditions

(Of every thing produced),

Its cause, its object, its foregoing moment,

Its most decisive factor.¹

There is no fifth condition.

Among them the cause is what «turns out».² Such is the definition. Therefore, if one entity turns out the other, i. e., if their mutual position is similar to that of a seed (*versus* a sprout),³ it is called its cause, (this is the first condition, the cause in a general sense). If something, when being produced, is intent (upon something else, as e. g., a sensation which is always intent upon an object), the latter is called its objective condition.

The foregoing condition for the production of a result is the evanes-

77. 1. Problems, ch. XVI, my Central Conception, p. 28 n., and above p. 134. The schools of Hīnayāna were moreover engaged in classification of the varieties of coordination between the separate momentary elements in which existence had been split. They thus established different *pratītyas* of the *pratītya-samutpāda*. The classification into four varieties here mentioned belongs to the school of the Sarvāstivādins. It has been supplemented by a further classification into 6 different *hetus*, which probably is later than Nāgārjuna, since it is not mentioned by him. The Pāli school had devised a classification into 21 *pratītyayas*. The full theory of the Sarvāstivādins is given in Ab. Kośa, II. 50 ff. *Pratyaya* when contrasted with *hetu* means condition in general, and *hetu* cause (special). Otherwise both terms are very often used as synonyms. All the very interesting details of their connotation can be realized only through a careful study of the abhidharma.

¹ *ādhipateya* = *ādhipati-pratyaya*.

² *nirvartaka*.

³ The seed is the *ādhipati-pratyaya* = *kāraṇa-hetu* = *asādharaṇa-kāraṇa* of the sprout, cp. p. 86. 17, here it exemplifies a condition in general.

cence of its (material) cause as e. g., the foregoing destruction of the seed is a condition for the production of the sprout.

77. 4. The decisive (or predominant) condition is (that decisive fact) which being (efficient) the result (inevitably) appears. Such are the four kinds of (possible) conditions.

77. 5. If there be other circumstances, previous, contemporaneous or posterior to an event, they are all to be included in one of these categories. A Supreme Deity and similar (transcendental) conditions do not exist. Therefore the author puts a limit, «there is no other, fifth, kind of condition». Entities arise under these conditions, conditions which are not identical with the thing produced. In this sense there is a production (or coordination) with things other (than the thing produced).

77. 8. We answer. Neither are entities produced out of (or coordinated with) conditions which are (substantially) separate from them.

III. In these conditions we can find
No self-existence of the entities.
Where self-existence is deficient,
Relational existence also lacks.

78. 3. If the produced entities¹ had any preexistence² at all, in (their own) causes and (conditions) which are something different from (these entities themselves)—whether in all the complex of them or in some of them separately or both in all of them and in every one of them, or (even if they existed) somewhere outside the complex of their causes and conditions,—then alone could they appear *out* of them. But that is not so. They do not preexist. If they did, they would have been perceived, and their (new) production would have been useless.

78. 6. Therefore the conditions and (causes) of an entity do not contain any real existence³ (of the result). If they do not contain its real existence, neither do they contain its relational existence.⁴ Existence, relation, production⁵ (are synonyms). Production out of something extraneous means relation⁶ to it, (some kind of preexistence in it). This is impossible. Therefore it is wrong

¹ *bhāvānām kāryāṇām.*

² *svabhāvaḥ.*

³ *bhāvanam bhāva utpādīḥ.*

⁴ *utpādāt pūrvam sattvam.*

⁵ *parabhāvaḥ.*

⁶ *bhāva, cp. in kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva.*

to maintain that entities can be produced out of conditions which are different from them.

(But then the Hīnayānist would maintain that) the produced entities, 78. 9. such as a sprout etc., do not really exist in their causes, such as seeds etc., as long as the latter have not undergone any change. (But when they are changed the result appears). Otherwise the latter would appear without any cause altogether. (This is what they call their relation to other entities which are their causes).

But in what sense¹ are we to understand the «otherness»² of causes 78. 11. (and conditions). When both Maitra and his help-mate are present, (we can assert that) they are two separate entities which depend upon one another (in producing a piece of work together). But this kind of coexistence is not found between a seed and a sprout. Therefore when results do not possess such separate existence of their own, their relation, the «otherness» (of the sprout) in regard to the seed, is absent. The designation of it as «other» becomes (meaningless) and this alone makes production out of something extraneous impossible.

(The Hīnayānist's appeal to Scripture betrays) his utter ignorance of 78. 13—14. its real intention. Never did the Buddhas preach something contrary to reason.³ What the real aim of their doctrine is we have indicated above, (we have namely indicated that the doctrine of causality refers to the phenomenal world).⁴

XLIII. THE EXISTENCE OF SEPARATE ENERGIES DENIED.

When the philosopher who maintains the origination (of entities out 79. 1. of other entities which are) their causes, has been thus dismissed, another one sets forth a theory of origination through (special) energies.⁵ The organ of vision, colours and the other causes (of the visual sensation) are not producing it directly. They are called causes because they call forth an energy⁶ (capable) of producing sensation. This energy⁷ then (actually) produces (visual) sensation. Thus the causes, as separate entities, do not produce sensation. Its (real) producer⁸ is a (corresponding) energy, an energy inherent

¹ *kimapekṣa.*

² *paratva.*

³ *yukti-viruddha.*

⁴ Cp. above text, p. 54. 10.

⁵ Nāgārjuna avails himself of the term *kriyā* (= *jani-kriyā*) in the sense of energy or function. Later it is replaced by the term *vyāpāra* which is also used by Candrakīrti, cp. p. 329. 16.

⁶ *jani-kriyā.*

⁷ *kriyā.*

⁸ *viññāna-janīḥ.*

in the causes¹ and creative² of sensation. Analogous is the (physical) energy of heat³ which produces, e. g., cooked rice.

We answer,

IV. No energies in causes,
Nor energies outside them.
No causes without energies,
Nor causes that possess them.

79. 7. If an energy (producing sensation does really exist) it must be associated with such causes as the organ of vision etc. But this is impossible. Why? Because (we will then be asked) whether this assumed energy is supposed to appear when the sensation already exists or before it or simultaneously with it? (The first alternative must be rejected). If the sensation is already produced, the energy is useless. The energy (is supposed) to produce something. But if it is already produced, what has the energy to do? This has been expressed in our «Mādhyaṃika Introduction» thus, —⁴

The second birth of something born
Should never be admitted, etc.

79. 12. Neither is the existence of an energy to be assumed (in the causes) previously (to the sensation) produced. This we have expressed (in the same work) thus, —⁵

This energy cannot take shape,
As long as the result⁶ is absent.

80. 1. Neither is (the existence of an energy just at the moment of) production possible, because a thing is either produced or not yet produced, there is no existence between (these two moments). It has been said —

What is being produced is not produced,
Because 'tis only half-produced.
Or else all things without exception
Would nascent always be.⁷

¹ *pratyayavatī*.

² *viññāna-janī-kriyā*.

³ Read *paci-kriyā*.

⁴ M. av., VI. 8.

⁵ Ibid., VI. 19, cp. M. vī., p. 545.

⁶ *kartrā-vinā*, lit. «without the maker», sc. without the result as maker or shaper of the energy. The future *viññāna* is here envisaged as the shaper (*karma-kāraka*) of its own producer.

⁷ Lit., p. 80. 3-4. «Because the nascent is half-born the nascent is not born. Otherwise the condition of being nascent would attach (*prasaṃjate*) just to everything».

Since this (assumed) energy cannot be located in any one of the three 80. 5. times (past, present and future), it does not exist altogether. (Nāgārjuna) therefore says,

No energies in causes.

We have commented upon this point in our «Mādhyaṃika Introduction» when explaining that,

Without something characterized
There can be no characteristic feature, etc.¹

Indeed the (non-existing) son of a barren woman cannot be characterized as the possessor of a cow, (since he neither did nor does nor will exist). (The non-existing energy cannot appertain to a cause).

But then an energy might perhaps exist (alone) without being the pos- 80. 9. sessor of a cause? This is also impossible,

No energy outside the causes.

If there is no energy in the causes, there neither can be any 80. 10. outside them, (it would then be) an uncaused energy. If there is no (separate) cloth beside the threads (composing it), this does not mean that the cloth preexists (somewhere else), in some straw.² Consequently no energy producing entities does really exist.

If this is the case, if it is impossible to assume energies, then perhaps 80. 13. the causes (alone, without possessing any energies will be sufficient) for the production of entities? It is answered,

No causes without energies.

80. 15.

If energies do not exist, then the causes will be bereft of energy, they will not be efficient, they will not be causes. How then will they produce something?

But (if causes really) produce something, they must be necessarily 80. 17. possessors of energy!

¹ Ibid. VI. 57. The possessive relation is here represented in an inverted manner. Instead of speaking of causes or objects possessing energies, the author speaks of energies possessing causes (*pratyayavatī kriyā*), he means «belonging to causes».

² *vīraṇa*.

To this it is answered,

Nor causes are there that possess them.

81. 2. The¹ existence of energies is thus denied. (It then becomes clear) that causes cannot be possessors of (non-existing) energies.
81. 3. What has been here said about an energy producing sensation, equally applies to the energy of heat² and other (physical energies). Thus the word «production» is itself devoid of any meaning.

XLIV. CAUSATION IS NOT COORDINATION.

81. 6. To this the (Hīnayānist) replies. We are not in the least affected by your examination of the question whether the causes are possessors of energy (or not. We are satisfied with establishing the fact) that entities, such as sensation, arise in a certain coordination with (other entities),³ e.g., the organ of vision etc. (This is all what we mean, when we assert that the existence of an organ of vision etc. are the conditions under which a visual sensation etc. can arise).
81. 8. (Nāgārjuna) now states that (this coordinational theory of causation) is also wrong,
81. 9. V. Let those facts be causes
With whom coordinated other facts arise,
Non-causes will they be
So far the other facts have not arisen.
81. 11. If sensation is an entity whose origination is coordinated with a faculty of vision and other (conditions), and these coordinates (are called causes), is it not evident that up to the moment when this so called «result», the sensation, has really arisen, what can the organs etc. represent but non-causes? They are (as good as) non-causes. That is the idea of (Nāgārjuna). And nothing can be produced out of its non-causes, e.g., oil cannot be pressed out of sand corns.
82. 1. But the following objection is then raised. They begin by being non-causes, but they are afterwards converted into causes by combining with

¹ Lit., p. 81. 2. «The word «not» is the connection with the subject-matter, (i.e., the negation must be taken out of the preceding sentence). The word «uta» puts emphasis».

² Read *paci-kriyā*.

³ *pratyayān pratītya*.

some other (concomitant) conditions. This also won't do! Because this concomitant condition, concomitant with something which is not yet a condition, can be considered as a condition only if the other fact is (really) a condition. We are in this case faced by the same difficulty as before. Therefore this explanation cannot be accepted.

An organ of vision and (an object) are here assumed to represent the 82. 4. causes producing (visual) sensation. But are they the causes of an existing sensation or are they the causes of a sensation not yet existing? It is anyhow an impossibility. (Nāgārjuna) says,

VI. Neither non-Ens, nor Ens
Can have a cause.

Why?

If non-Ens, whose the cause?

If Ens, whatfor the cause?

Non-Ens, i.e., a non-existing thing, how could it have a cause? (Its 82. 9. cause is perhaps) so called in anticipation? (It will produce the result at some future occasion). No!

Referring to a future fact
We give a name anticipating,
But never will this future come
Without a force that (latently) is present.¹

The incongruities² (resulting from assuming latent forces) have been indicated above.³

But if a thing is really existent, if it is present, if it has taken shape, it is absolutely useless to imagine some causes producing it.

XLV. THE CAUSE-CONDITION

After having represented that conditions⁴ in general are not really causes, 83. 1. since they have no capacity to produce effects, (Nāgārjuna) now proceeds (to

¹ M. av., VI. 58. Lit. «There is for it no futurity without a force».

² *doṣa*.

³ Cp. above, p. 167 ff.

⁴ It would have been strictly correct to translate *pratyaya* «condition» or «coordinate» and «hetu-pratyaya» «cause-condition» or simply «cause». But *adhipati-pratyaya* is even more of a cause than *hetu-pratyaya* which, therefore, is sometimes called *śahakāri-pratyaya* (cp. Sarvadārś. p. 39. Poona 1924). Only the *ālambana* and *samanantara-pratyayas* can be distinguished as «conditions». It is therefore impossible always to distinguish between these two terms. Yaśomitra accordingly says, ad Ab. Kośa, II. 50, *hetūnām ca pratyayānām ca ko viśeṣaḥ? na kaścit*.

consider their varieties separately and) to show that none of them singly is (really) a cause.

83. 3. The following objection is raised (by the Hinayānist). If you are right (he says), there can be no conditions at all. But (the notion of) a condition is very well established, since we have a definition of its essence. The definition of the cause-condition¹ which is here accepted, is the following one. A cause is what «turns out». If something be altogether a non-Ens, the definition of its essence) could never be given, it would be as though (some one were to teach us about the essence of the non-existing) son of a barren woman.

83. 5. We answer. The producing condition (*i. e.*, the cause), would exist if its essence were something real. (But this is not the case), since,

83. 7. VII. Neither an Ens, nor a non-Ens,
Nor any Ens-non-Ens,
No element is really «turned out».
How can we then assume
The possibility of a producing cause?

83. 9. Producing means creative.² If an element which can be produced would really be produced, then a creative cause would produce it. But it is not being (really) produced, since there is altogether no such thing that needs to be produced, whether Ens or non-Ens or (something including both) Ens and non-Ens.

83. 10. Indeed Ens is not produced because it exists. Neither is non-Ens, since it does not exist. Nor Ens-non-Ens, since such mutually contradicting (characteristics) cannot exist in one thing, and because, if they did, they

¹ *hetu-pratyaya*, the first of the four *pratyayas*. This classification of conditions into four varieties is not what to our requirements should be a strictly systematic classification, all members are not exclusive of one another. Thus the general condition is contrasted with the special one (*adhipati*), but it includes the two others which are only its varieties. It also embraces 5 causes of the *hetu*-classification, 1) *sabhāga-hetu*, relation of homogeneity between the preceding and the following moments of the same thing, producing the illusion of its duration, or moral homogeneity among the subsequent elements of a personality. This *hetu*-classification is also unsystematical, because the sixth class, the *kāraṇa-hetu* has two varieties, the efficient and the non-efficient one (*nus-bcas*, *nus-med*), the first is the same as the predominant condition *adhipati-pratyaya* or *osādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*, the second is an expression of the dependence of a given point-instant upon the condition of the whole Universe (*sarve dharmāḥ*) cp. above p. 41 n. 6. 2-3) *sahabhū* and *samprayukta-hetu*, relations of coexistence according to which some elements of Matter and Mind never appear alone, but always together, 4) *vipāka-hetu* which is another name for *karma* and 5) *sarvatraḡa-hetu*, moral homogeneity among coexisting elements. Cp. Ab. Kośa, II. 50 ff.

² Lit., what «turns out» (*nivartaka*).

would be subject to both the above strictures together. So it is that, since there is no production of effects (from the Monist's point of view), neither are there any creative causes.

Consequently the argument that causes must exist because their essence (or function) has been defined does not hold good in the present case. 83. 13.

XLVI. THE OBJECT, A CONDITION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA.

The author now proceeds to deny the (second condition), the condition consisting in the fact that (every mental phenomenon) has an objective counterpart (upon which it is intent).

VIII. A (mental) Ens is reckoned as an element,
Separately from its objective (counterpart).
Now if it (begins) by having no objective counterpart,
How can it get one afterwards?

What are the elements¹ of existence which are here in (the Hinayānist's system) characterized as possessors of an objective counterpart?² Consciousness, (*i. e.*, pure, indefinite sensation)³ and definite mental phenomena.⁴ Such are the words of Scripture. When consciousness (is awakened), or definite mental phenomena produced, they are intent⁵ upon some object (which transcends them), whether it be a patch of colour or some other object corresponding (to the sensation). These are then called the objective conditions⁶ (of those mental elements).

(It is now asked), is this objective condition imagined (for sensation) already existing, or for sensation not yet produced? In the first case the objective condition becomes useless. Indeed the objective condition is assumed in order to account for the production of this element,⁷ (sensation). But this element then really exists before the objective (cause has begun to operate).

Indeed in this case the element (consciousness) would be established as existing by itself, separately from its objective cause. Why would we then imagine it influenced by an (external) object? 84. 4.

Thus consciousness and similar elements would appear as existent and real, separately from their objective counterparts. Then it would simply be your fancy to call them possessors of an objective counterpart.⁸ They would have altogether no (real) relation to objects. 84. 7.

¹ *dharmā*.

² *sālabhāna*.

³ *citta*.

⁴ *caitta*.

⁵ *ālambanena utpadyante*.

⁶ *ālambana-pratyaya*.

⁷ *dharmā*.

⁸ *sālabhāna*.

84. 9. Now (let us examine the other alternative). We then imagine that a sensation not yet existing has already an object. This is also impossible. Because an element which has been entered into the system of elements separately from its objective counterpart is, in any case, an existing element. But (to imagine) an unexisting element combining with an object (is quite impossible).¹

85. 1. The (first) sentence (of the above verse) must be supplemented thus — «you call possessor of an object» a (mental) Ens which (in the system) is reckoned as an element separately from its object.

(The second sentence of the verse contains a question),

Now if it begins by having no objective counterpart
How can it get one afterwards?

85. 4. This is the reason expressed in the form of a question.² The meaning is the following one. If an element cannot exist without being intent upon an object, if it is not real, wherefrom will then the object appear? If the object-maker³ is absent, neither can the object exist.

85. 6. But then how are we to understand (the Scriptural) evidence that mind and mental phenomena must have an object? The question is trivial!⁴ (Yes they have an object), if the rule be considered (from the empirical standpoint) of contingent reality, not (from the transcendental standpoint) of absolute reality.

XLVII. THE CAUSA MATERIALIS DENIED.

85. 7. (Nāgārjuna) next proceeds to destroy the notion of an immediately preceding (moment of a chain of homogeneous momentary existences which by the Hinayānist is reckoned as a special) condition.⁵ He says,

IX. If (separate) elements do not exist,
Nor is it possible for them to disappear.
There is no moment which immediately precedes.
And if it disappears, how can it be a cause?

¹ Lit., p. 84. 9-10. «This also is impossible, (because it is stated in the aphorism) — «without an object really... etc (an existing element is taught (in the system)). Indeed the non-existing has no combination with the object».

² Lit., p. 85. 4. «The word *atha* for a question. Why? — for the reason».

³ *ālambanaka*.

⁴ *adoṣa*.

⁵ This condition corresponds roughly to the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, it represents the *upādāna*, the substratum of every appearing element. In the realistic systems the *causa materialis* is the continuant substance in the new production. But all Buddhists deny

The¹ definition of the immediately preceding (homogeneous) condition 86. 4. is here (in the Hinayāna) the following one. The immediately preceding destruction of the (material) cause is a condition of the production of the result. The following must be considered. When (in a monistic system) all entities,² all (supposed) results, (are viewed) as non-produced,³ as *e. g.*, a sprout (is not considered as a new origination),⁴ then (it is clear that from this standpoint) the disappearance of the cause, the seed (in its last moment), is impossible. In this case, there is no disappearance of the (material) cause, and therefore how can there be (a moment representing) the immediately preceding condition for the production of the sprout?

But (the Hinayānist) maintains that (all existence being a chain of 86. 7. discrete moments) the disappearance of the seed must have happened before the result has appeared. However if the seed is destroyed, converted into non-existence, what is then (supposed to represent) a cause of the sprout? Or what is the cause that has destroyed the seed? Both are without a cause. (This is expressed in the words),

And if it disappears, how can it be a cause?

The word «and» refers to a non-produced (sprout).⁵ Indeed, since it is as- 86. 9. sumed that the sprout is not yet produced at (the moment) when the seed has already disappeared, both these events (the disappearing of the seed and the appearing of the sprout) are without a cause. For this reason an immediately foregoing separate momentary (existence as a cause) is an impossibility.

Another explanation of this verse is the following one.

(In the first aphorism of this treatise, viz.—

There absolutely are no things,
Nowhere and none, that arise anew),

the existence of continuant substances and reduce them to chains of discrete moments, every preceding moment representing the *upādāna* of the following one. The preceding moment is supposed to have vanished when the next one appears.

¹ Precedes a grammatical explanation. Lit., p. 86. 1-3. «Here, in the last half of the verse, the quarters must be transposed. Moreover the word «and» is at the wrong place, it should stand after the word *niruddhe*. The reading will then be, «if it has disappeared, how is it a cause? Therefore «the foregoing» is not admissible». It has been thus expressed for the sake of versification».

² *dharma*.

³ i. e. existing *sub specie aeternitatis*

⁴ but as a mode of the unique substance (*tathātā* = *dharmakāya*) of the Universe.

⁵ It is the habit of Indian commentaries to interpret the particle «and» as an indication of some additional circumstance.

Neither out of themselves, nor out of non-self,
Nor out of both, nor at random,

(the notion) of «origination» has been cleared away (altogether).

(The present aphorism simply) refers to that (general denial and draws the consequence that—)

If (separate) elements never appear,
Nor is it possible for them to disappear.
There is no moment which immediately precedes.¹

86. 14. As to the explanation (of the last sentence of the aphorism, viz.)

And if it disappears, how can it be a cause?

it remains then just the same as before.

XLVIII. THE SPECIAL CAUSE ALSO DENIED.

86. 17. (Nāgārjuna) now goes on to deny the existence of a predominant condition² and says,

X. If entities are relative,³
They have no real existence.
The formula «this being, that appears»
Then loses every meaning.

87. 1. The definition of the predominant condition⁴ is here in (Hīnayāna) the following one. A predominant condition is that (special) fact which being present the re-

¹ i. e., there is no momentary existence which immediately disappears in order to make room for the next moment.

² This variety of causation is probably the precursor of the *nimitta-kāraṇa*, *asādhārāṇa-kāraṇa*, *sādhakatama kāraṇa* or *kaṇa* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The eye, e. g., is the *adhipati-pratyaya* of a visual sensation. But it cannot be identified with our *causa efficiens* because such a conception has, strictly speaking, no place in the Buddhist system. Causation in the world-process is imagined as quite impersonal, the separate bits of reality are following one another automatically. *Karma* itself is a separate element, it is not personal in theory. All results are therefore automatical, the natural outflow (*niṣyanda-phala*) of conditions. Some results are very characteristically called «anthropomorphic» (*puruṣa-kāra-phala* = *puruṣa-iva kṛta*), they are also conceived as automatical, but only appearing as though they were produced by a conscious will. Cf. A. b. Kośa, II. 56 ff.

³ *niḥsvabhāva* = *śūnya*.

⁴ *adhipati-pratyaya*.

sult (inevitably) appears. But since all separate entities¹ (from the Monist's point of view) have only a relative origination² and no real (independent) existence,³ the (definition of causation expressed in the words «this being, that appears» then loses every meaning). What is indeed the meaning of the word «this» which is supposed to point to a cause, and what the meaning of the word «that» which is supposed to point to its result? It is true, a definition is given, but Causality is not thereby established.⁴

(The Hīnayānist) makes the following objection. After having observed 87. 4. that a piece of cloth is produced out of threads, we conclude that the existence of threads etc. is a necessary condition for the existence of a piece of cloth.

We answer. (From the standpoint of transcendental reality) it is just 87. 5. the production of such separate results as cloth etc. that is ultimately⁵ denied. How can we then admit that their supposed conditions are really causes? That the production of such results as cloth etc. is (ultimately) unreal, this Nāgārjuna makes clear in the following words,

XI. Neither singly in anyone of these conditions, 87. 7.
Nor together in all of them
Does the (supposed) result reside.
How can you out of them extract,
What in them never did exist?

The cloth, indeed, does not exist neither in the threads, nor in the 87. 9. weavers brush, nor in his loom, nor in the shuttle, nor in the pins or other causes taken singly. We do not perceive in them (any cloth). Moreover from a plurality of causes a plurality of effects would be expected. And since the cloth does not exist in any one of its parts taken singly, it neither does exist in all of them, in the threads etc., taken together.

(If we would admit that every single cause contributes its part to the 87. 11. general result), we would be obliged to admit that one result is produced

¹ *bhāvānām*.

² *pratītya-samutpannatva* = *śūnyatā*.

³ *svabhāva-abhāva* = *śūnyatā*.

⁴ Lit., p. 87. 1-3. «Since there is non-existence of self-existence of the entities because of their Dependently-together-origination, wherefrom that which is pointed to by «this» as a cause, wherefrom that which is pointed to by «that» as a result? Therefore, albeit from a definition, there is no establishment of conditions».

⁵ *varūpatah*.

87. 11. piece-meal. Therefore since there are really no results, neither can the existence of causes as separate entities¹ be admitted.

87. 13. XII. Supposing from these causes does appear
What never did exist in them.

This is what (the Hinayānist) maintains.

Out of non-causes then
Why does it not appear?

88. 3. The result does not preexist in those things which (admittedly) are not its causes. (And we have seen that it neither does preexist in those things which admittedly are its causes). Why then is a piece of cloth never produced out of straw and other things which admittedly are not its causes? From the standpoint of ultimate reality² we then deny the production of results altogether.

88. 5. (The Hinayānist) makes here the following objection. If the result were really one thing and its causes something separate, then we would understand your solicitude about the question whether the result preexists in the causes (or not)? But the result is not something outside its causes. On the contrary, it includes them in itself, (the presence of the whole complex of all the causes of a given event is equivalent to the production of the latter).

88. 6. (Nāgārjuna) says,

88. 7. XIII. The result a cause - possessor,
But causes not even self-possessors.
How can result be cause-possessor,
If of non-self-possessors it be a result.

88. 9. You maintain that there is a possessive relation between a result and its causes, i. e., that the result is simply a modification³ of its causes. This is wrong, because these (supposed) causes do not possess their own selves, i. e., they are no real causes.⁴

88. 10. It is asserted that a piece of cloth consists of threads. The cloth then could be (a reality) if the threads themselves had ultimate reality.⁵ But they

¹ *svabhāvataḥ*.

³ *pratyaya-vikāraḥ*.

⁵ *svabhāva-siddha*.

² *svarūpataḥ = tattvataḥ*.

⁴ *apratyaya-svabhāvāḥ*.

consist of parts.¹ They are themselves modifications of their own parts, they are no ultimate realities.² Therefore what is the use of maintaining that the result designated as a cloth consists of threads, when these threads themselves are no ultimate realities,³ they are not «self possessors».⁴ This has been expressed (in the following aphorism),

Cloth is existent in its threads,
The threads again in something else.
How can these threads, unreal themselves,
Produce reality in something else?⁵

XIV. There is therefore no cause-possessor,
Nor is there a result without a cause.
Nor causes are there, nor non-causes,
If (altogether) no results.

89. 5-15.

Therefore there is no cause-possessing result. Then perhaps there may be a result without causes? No, there is no result outside its (material) cause. If the (reality) of a piece of cloth is not (sufficiently explained by) the reality of its component threads, this does not mean that it will be explained any better by the reality of the straw (of which mats are made).⁶ (The Hinayānist) objects. Let us admit (for the sake of argument) that there are no results (i. e., no production and no preexistence of supposed results)!⁷ There is however a regularity⁸ (in the phenomenal world

¹ *amśumaya*, possessing particles or filaments.

² *asvabhāva-siddha*.

³ *asvabhāva*.

⁴ *asvayammaya*.

⁵ This is against the Vaiśeṣika view that the reality of the whole is conditioned by the reality of the parts in which the whole is supposed to inhere, the atoms being the ultimate, eternal reality. For the Mādhyamikas atoms will be relative realities, constructed realities (*saṃvṛtā*). For the identification of this stanza cf. M. de la V. P.'s note in his ed.

⁶ Lit., p. 89.9. «If there is no cloth consisting of threads how can there be one consisting of *virāṇa*-straw?»

⁷ The theory of the non-existence or the non-pre-existence of the result in its causes (*mā bhūt phalam = asat-phalam = asat-kāryam*) is also admitted by the Vaiśeṣikas, but they admit a new creation (*ārambha*) of the results by the causes. The Hinayānist has substituted for a notion of efficient causality (*utpāda*) a notion of coordination (*pratitya-samutpāda*) and converted efficient causes (*hetu, kāraṇa*), into conditions or coordinates (*pratyaya*). At the same time they have here converted every entity, every durable object, into a series of discrete momentary existences following one another with strict regularity. They have thus replaced causality by a regularity or uniformity in nature (*pratyaya-niyama*). The Mahāyānist rejects this theory from the standpoint of absolute reality, but this does not prevent him to accept the realistic view for phenomenal reality, cp. above p. 163.

⁸ *niyama*.

according to which some facts appear as coordinated and others are not so coordinated. You yourself admit it. Indeed you ask us the following question: if there are no results (produced by causes and if all existence consists of discrete moments following one another) why is it that (certain facts) appear only after those with which they are (serially) coordinated, why is it that they do not appear with the same evidence¹ after facts with which they are not (serially) coordinated? (By putting this question you implicitly admit a strict regularity in the phenomenal world). If the (supposed) results, called a cloth or a mat, were not existent, their coordinates, the threads and the straw, would never have been called causes. In this sense we (the Hinayānists) maintain the reality of results.²

89. 13. We answer. There would have been a (real) result, if conditions and non-conditions themselves (really) existed. We would then distinguish that, given a certain result, such and such facts are its conditions, such and such facts are not its conditions. But if we critically examine³ these (conceptions, they reveal themselves) as non real. Therefore,

No causes are there, no non-causes,
Since (altogether) no result.⁴

Thus we conclude that there is no coordination⁵ among separate entities, when considered from the transcendental point of view.⁶

90. 3. Accordingly it is stated in the Ārya-Ratnākara-sūtra,⁷

90. 4. Where the adept of Relativity⁸ himself is lost,
What (vanishes) like a bird's flight in air,
What independently nowhere exists,
Will never be a cause producing something!

¹ *abhipravartate* = *abhimukham pravartate*.

² Lit., p. 89. 10-12. «Here he says, let there be no result, but there is a regularity of conditions and non-conditions. Accordingly you say «if a non-existent result appears after its conditions, after its non-conditions also why does it not evidently appear»? And if the result called cloth or mat does not exist, the conditionality of the conditions, of the threads or the straw, is impossible».

³ *vicāryamāna*.

⁴ Lit., p. 90.1. «Causes and non-causes is a (*dvandva*) compound».

⁵ *samutpatti* = *pratitya-samutpada*. The first chapter thus winds up with a rejection of the Hinayānistic *pratitya-samutpada*.

⁶ *svabhāvataḥ* = *tattvataḥ*.

⁷ Cp. L. Feer, Index du Kandjour, p. 248.

⁸ *sūnya-vid*. cp. Tib.

- What independently at all does not exist,
How can it have a cause,¹ without itself existing.
Without itself existing, how can it be efficient?²
Such is Causality as taught by Buddha. 90. 6.

- All (supposed) forces³ are (like) mountains,⁴
They are (immovable) and firmly seated,
Not changing, never suffering, (ever) quiescent
Unconscious⁵ are they like aerial Space. 90. 8.

- Just as a mountain can be never shaken
So motionless are all the elements⁶ (of nature),
They never go and never come!
Thus (should we understand) these elements
Revealed by the Victorious (Buddha) 90. 10.

- And moreover, 91. 1.

This one Reality (eternal)⁷
Has been revealed by the Victorious (Buddha).
The lion of this mankind:
It is not born, it does not live,⁸
It does not die, does not decay,
And merged⁹ in it are all the beings!

- If something has no essence in itself,
How can it then receive an essence from without?¹⁰ 91. 6.

¹ *para-paccayaḥ*, possibly as *bahuvrīhi*.

² Lit. «give birth to something else».

³ *sarva-dharma* = *sarve saṃskārāḥ*, the totality of all the active elements of existence.

⁴ or «motionless», *acala*.

⁵ *ajānaka* Tib. *ses-pa-med-po* does not mean that *dharma-kāya* is an unconscious materialistic principle, but that no individual things are cognized, since they are lost in the all-embracing whole, cp. 185 n. 3.

⁶ *dharma*.

⁷ *dharma* evidently in the sense of *dharma-kāya* = *dharmatā* = *tathātā*. But the meaning of *dharma* «the doctrine of Buddha» is also suggested.

⁸ *upapadyi*, here probably in the sense of *sthita* as a member of the series *utpādo, sthiti, jarā, anityatā*.

⁹ *niveśayi* = Tib. *bkod-pa* = *saṃniveśa* «arrangement», i. e., the whole is an arrangement of parts, the parts disappear in the whole.

¹⁰ *para-bhāvatu*.

There are, therefore, no things internal,
There also are no things external.
But everywhere is present our Lord.¹

91. 6.

This (absolute) condition² of Quiescence
(Where every individual disappears),
Has been revealed by the real Buddha.³
There is in it no (individual) life whatever.
There you will stroll⁴ from birth delivered!
You will then be yourself the Saviour,
And you will save the hosts of living beings!
There is no other Path discernable whatever.
There you will live, from birth⁵ delivered,
And free yourself, deliver many beings!

etc.

Finished the «Examination of Causality» the first chapter of the «Clear worded» Comment upon Relativity, the work of the venerable Master Candrakīrti.

¹ Lit., 91. 4-5. «With whom some self-existence is not found, through something it is not reached as other-existence, it is not being reached neither from within, nor from without, in it is the Lord inherent». *nātha* = *dharma-kāya*; *niveśayi* in the same sense as in 91. 2.

² The term *gati* signifying the six kinds of worldly existence is here applied to Nirvāṇa which is not a *gati*, but the ultimate aim of all *gatis*.

³ The term *su-gata* is here evidently being interpreted as the man who has entered the «best *gati*», i. e., who is lost in the Absolute.

⁴ *vyaharati* is here also used pointedly for a condition which is the negation of *vyavahāra*, but at the same time the ultimate aim of all *vyavahāra*.

⁵ *gati*.

CHAPTER XXV

EXAMINATION OF NIRVĀṆA

I. THE HINAYĀNISTIC NIRVĀṆA REJECTED.

On this (subject Nāgārjuna) says,

519. 3.

I. If everything is relative,¹

No (real) origination, no (real) annihilation,

How is Nirvāṇa then conceived?

Through what deliverance,² through what annihilation?³

With regard to this point the Buddha has taught that personalities⁴ who have lived a pure life and have been initiated into Buddha's religion,⁵ who have acquired a knowledge of (ontology, i. e.,) of the elements of existence as taught in that religion,⁶ can attain a double kind of Nirvāṇa, a Nirvāṇa at lifetime, (being an annihilation) with some residual substratum, and a (final) Nirvāṇa, (being an annihilation) without any residue.

(The first) of them is conceived as something attainable by a complete deliverance⁷ from the whole catalogue of the defiling elements,⁸ e. g., the illusion (of personal identity),⁹ desires¹⁰ etc. etc. A substratum is what underlies (all these defiling agencies), it is (the inveterate instinct) of cheris-

¹ *śūnya*.

² *nirodha*.

³ *tathāgata-śāsana-pratipanna*.

⁴ *dharma-anu-dharma-pratipatti-yukta*; noteworthy the use of the term *dharma* in its two chief significations side by side, the first *dharma* refers to the doctrine, or religion, the second to the 75 elements of existence, or ontology.

⁵ *prahāṇa*.

⁶ *avidyā*.

⁷ *prahāṇa*.

⁸ *puṅgalā*.

⁹ *kleśa-gaṇa*.

¹⁰ *rāgādi*.

hing one's own life.¹ The word «residual substratum» thus refers to that foundation of our belief in personal identity² which is represented by the ultimate elements of our mundane existence,³ which are systematized in five different groups. A residue is what is left. A substratum is left (in a partial Nirvāṇa). It exists with a residual substratum, hence its name.

519. 11. What is the thing (in which there still is a residue of personal feeling)? It is Nirvāṇa. It is a residue consisting of the pure elements⁴ of existence alone, delivered from the illusion of an abiding personality⁵ and other stealthy defilers,⁶ a state comparable to that of a town in which all criminal gangs have been executed. This is a Nirvāṇa at lifetime with some residue (of personal feeling).

520. 1. A Nirvāṇa in which even these purified elements themselves are absent is termed (final Nirvāṇa), a Nirvāṇa without any residue (of personal feeling), because of the idea that here⁷ the residue (of personal feeling) is gone, (it is impersonal). It is a state comparable to that of a destroyed town, a town which, after all the criminal gangs have been executed, has been itself also annihilated. It has been said about this (Nirvāṇa).

520. 4. The body has collapsed,
Ideas⁸ gone, all feelings vanished,
All energies⁹ quiescent,
And consciousness¹⁰ (itself) extinct.

520. 6. And likewise,
With his body still at life,
(The Saint) enjoys some feeling,

¹ *ātma-sneha*.

² *ātma-prajñapti*.

³ *upādāna-skandhāḥ* = *sāsrava-dharmāḥ*, the elements of mundane existence as contrasted with the elements composing the Saint and the Buddha; *skandha* can be translated as «element» and as «group of elements» because three *skandhas* (*vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *viññāna*) contain one *dharma* each, *rūpa-skandha* contains 10 *dharma*s, and *saṃskāra-skandha* the remaining 59 ones, except the eternal ones *asaṃskṛta*, not included in this classification at all; *skandha* is also a group in the sense of containing past, present future etc. *dharma*s, cf. my Central Conception, p. 6.

⁴ *skandha-mātraka* = *anāsrava-dharmāḥ*.

⁵ *sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi*.

⁶ *kleśa-taskara*.

⁷ *nir-upādhi-śeṣa* is thus an *adhikaraṇa-sādhana madhyama-pada-lopin* composite word implying that when all the elements of life are gone there still remains something lifeless in what there has formerly been life, cp. below p. 525. 6.

⁸ *hdu-śeṣa* = *saṃjñā*.

⁹ *hdu-byed* = *saṃskāra*.

¹⁰ *nam-par-śeṣa* = *viññāna*.

But in Nirvāṇa consciousness¹ is gone,²
Just as a light (when totally extinct).

This (lifeless) Nirvāṇa, without any residue, is attained through an extinction of all elements of life.³

(The Mahāyānist). Now, how are we to understand the possibility of 520. 10. this double Nirvāṇa?

(The Hinayanist). (Nirvāṇa is only possible) through the annihilation of desires⁴ and all (active) elements (producing life).⁵ If everything is relative,⁶ if nothing (really) originates, nothing (really) disappears, where is the source of illusion and desires,⁷ where all the elements⁸ which must vanish, in order that Nirvāṇa should take place? It is therefore clear that (separate) entities must really exist⁹ (in order that something should really vanish).

¹ *cetaḥ* = *viññāna-skandha*.

² *vimokṣaḥ* = *nivṛttiḥ*, cp. p. 525. 7.

³ *skandhānām nirodhāt*. These two Nirvāṇas are well known in European science since the time of Childers. Of them only the second is the real and final Nirvāṇa, it is defined by Childers, according to the Pali school, as annihilation of all the *skandhas*. But the classification of existence as *skandhas* does not include *nirodha* or *asaṃskṛta-dharma*. The Sārvastivādins and Vaibhāṣikas, as we have seen, assume this *nirodha* to represent a separate reality — *satya*, *vastu*, *dharma*, it is a lifeless *dharma-svabhāva* as contrasted with the living *dharma-lakṣaṇa* = *saṃskārāḥ*. The Mahāyānist, from his higher, monistic point of view, brushes both these Nirvāṇas aside. But there cannot be the slightest doubt that Nāgārjuna accepts their contingent reality. He thus has three Nirvāṇas. The first represents the world *sub specie aeternitatis*, it is defined below, XXV. 9. The second is the condition of the Mahāyānist Saint, the *ārya*, the *bodhisattva*. The third corresponds to his disappearance in final Nirvāṇa. The first alone is ultimately real, the two others are immanent in it, they are not separately (*svabhāvataḥ*) real. To these three Nirvāṇas the Yogācāras have added a fourth one, called by them *apratisthita-nirvāṇa* «altruistic» Nirvāṇa, it represents the pure condition of their eternal Conscious Principle, that principle which they have inherited from the Sautrāntikas and the latter from earlier schools with similar theistic tendencies, the Vatsīputriyas and the Mahāsaṃghikas, cp. above p. 30 and J. Masuda, *Der Idealismus der Yogācāra Schule*, p. 52 ff. (Heidelberg, 1926) According to consequent Mahāyānism this fourth Nirvāṇa should be also regarded as merely an aspect of the first, but this question appears never to have been finally decided, at least among some of the followers of that school. It is a moot point among the Tibetans, even now, whether the Absolute of an author like Dharmakīrti represents a Conscious Principle (*śeṣa*) or Impersonal Eternity (*rtag-pa*). According to the early Yogācāras the *dharma-kāya* is divided into *svabhāvakāya* (*ño-bo-ñid-sku*) and *jñāna-kāya* (*je-śe-kyi-sku*), the first is the motionless (*nitya*) substance of the Universe, the second is *anitya*, i. e., changing, living.

⁴ *kleśa*.

⁵ *skandha*.

⁶ *śūnya*.

⁷ *kleśāḥ* = *avidyā-trṣṇa*.

⁸ *skandhāḥ*.

⁹ *skandhānām* = *saṃskṛta-dharmānām* = *saṃskārānām*.

¹⁰ *bhāvānām svabhāvah*, «non relative, absolute existence».

521. 1. To this the following aphorism is an answer,

II. Should everything be absolutely real,¹

No (real) creation, no (real) destruction.

How is Nirvāṇa then conceived?

Through what deliverance, through what annihilation?

521. 4. If the defiling elements,² or all the elements in general,³ are independent entities, existing in themselves,⁴ since it is impossible for them to be deprived of their own reality, how can they be annihilated, in order that through this annihilation Nirvāṇa should be reached? Therefore Nirvāṇa is equally impossible from the standpoint of the Realists.⁵ But the Relativists⁶ do not admit a Nirvāṇa consisting in annihilation of all elements in general, nor do they admit a (partial Nirvāṇa) consisting in an annihilation of the defiling elements alone. Therefore they are not responsible for the just mentioned incongruity.⁷ The Relativists, in consequence, can never be accused (of assuming a kind of Nirvāṇa which is logically impossible).

II. THE MAHĀYĀNISTIC NIRVĀṆA, WHAT?

521. 8. If, to be sure, the Relativists admit neither a Nirvāṇa consisting in the extinction of illusion and desire,⁸ nor a Nirvāṇa consisting in the extinction of all elements of life, what is then their idea of Nirvāṇa? (The following aphorism) gives the answer,

521. 10. III. What neither is released, nor is it ever reached,
What neither is annihilation, nor is it eternity,
What never disappears, nor has it been created,
This is Nirvāṇa (World's Unity, the Unexpressible).

521. 12. That (undefinable essence) which can neither be extinguished, as e. g., a desire, nor can it be attained, as e. g., a reward for renunciation; which neither can be annihilated, as e. g., all the (active) elements of our life,⁹ nor

¹ *aśūnya*.

³ *skandha*.

⁵ *svabhāva-vādin*.

⁷ *teṣām ayam adoṣaḥ*.

⁹ *skandhādivat*.

² *kleśa*.

⁴ *svabhāvenavyavasthita*.

⁶ *śūnyatā-vādin*.

⁸ *kleśa = avidyā-trṣṇa*.

is it everlasting,¹ as a non-relative² (absolute principle); which cannot really³ disappear, nor can it be created; (that something) which consists in the Quiescence⁴ of all Plurality,⁵ that is Nirvāṇa.

Now, if the Universe is really such (a Unity), if it is no Plurality,⁶ 521. 14. how is it then that our imagination has built up defilers⁷ (i. e., an illusion of personal identity and desires) through a suppression of which Nirvāṇa is supposed to be attained? Or how is it that our imagination has built up separate elements through the annihilation of which Nirvāṇa reveals itself? As long as these constructions of our imagination⁸ exist, Nirvāṇa cannot be reached, since it is reached just through a suppression of all Plurality.

(The Hinayānist objects). Be that as the case may be, let us admit 522. 3. that neither the defiling elements, nor the elements in general exist when Nirvāṇa is reached. However they must exist on this side of Nirvāṇa, (i. e., before Nirvāṇa is reached). In that case Nirvāṇa will be possible through their total annihilation.

We answer. You are haunted⁹ (by illusion), get rid of it! 522. 4.

For a (real Ens) which exists as an independent entity¹⁰ can never be converted into a non-entity. Therefore those who are really desirous to attain Nirvāṇa must first of all get rid (of this imagined Plurality). Indeed (Nāgārjuna himself) will state (that there is no line of demarcation, with the Phenomenal world on this side and the Absolute on the other),

Where is the limit of Nirvāṇa,

'T is also there the limit of Saṃsāra,

There is between (no line of demarcation),

No slightest shade of difference (between them).¹¹

Thus it should be realized that nothing is really suppressed in Nirvāṇa, and nothing really annihilated. Nirvāṇa consists merely in the suppression

¹ *śāsvata* «beginningless».

² *aśūnyavat*, as the *śvalakṣaṇa* of the Yogācāras, the Nirvāṇa of the Hinayānists, the *pradhāna* of the Sāṃkhyas etc. etc. They are all *aśūnya* in that sense that their adepts suppose them to be absolute, non-relative.

³ *svabhāvataḥ*.

⁵ *sarva-prapañca*.

⁷ *kleśa-kalpanā*.

⁹ *grāha*.

¹¹ XXV. 20.

⁴ *upaśama*.

⁶ *niṣprapañca*.

⁸ *kalpanāḥ*.

¹⁰ *svabhāvato vidyamāno*.

of absolutely all the (false) constructions of our imagination. This has been stated by the Buddha himself (in the following words),

522. 11. Real ultimate elements¹ can never be annihilated,
The things that in this world do not exist,
They never did at all exist.
Those who imagine existence along with non-existence
Will never realize phenomenal² (Plurality's) Quiescence.

522. 15. The meaning of this stanza is the following one. In the Absolute,³ i. e., in that principle which is final Nirvāṇa⁴ without any residue (of phenomenal life altogether), all elements of existence have vanished, because (all of them), whether they be called defilers,⁵ or the creative power of life,⁶ or individual existences,⁷ or groups of elements, they have all totally vanished. This all systems of philosophy⁸ admit, (i. e., that the Absolute is a negation of the Phenomenal).

523. 1. Now, these elements which do not exist there, in the Absolute, they really do not exist at all; they are like that kind of terror which is experienced when, in the dark, a rope is mistaken for a snake and which dissipates as soon as a light (is brought in). These elements (of our life), called illusion and desire, their creative force and the (consequent) individual lives,⁹ have no real existence in the absolute sense,¹⁰ even at any time in the phenomenal condition of life.¹¹ Indeed, the rope which in the dark has been mistaken for the serpent, is not really in itself a serpent, since it is not apprehended by sight and touch, whether in the light or in the darkness, (as a real serpent would necessarily be).

How is it then that it is called phenomenal reality?¹²

523. 5. We answer. Obsessed by the unreal devil of their «Ego» and their «Mine» the obtuse men and common worldlings imagine that they really perceive separate entities which in reality do not exist, just as the ophtalmic sees before himself hair, flies and other (objects which never did exist). It has therefore been said,

523. 9. Those who imagine existence along with non-existence
Will never realize phenomenal Plurality's Quiescence.

¹ dharmāḥ.

² nirvṛtti.

³ kleśa.

⁴ janma.

⁵ kleśa-karma-janmādi.

⁶ saṃsāra-avasthāyām.

⁷ dukkha = saṃsāra, cp. p. 523.12.

⁸ nirvāṇa-dhātu.

⁹ karma.

¹⁰ sarva-vādinah.

¹¹ tattvataḥ.

¹² saṃsāra.

Those who assert existence, (the Realists) who imagine that there is a real existence of (separate) entities,¹ are (the followers of) Jaimini, Kaṇāda, Kapila and others up to the (realistic Buddhists), the Vaiśbhāṣikas.²

Those who deny (future) existence are the Materialists³ who are firmly rooted in a destiny leading them to hell. The others are (the Sautrāntikas) who deny the existence of the past and the future,⁴ deny the existence of such a separate element as the moral character of the individual,⁵ deny the existence of forces which are neither physical nor mental,⁶ but admit the reality of all other separate elements. Or they are (the Yogācāras, the Idealists) who deny the existence of individual things so far as they represent logical constructions of our thought,⁷ but admit 1. their contingent reality so far they obey to causal laws,⁸ and 2. their final reality (so far they are merged into the universal Whole)."

The phenomenal world,¹⁰ or the phenomenal life,¹¹ will never reach final Quiescence neither for the Realists,¹² nor for the Negativists.¹³ (nor for partial Realists). Indeed,

- A man, suspecting he has taken poison,
Faints even when there is no poison in his stomach.
Swayed by (the care) of Ego and of «Mine».
Eternally he comes and dies,
Without real knowledge¹⁴ 'bout this Ego.¹⁵

¹ bhāva-sadbhāva-kalpanāvantah.

² It is noteworthy that the Sautrāntikas are not mentioned among the Realists, it is just because they are half-realists. In addition to what has been said above, p. 29 ff., about the position of the Sautrāntikas, it must be mentioned that Bodhidharma and many others characterized this school as Mahāyānist because of its moral philosophy. But their opinion was rejected, since the founders of the two main schools of the Mahāyāna, i. e., Nāgārjuna and Āryaśāṅga, did not share it (Cp. Lcan-skyā-hu-tuk-tu, Grub-mthah, trans. by M. Gorsky, Ms. Mus. As. Petr.). The total silence about Vedānta is also to be noted.

³ nāstika, they deny retribution, moral responsibility. cp. p. 28.

⁴ Cp. Central Conception, p. 42.

⁵ avijñapti to be corrected from vijñapti, p. 523.11, cp. ibid., p. 6, 7, 99.

⁶ viprayukta-saṃskāra = rūpa-citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra, cp. ibid., p. 21.

⁷ pari-kalpita-svabhāva, cp. Trīmśika, p. 39, and above p. 33.

⁸ paratantra, cp. ibid.

⁹ dukkha = pañca-upādāna-skandhah.

¹⁰ saṃsāra.

¹¹ nāstivādin.

¹² bday-der-hāu-śes-yañ-day = tad-ātma-saṃjñā.

¹³ from the Tib.

¹⁴ astivādin.

524. 5. Therefore it should be known that nothing is suppressed in Nirvāṇa and nothing annihilated. The essence of Nirvāṇa consists merely in the extinction of all constructions of our productive imagination.¹

524. 7. Accordingly we find it stated in the Ratnāvali.²

Nor is Nirvāṇa non-existence.

How can such an idea³ come to you?

We call Nirvāṇa the cessation

Of every thought of non-existence and existence.

III. NIRVĀṆA NOT AN ENS.

524. 10. The following aphorisms are directed against those who not being able to realize that Nirvāṇa is simply the limit of all constructions (of our productive imagination) continue to imagine a kind of Nirvāṇa which either represents reality or non-reality or both or neither.

524. 12. IV. Nirvāṇa, first of all, is not a kind of Ens,

It would then have decay and death.

There altogether is no Ens

Which is not subject to decay and death.

525. 1. There are indeed philosophers who have a preconceived idea⁴ that Nirvāṇa must be something positive.⁵ The following is their line of argument. According to our system,⁶ they say, there is a positive thing which represents a barrier,⁷ a definite limit⁸ for the existence of a stream⁹ of defiling elements, creative actions and (consequent) existences.¹⁰ It is comparable to a dam checking a stream of water. This is Nirvāṇa. We know from experience¹¹ that a thing¹² without having a reality of its own¹³ could not be efficient¹⁴ in that way.

525. 3. (The Sautrāntika objects). It has been declared that absolute indiffe-

¹ sarva-kalpanā-kṣaya.

² Ratnāvali or Ratna-mālā, a work ascribed to Nāgārjuna.

³ bhāvanā.

⁵ bhāva.

⁷ nirodhā-makāḥ padārthaḥ.

⁹ santāna.

¹¹ drśyate.

¹³ vidyamāna-svabhāva.

⁴ abhinivṛta.

⁶ iha.

⁸ niyata-rodha = nirodha = nirvāṇa.

¹⁰ kleśa-karma-janma.

¹² dharmā.

¹⁴ kārya-kārin.

rence,¹ the extinction of desires which are associated with enjoying life,² that this kind of blank,³ is Nirvāṇa. What (in itself) is a mere Extinction⁴ cannot be envisaged as (a kind of) Ens.⁵ It has been just declared,

But in Nirvāṇa consciousness itself is gone.

Just as a light (when totally extinct).

To regard the extinction of the light of a lamp as a (kind) of Ens is logically impossible.⁶

(The Vaibhāṣika) answers. Your interpretation of the words «extinction of desire», aś meaning «extinct desire» is wrong. (The right interpretation is the following one). «That thing in which desire is extinct» (is called extinction of desire). It can then be asserted that when that ultimate entity⁷ which is called Nirvāṇa is present, it means that every desire (and consciousness) are extinct (at final Nirvāṇa). (The extinction) of the light of a lamp is a mere example. And even this example must be understood (as an illustration of the idea) that consciousness is quite extinct⁸ in something that (continues to) exist.

Our Master (Nāgārjuna) now examines (the consequences of the theory) which determines Nirvāṇa as a kind of existence. Nirvāṇa is not a positive thing (he says). Why? Since it would follow that it must possess the characteristics of decay and death, because every existence is invariably connected with decay and death. He means, it would not then be Nirvāṇa, (the Absolute), since like our life⁹ it would be subject to decay and death.

In order to make sure this very point, that every life is invariably connected¹⁰ with the marks of decay and death, the Master says, «there is no existence without decay and death». Indeed, that thing which is without decay and death is not at all an Ens, it is a mirage, as e. g., flowers in the sky. They never decay and never die, (hence they do not exist).

¹ virāga.

² nandirāga-sahagatā tṛṣṇā.

³ nirodha.

⁴ kṣaya-mātram.

⁵ bhāva.

⁶ nopapadyate.

⁷ dharmā.

⁸ vimokṣa.

⁹ vijñānādi = skandhāḥ.

¹⁰ Read avyabhicāritām.

525. 18. Moreover,

V. If Nirvāṇa is Ens,
It is produced by causes.
Nowhere and none the entity exists
Which would not be produced by causes.

526. 3. (Thesis). If Nirvāṇa is (a kind) of Ens, it would then be produced from causes.

(Reason). Because it is an Ens.

(Example). Just as consciousness and the other (elements of our life).

The contraposition¹ (of the major premise will result in the following sentence): What is not produced by causes does not exist, like the horns on the head of a donkey. Pointing to this the author says,

Nowhere and none the entity is found
Which would not be produced by causes.

526. 6. The word «nowhere» refers to location, the place or the time. It might be also taken (as referring to) a philosophic system. The word «none» refers to the located thing, whether it be an object of the external world or a mental phenomenon.

526. 8. Moreover,

VI. If Nirvāṇa is Ens
How can it lack substratum?
There whatsoever is no Ens
Without any substratum.

526. 11. If, in your opinion, Nirvāṇa is a positive entity, it must repose on a substratum, it must have a root in the totality of its own causes. But such a definitely located² Nirvāṇa is accepted by nobody. On the contrary, Nirvāṇa (is the Absolute), it does not repose on any substratum. Therefore, if Nirvāṇa is an Ens, how can it be an Ens without any substratum? Indeed,

526. 13. (Thesis). (Nirvāṇa) cannot exist without substratum.
(Reason). Because it is an Ens.

¹ vyatireka.

² upādāya.

(Example). Just as consciousness and other (elements of existence).
The contraposition of the major premise is further adduced as a reason,

There whatsoever is no Ens
Without any substratum.

IV. NIRVĀṆA IS NOT A NON-ENS.

(The Sautrāntika) now suggests. If Nirvāṇa is not an Ens, because of 527. 1. the incogruity¹ which has been elicited, it must be a non-Ens, since it consists merely in the fact that the defiling elements and (their consequence), the individual existences, are stopped. We answer. This is also impossible, because (the following has been declared),

VII. If Nirvāṇa is not an Ens,
Will it then be a non-Ens?
Wherever there is absence of an Ens,
There neither is a non-Ens.

If it is not admitted that Nirvāṇa is an Ens, if (the thesis) «Nirvāṇa 527. 5. is an Ens» is rejected, then perhaps Nirvāṇa might be a non-Ens? (The author's) idea is that it neither can be a non-Ens.

If it be maintained that Nirvāṇa is the absence of defiling elements and individual existences (produced by them),² then (it would result) that the impermanence of these defiling elements and personal existences is Nirvāṇa. Indeed, the cessation of these defiling agencies and the end of personal existences (can be envisaged as) nothing but their own character of impermanence. (They always have an end). Thus it will follow that impermanence is Nirvāṇa. And this cannot be admitted, since in that case (Final Deliverance) will be attained automatically,³ (the teaching of a Path towards Salvation, would be useless). Hence this is quite inadmissible!

Moreover,

527. 10.

VIII. Now, if Nirvāṇa is a non-Ens,
How can it then be independent?

¹ doṣa-prasaṅga.

² kleśa-janmanor abhāvaḥ.

³ ayatnena.

For sure an independent non-Ens
Is nowhere to be found.

527. 13. A non-Ens, whether it be here the impermanence (or cessation of something), is constructed in our thought (and expressed in speech)¹ as (a characteristic) appertaining to some positive counterpart.² (Absolute non-existence indeed) is similar to the non-existence of horns on the head of a donkey. It is not known to be impermanent. We imagine³ a characterized thing as relative⁴ to some characteristic, and (*vice versa*) a characteristic as being relative to something characterized. The work of characterization⁵ being thus relational,⁶ what is impermanence (or cessation) without an entity characterized by it? Non-existence must therefore be imagined along with a counterpart.⁷ Therefore, if Nirvāṇa is a non-Ens, how can it be an absolute⁸ Nirvāṇa?
528. 3. (This argument might be formulated as follows),
(Thesis). Nirvāṇa can be a non-Ens only as relative to some positive counterpart.
(Reason). Because it is a non-Ens.
(Example). Just as the destruction (of a jar is relative to this jar).
In order to make this clear it is added,

For sure, an absolute⁸ non-Ens
Is nowhere to be found.

528. 5. (An objection is raised). If indeed it is maintained that an absolute non-Ens is impossible, then, e. g., the negation of a son of a barren woman must also be related⁹ to a positive counterpart (in the shape of a real son of a barren woman).
528. 6. (Answer) Who has established that the son of a barren woman etc. is a non-Ens? Just the contrary has been said above,¹⁰

If something is not settled as an Ens
Neither can it be settled as a non-Ens.
What people call a non-Ens
Is nothing but a change in Ens.

¹ *prajñāpyate.*

² *bhāvam upādāya.*

³ *prajñāpyate.*

⁴ *āśritya.*

⁵ *lakṣya-lakṣaṇa-pravṛtti.*

⁶ *paraspara-apekṣika.*

⁷ *upādāya.*

⁸ *anupādāya.*

⁹ *upādāya abhāvaḥ.*

¹⁰ XV. 5.

Thus the son of a barren woman is not (really) a non-Ens, (a nega- 528. 9.
tion as something real). It has indeed been declared that,

The empty space, the horns of asses,
The sons of barren women
Are spoken of as non-Ens.
The same refers to all imagined Ens,¹

But this should be understood as a mere denial of the possibility to ima- 528. 12.
gine them as real, not as conceiving them as a negation, because positive (counterparts to which they could be related) do not exist. The «son of a barren woman» are mere words. They do not correspond to any reality which could be cognized, which could either be an Ens or a non-Ens. How can a thing whose concrete reality has never been experienced be imagined either as existing or as not existing.² Therefore it should be known that the son of a barren woman is not a real negation. Thus it is settled, there can be no non-Ens without a positive counterpart.³

V. NIRVĀṆA IS THIS WORLD VIEWED SUB SPECIE AETERNITATIS.

It is now asked, if Nirvāṇa is neither Ens nor is it non-Ens, what is 528. 17.
it indeed? We answer. The godlike Buddhas have made about this point the following declaration,

IX. Coordinated here or caused⁴ are (separate things),
We call this world phenomenal.
But just the same is called Nirvāṇa,
When viewed without Causality, without Coordination.

¹ *bhāveṣu kalpanā.*

² Buddhist logic has established a very detailed and thorough theory of negation, where it is proved that every negative judgment is founded on a negative experience, on a possible perception which has not happened (*anupalabdhi*), it is therefore always related to some positive substratum, cp. Nyāyabindu, II. 26 ff.

³ *anupādāya*, this kind of *upādāya* is termed in the Nyāya system a *pratiyogin*. This realistic system admits absolute non-existence (*atyanta-abhāva*) and relative non-existence (*anyonya-abhāva*).

⁴ From the Buddhist point of view the terms *pratītya* «relative to a cause» and *upādāya* «relative to a substratum» are equivalents. The realistic Vaiśeṣika system imagines that the substratum (*upādāya*) is a cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*) really producing (*ārambhaka*) the result. In Hīnayāna the real existence of a durable substratum, of a stuff or substance, is denied and the

529. 3. (The phenomenal world) is here the run of life, hither and thither, the come and go of life, the concatenation of births and deaths. This phenomenal world is imagined as existing in the sense that (its separate entities) are dependent upon a complex of causes and conditions,¹ (they are relatively real) as, e. g., the long (is real) as far as there is something short (with which it is contrasted). Sometimes they are imagined as produced by causes, e. g. the light (is supposed to be produced) by the lamp, the sprout (is conceived as produced) by a seed etc. But in any case, whether it be only imagined as relatively coordinated, or whether they be considered as produced by causes, when the continuity of birth and death has ceased, when there are neither relations nor causality, this (same world as motionless and eternal) is then called Nirvāṇa.² Now, the mere cessation (of aspect) can neither be considered as an Ens, nor as a non-Ens. Thus it is that Nirvāṇa is neither an Ens, nor a non-Ens.

529. 9. Another (interpretation of this aphorism is also possible; it would then intimate that the manner of conceiving Nirvāṇa by the Hinayānists is much the same, although they aver that their Nirvāṇa is an Ens)

They indeed maintain (either, like the Sarvāstivādins, that there is in the Universe no abiding central principle³ at all, that the world-process consists)

duration of an object is converted into an uninterrupted sequence of momentary flashes without any substratum, every preceding moment is the substratum (*upādāna-bhūta*) of every following one. Cause and effect are thus declared to be correlated concepts, just as the long is correlated with the short (*līrgha-hrasva-vat*), causation is replaced by coordination, and the causes converted into coordinates. Nāgārjuna here says that whether we, with the Vaiśeṣikas, imagine causation as a production of one thing by the other (*pratītya*), or whether we, with the Hinayānists, imagine mere coordination (*upādāya*), there nevertheless is a Whole (ॐ नृत्तं पञ्च) in which these causes and coordinates are merged. Otherwise, *pratītya* as a part of the term *pratītya-samutpāda* refers also to causation in the sense of coordination, it then is synonymous with *upādāya*, but here both terms are contrasted from a special view-point.

¹ *hetu-pratyaya-sāmagrī*. Since among the hetus we must include the *kāraṇa-hetu*, cp. above p. 41 n. 6, the state of the whole Universe with respect to a given point-instant is included in the totality of its causes and conditions.

² Lit., p. 529. 5-7. «In any case whether it be established that it is imagined *prajñapayate* as coordinated (*upādāya*), or produced as caused (*pratītya*), in any case the non operation (*apratyitti*) of this duration of a lineage of births and deaths, whether as non-caused or as non-coordinated, is established as the Nirvāṇa». The non-operation or cessation of an imagined construction (*prajñapti* = *kalpanā*) is nothing but a change of aspect, Nirvāṇa is thus the Universe *sub specie aeternitatis*.

³ The *anātman* principle is an equivalent of *saṃskārāḥ saṃsaranti*, cp. my Central Conception p. 25, 52 etc.

in the evolution¹ of coordinated energies.² (They maintain that this world in which every momentary origination and (every) destruction, obeys, in every case, to causal laws,³ when these causal laws have ceased to operate,⁴ when all energies are extinct,⁵ is called Nirvāṇa.⁶

Or they (like the Vātsīputrīyas) maintain (that there is such a central principle, termed by them) «personality»⁷ which migrates (out of one existence into an other). It escapes definition.⁸ It neither is the eternal (Soul of the Brahmins), nor is it momentary⁹ (like the energies of the Buddhists). (Phenomenal life consists) in its coming and going,¹⁰ dependent every time upon a changing substratum¹¹ (of elements). It then evolves obeying to causal laws.¹²

This very (principle) which evolves on the basis of changing elements,¹³ 530. 1. when the time comes¹⁴ for it to assume no new substratum¹⁵ and its evolution stops,¹⁶ is said (to have entered) Nirvāṇa.¹⁷

¹ *saṃsaranti*.

² *saṃ-skārāḥ* = *sambhūya-kāriṇaḥ*. It would be incorrect to surmise that *saṃskāra-skandha* is alone meant, although the chief *saṃskāra*, *karma* or *cetanā*, the *élan vital*, the biotic force which arranges the coordination of all other elements, is first of all meant. But *vedanā* and *saṃjñā* are *saṃskāras*, and *viññāna* and *rūpa* are, according to the rules of the 12 membered *pratītya-samutpāda*, always included in every life. From this whole passage it appears clearly that the Buddhist conception of *saṃskāra* and *saṃskṛtata* is but an other name for *pratītya-samutpannatva*, cp. ibid. p. 28.

³ *pratītya pratītya ya utpādaś ca*.

⁴ *apra itya*.

⁵ *apratyamāṇaḥ*.

⁶ This absolutely lifeless something representing the picture of the Universe in which all energies are extinct reminds us, to a certain extent, of the final condition of the Universe as represented by modern science according to the law of entropy, cp. above p. 26.

⁷ *pudgala*.

⁸ *avācya*.

⁹ *anitya*.

¹⁰ *ājavanjanvibhāva*.

¹¹ *tad tad upādānam āśritya*.

¹² *upādāya pravartate* = *pratītya pravartate*, sc. it obeys to the laws of causation or coordination. The theory of the Vātsīputrīyas about an abiding personality (*pudgala*), which they nevertheless do not consider as a reality (*dharma*) or a Soul (*ātman*), is exposed with detailed argumentation by Vasubandhu, Ab. Kośa, XI and above p. 31. n. 1.

¹³ *upādāya upādāya pravartamāṇaḥ*. ¹⁴ *idānim*.

¹⁵ *anupādāya*.

¹⁶ *apratyamāṇaḥ*.

¹⁷ Lit., p. 529. 9 — 530. 2. «Otherwise, those who have the tenet that the forces (*saṃskārāḥ*) are migrating, for them it is said that in every case-coordinated origination and destruction is Nirvāṇa when going on without coordination. But for those for whom the personality (*pudgala*) is migrating, for them this (personality), being undefinable as to whether it is eternal or non-eternal, possesses a coming and going when reposing on different substratums, it is then going on upon a substratum; this very (personality) which is going on (*pravartamāṇa*) upon different substratums is now called Nirvāṇa when it no more is going on upon a substratum».

530. 2. Now, whether it be coordinated energies¹ alone, or (some central principle like the one called) «personality»,² it is clear that the mere fact of their evolution being stopped can neither be characterized as an Ens, nor as a non-Ens.³

530. 4. And further,

X. The Buddha has declared

That Ens and non-Ens should be both rejected.

Neither as Ens nor as a non-Ens

Nirvāṇa therefore is conceived.

530. 7. On this point it is stated in Scripture, «O Brethren, those who seek an escape out of this (phenomenal) existence in (a kind of new) existence⁴ or in annihilation⁵ they have no true knowledge». Both should be rejected, the craving for (eternal) life and the craving for (eternal) death. But this Nirvāṇa (is the only thing) which the Buddha has characterized as the thing not to be rejected. On the contrary, (he has declared it to be the only thing) desirable.⁶ But if Nirvāṇa would have been (eternal) existence⁷ or (eternal) death,⁸ it also would have been rejectable. However it is not rejectable.

Neither as Ens nor as a non-Ens

Nirvāṇa therefore is conceived.

VI. NIRVĀṆA IS NOT BOTH ENS AND NON-ENS TOGETHER.

530. 12. There are some (Vaibhāṣikas) who assume a double character in Nirvāṇa. It is a non-Ens so far it is the place in which the defiling elements and the elements of existence in general are extinct. But in itself (this lifeless place) is an Ens.⁹ The author now proceeds to state that such double Nirvāṇa is impossible.

¹ *saṃskārāḥ*.

² *pudgala*.

³ This clearly is an answer to those Hinayānists who maintain that their Nirvāṇa is an Ens (*vastu*, *dharma*).

⁴ *bhava*.

⁵ *vibhava*.

⁶ *aprahātarya*.

⁷ *bhāva*.

⁸ *abhāva*.

⁹ This is the Vaibhāṣika view about the reality of Nirvāṇa with but a little change in its formulation. It is here examined once more in order to fill up the schema of the quadrilemma.

XI. If Nirvāṇa were both Ens and non-Ens,
Final Deliverance would be also both,
Reality and unreality together.
This never could be possible.

If Nirvāṇa had the double character of being both an Ens and a non-Ens, then Final Deliverance would be both a reality and an unreality. It would then follow that the presence¹ of the energies² (of life) and their extinction, both represent Final Deliverance. However a Final Deliverance (from phenomenal life) and the energies (of phenomenal life) cannot be the same.³ Therefore, says the author, this is impossible.

And further,

XII. If Nirvāṇa were both Ens and non-Ens,
Nirvāṇa could not be uncaused.
Indeed the Ens and the non-Ens
Are both dependent on causation.

If Nirvāṇa would have the double character of an Ens and a non-Ens, it would be then dependent, it would be relative to the totality of its causes and conditions,⁴ it would not be the Absolute.⁵ Why? Because both these Ens and non-Ens are conditioned.⁶ Considering that the Ens is the counterpart⁷ of the non-Ens and (*vice versa*) the non-Ens is the counterpart of the Ens, both Ens and non-Ens⁸ are necessarily dependent existences. They are not absolute.⁹ (If Nirvāṇa were not the absolute), it could then be (partly) an Ens and (partly) a non-Ens. But it is not so. Therefore this is impossible.

¹ *ātma-lābha*.

² *saṃskāra*.

³ Probably the Vaibhāṣika theory about the *dharma-svabhāva* is here alluded to. According to this theory some lifeless residue of the *saṃskāras* or *dharma*s remains in Nirvāṇa, but there manifestation (*dharma-lakṣaṇa*) is stopped for ever. We would then have in Nirvāṇa *saṃskāras* somehow existing and non-existing at the same time, cp. my Central Conception, pp. 42, 95.

⁴ *hetu-pratyaya-sāmagrīm upādāya*... *bhavat*.

⁵ *anupādāya (sat) = paramārthasat*.

⁶ *upādāya = pratitya = sāpekṣika = śūnya*.

⁷ *upādāya = sāpekṣika = sapratyogitāka*.

⁸ Read *bhāvaś cābhāvaś ca*.

⁹ *anupādāya- (sat) = paramārthasat*.

531. 13. And further,

XIII. How can Nirvāṇa represent
An Ens and a non-Ens together.
Nirvāṇa is indeed uncaused,¹
Both Ens and non-Ens are productions.²

532. 1. An Ens is caused, since it is produced by the totality of its causes and conditions.³ A non-Ens is likewise caused,⁴ since 1. it arises as the counterpart⁵ of an Ens, and 2. because it has been declared (in Scripture) that decay and death, are consequent upon a birth.⁶ Thus if Nirvāṇa were essentially an Ens or a non-Ens it could not be uncaused, it would be necessarily caused. However it is not admitted to be caused. Therefore Nirvāṇa cannot be both Ens and non-Ens together.

532. 5. Let it be so. Let Nirvāṇa itself not be Ens and non-Ens together. Perhaps it may be *the place* where Ens and non-Ens are found together. However this is also impossible. Why? Because,

XIV. How can Nirvāṇa represent
(The place) of Ens and of non-Ens together?
As light and darkness (in one spot)
They cannot simultaneously be present.

532. 9. Since Ens and non-Ens are mutually incompatible, they cannot possibly exist together in one place, in Nirvāṇa. Therefore it is said,

How can Nirvāṇa represent
(The place) of Ens and non-Ens together?

(The interrogation) means that this is absolutely impossible.

¹ *asamskṛtam* = *na kṛtam*.

² *samskṛta* = *kṛta*.

³ *hetu-pratyaya-sāmagrī-sambhūta*.

⁴ *samskṛta*.

⁵ *pratītya* = *upādāya* = *pratiyogin*.

⁶ This simple statement that non-existence is dependent upon previous existence is here given the form of a Scriptural evidence, because it corresponds to the two last members of the 12-membered *pratītya-samutpāda*, stating that death follows upon a birth.

VII. NOR IS NIRVĀṆA A NEGATION OF BOTH ENS AND NON-ENS TOGETHER.

The author now proceeds (to consider the fourth part of the quadri- 532. 11.
lemma, and) indicates (the incongruity) of assuming that Nirvāṇa is a nega-
tion of both Ens and non-Ens. He says,

XV. If it were clear indeed
What an Ens means and what a non-Ens,
We could then understand the doctrine
About Nirvāṇa being neither Ens nor non-Ens.

The judgment¹ that Nirvāṇa is not an Ens would be possible, if (we 533. 1.
knew) that there is a real Ens, then by its negation (Nirvāṇa would be
determined). If (we knew) that there is a real non-Ens, then by its nega-
tion we would also understand what (the judgment means) that Nirvāṇa is
not an Ens. But since (we neither know) what an Ens nor a non-Ens really
are, we can neither (understand) their negations.² Therefore (the result at
which we are arrived, viz.) that Nirvāṇa is neither an Ens nor a non-Ens,
even this negative (result, cannot be accepted as logically) consistent.³ This
also must be rejected.

And moreover,

533. 5.

XVI. If Nirvāṇa is neither Ens, nor is it non-Ens,
Who can then really understand
This doctrine which proclaims at once
Negation of them both together.

¹ *kalpanā* = *yojanā*.

² From this and the following aphorisms it results that the fourth part of the quadrilemma, viz. that Nirvāṇa is neither Ens nor is it non-Ens, represents the solution favoured by the Mādhyamika. Indeed since Ens (in aphorism IV.) and non-Ens (in aphorism VIII.) are conceived empirically, as referring to such entities which conform to causal laws, it is evident that transcendental or absolute existence which is contrasted with both these Ens and non-Ens, can be nothing but their simultaneous negation. Since this kind of reality cannot be expressed in terms of our language, since it is *anirvācya*, the fourth part of the quadrilemma is likewise denied, but in terms which are altogether different from those used in denying the three first parts of the quadrilemma. This especially appears from the comment upon aphorism XVI. It is explicitly stated above, under aphorism IX, comment p. 530. 3, that both in the Hinayānistic and in the Mahāyānistic conception Nirvāṇa is neither an Ens nor a non-Ens, since it is transcendental and unexpressible in terms of human language.

³ *nopapadyate*.

533. 8. If it is imagined¹ that this Nirvāṇa neither has the essence of a non-Ens, nor has it (the essence) of an Ens, where is the man (to understand this)? Who indeed can understand, who can grasp, who can proclaim the doctrine that Nirvāṇa represents such a double negation?
533. 9. (But if there is nobody to understand this here, in this world), perhaps there, in Nirvāṇa, someone exists who is capable) to realize² it? Or is this also impossible? If you admit it, you will be also obliged to admit the existence of an (eternal) Soul³ in Nirvāṇa. But this you do not admit, since the existence of a Soul, (or consciousness) without any substratum,⁴ (independent from causal laws) you do not admit.
533. 10. But if there is nobody (in the Nirvāṇa-world, if Nirvāṇa is altogether impersonal), by whom will it then be realized that there really is a Nirvāṇa of such description? If it is answered that those who remain in the phenomenal world⁵ shall cognize it, we will ask, shall they cognize it empirically⁷ or metaphysically.⁸ If you imagine that they will cognize Nirvāṇa empirically, this is impossible. Why? Because empirical consciousness apprehends (separate) objects.⁹ (But Nirvāṇa is the whole). There are no separate objects in Nirvāṇa. Therefore, first of all, it cannot be cognized by

¹ kalpyate.

² pratipattā.

³ ātman.

⁴ nirupādāna = asamskṛta = paramārthasat.

⁵ samsārīṇaḥ = prthagjanā āryāś ca.

⁶ samsāravasthūḥ = prthagjanā āryāś ca.

⁷ vijñānena.

⁸ jñānena. vijñāna as vijñāna-skandha is contrasted in Hinayāna with saṃjñā. The first means pure sensation, and even something still more primitive, potential sensation, since sensation is sparśa. Saṃjñā, as we have seen above, text p. 65. 5. can be replaced by jñāna. We have then a contrast between vijñāna and jñāna, the first meaning undeveloped and the second—developed cognition. The relation between these two terms is here, to a certain extent, similar to what it is in the Bhavadgītā, whereas the early Upaniṣads make no difference between them, cp. Brh. 3. 9. 2. 8, Tait. 2. 5. 1, 3. 5. 1, Katha 3. 13, Tait. 2. 1. 1. In Buddhism, however, vijñāna is not empirical cognition, but sensation, and jñāna, as is quite clear from the context, means transcendental, or absolute knowledge, sarva-prapañca-atīta. The Tibetans usually translate this kind of jñāna not by their ordinary *śes-pa*, but by *ye-śes*, i. e. «highest knowledge». Vijñāna again, in this context, does not mean pure sensation, but empirical knowledge, knowledge founded upon pure sensation.

⁹ The definition *nimittāmbana* or *nimittagrāhin*, or *nimitta-udgrahaṇam* is given to *saṃjñā*, and not to *vijñāna*, whose definition is *prativijñaptiḥ*, cp. my Central Conception, p. 16. But here this difference does not matter, since both *vijñāna* and *saṃjñā* are equally *nimitta-grāhin* when contrasted with the transcendental or direct knowledge of the absolute; *nimitta* has here the meaning of «a mark», or «a particular object», *nimitta-udgrahaṇam* means abstraction, or synthesis.

empirical consciousness. But neither can it be cognized by transcendental knowledge.¹ Why? Because transcendental knowledge should be a knowledge 533. 15. of universal Relativity.² This is (the absolute knowledge), which is essentially (eternal), beginningless.³ How can this knowledge which is itself undefinable⁴ grasp (the definite judgment) «Nirvāṇa is negation of both Ens and non-Ens». Indeed the essence⁵ of absolute knowledge is such that it escapes every formulation.⁶

Therefore (the doctrine that) Nirvāṇa is neither a non-Ens nor an Ens (at once) can be realized by no one. No one can realize it, no one can grasp it, no one can proclaim it, consequently it is (logically) impossible.⁷

VIII. THE REAL BUDDHA, WHAT?

The author now proceeds to state that just as all the parts of the qua- 534. 3. dillema are unapplicable to Nirvāṇa, just so are they unapplicable to the Buddha who enters Nirvāṇa. He says,

XVII. What is the Buddha after his Nirvāṇa?

Does he exist, or does he not exist?

Or both or neither?

We never will conceive.

Indeed it has been already stated⁸ —

That one who firmly is convinced,
That Buddha (during lifetime) did exist,
Will be convinced that after death
The Buddha cannot be existing.

¹ jñānena.

² *śūnyatā-āmlana*, it is clear that the absolute Reality (*sāmṛta-śūnyatā*) is here meant which underlies the Universe of Relativity (*saṃvṛti-śūnyatā*), cp. p. 164 n.

³ *anutpādam eva*, «quite beginningless», it is also the knowledge of the Universe in which there is no causality (*anutpāda*). This knowledge is also called Omniscience, *sarvajñatā* = *sarva-ākārajñatā* = *śūnyatā-jñānam* = *prajñā-pāramitā*.

⁴ *avidyamāna-svarūpa*, i. e. its character, *svārūpa*, is not to be found among our human kinds of knowledge.

⁵ *rūpa* = *svārūpa*.

⁶ *sarva-prapañca-atīta*, (*prapañco vāk*, cp. M. vr, p. 373.9).

⁷ *na yujyate* = *napapadyate*.

⁸ Translated according to the version in XXII. 13, p. 447.

534. 10. Thus it is that we cannot imagine¹ what has happened after the complete extinction² of the Buddha, does he then exist, or does he not exist (after Nirvāṇa)? Since both these solutions are unimaginable singly, they cannot be right both at once, neither is the negation of them both, therefore, imaginable.
534. 12. Not alone are all these four solutions unimaginable with regard to Buddha after his demise, but (his real existence before Nirvāṇa is equally unimaginable).

XVIII. What is the Buddha then at lifetime?
Does he exist or does he not exist?
Or both or neither?
We never will conceive.

535. 1. This is beyond our understanding, beyond our concepts. It has been shown in the chapter devoted to the examination of Buddhahood.³

¹ *nohyate* = *na kalpyate*.

² *nirodha*.

³ Ch. XXII. This chapter begins by stating that the Buddha is neither contained in the elements (*skandha*) of a personality, nor is he something apart from them (XX. 1—2). It is the old formula of the Vātsīputriyas and, probably, of all the early sects who have favoured the idea of a superhuman Buddha. If the Buddha consisted of elements (*skandha*) he would be *anātmā* (XX. 3). On this occasion Candrakīrti remarks that the term *ātman* in this context is a synonym of substance, a real, independent or absolute substance (*ātma-śabdo'yaṃ svabhāva-śabda-paryāyah*). If he were not Self-existent, he could not be the Buddha, since Buddha means Self-existent, *tathāgata* — existent in reality, in absolute reality. He is then characterized as *śūnya* and *niṣ-prapañca*, the Inexpressible. Those who would attempt to give him a conceptual definition (*prapañcayanti*) are incapable of contemplating him by mystic intuition (*na paśyanti tathāgatam*) (XX. 10). The Reality, or Substantiality (*svabhāva*) of the real Buddha (*tathāgata*) is just the same as the real substance of the world (*tathāgato yatsvabhāvas tatsvabhāvam idam jagat*). And just as the (phenomenal) world is unreal (*nīḥsvabhāva*), the personal Buddha is unreal just in the same degree (XXII. 16). Candrakīrti adds that the unreality or relativity of the phenomenal world has been established in the first chapter of this work. It is thus clear that Buddha is regarded in a pantheistic light as *Deus sive substantia*. This is the strictly monistic stand-point of consequent Mahāyānism. The conception of the Buddha is here quite the same as the conception of God (*īśvara*) in the *buddha-advaita* system of Śāṅkara. The Yogācāra school has, in this point as in others, deviated from strict Mahāyānism. Just as it had established four kinds of Nirvāṇa, instead of the former three (cp. above p. 185), it has also four kinds of Buddhas or four Bodies of Buddhas and four kinds of absolute knowledge (*bodhi*). Here Buddha abiding in «altruistic» (*apratīṣṭhita*) Nirvāṇa appears as a real God, the personified Wisdom and Love. His Spirit is not that unique substance, undifferentiated into subject and object which is the essence of *dharma-kāya* or *tathātā*, but it is a living and sympathizing Spirit which distinguishes subject, object and the separate things of the pluriverse by *pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna*. The constructions of the early Yogācāra school regarding Nirvāṇa, Buddha and Bodhi

IX. ULTIMATE IDENTITY OF THE PHENOMENAL AND THE ABSOLUTE.

Just for this reason, (since both are equally inconceivable),

XIX. There is no difference at all
Between Nirvāṇa and Saṃsāra,
There is no difference at all
Between Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa.

Since it is impossible to imagine a (real) Buddha living in this world 535. 4.
nor (to deny it), and since it is equally impossible to imagine a (real) Buddha after his Nirvāṇa nor (to deny it), just for this reason there is no difference at all between the Phenomenal world and the Absolute. On analysis they reveal themselves as being just the same in their essence.¹ For this very reason we can now understand the words of the Buddha when he spoke, «O Brethren! this phenomenal world² consisting of birth, decay and death has no under limit». This is just because there is no difference between the Phenomenal and the Absolute. Indeed,

XX. What makes the limit of Nirvāṇa,
Is also then the limit of Saṃsāra.
Between the two we cannot find
The slightest shade of difference.

The phenomenal world being (in its real essence) nothing but the Absolute,³ it is impossible to imagine neither its beginning, nor its end. 535. 11.

X. THE ANTINOMIES.

But not alone that, (the 4 antinomies established by the Buddha are insoluble for the same reason).

are extremely artificial and evidently the product of a compromise between strict Monism and the theistic tendencies of the school, cp. Vinītadeva's comment upon the closing passage of Santānāntara-siddhi (B. B.) where he seems not to be at one with Dharmakīrti, cp. also J. Masuda, op. cit. p. 57 ff.

¹ *rūpa* = *svārūpa*.

² *saṃsāra*.

³ *nirvāṇa*.

XXI. (Insoluble are antinomic) views

Regarding the existence beyond Nirvāṇa,

Regarding the extinction of this world,

Regarding its beginning.¹

536. 3. All the theories (about these questions) are inconsistent² (antinomies). Since the phenomenal world and the Absolute, are naturally merged quiescent³ (in the Unity of the Whole).

536. 4. By the indication⁴ contained in the words «after Nirvāṇa» four theories are embraced, viz. 1. the Buddha exists after death; 2. after death the Buddha does not exist; 3. after death the Buddha exists and does not exist (both at once); 4. after death the Buddha neither exists, nor does he not exist. These four theories are professed regarding Nirvāṇa.

536. 8. The theories regarding the end of the world, are the following ones; 1. the world has a limit; 2. the world has no limit; 3. the world has and has not a limit; 4. the world neither has, nor has not a limit. Those four theories exist regarding the upper limit (i. e., the end) of the world.

536. 10. Not being able to know something about our future life or about the future of the living world, we imagine that the life of the world will be stopped. This (theory) establishes a limit to the living world. Similarly the theory that the living world will have no end is produced by an expectation of a future life. Those who partly expect it and partly do not expect it profess a double theory. Those who deny both profess the theory that the world-process neither has, nor has not any limit.

536. 12. Regarding the beginning of the world there are likewise four theories. 1. It is eternal (i. e., it has no beginning); 2. it has a beginning; 3. it both has and has not a beginning; 4. it neither has, nor has not a beginning.

536. 14. The theory that the world is beginningless⁵ is based upon the view that we ourselves, or the living world, previously existed. The opposite view leads to the theory about the world having a beginning. Those who are both convinced and not convinced of it will profess the theory that the world

¹ Lit. p. 536. 1—2. The theories (*drṣṭayaḥ*) «beyond final extinction (*nirōdha*)», «end etc.», «eternal etc.» are directed (*samāsrita*) towards Nirvāṇa, the upper limit and the under limit.

² *napapadyante*.

³ *prakṛti-sāntatvāt*, cp. above p. 35.

⁴ *upalakṣaṇa*.

⁵ *śāśvata* means here, as appears from the context eternal in the sense of beginningless.

is both eternal and non-eternal. Those who neither are convinced, nor are they unconvinced will profess the theory that the world is neither eternal, nor is it non-eternal.

How are the antinomies¹ to be solved?² If any one of these attributes³ (by which the world is characterized as finite, infinite etc.) possessed absolute reality in itself,⁴ we would then understand what its affirmation or negation⁵ means. But since we have established that there is no difference between the phenomenal world (as constructed according to those ideas) and the Absolute⁷ (underlying it), therefore (no one of these attributes has ultimate reality, indeed —),

XXII. Since everything is relative,⁸ (we do not know)

537. 3.

What is finite and what is infinite,

What means finite and infinite at once,

What means negation of both issues,

XXIII. What is identity, and what is difference,⁹

What is eternity, what non-eternity,¹⁰

What means eternity and non-eternity together,

What means negation of both issues?

¹ *drṣṭayaḥ* = *avyākṛta-vastūni*.

² *katham vyūjyante*.

³ *padārtha* = *artha* = *dharma* means «any object», «everything»; it contains here an allusion to the following *śūnyeṣu sarvadharmeṣu*, but the predicates of finiteness, infinity, identity, otherness, etc., are more particularly aimed at, they are also *dharma*s.

⁴ *kaścit svabhāvaḥ*.

⁵ *bhāvābhāva-kalpanā* = *bhāvābhāva-yojanā*; *kalpanā* in this context means as much as our judgment.

⁶ Lit., p. 537. 1-2. «How are these views possible? If anything whatever possessed some self-subsistence, by arranging it with existence and non-existence these views would be (possible)».

⁷ This identity must evidently be understood in that sense that the Unity of the Absolute is the reality underlying the mirage of plurality.

⁸ *śūnya*.

⁹ This refers to the question of identity between the Ego and the body, it is usually formulated as a dilemma, whereas the antinomies regarding the end and the beginning of existence, as well as the question about existence after Nirvāṇa are formulated in the familiar Indian method of a quadrilemma. Thus the consecrated traditional number of 14 insoluble points (*avyākṛta-vastūni*) concerning the four antinomies is arrived at. In XXVII. 4 ff. the question of personal identity between the present Ego, the past and the future one, is examined in detail with the result that there is neither identity nor otherness.

¹⁰ or «without beginning» (*śāśvata*).

537. 7. These fourteen points which (by the Buddha) were declared insoluble, will never be solved,¹ because (we do not know) what reality in itself is.² But those who imagine (some kind) of absolute reality,³ and, by either excluding or asserting⁴ it, establish these (dogmatical) theories, they are influenced by a preconceived bias⁵ It prevents them from entering the right Path, leading to the city of Nirvāṇa, and binds them to the turmoil of phenomenal existence. This should be noted.

XI. CONCLUSION.

537. 11. An objection is raised. If this is so (will it not be possible to maintain that) Nirvāṇa has been denied by the Buddha? Will not his doctrine be absolutely useless, (this doctrine which) establishes corresponding antidotes for every kind of worldly career in order to enable mankind to reach Nirvāṇa. (It has been established by the Buddha) who watches the infinite hosts of living beings in their worldly career, who unmistakably knows the real intentions of all the living world, who is quite given up to his feeling of Great Commiseration, who cherishes the denizens of all the three spheres of existence as only a unique son is cherished! We answer. This criticism would be right, if there were any absolutely real⁶ doctrine, or if there were any (absolutely real) beings which would attend to this law, or if there were any absolutely real teacher, a divine Buddha. But (since in a monistic Universe that does not exist, we are not hit by your accusation)!
537. 14.

538. 3. XXIV. Our bliss consists in the cessation of all thought,

In the quiescence of Plurality.

To nobody and nowhere no doctrine (about separate elements)⁷

By Buddha ever has been preached!

¹ *naiva juyante*.

² *asati bhāva-svarūpe*, lit. «because they are not selfsubsistent things». Here again we must point out a remarkable analogy between Indian and European philosophy with respect to the doctrine of antinomies and their solution. Kant thought that «these questions naturally suggest themselves to the human mind and he inevitably must encounter them», and the explanation he sought in the fact that the objects of the phenomenal world are not «selfsubsistent things», cp. Critique of Pure Reason (transl. by Max Mueller), p. 400.

³ *bhāva-svarūpam adhyāropya*.

⁴ *tad-vigama-avigamataḥ*.

⁵ *abhivivṛtate*.

⁶ *svabhāva-rūpa*.

⁷ *dharmā* is here used in both senses, a doctrine about *dharmas*. Not a single one of the Hīnayānistic *dharmas* (elements of existence) has been taught by the real Buddha, since on p. 539. 1—2 it is stated that neither a defiling (*sāṃkleśika*) element i. e., ignorance and desire,

In this case how can the reproach made above affect us! Our view¹ is that Nirvāṇa represents Quiescence, i. e., the non-applicability² of all the variety of names³ and (non-existence of) particular objects.⁴ This very Quiescence, so far it is the natural (genuine) quiescence (of the world), is called bliss. The Quiescence of Plurality is also a bliss because of the cessation of speech or because of the cessation of thought. It is also a bliss because, by putting an end to all defiling agencies, all individual existencies⁵ are stopped. It is also a bliss because, by quenching all defiling forces, all instinct (and habits of thought)⁶ have been extirpated without residue. It is also a bliss because, since all the objects of knowledge have died away, knowledge itself has also died.

When the divine Buddhas have entered blissful Nirvāṇa in which all Plurality has vanished, they are like regal swans soaring in the sky without any support,⁷ they are hovering in the wind produced by their (two) wings,⁸ the wing of accumulated virtue⁹ and the wing of accumulated wisdom,¹⁰ or they are hovering in the wind of Space, (that Space which) is the Void.¹¹ Then (from this elevation), all separate objects having become undistinguishable,¹² the Buddhas have not preached, neither about the defiling elements¹³ (of life), nor about its purifying elements,¹⁴ neither in the divine worlds, nor in the human world, neither to gods, nor to men. This should be realized.

nor a purifying one (*vaiyavadānika*), i. e., *prajñā* and *samādhi*, has been taught by the real Buddha, i. e. by the Buddha conceived as Dharma-kāya, the Cosmos. The whole catalogue of the *dharmas* is evidently meant, and their relativity and unreality from the transcendental point of view. But since Hīnayāna is Pluralism, i. e., a doctrine about the elements, a *Dharma* about the *dharmas*, *dharmānudharma*, both meanings are so interwoven that in many contexts both will apply. On p. 537. 13 the general meaning is evidently intended.

¹ *iha*.

² *apavṛtti*.

³ *prapañca, prapañco vāk*.

⁴ *nimitta*.

⁵ *janman*.

⁶ *vāsanā*, explained as *pūrvam jñānam*, but conceived as a cosmical Force, transcendental illusion.

⁷ *asthūna-yogena*.

⁸ *pakṣa-pāta*, the meaning of bias or, fervour, towards a special doctrine is equally here intended.

⁹ *puṇya-sambhāra*.

¹⁰ *jñāna-sambhāra*.

¹¹ *akāśa*, an allusion to the doctrine of *sūnyatā*; the lofty Bodhisattva is hovering in the regions of Relativity, which is here poetically compared with the Void (*svabhāvo-sūnyā*).

¹² *sarva-nimitta-anupalambha*.

¹³ *sāṃkleśika-dharma*.

¹⁴ *vaiyavadānika-dharma*.

539. 3. Accordingly it has been declared in the Ārya-tathāgata-guhyā. «The night when, O Śāntamati, the Buddha has reached the highest absolute enlightenment, the night he was about to pass into Final Nirvāṇa, at that occasion the Buddha did not pronounce even one syllable, he has not spoken, nor does he speak, nor will he speak. But since all living beings, according to the intensity of their religious fervour,¹ appear as different characters² with different aims,³ they imagine⁴ the Buddha proffering on different occasions a variety of discourses. On separate occasions it occurs to them «this Buddha teaches us about such a topic»,⁵ «we listen to his teaching about this topic». But the (real) Buddha⁶ is never engaged in thought-construction, in thought-division. O Śāntamati, the Buddha is averse to all plurality which is produced by our habits of thought,⁷ (that Plurality which is the cause) of an entanglement of thought constructions⁸ and of the dismemberment⁹ (of the world's Unity).¹⁰

539. 10. Indeed,

Unspeakable, unpronounceable are all (elements),
Relational,¹¹ quiescent, pure!
Those are (real) Buddhas and Bodhisattvas¹²
Who realize them in this (their pure condition).

539. 13. But if the Buddha has preached no doctrine (of separate elements) nowhere and to nobody, how is it then that we hear about his various discourses, constituting the Scriptures?

539. 14. We answer. Mankind is plunged in the slumber of ignorance, they

¹ *yathādhimuktāḥ*.

² *vividha-dhātu, dhātu* evidently in the sense of *gotra*.

³ (*vividha*)-*āśaya*.

⁴ *saṃjñanti*.

⁵ or element, *dharma*.

⁶ i. e. *Dharma-Kāya*.

⁷ *vāsanā = pūrvam jñānam*.

⁸ *kalpanā = yojanā*.

⁹ *vikalpa = dvaidhikarāṇa*.

¹⁰ This is a purely Mahāyānist doctrine, viz. that Buddha, as soon as he became a real Buddha, did not speak, because human speech is not adapted to express, and human knowledge incapable to realize conceptually, that unique Substance of the Universe with which Buddha himself is identified as *dharma-kāya* and which appears directly to the intuition of the mystic. The logical value of the tenets *sarvajño na vaktā* and *asarvajño vaktā* is analysed with much subtlety by Dharmottara in the *Nyāyabindu*, p. 66. 19 ff. and by Vācaspati-miśra in the *Nyāyakanikā*, p. 110. 16 and 112. 21 ff. M. de la V. P., p. 366 n. 1 of his edition, thinks that this doctrine is in glaring contradiction with what is repeatedly stated in the Pali Canon. No wonder, since Mahāyāna is Monism and Hinayāna Pluralism. Spinoza can hardly be expected to agree with Aristotle!

¹¹ *śūnya*.

¹² *kumāra = jina-putra*.

are as though in a dream, they have a wealth of constructive imagination.¹ It occurs to them «this Buddha, this Lord over all gods, demons and human beings in all the three worlds, teaches us about this topic».

Accordingly it has been said by Buddha,

539. 16.

The Buddha is but a reflexion
Of the pure, passionless principle.
He is not real, he is not the Buddha,
'Tis a reflexion that all creatures see.

This is likewise explained at length in the chapter about the «Secret meaning of the Buddha's words».

Since there is thus no (separate) teaching about (separate) elements, for the sake of reaching Nirvāṇa, how is it then possible to maintain that (a kind of) Nirvāṇa exists, because the discourses² about the elements³ of existence really exist. Therefore it is established that (this kind of) Nirvāṇa does not really exist. Accordingly it has been said by Buddha,

«The Ruler of the World has said
That (this) Nirvāṇa is not (real) Nirvāṇa:
A knot by empty space entwined
By empty space has been untied!»

540. 8.

And moreover, «Those who imagine that something can appear and disappear, for them, o Blessed one, the (real) Buddha has not (yet) appeared! Those, o Blessed one, who seek a realistic⁴ (definite) Nirvāṇa, they never will escape out of the world-migrations! For what reason? Because, o Blessed one, Nirvāṇa is the merger⁵ of all particular signs,⁶ the quiescence of every motion and commotion!⁷ Ignorant indeed, o Blessed one, are all those men who having become recluses in the name of a doctrine and discipline by them imagined,⁸ are seeking for a realistic Nirvāṇa and have thus fallen down into a false doctrine which is not Buddhist. (They think to

¹ *sva-vikalpa-abhyudaya*.

² The reading of the Mss. *deśanānām* is perhaps to be retained («*abhidheya-bahutvāt*»).

³ *dharma*.

⁴ *bhāvataḥ = svā-bhāvataḥ*, i. e. not that Nirvāṇa which is immanent to the Universe.

⁵ *prāśama*.

⁷ *sarva-tñjita-samñjita*.

⁶ *sarva-nimittānām*.

⁸ *svākhyāta*.

win Nirvāṇa is the same) as to get oil out of oil-seeds or butter out of milk! I declare, o Blessed one, that those who seek Nirvāṇa in the fact that separate elements of life will be absolutely extinct,¹ (I declare) that they are not better than the most selfconceited gentiles».

541. 3. «A Master of Yoga,² o Blessed one, the man thoroughly trained (in yoga) does not (really) produce something (new), nor does he suppress something (existing),³ nor will he admit that something, some real element,⁴ can be attained, or seized by absolute knowledge,⁵ etc.».

Finished the Examination of Nirvāṇa, the 25th Chapter in the Comment upon Relativity, composed by the venerable Master Candrakīrti.

¹ *parinirvṛta* = *parito niruddha*.

² *Yogācāra*, here in the general sense of a Mahāyānist, not in the sense of a Master of the Yogācāra school.

³ as the Hinayānist teaching about *yoga-samādhi* assumes, cp. above, p. 14, and Central Conception, p. 51.

⁴ here *dharma* refers to the *phalas* attained by *mārga*.

⁵ *abhisamaya* = *prajñā-pāramitā*.

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- Agent**, denial of conscious agents in the impersonal world-process, 148, 149, 175 n. 2.
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- Aquinomies**, similar to those of Kant, 205; similarity in the solution, *ibid*.
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Sautrāntika, an intermediate school between Hinayāna and Mahāyāna, 24, 29 ff.; their rôle comparable with Occam's Razor, 24; their conception of reality, 29 ff.—189; regarded as Mahāyānist, 189 n.

Scholasticism in Early Buddhism, 23, 24.

Scriptures, their conventional and real meaning, 125 ff.

Sense-data, the only reality in Matter according to Hinayāna, 144.

Sense-perception, its definition as pure sensation, 156 ff.; the Mādhyamika definition 45 n. 7, 159.

Sophisms of Bhāvaiviveka., 115, 116; of Zeno of Elea, 52, 67, 140.

Soul, eternal, individual, 2; denial of its existence as a separate substance in Early Buddhism, 4, 5; an inanimate ubiquitous «stonelike» substance in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, 59.

Sound, theories about its essence, 109.

- Sources of knowledge only two, (senses and intellect), 141; the four sources of realistic logic accepted by the Mādhyamika, 163.
- Space, a reality in Hinayāna, 3.
- Speech, the Buddhist theory of speech (*apoha*), 155.
- Sphere (The) of purified matter or ethereal bodies, 10; of pure spirits, 10, cp. s. v. Mystic worlds.
- Substance denied, 3, 8, 144, 152; the unique substance of the world, 3.
- Śūnyatā means *svabhāva-śūnyatā* = *paraspara-apekṣatā*, or Relativity (q. c.), cp. Index 7.
- Thing in itself. The conception of an extreme concrete and particular, the absolutely particular, the thing characterized exclusively by its own self (*sva-lakṣaṇa*), the residue which remains when all constructions of thought and all relations have been dropped, is opposed by Dignāga as a kind of Absolute to the Universal Relativity and Unreality of Nāgārjuna, 141. Candrakīrti declares it also to be relative, 154; its double relativity, a) with the corresponding cognition, b) with the Universal as the thing «not in itself», 142 ff., 154. Its similarity to the *Hoc Aliquid* of Aristotle; to the «thing in itself» of Kant, 164 n.; to the «Thisness» of Hegel, 53.
- Time, its unreality, 115.
- Truths (The Four) of the Saint, 16; their meaning in Hinayāna and their meaning in Mahāyāna, 17; in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, 55; a scheme for philosophical construction accepted by all systems, 55; nothing Buddhist in them, since they are accepted by all systems, *ibid.*
- Upanishad views, 3.
- Vaiśeṣikas, continuators of the Sarvāstivādins, 23, 27 ff.; in a broader sense the name is applicable to all the 18 schools of Hinayāna, sc. all Hinayāna the Sautrāntikas excepted.
- Vatsīputriyas, their idea of a surviving personality, 197.
- Yoga I, profound meditation, the means of attaining Quiescence, 4; is not magic, 5. Opinions of Keith, Beck, Lehman, Söderblom, Heiler, de la Vallée Poussin, Sénart, Woods, Anesaki, Takakusu, 6. The faculty of concentrating attention upon one point to the exclusion of all other objects (= *samādhi*), 6; considered as a separate faculty, one of the ten general faculties of the human mind (such as feeling, will, desire, ideas, attention etc.) 7 n.; when cultivated induces hypnotic states ending in catalepsy (*asamjñi-samāpatti*), 7; considered to be one of the most precious human faculties, 9. Can mean the faculty, the resulting mental state and the different places (worlds) where it is more or less intensely practised, 7. Its synonyms *dhyaṇa*, *samāpatti*, *ekāgratā*, *ibid.*
- Yoga II, the mystic power produced by intense concentrated contemplation of a single point or idea, 10. This power capable of producing a radical change in the composition of individual existences by suppressing the operation of elements composing a normal existence, *ibid.* Individuals with a highly developed faculty of concentration and having much practised it considered to be purified, *ibid.* This power capable of transferring human beings out of this world of gross bodies into higher mystic worlds (q. c.) where it becomes the predominant faculty controlling the character of life and the composition of individual existences (the gradually reduced number of elements entering into cooperation for producing an individual personal life) 11. The ultimate end of this process of suppression in Nirvāṇa, 15. Buddhist yoga has nothing to do with magic and sorcery, 2 ff., 5 ff. Yoga exercises in Zen monasteries in Japan, 15 n. Origin and history of the Buddhist doctrine of meditation, 18; its denial as a mystic power by the Mīmāṃsakas, 19; its importance in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, 58.
- Yogācāra, the school, 31 ff.; their idea that all elements of life are eternally quiescent, 35; their conception of Reality, 33, 189; the synonym of a Mahāyānist, 212.

7. Technical Terms.

- ati-prasanga*, a generalized *deductio ad absurdum*, e. g., «if cause and effect are identical, everything will be eternally nascent, if they really are different, all things being different from one another, everything will be produced out of anything», 94.
- adhikaraṇa-sādhana*, a noun denoting the place where an action is going on, e. g., *dhyaṇa* from the *√dhya* «to meditate», in the sense of a world of which the denizens possess thought-concentration as their normal condition, 7, 134.
- adhipati-pratyaya*, a ruling or determining cause, e. g., the organ of vision in regard of visual sensation, 176, cp. *samanantara*—, *ālambana*—, and *hetu-pratyaya*.
- ādhyavasita*-(*viśaya*) see *prāpya-viśaya*, 141.
- adhvan*, transition, time; past, present and future, 41, 115.
- anapekṣaḥ sva-bhāvaḥ*, «one's own» independent existence, non-relative, absolute Ens; a conception corresponding, to a certain extent, to Spinoza's Substance, 46.
- anāsrava*, «uninfluenced» by *kleśas* q. c., cp. *āsrava*, 55, 125.
- anātma*-(*vāda*), the theory maintaining that the Whole, whether a Soul, a Psyche or a Substance, does not exist separately, over and above its separate elements (*dharma*) linked together by causal laws. This the principal tenet of Hinayāna Buddhism, synon. *pudgala-nairātmya*, *prāṭītya-samutpāda* (Hinayānist), *dharma*tā (Hinayānist), *dharma-sanketa*, *skandha-āyatana-dhātavaḥ* etc., q. c. The converse theory, viz. that the Whole really exists, but not the parts, is the central conception in Mahāyāna, 39, 41, 135.
- anupākhya*, inexpressible in speech, beyond words and discursive concepts, = *anirvacanīya* = *niraprāṇa*, 156.
- anupalabdhi*, negation of the hypothetically assumed presence of something, e. g., «there is on this place no jar, because if it were present it would be perceived», 195; a theory of negative judgments very similar to that introduced into European Logic by Sigwart, cp. Logic, 3 p. 155, «die Verneinung setzt eine Zumuthung (*āropa*), voraus»; cp. Nyāya-bindu, II. 26 ff.
- anupādāya-sat*, existence independent of any substratum, uncaused, non-relative, absolute existence, 199.
- anubhava*, immediate experience (as contrasted with philosophic interpretation), 189.
- anāikāntika* (-*hetu*), inconclusive, indefinite argument, synon. *avyabhicāra*, 117.
- anya-vyāvṛtti*, (existence of an object established by) contrast with its negations, e. g., «blue colour is established and exists only in so far as there are non-blue colours», synon. *apoha*, *paraspara-apekṣa*, *svabhāva-śūnya* etc., 155.
- anvaya-jñāna*, a momentary mystic intuition of the «Four Truths» in the mystic worlds, i. e., of the elements out of which these worlds are constructed in accordance with special causal laws, 17.
- aparokṣa*-(*artha*), the presence of an object in one's ken, the essence of sense-perception according to Vedānta and Mādhyamika, 45, 159, 163.
- apratīṣṭhita* (-*nirvāṇa*), «altruistic» Nirvāṇa, cp. in the preceding Index s. v. Nirvāṇa, 185, 204. M. de la V. P. explains it (Muséon, 1914, p. 34) as a Nirvāṇa into which a Buddha could have entered, if he did not prefer to remain in Samsāra and to work for the Salvation of all living beings. A similar explanation is also current in Japan, cp. O. Rosenberg, Die Weltanschauung des modernen Buddhismus, p. 30. J. R. A. h. d. e. r, Daśabhūmikasūtra, p. XXIV, thinks that the Mahāyānist Buddha «does not reside» in *aprat. n.*, «il n'est pas séparé du samsāra, ni ne se réjouit du nirvāṇa». But a Buddha who «does not reside» in Nirvāṇa is not a complete Buddha in his Dharmakāya. However *aprat. n.* is always represented as the highest form of Dharmakāya, the most perfect Mahāyānist Nirvāṇa. It is contrasted with the Hinayānist Nirvāṇa or the

Nirvāṇa of the Śrāvakas. The latter is attained by the Saint for his own, personal salvation, it is «egoistic». The Mahāyānistic Buddha «does not reside» in that kind of Hinayanistic Nirvāṇa, his Nirvāṇa is «altruistic» and represents allembreaching Love and Wisdom as the highest manifestation of Dharmakāya, just as every creature and every object is also but a manifestation of it. The Tibetan Grubmthaḥ is perfectly aware that the Mahāyānistic Buddha represents the motionless Cosmos and cannot be an active principle, but the empirically existing virtues are conceived as a special manifestation of the eternal principle; *apratīṣṭhita-nirvāṇa* is thus defined negatively, it is not a Nirvāṇa which is reached exclusively for one's own Salvation, it is «altruistic» (*rañ kho-nai don-du zhi-ba-la mi-gnas = svārthamātrena upaśame na pratīṣṭhitāḥ*). The manifestations of Love and Wisdom in the Universe are viewed as a special manifestation of the eternal Buddha and this is called the altruistic aspect of Nirvāṇa. The Hinayanist, i.e., the Śrāvaka and the Pratyeka, are characterized as persons degraded by their bias for personal egoistic Quietism (*zhi-mthar lhuñ-bai gañ-zag = upaśamānte patitau pudgalau*). Suzuki's words (Mahāyāna, p. 345) that the Buddha «does not cling to Nirvāṇa» etc., are apparently intended to suggest the same explanation as the one here given.

abhisamaya, 1) in Hinayāna = *prajñā-amalā*, direct intuition of a pluralistic Universe (= *dharmābhīśamaya*), 2) in Mahāyāna, direct intuition of a monistic Universe (= *prajñā-pāramitā*). Nāgārjuna in his *Prajñā-mūla* has taught Monism directly and the Mahāyānistic *mārga* indirectly. Maitreya-Asanga in his *Ahisamaya-alankāra* has taught this *mārga* directly; it is thus a synonym of *prajñā-pāramitopadeśa* or *mārga*, 47, 90, 212.

arūpa-dhātu, immaterial plane of existence, the mystic worlds of pure spirits, 7, 10, 11, 81. The formula of individual existence in these worlds includes three kinds (*dhātu*) of elements *dhātu* № 6 (*manas*), № 12 (*dharmāḥ*) and № 18 (*mano-vijñāna*), cp. Central Conception, p. 10, 97.

arūpīno dharmāḥ, non-material, mental elements, 8.

artha-kriyā-kāritva, efficiency of an Ens, existence characterized as efficiency in the schools of Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras, 114.

artha-vākya, an aphorism implying a wide connotation, 105.

avidyā, naive realism, as contrasted with *prajñā amalā* = philosophic insight, 9, 134, 173,

avyākṛta-vastūni, the four insoluble antinomies established by Buddha, (they are 14, according to the Indian mode of reckoning), 207.

asamākṛta, not being produced by cooperating causes, eternal, absolute, (three such elements in the Sarvāstivādin system), 15, 17, 34, 42, 55, 184, 185, 200.

ātman, 1) Soul, personality, 8, 31, etc.; the equivalent of *pudgala* according to most schools; different from it according to the Vātsīputriyas; 2) substance (= *sva-bhāva*), 204;

ātma-bhāva, individual existence, 155, 161; *ātman* means here «body», and is usually in this context translated into Tib. as *lus*, cp. Buddhaghosa, Asl. 308.

ātma-lābha, taking shape, actual existence, 199; = *ātma-bhāva-pratīlābha*, having a body in one of the three spheres of existence, either as a gross or an ethereal or immaterial (*manomaya*) body, cp. Rhys Davids, Dialogues I, 259.

ādī-śānta-(*dharmā*), eternally quiescent existence, 35; a theory denying a real transition from the phenomenal into absolute existence and maintaining that the phenomenal world itself is the Absolute, if viewed *sub specie aeternitatis*.

ādhyātmika-āyatana, the 6 internal bases of cognition, viz. consciousness (pure) and the 5 sense-faculties; the translation «mental phenomena» will be found applicable in many cases, although it is not quite correct, since *saṃjñā*, *vedanā*, *saṃskāra* are classified as *bāhya-āyatana* with regard to pure consciousness (*manas*), 96, 108, 112, 113.

ārambha-vāda, the «creative» theory of causality advocated in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools, the reverse of the Sāṃkhya theory of an identity (*tādātmya*) between cause and effect and of a mere change of manifestations (*pariṇāma-vāda*), 179.

ārya, a Buddhist Saint, cp. prec. Index s. v. Saint, 3, 9, 90 n.

ārya-satya (= *āryasya catvāri satyāni*), the four aspects of the Universe (of its elements) as it appears to the Saint in mystic intuition, 55, 56; replaced of Mahāyāna by two aspects (the phenomenal and the absolute).

ālambana-pratyaya, the object of a cognition viewed as a cause or a condition of every knowledge, 173

ālambanaka, the agency producing the intentness of cognition upon an object, 174.

ālaya-vijñāna, the «granary» of consciousness, containing the «seeds» in all future ideas and the residue of all passed thoughts and deeds, 30, 31, 32.

āvasthika, (or *prākarsika*), *pratītya-samutpāda* q. c. 123.

āśraya-asiddhi, devoid of a real substratum, e. g., the quality length of the (non-existing) horns of a donkey, 108.

āśrava, originally a physical «influx» of subtle defiling matter through the pores of the skin to fill up the Soul; in Buddhism, spiritual «influence» by *kleśa* q. c., from *√sru*. Buddhaghosa derives Pali *āsava* from *√su*, and interprets it etymologically as an «intoxicant», 57, 125.

idamīti, = *tathātā*, 47.

idampratyoyatā, causation in its Buddhist interpretation, 47, cp. Index 6 sub. v. Causality.

indriya, 1) the six, 5 sense faculties and *manas* (pure sensation), 56, 55, 116; 2) the 22, agencies determining the shape or formulas of life in the different planes of ordinary or mystic existence, cp. Ab. Kośa, II. 1 ff.

indriya-kṣaṇa, a moment of the operating sense-faculty, which together with a moment of the object and a moment of consciousness (*viññāna*) produces actual sensation (the *sparsa*); before such actual sensation consciousness in an embryo is latent *sammūrchita*, 162.

uccheda-vāda, the theory denying future life, Materialism in the sense of a denial of retribution and of a moral law; according to this theory every death is Nirvāṇa; Buddhism maintains that this theory does not lead to Nirvāṇa, but to the hells, 28, 50.

utkarṣa, either growth (*avayava-upacaya*), or increased intensity, 9.

utpāda, production or causation, in Mahāyāna a synonym of existence (*bhāva*), of becoming (*bhavana*), and relation (*bhāva*), 166.

upapatti, 1) being logically admissible, 155; 2) being reborn in one of the worlds, 7.

upapatti-dhyāna, being born in the lower 4 mystic worlds whose denizens possess ethereal bodies 7, cp. *samāpatti-dhyāna*.

upapāduka, apparitional, born miraculously or according to special laws, 12.

upādāna, substratum, 134, 196.

upādāna-skandha, sc. *kleśa-upādāna-skandha*, the elements of a personality as influenced by *avidyā* and *trṣṇā*, = *sāśrava-dharmāḥ* = *duḥkha-satya* = *duḥkha*, 184.

upādāya, having a substratum, coordinated, caused, relative, 197, 199.

upādāya-prajñapti, a synonym of the Mahāyānistic *madhyamā pratipad* q. c., 81.

ekagrata, the concentration of thought upon one point (= *samādhi*), 6.

karana-sādhana, a noun meaning the instrument of an action, 7, 90.

karman, 1) volition and the purposive action following the volition (= *cetanā cetayitṛ ca karanam*, Ab. k. IV, 1), 2) the will of the Universe, the general force which keeps life going and models its forms in the different worlds, the *πῶρον κίνητον*, the *élan vital*, 11, 13, 14, 41, 56, 124 128, 172, 176, 186 197. Every system of philosophy in India has its own construction regarding the origin, the essence, the operation, the immediate and the remote result of *karman*. It has accordingly a place assigned to it in the ontology of each system.

The Materialists deny its existence altogether, i. e., they deny the reality of an influence of past deeds, whether good or bad, upon man's destiny. The Jains classify *karman*, among their elements of Matter. Gosāla admitted that volition is only half-*karman* since the real *karman* is physical, cp. D. N., I. 54. The Mimāṃsakas analyse it into their conceptions of *vidhi*, *bhāvanā*, *apūrva*, *niyoga* etc. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system finds a place for it among the *guṇas* where its different aspects can be recognized under the mental qualities of *dharma*, *adharma*, *adr̥ṣṭa* and *saṃskāra*. The Buddhists place it into their *saṃskāra-skandha* where it originally held the place of a predominant, ruling force of life (cp. Central Conception, p. 20). In the Sarvāstivādin list of ultimate realities it is classified as the *citta-mahā-bhūmika-samprayukta-saṃskāra* № 3, under the name of *cetanā* «will», cp. Central Conception, p. 19 and 100.

karma-sādhana, a noun meaning the object of an action, 47, 70, 90.

kalpanā, a mental act of linking together an ind-finite something (*Hoc Aliquid*) either with a name or a universal or a quality or an action (= *nāma-jāti-ādi-yojanā*); a judgment of the form «this is that» (*sa evāyam*), 137, 147. According to Sigwart, cp. Logic, 3 I, p. 67, the judgments of the form «this is Socrates», (i. e., *sa evāyam*) are also the fundamental form of all judgment. Hence it is identified with *vikalpa* q. c.

kalpanāpodha, pure sensation without any participation of synthetic thought, 141, 142.

kāraṇa-hetu, notion of a universal causal link between all elements of existence, past, present and future, 41, 124, 172, 196; also called *śahakāri-hetu* as contrasted with the *adhīpūti-hetu* q. c.; this notion a forerunner of Monism.

kālānugata, having no duration in time, point-instant, cp. *deśānugata* 141.

kleśa, morally impure elements (mental in Buddhism, physical in Jainism); illusion and desire (*avidyā-tr̥ṣṇa*) are the principle ones; when residues (*saṃskāra*) of former deeds (*karman*) are moistened (*abhiṣandita*) by them, they like «seeds» produce new existences (*janman*) 10, 185, 186.

kriyā, (= *vyāpāra*), energy supplying a link between the cause and effect, such as the energy heat (*paci-kriyā*), 167, 169.

kṣaṇa, a moment, point-instant; identified with the «thing in itself», 142; the differential of motion; its principle known to Indian astronomers and philosophers (= *ruṇi*), 142.

kṣānti, satisfaction (= *ruṇi*), 17.

kharatva, resistance, 116.

khyāti, = *jñāna* = *upalabdhī*, 38.

gati, 1) motion, 115; 2) individual existence in one of the six kinds of bodies, 182.

grahana-kārya, a short statement to be developed (*vicāraṇa*) in the sequel, 99.

grāhya-viśaya, the *prima facie* object, the first moment in the cognition of an object, cp. *prāpya-viśaya*, 141.

citta, pure consciousness, or pure sensation, *manas* and *vijñāna* (sc. *vijñāna-skandha*) its synonyms in Hinayāna, 31, 108, cp. *vijñāna*.

citta-mahā-bhūmika (*dharma*), ten mental elements always represented in every conscious moment, 7, 9, cp. Central Conception, p. 100.

cetanā, will, conscious volition, a purposive action (= *karman* q. c.), 124, 197.

caitta, mental phenomenon, 173 (= *citta-samprayukta-saṃskāra*), cp. C. C.

jani-kriyā, energy, function, 167, 168, (= *vyāpāra*).

jñāna, 1) knowledge in general in the sense of a mental phenomenon, 143; 2) definite cognition as contrasted with pure indefinite sensation (*vijñāna* q. c.), 141, 149; 3) transcendental, meta-physical knowledge, 202; 4) Omniscience (= Tib. *ye-śes*).

tat-sabhāga, non-active, non-operating sense faculty (= *a-sva-karma-kṛt*), cp. *sabhāga*, 115.

tattva, absolute reality, 153 (= *tattvam eva*).

tathātā, «Thisness», absolute reality, 47 (many synonyms).

tātkāliki gatiḥ, the differential of a planet's motion, 142.

duḥkha, 1) *vedanā-duḥkha*, suffering; 2) *pariṇāma-duḥkha*, phenomenal existence (= *upādāna-skandha*), cp. Pessimism in Index 6.

dr̥ṣṭi, 1) intuition, 16; 2) wrong view, (= *mithyā-dr̥ṣṭi*); 3) antinomy, 207.

dr̥ṣṭi-mārga, the path of illumination, momentary mystic intuition of the real condition of the Universe, (= *yogi-pratyakṣa*), 16, 18, 90, 137.

deśānugata, having no extension, a point-instant, 141.

devidhī-karāṇa, dichotomizing (thought), thought operating by contrast of A with non-A, 147.

dharma, 1) doctrine, 2) quality, 3) element of existence; hence *dharma-anu-dharma* a doctrine about elements or an element according to that doctrine, 183; its connotation (*dharma-sanketa*) includes strict uniformity in nature (*asmin sati idam bhavati*), 135; hence the translation «norm», «normalism» which is not quite correct since norm is *niyama* = *dharmaṇām niyama* = *pratyaya-niyama* = *pratītya-samutpāda* q. c.; 4) a synonym of *saṃskṛta-dharma* and *saṃskāra* q. c.; 5) in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika — a meritorious action (= *karman*) 6); in Jainism, a special ubiquitous substance, the medium of motion.

dharma-kāya, the Cosmical Body of the Buddha, i. e., the Cosmos regarded as the personification of the eternal Buddha, 45; divided into *svabhāya-kāya*, which is *nitya* and *jñāna-kāya*, which is *anitya* 185 n. 3; identified with Buddha's final Nirvāṇa, 48, when mentioned in Hinayānistic lore (e. g., D. N., III. 84 with the synonyms *brahma-kāya* and *dharma-bhūta*) it probably has no clearly Mahāyānistic, sc. monistic, connotation. Synon. *tathātā*.

dhātu, has many different meanings which are summarized in the *Bahu-dhātuka-sūtra*, the principal are, 1) when three are reckoned, the 3 spheres or planes of existence, of gross bodies (*kāma*—), of ethereal bodies (*rūpa* —) and of immaterial (*arūpa*- or *ārūpya-dhātu*) bodies, 11, 55, passim; 2) when six are reckoned, the component principles of an existence in the material worlds, sc. the four general elements of Matter (*mahā-bhūta*), *ākāśa* and *vijñāna*; this *ākāśa* is not the *asaṃskṛta-ākāśa* included in the next classification, and *vijñāna* here comprises all mental elements, it is also quite different from the *vijñāna-dhātu* of the next classification, cp. Ab. Kośa, I. 28; 3) when eighteen are reckoned, a special division of all elements of existence into 10 material and 8 spiritual ones, (cp. Central Conception, p. 9), 11, 14, 18, 56, 66, 4) *dhātu* = *gotra*, 210.

dhyāna, 1) concentrated contemplation (= *samādhi* = *yoga*); 2) a mystic world where the denizens normally possess thought-concentration, 6, 7.

nāstika, when used by Buddhists as an invective means Materialism as a denial of *karman* i. e. of the moral law and of every survival after death, 189.

nir-svabhāva, having no independent existence of one's own, relative, ultimately unreal, = *śūnya*, 176.

niyama, strict uniformity in nature, norm, causality between elements of existence, cp. *dharma*, 179.

nirodha-satya, 1) in Hinayāna, the reality of the Annihilation of all energies (*saṃskāra*), comparable with the idea of Entropy in modern science 16, 17, 197 n; 2) in Mahāyāna, the cessation of all differentiation in a monistic Universe, 190 (*sarva-kalpanā-kṣaya*).

nirmāṇa-kāya, the apparitional body of Buddha, Buddha in the docetic sense, 57.

nirvāṇa, cp. prec. Index.

nirvāṇa-dhātu, ditto.

nir-vikalpa, pure sensation, devoid of any synthesis or thought-construction, 31, 141, 156.

niṣprapañca, inexpressible in speech and unrealizable in concepts, = the Absolute, 42, 43, 44, 156, 187, 204.

niṣyanda-phala, natural result, automatical outflow out of preceding homogeneous conditions (*sa-bhāga-hetu*), 8, 176.

pakṣa, tenet, thesis, minor term in a syllogism, 155.

pakṣa-doṣa, impossible thesis (= *bādhitā-viśaya*), 108.

prakṣa-dharma, minor premise (= *upanaya*), 94.

padārtha, a thing, an entity, 190.

parata-utpatti, a break between cause and effect, production out of something different, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of causality, extreme realism, involving *ārambha-vāda* q. c. and the doctrine of *samavāya* as a semi-substantial universal substratum, an ubiquitous, thing invented in order to bridge over the gap between a result and its material cause 101, 120, 121.

paratantra, relative (with the connotation attached to it in the Yogācāra school which admits the reality of relative things obeying to causal laws), 33, 164, 189.

paramārtha-sat, existing in an absolute, non-relative, sense, 111, 114, 137, 141, 146, 156.

paramārtha-satya, absolute reality as contrasted with *saṃvṛti-satya* q. c., 140.

paraspara-apekṣa, mutually relative, relative, 153, 164, 191, synon. *śūnya*, *pratītya-samutpanna*.

parikalpita-lakṣaṇa, see *lakṣaṇa niḥsvabhāvatā*.

pariṇāma-duḥkhatā, the changing, impermanent or phenomenal world, 17; synon. *duḥkha-satya*, or *duḥkha*, cp. *duḥkha-vedanā* suffering.

pariṇippanna, absolute reality in a monistic sense with the connotation attached to it in the Yogācāra school, 33, 34, 189.

puṭgala-nairātmya = *anātman* q. c., 135.

puṭgala, «the fleeting union of elements that make up, for a time only, an unstable individuality» (Rhys Davids, Dialogues, I, 260), synon. *ātma-bhāva*, *santāna*. Vatsīputriyas and others assume a kind of surviving *puṭgala*; this tendency the forerunner of Mahāyāna.

puruṣa-kāra-phala (= *puruṣeṇa iva kṛta*) antropomorphic result, antropomorphic conception of causation, 176.

prthivī, the resistant hard stuff in Matter, imagined as an atomic force of resistance, 143, 150, 152.

prati-vijñapti, the momentary awareness of the presence of an object in one's ken, 202.

prati-sankhyā-nirodha, the blank created by the extinction of an element (*dharma*) through yoga, 57.

pratītya, different interpretations of the term, 85—88, 107, 200.

pratītya-samutpāda, 1) in Hinayāna, interconnection according to causal laws of all the elements cooperating in the formation of life, contrasted with *adhītya-samutpāda* «production at random», synon. *pratyaya-niyama* = *niyama* = *samskṛtatva* = *dharma-sanketa*, 39; 2) in Mahāyāna, Relativity, synon. *paraspara-apekṣatā* = *svabhāva-śūnyatā* = *śūnyatā* = *saṃvṛti*; 3) its general formula in Śālistamba-sūtra, in Hinayānist and Mahāyānist interpretation, 123, 124; 4) *āvasthika* or *prākarsika* pr. s. utp. = 12 *nidāna*, a special case of the general law, its application to the evolution of an individual life under the influence of illusion (*avidyā*) and passion as long as they are not extinct by philosophic insight (*prajñā*) and ecstatic meditation and the mystic power (*yoga*) derived from it. Prenatal forces (*samskāra*) then produce a new life (*viññāna*) in a matrix, it passes through an embryonic state (*nidāna* 4—7), develops into full life (n. 8—10), decay and death and is continued in a new life (n. 11—12) in a new individual and so on without an end, until Nirvāṇa is attained, which according to strict Hinayāna represents a complete Annihilation of every life (Entropy). This twelve-membered formula refers to the phenomenal world, 123, 134.

pratyakṣa, sense-perception or object perceived, 45, 90, 141, 156, 159, 162, 163.

pratyaya-niyama, see *niyama*, 179.

pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna, a special kind of Omniscience with which the Buddha, according to the Yogācāras, is endowed when representing *apratīṣṭhita-nirvāṇa* q. c., 204.

prapañca, speech (= *vāk*), the expression of conceptually differentiated reality in words, 48, 91, 156, 209.

pramāṇa-viniścaya-vāda, vindication of Logic, anti-skepticism, the standpoint of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti as opposed to the Mādhyamika school, 134.

prayoga (-*vākya*), formulation, syllogism, (= *prayogānta*), 105.

prayoga-mārga, path of practice, the 2nd division of the Path of Salvation, 16, 18.

prasanga-vākya, deductio ad absurdum, 94.

prasajya-pratiśedha, simple negation, not necessitating any affirmation of the opposite, 93.

prākarsika, cp. *āvasthika* (sc. *pratītya-samutpāda*), 123.

prāpya-viṣaya, the object as cognized in a definite representation, the final object, synon. *adhyava-seya* —, cp. *grāhya-viṣaya*, 141.

bhāva, existence, becoming (= *bhavana*), relation, production, 166, pass.

bhāvanā, 1) profound meditation (= *samādhi*), 120, 190, 2) = *vāsanā*, *karman*.

bhāvanā-heya, an element of existence to be neutralized or extirpated by profound Meditation, 10, cp. *drṣṭi-heya*.

bhāva-sadbhāva-kalpanā, Realism, 189.

bhāvābhāva-kalpanā, affirmation and negation, 207.

bhūta = *mahā-bhūta*, Matter 116.

mādhyamā pratipad, the Middle Path, 1) in Hinayāna, a middle course between materialism (*uccheda-vāda*) and the doctrine of an Eternal Soul (*ātma-vāda*, *sāsvata-vāda*); 2) in Mahāyāna, Relativity = *śūnyatā*, 81 n., the theory which maintains that the Relativity of all the objects of the empirical World is the surface (*saṃvṛti*) of its monistic Essence.

mahā-kāruṇā, Great Commiseration (Hinayānist, different from Mahāyānist), 84.

mahā-bhūta, the four fundamental elements or atomic forces of Matter: repulsion, cohesion, heat and lightness (or motion), 158.

yathādhimukta, being in accordance with one's religious fervour (either Hinayāna or Mahāyāna), 210.

yoga, v. Index 6.

yogācāra, v. Index 6.

rūpa, 1) = *svarūpa*, essence, real essence, 101, 203, 205, 2) = *rūpāyatana*, colour and shape, the external basis (*bāhya-āyatana*) of visual cognition, 39, 116, 135, 158; 3) = *rūpa-skandha*, the assemblage of all physical elements partaking in the constitution of an individual life, the elements of its body and of its external world, 116, 134; 4) = *rūpa-dhātu*, the mystic worlds of ethereal (*accha*) bodies, 10, 81.

lakṣaṇa-niḥ-svabhāvatā, the unreality of logical constructions (*parikalpita*), according to the Yogācāras, 33, 116.

lakṣya-lakṣaṇa-pravṛtti, imagining entities as something continuant characterized by changing characteristics, 194.

vāsanā, the Yogācāra idea of *karman* q. c., explained as *pūrvam jñānam*, and derived either from *√vas* «to perfume», or from the caus. of *√vas* «to live», *vāsanā* = *bhāvanā* «to make live», to produce empirical existence, 61, 209, 210.

vikalpa, dilemma, dichotomizing thought, the differentiation of the object into A and non-A, hence productive imagination, thought in general and a synonym of *kalpanā* q. c., 43, 147, 210.

viññāna, 1) in Hinayāna synon. of *citta* and *manas*, = *viññāna-skandha*, = *mana-āyatana* = *mano-dhātu*, pure indefinite sensation, pure consciousness, the principle of every conscious life, 135, 148, 149; 2) the 3rd member of the 12-membered formula of *pratītya-samutpāda*, it is latently (*sammūrchita*) present even in an egg as long as it has not lost its vitality; this *viññāna* is regarded by the Yogācāras as an *ālaya-viññāna*, by the Hinayānists and Mādhyamikas as a *mano-viññāna-dhātu*; in the moment of conception the masculine and feminine sperma unite with *viññāna* under the influence of *samskāras* (= *karman*), the physical part of the new being comes from the parents, but the *viññāna* element is causally connected with some previous existence, not necessarily that of the parents; this theory, possibly founded upon some observation, has led to the doctrine of reincarnation; *viññāna* is here to be translated as «life», «the vital principle», and must be distin-

guished from sensation, *sparsā*, which is a further step of the formula, 134, 135; 3) empirical knowledge, when contrasted with absolute knowledge (*jñāna* = *sarvajñatā* = Tib. *ye-śes*), 149, 202; 4) in the idealist Yogācāra system (*vijñāna-vāda*) everything becomes *vijñāna*, it then means idea in general.

vijñāna-skandha, ditto.

vipāka-hetu, moral causation, = *karman*, 172.

viprayukta-samskāra, forces *खर'त'छ'ण*, pure forces which cannot be classified neither as Matter nor as Mind (= *rūpa-citta-viprayukta-samskāra*), 189, ch. Central Conc., p. 20.

vaiyavadānika-dharma, those elements of an individual life (*santāna*, *pudgala*) which have a purifying, soothing force, conducing to Nirvāṇa, e. g., *prājñā* and *samādhi*, 209.

śāsvata, eternal, beginningless (cp. *pūrvāntam samāśritya dr̥ṣṭi*) 206.

śūnya, devoid of independent reality (= *svabhāva-śūnya*), dependent, relative, unreal; in Mahāyāna, a synonym of *pratītya-samutpanna* q. c., 41, 42.

śūnyatā, Relativity, the theory that nothing short of the Whole is real, the parts being always dependent are ultimately unreal; its synonym is *pratītya-samutpāda*, *madhyamā pratīpad* etc, 81; as *sāmṛta-śūnyatā* q. c. represents the Absolute, 43.

saṃvādaka, agreeing with experience, supported by successful purposive action, = *avisamvādaka*, not contradicted by experience cp. N. b. t., p. 3. 5.

saṃvṛti-satya, the «surface» reality, empirical reality, identified with Relativity, with the Dialectic of Being, 155, 164.

samskāra, 1) the forces *खर'त'छ'ण*, the four forces (*samskṛta-lakṣaṇa*) accompanying the appearance of every momentary existence (*jāti-sthiti-jarā-anityatā*), 2) = *viprayukta samskāra* q. c., 3) *citta-samprayukta-samskāra* — all mental phenomena, 4) a synonym of *samskṛta-dharma* in general, 5) = *karman* cp. Central C., p. 20 ff.

saṃjñā, idea, conception produced by abstraction (*nimitta-udgrahana*), 149, 184, 197, 202.

satya, truth, reality, four stages of reality in Hinayāna and in all realistic systems, replaced by two stages in Mahāyāna, 55, 164, 185.

saṃdassana, the visible, = *rūpāyatana* q. c., 135.

santāna, continuity or synthesis of moments of existence of either an element, or an assemblage of elements, a personality (= *pudgala* = *ātman*), 8, 9, 190.

sabhāga, 1) — *hetu*, homogeneity between cause and effect, 172; 2) — *indriya*, active, operating, efficient, = *sva-karma-kṛt*, 115, cp. *taṭ-sabhāga*.

samanantara-pratyaya, the immediately preceding moment of every effect, its substratum (= *upādāna-kṣaṇa*), 32, 174.

samāpatti-dhyāna, being transferred in extatic meditation to one of the mystic worlds, 7.

sambhāra-mārga, the accumulation of virtue and knowledge, the preparatory path to Salvation, 16, 18.

sarva, a techn. term denoting the totality of all elements of the Universe including the Absolute, 55.

sarvajñatā, Omniscience in the sense of an intuition of the Absolute, 90.

sa-svabhāva-vāda, Realism, 134.

sāmṛta, «under the surface»; Relativity (*pratītya-samutpāda* = *śūnyatā*) is the «surface» (*saṃvṛtti*) of the absolute reality; this same absolute reality viewed as the thing lying «under the surface» is metaphorically also called *pratītya-samutpāda* or *śūnyatā* which, in this sense, become designations of the Absolute, and it is in this sense that Nirvāṇa the Absolute is declared to be the equivalent of Samsāra the Phenomenal, 90, 154, 156.

sādhyā-sama, *petitio principii*, 117, 139.

sāṃkleśika, associated with *kleśa* q. c., defiling, disquieting, relegating Nirvāṇa, 209.

sāmagrī (= *hetu-kāraṇa-sāmagrī*), the sum total of causes and conditions relative to a given entity, «the entire setting in which the thing exists» (J. S. Mill), 65, 196, 199.

sālambana, intentness upon an object as a characteristic of mind and mental phenomena, 173.
sāsrava, see *āsrava*.

skandha-āyatana-dhātavaḥ, classification of the elements (*dharma*) of existence from different points of view, = *anātman* q. c., cp. Central Conc., p. 3 ff.

sparsā, sensation as a mental element (*citta-samprayukta-samskāra*), the sixth member of the 12-membered formula of life's development, it is sensation in which a sense-faculty and its object partake, it must be distinguished from *vijñāna*, the third member, which then represents the quite indefinite and even latent principle of life, 135.

svabhāva-abhāva, = *nīḥsvabhāvatā*, *śūnyatā* q. c.

svakṣaṇa, the «thing in itself», cp. prec. Index.

hīnādhimukta, = a Hinayānist, 36.

hetu-pratyaya, causes and conditions, both terms also used as synonyms, 8, 43, 90, 172; 196, 199, 200.

heya-dharma, elements of phenomenal existence to be extinguished by the Saint, 10.

CORRIGENDA.

in the printed text of chap. I and XXV of the Mādhyamika-vṛtti.

Page	Line		
1	3	toyasya	kośasya
7	4—5	nipātaḥ	pāṭhaḥ
8	10	etad vā ayuktam	etaccāyuktam
9	1	anenaiva tat-prāpteḥ	anavagata 'prāpte
20	3	samgrahēṇokta-vākyasya	grahāṇaka-vākyasya
30	4	abhūtam	bhūtam
31	14	pare	paraiḥ
32	9	sāśrayam	sabhāgam
35	1	eva	evam
37	2	anantaḥpāti ^o	antaḥpāti ^o
40	1	the second tatbhāgatānām	to be dropped
40	5	nirudhyate	virudhyate
40	7	yata evam	yata eva
41	2	anāsrava	āsrava
56	6	tadviruddhāviruddha	tadviruddha
62	4	asamanupaśyan	samanupaśyan
65	14	dei khyad-pas	dei khyad-par
66	6	viśeṣaṇāntara	viśeṣaṇāntara
67	11	samvṛtir	samvṛter
69	1	samvṛti-	samvṛtim
69	10	pravṛttito	pravṛttitā
81	2	parikriyā	paci-kriyā
525	15	vyabhicāritām	avyabhicāritām
529	3	— gamana-bhāva-	— gamana-bhāvo
530	1	pravartayamānaḥ	pravartamānaḥ
532	11	bhāvam cābhāvam ca	bhāvaś cābhāvaś ca
540	6	deśanāyāḥ	deśanānām

ERRATA.

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5	15	precedeing	preceding
9	12	developement	development
—	20	controled	controlled
10	26	Buddist	Buddhist
11	35	eist	exist
14	12	resistent	resistant
—	17	—	—
—	21	—	—
15	n. 3	meditation	meditation
—	—	Monastery	monastery
—	—	nonastery	monastery
15	n. 2	practised	practiced
18	n. 3	l'intuition	l'intuition
21	22	Vasubandu	Vasubandhu
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—	28	prefered	preferred
24	n. 1	sourses	sources
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27	24	manifestations	manifestations ²
30	9	consiousness	consciousness
31	13	substanse	substance
38	21	dhama-kāya	dharmā-kāya
36	3	ts	its
39	18	discreet	discrete
42	7	samskrta	samskrta
—	—	asamskrta	asamskrta
43	n. 1	pratitya-samatpāda	pratitya-samutpāda
45	2	It	If
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50	26	XIX	XVIII
51	34	litteral	literal
58	n. 1	Heidelberg	Heidelberg
65	n. 1	on	On
72	8	whatfore	whatfor
88	13	Budohapalita	Buddhapālita
89	8	disjunctive	conditioned
90	n. 3	samvṛtti	samvṛti
91	5	—	—
—	8	equalisation	equalization
—	9	realised	realized

Page	Line		
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94	19	Bāvaviveka	Bhāvaviveka
—	15	Buddhapālita	Buddhapālita
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105	6	Nāgājuna	Nāgārjuna
111	n. 1	paramār tha-sa	paramārtha-sat
120	n. 1	treads	threads
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127	24	be to	to be
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—	n. 10	movng	moving
—	—	sāṃvṛtta	sāṃvṛta
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137	n. 3	judgments	judgments
141	n.	samvādaka	samvādaka
142	n.	kālānugata	kālānanugata
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145	n. 6	p. 62 7	p. 62. 7
146	n. 3	pūrāntam	pūrvāntam
152	n. 12	samvṛti	samvṛti
152	12	orsense	or sense
158	22	transcendentalist	transcendentalist
159	15	connenction	connection
161	13	mnid	mind
163	16	regads	regards
164	n. 1	estblished	established
165	1	cannot	cannot
173	24	conditon	condition
186	n. 4	svabhāvenavyavasthita	svabhāvena vyavasthita
197	14	stopps	stops
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—	n. 4	apra itya	apratitya
202	8	Bhavadgītā	Bhagavadgītā
205	7	improssible	impossible
208	19	absolutelv	absolutely
209	5	speach	speech
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—	n. 11	poetically	poetically
—	n. 11	svabhāvo-śūngaa	svabhāva-śūnyatā